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VOL. CXIV.

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NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCXXXIV.

JANUARY, 1872.

Art. I. — Poor-Law Administration in New England.

The scope of this paper will be to show, by the exhibition of such facts as seem pertinent and are accessible, first, whether poverty is increasing in New England or not; and next, if it appears not to be gaining ground, to point out some causes, greater or less, of such a state of things. Among the lesser causes that check the extreme form of poverty known as pauperism, it is hoped to prove that the poor-law administration of New England, and particularly the policy of Massachusetts, which has been of late maligned and misconstrued for political purposes, holds an important place.

At the outset I would observe, in entire accord with Professor Fawcett's remarks on this point, though compelled to dissent from his conclusions in many cases, that the rapid accumulation of wealth in a community by no means protects it from the worst evils of poverty known to modern life. There is a certain truth as well as an epigrammatic point in Goldsmith's well-worn couplet, —

> "Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey,
> Where wealth accumulates and men decay," —

though it was not so true in Goldsmith's day as in that of Professor Fawcett. "How comes it," asks that able writer on English pauperism, "that the augmented produce of agricul-

ture is so distributed that the condition of those who till the soil has not only not improved, but has in some cases retrograded? How, again, does it happen that the greater is the wealth accumulated in our large towns, the deeper seem to be the depths of poverty into which vast multitudes sink?" * These are the same complaining questions that Goldsmith asked a century ago, and with less reason than they are now asked in England. There is even some excuse for asking the second one in New England, where, in a few of the cities, the depths of sickening poverty are quite discernible, amid the evidences of great and fast-growing wealth. But that the poor, as well as the rich, are growing richer in New England, however it may be in the mother-country, cannot well be doubted, when we consider the whole population of a State or even of a county. For, while pauperism, which is the final stage of poverty, is perhaps keeping pace with the growth of population in some of the New England cities, it is absolutely stationary, if not receding, in the six States as a whole, and is actually diminishing in Massachusetts, which now has a population nearly as large as all the rest of New England.† At the same time, the valuation of property is increasing much faster than the gain in population, and that share of this increase which falls to the industrious classes, or to those who may be called, in a general way, poor, is a very large one.‡ This is known in various ways, among others by the constant and rapid increase of those deposits in savings banks which come from the laboring poor; by the testimony of town and city assessors, who have reason to know how the facts stand; and by the con-

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* Pauperism, its Causes and Remedies. By Henry Fawcett, M. A., M. P., etc. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1871. The passage quoted is on the fourth page.

† The population of all New England in June, 1870, was 3,487,924, and now no doubt exceeds 3,550,000. Massachusetts, which then had 1,457,351, has now more than 1,500,000 people, leaving but about 2,000,000 in the other five States. The density to the square mile in Massachusetts now is nearly 200, while that of Great Britain and Ireland is but little more than 250.

‡ The taxables of Massachusetts, including the deposits in savings banks, the "taxable excess" of corporation property, and the stock of national banks, amounted in 1870 to $1,647,423,623, while in 1865 this amount was but $1,132,675,881. The gain in population in these five years was not quite 200,000, or sixteen per cent, while the gain in taxables was hardly less than fifty per cent.

tinual purchases of real estate by the laboring poor, especially those of Irish parentage, which the registry of deeds discloses in most of the rural counties of New England. Indeed, one of the things complained of by those who lament the "decay of farming" in Massachusetts is this great change in the ownership of land, passing, as it so often does, from the family that had held it ever since the township was settled, in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, into the grasp of persons born in Europe, or of their children in the first generation. This is a change sometimes to be regretted on local or sentimental grounds, but one that is producing excellent effects on this new class of landholders. It is giving them a "stake in the country," and transforming them from a mere proletariat, as they exist in New York and other great cities, into a "territorial democracy," to borrow a happy phrase from Mr. Disraeli.

So much for the growth and the distribution of wealth. Looking now at the growth and distribution of pauperism, the negative of wealth, we find a singular state of things, already remarked upon by the present writer in this Review.* From all the statistics that offer themselves, including the pauperism tables of the census of 1870, now going through the press at Washington, the number of paupers in New England appears to be actually less than in 1860, though the population in the mean time has increased about twelve per cent. The census report of 1860 represents the number of paupers in New England, June 1, 1860, as 18,133; the report for 1870 gives the number on the 1st of June that year as less than 16,000. Neither report is very correct in its figures, but probably the errors were no greater in 1870 than in 1860, and therefore we may regard these statistics as showing a decrease in the number of paupers amounting to about one and a quarter per cent a year since 1860.† In Massachusetts we have the authority of care-

* See an article on "Poverty and Public Charity," in the North American Review for April, 1870.

† The census table of 1870 is somewhat more in detail than that of 1860, but the general result for each of the New England States, after adding the State paupers omitted in Massachusetts, stands thus: Number of paupers supported in Maine, June 1, 1860, 4,618; June 1, 1870, 3,631: in New Hampshire (1860), 2,311; (1870), 2,129: Vermont (1860), 1,850; (1870), 1,785: Massachusetts (1860), 6,503; (1870), 5,819: Rhode Island (1860), 613; (1870), 634; Connecticut (1860), 2,238; (1870), 1,705.

fully prepared yearly reports for saying that this decrease has actually been taking place there, and the same general causes that operate there would affect the other New England States about equally. We find that, in Massachusetts, the average number of State and town paupers receiving in-door relief was 5,276 in 1860, 4,983 in 1865, and only 4,457 in 1870; a decrease, in ten years, of fifteen per cent, or one and a half per cent a year. In the class of State paupers, in consequence chiefly of the labors of the Board of State Charities, the decrease was even greater. The average number of this class, including pauper lunatics, was 2,537 in 1860, 2,591 in 1865, 2,150 in 1870, and 2,125 in 1871. The number receiving in-door relief from the State on the 1st of October in each year was as follows: 1860, 2,322; 1861, 3,112; 1862, 2,748; 1863, 2,544; 1864, 2,307; (from the State and towns, 5,814;) 1865, 2,259; (State and towns, 6,110;) 1866, 2,148; (State and towns, 6,029;) 1867, 2,209; (State and towns, 6,116;) 1868, 2,142; (State and towns, 6,131;) 1869, 1,882; (State and towns, 5,727;) 1870, 1,737; (State and towns, 5,574;) 1871, 1,785; (State and towns about 5,700.) Here the comparison is imperfect, for we have not the exact number of those receiving in-door relief at the expense of the towns previous to 1865, and therefore cannot give the total of both classes of the poor, on the 1st of October, 1860 and 1861. It cannot well have been less then 6,400 at that date in 1860, and 7,000 in 1861. Here, too, for special reasons, the numbers vary more from year to year than in the comparisons given above, and the regularity of the decrease of pauperism is not so obvious. But the general deduction to be drawn from the pauper statistics of Massachusetts is this, that though the cost of relieving the poor has much augmented since 1860, their number has diminished from ten to fifteen per cent.

In regard to this increased cost of relieving the public poor, Mr. Goschen, President of the English Poor Law Board in 1870, made some judicious remarks in his report of that year.* He said: "The same number of paupers cost at the present day very much more than twenty years ago. Several causes have contributed to this result. It cannot be denied that the

* Twenty-second Annual Report of the Poor-Law Board, p. x.

more humane views which have prevailed during the last few years, as to the treatment of the sick poor, have added most materially to poor-law expenditure. Workhouses, originally designed mainly as a test for the able bodied, have, especially in the large towns, been of necessity gradually transferred into infirmaries for the sick; and the higher standard for hospital accommodations has had a material effect upon the expenditure." This explanation of the increase in the English outlay for the poor is true in New England; besides which we have the additional circumstance that our currency has depreciated greatly in purchasing power within ten years past, so that a dollar goes no further now than seventy-five cents did in 1860. In consequence of all causes, the pauper expenses of New England, in general, have risen to be nominally sixty per cent more than they were in 1859–60. At that time, according to the defective census report, the sum expended in the six States was $1,249,913; in 1869–70, according to the last census report, which is rather more exact, the sum expended was $2,180,496.* Nearly half of this money was expended in the single State of Massachusetts, which, from its position and the character of its industry, has attracted within its borders more of the class from which paupers come than the other States have, in proportion to their population. In Massachusetts, also, the appliances for the better treatment of the poor are more in use than in the other States.

Here, then, we have an apparent paradox; the State in which the number of the public poor has decreased most is also that in which the expenditure for their relief increases fastest,—so far as we can judge by the imperfect returns from the other States. At any rate, this is true of the pauper expenses of the cities and towns of Massachusetts, which, in 1859, were but $522,313, and in 1869 were reported as $854,609; an appar-

* Making allowance for the increased population, here would be an increased expenditure of just about sixty per cent. But we know that the pauper expenses of Massachusetts in 1859–60 exceeded the sum named in the census report by about $180,000, the true expenditure in that State being some $760,000. This makes it probable that the actual sum expended in all New England was more than $1,500,000 in 1859–60. In the census report of 1870 the pauper expenses of Massachusetts are given as $1,108,574, which is but little less than the true amount; the actual sum in all New England was perhaps $2,450,000.

ent increase in ten years of $331,704, or more than sixty per cent. During the same period the pauper expenses of the State, for its beneficiaries, only increased about $60,000, or a little more than twenty-five per cent, — an excess that can be fully accounted for by the depreciation in the value of the currency. But whether our seeming paradox is true or not, there can be little doubt that the better classification and more humane treatment of the poor, against which General Butler declaimed so loosely, does really diminish their number, if it is accompanied with a strict supervision of the poor-law administration. The experience of Massachusetts since 1863 proves this; and we find that, while the average amount of money expended on each poor person is greater than formerly, the whole number of the poor is so much reduced, that those supported by the State now cost no more in the aggregate than they did in 1860, after allowance has been made for the change in the value of money. In fact, the State officials whom General Butler accused of extravagance had been demonstrating, for eight years, the most economical as well as the most humane method of dealing with the poor, which had ever been put in practice in New England, inasmuch as it was the method by which the adult poor were best cared for, and their children preserved from growing up to pauperism. The example set by Massachusetts since 1863 has already been followed in Rhode Island, and now New Hampshire is in the way to repeat the same experience. In course of time we may reasonably expect Maine, Vermont, and Connecticut to take a similar course; but before that time, probably, Massachusetts will have come nearer to the present system of poor-law administration in those three States; having passed from (1) Local Relief without State supervision, through a period of (2) Mixed Local and State Relief, to (3) Local Relief supplemented and supervised by the State. These are the three progressive stages of poor-law administration in Massachusetts; the first having been discontinued since 1854, and the second and third now existing side by side, until, in course of time, the third stage shall take the place of both the others. In the opinion of those best qualified to judge, this third method — Local (or Municipal) Relief, supplemented and supervised by the State — is that which

must ultimately be adopted in order to reduce pauperism in New England to a minimum, and keep it there. By means of it, coupled, as it naturally would be, with a good understanding between the poor-law authorities of the several States, such as now exists between the overseers of the poor in different towns of the same State, it will be comparatively easy to prevent the formation, in New England, of such a persistent class of paupers as is now the curse of the mother-country.

In former numbers of this Review the poor-laws of New England have been historically traced, and the origin of the large class of persons in Massachusetts known as "State paupers" has been explained;* as well as the modifications in their condition recently made under the administration of the Massachusetts Board of Charities. Without repeating these former statements, when repetition can be avoided, it may be permitted to continue the discussion thus begun, and to indicate the present condition of the laws of pauper settlement and the general management of the poor in the six States of New England. In only two of these, as we understand, have the "settlement laws" been materially changed since April, 1868, namely, in Massachusetts and New Hampshire. In the former, the terms of settlement have been made so much easier by the act of June 9, 1868 (removing the restriction of citizenship, imposed by the statute of 1794), by the more liberal provisions of the acts of 1868 and 1870 concerning military settlements, by the grudging admission of single women to a settlement by residence, and by cutting off all settlements prior to 1794, that the class of State paupers has been very considerably diminished in number, and many of the poor who used to be sent to State almshouses are now relieved or supported in the place of their residence. In the gradual operation of the new laws the State pauper class will be still further diminished, until it is probable they will not number more than a fourth part of all the paupers in the State, instead of half, as formerly. In New Hampshire the effect of legislation has been precisely the reverse of this, and more like what Massachusetts did in 1850–1854. There is no class of "State paupers" in New

* See a paper on "The Poor-Laws of New England" in this Review for April, 1868, and one on "Poverty and Public Charity," in April, 1870.

Hampshire, but the unsettled poor, who in Massachusetts are supported from the State treasury, are there maintained by the several counties, and are termed "county paupers." Till within the last ten years, this class in New Hampshire was small; but two successive acts, one before 1868, cutting off all settlements prior to 1820, and another since 1868, bringing this date down to 1840, have had such a sweeping effect that, in most counties, the settled poor are now much less numerous than the unsettled or county poor. Coincident with this growth of the class of county paupers, large county almshouses have sprung up, and are now maintained in all, or nearly all, the ten counties of the State. From the published reports of these county almshouses it would seem that the class of permanent county paupers is much larger, in proportion to the population, than is the class of permanent State paupers in Massachusetts. In the five New Hampshire counties of Rockingham, Strafford, Hillsborough, Belknap, and Carroll, containing 176,791 inhabitants, in 1870, less than an eighth part of the population of Massachusetts, the average number of county paupers supported at the five almshouses * was 478, in 1870. If this proportion held good in Massachusetts of the State paupers, their average number ought to be nearly 4,000, whereas it is but little more than half that. It is plain, therefore, that the unsettled or county poor in New Hampshire are more numerous than the settled or town poor; indeed, in some counties they are estimated at three times as many. Probably in the whole State the proportion is about two to one, whereas ten years ago it was perhaps three to one the other way; the town poor being then much the most numerous. One result of this change has been that the town almshouses have been sold, in a great many in-

* The county almshouse of Rockingham is in Brentwood, near Epping; that of Strafford at Dover; of Hillsborough at Wilton; of Belknap at Laconia; of Carroll at Ossipee. The average number of paupers at these establishments in 1870 was, in the order given above, 130, 135, 107, 60, and 46; in all, 478. Of these at least a fourth part were insane or idiotic persons. The counties also supported and relieved a great many of their poor in the towns of their residence, probably more in number than those at the almshouses. In the five counties above named the whole number of different persons at the county almshouses, in 1870, was about 800; the number of outside poor was perhaps 1,200, and their average number 220. The cost of both classes was about $ 80,000.

stances, so that the number of these establishments is hardly more than half what it was in 1868.*

The change in New Hampshire from the old mode of local support to the present system of district almshouses is, therefore, much greater than the change in Massachusetts when the State almshouses were opened in 1854; for the latter, at the utmost, never contained more than two thirds as many inmates as were left in the town and city almshouses; while in New Hampshire there are, as we have estimated, about twice as many in-door paupers of the counties as of the towns. In other respects the case of the two States is not unlike, with this difference, that the New Hampshire law unsettling the poor loses something of its force with every successive year, so that the relative number of town paupers will increase constantly, while the Massachusetts laws, for at least ten years after 1854, tended to enlarge the relative number of the unsettled or State paupers. The change in New Hampshire has been followed, as in Massachusetts, by a great mortality among the poor transplanted from their places of residence to the large county almshouses; most of them being old or infirm persons, to whom an entire change of surroundings is often as fatal as an epidemic disease.† From this and other causes, a great prejudice against the county almshouses exists in the minds of the New Hampshire poor, which will eventually result in an extension of the system of local relief at their homes, as has been the case in Massachusetts. What is especially lacking in New Hampshire

* The present writer estimated the whole number of town and city almshouses in New England, in 1868, at 600. Notwithstanding the decrease in New Hampshire, it is probable that the present number is at least 650; there are also three State almshouses in Massachusetts, a State Workhouse, and a State Primary School; in Rhode Island a State Workhouse and an Asylum for the chronic insane, on the State farm at Cranston; and in New Hampshire nine or ten county almshouses. Reckoning the inmates of these establishments, and also the pauper lunatics in various establishments, the in-door poor of New England average perhaps 14,000.

† Out of 147 persons remaining in the Strafford County almshouse, March 1, 1871, 63 were above fifty years old and 23 above seventy; of 108 at the Hillsborough almshouse, 52 were above fifty and 16 above seventy; of 136 in the Rockingham almshouse, 70 were above fifty and 30 above seventy; of 76 supported in the Belknap almshouse, 40 were above fifty and 22 above seventy. The average age of the New Hampshire county paupers is nearly fifty years, of the Massachusetts State paupers less than thirty years.

is a general State supervision ; at present the several counties do not even report to each other or to the State the numbers, cost, etc. of their poor ; nor do the towns report to the county commissioners nor to the State authorities, save in case of persons for whom aid is sought, either of the county or State. Such reports will eventually be required by law, as in Massachusetts, most likely ; and it would be of great service to the public if a single State official had the general supervision of all the almshouses and establishments where the poor are supported. One of these establishments is the State Asylum for the Insane at Concord, where about one hundred poor persons were last year maintained at the expense of the towns and counties, and some thirty were aided by the State. A great many of these pauper lunatics have been removed from the Asylum within the past few years to the county almshouses, where they are maintained at much less cost, but not always in the most satisfactory manner. Another feature of the county almshouses is the existence in several of them of a workhouse or "house of correction," to which persons of the pauper class are sentenced for minor offences ; and in two counties, at least, Belknap and Carroll, the small county jails are included within the almshouse limits, and managed by the keeper of the poor. This mixture of paupers and criminals in one establishment is objectionable, but, for the present, it seems inevitable. We also find that many of the towns board their own poor at the county almshouses, in preference to maintaining them at home, which is one of the many facts showing that the present mode of supporting the poor is more economical than the former one.* The whole tendency of the system is to diminish and check pauperism in New Hampshire.

The fact that Rhode Island had adopted a pauper system in some respects similar to that of Massachusetts was briefly men-

* The census report for 1870 gives the whole number of paupers in New Hampshire, June 1, 1870, as 2,129, of whom all but fifteen were white, and only 375 were of foreign birth. It is probable that about one thousand of these were in-door paupers, and between eleven and twelve hundred were in receipt of out-door relief. The total cost of the poor for 1869–70, as given, is $235,126 ; it probably exceeded $250,000. Assuming the census figures to be correct, the number of the public poor in New Hampshire is somewhat greater than in Massachusetts, in proportion to the population, and their cost a little less.

tioned in these pages in 1870. The Rhode Island "Board of State Charities and Corrections" was established by law in 1869, and empowered to construct upon the State farm at Cranston the necessary buildings for receiving the insane, vicious, and honest poor of the State. The first class were to be maintained in an "Asylum for Incurable Insane"; the vicious were to be sentenced to a State Workhouse, modelled after that at Bridgewater in Massachusetts; and for the honest poor a State Almshouse was to be built. The latter has not yet been built, and this class of the Rhode Island poor are still kept in the town and city almshouses, unless they are insane. The Workhouse was first opened July 1, 1869, and up to January 1, 1871 had received 452 sentenced persons, of whom 169 remained at that date. The Asylum was opened November 7, 1870, and on January 1, 1871, contained 118 insane persons, reckoned incurable, of whom 93 were removed from lunatic hospitals, and 25 from city and town almshouses. A little more than half of these insane (62) were town paupers; the rest (56) were supported by the State. The inmates of the State Workhouse, averaging about 140, seem to be supported wholly by the State. The annual cost to the State of these persons (nearly two hundred in both classes) would seem to be about $ 25,000 for 1870. The sums expended by the thirty-six cities and towns of Rhode Island for in-door paupers during the same year was $ 45,656 (the average number supported being 514); and for out-door relief $ 42,320 (the whole number aided being 3,782); making a total of pauper expenses for the municipalities of $ 87,956. Adding to this the $ 25,000 expended by the State, and the cost of pauper lunatics at the Butler Hospital and elsewhere, the whole cost for the year was about $ 120,000.* In proportion to the population, therefore, both the number fully supported and the whole cost are considerably less than in Massachusetts, but the number receiving out-door relief is greater, and their cost about the same. The success of the new system in Rhode Island has

* The census report gives the cost for 1869 – 70 as $ 97,702, which probably represents only the municipal expenditure. The number of paupers supported June 1, 1870, is given as 634; of whom 35 were colored, and 192 were of foreign birth. No account is here taken of those partially supported, of whom more than three fifths were foreign born.

not been very marked as yet; there have been many changes in the State Board and its subordinates, and the condition of things at the State establishments has been experimental and unsettled. Much has been done, however, by the able Secretary of the Board, Dr. E. M. Snow of Providence, and the agent, Mr. Wightman, to exhibit the character and cost of pauperism in the State, and something has been accomplished toward checking its growth, by the new policy of removals and sentences. State supervision in Rhode Island has been firmly established, and, in time, will show satisfactory results.

In Maine, Vermont, and Connecticut, the old system of local support without State supervision continues, as has been said, but efforts are constantly making in the last-named State to change it. Connecticut has opened, since 1868, a large State Hospital, chiefly for pauper lunatics, at Middletown, and now maintains there, at the cost of the State or the municipalities, two hundred or more of this class, mostly incurable. The town and city almshouses also contain many pauper lunatics and imbeciles, but no report gives the true number of these or of the paupers as a whole.* The increasing number of State establishments for charitable uses, and the rapid growth of the foreign pauper element in the Connecticut population, will probably soon lead, as they ought, to the erection of a State Board of Charities, such as now exist in nine or ten States of the Union.† In Maine and Vermont no such boards are likely to be established at present, so far as appears, nor is

* The census report for 1870 states the pauper expenses of Connecticut in 1869–70 as only $ 189,918, or less than half the cost of New Hampshire in proportion to the population; the paupers supported, June 1, 1870, are given as 1,705, of whom 114 are colored, and 468 of foreign birth. No account is here made of the number relieved and partially supported, and probably the cost of this class, and of the lunatic poor at Middletown, is also omitted. We cannot estimate the actual pauper expenses of Connecticut at less than $ 260,000, and they are more likely to be $ 300,000. Even then they would be much less, proportionately, than those of Massachusetts.

† The States maintaining such boards, with the date of the acts creating them, are as follows: Massachusetts, April 9, 1863; Ohio, April 17, 1867; New York, May 23, 1867; Illinois, early in 1869; North Carolina, April 10, 1869; Pennsylvania, April 24, 1869; Rhode Island, May 28, 1869; Wisconsin, March 23, 1871. It is believed that Michigan and California also organized such boards last year; if so, they exist in States having a population of more than 16,000,000, or nearly half the whole people.

any material change proposed in the prevailing system of local support for the poor. Each of these States has a lunatic hospital (at Augusta and Brattleborough), where pauper lunatics are maintained at the charge of the State or of the towns and cities. That of Vermont has also contained, till recently, many of the pauper lunatics of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. In both States and in Connecticut the unsettled poor are relieved in the towns where they are found, except such as are sent to the lunatic hospitals, or "moved on" from town to town by frugal overseers, who often remove them unlawfully to neighboring States. Acts of this kind give rise to much ill-feeling along the State borders, and the through lines of railroads connecting different States: they should be rendered inexcusable by an official understanding among the State authorities, such as now prevails between Rhode Island and Massachusetts. Nothing has been done to effect this, however, since 1868.*

Returning now to Massachusetts, from which we have such full statistical returns every year, we find, as above stated, that, in spite of the growth of population, pauperism is decreasing. The number of the town and city poor is slightly increased, to be sure, in consequence of the great changes in the law of settlement, but much less than would be supposed. In 327 of the 340 towns and cities of Massachusetts, the whole number of paupers fully supported was some fifty less in 1871 than in 1870, though the average number was slightly greater, and the cost of support and relief a little increased. The number relieved and partially supported is also about the same as in 1870, when, for the whole State, it was 23,874; the reported cost of such relief being less than $300,000, or a little more than one third of the whole pauper expenditure, as it is in Rhode Island.† The number of the vagrant or casual poor grows

* The census report gives the paupers supported in Maine, June 1, 1870, as 3,631, of whom 39 were colored, and 443 of foreign birth; the annual cost for 1869 – 70 is returned as $370,548, which appears to be within $50,000 of the true cost. In Bangor, then a city of 18,500 inhabitants, the cost in 1869 – 70 was $13,825, or seventy-five cents for each inhabitant. At this rate the whole State would have paid $470,187. In Vermont the reported cost was $178,628, but it pr bably exceeded $200,000. The Vermont paupers, June 1, 1870, are given as 1,785 (more than Connecticut's), of whom 31 were colored, and 523 of foreign birth.

† In the city of New York the cost of out-door relief is but $120,000, or less than

larger year by year, but measures have been taken recently to diminish them, by arrest and sentence of such as are professional tramps and vagabonds.* The whole reported cost of supporting and relieving the poor in the towns and cities of Massachusetts was last year larger than ever before, and rose, probably, to $ 880,000; a portion of this, however, is reimbursed by the State, or between one municipality and another, so that the actual cost will not exceed $ 830,000 in all probability. In 1870 the reported cost was $ 854,609, and the actual cost a little more than $ 800,000. The increase has been mainly, perhaps wholly, in the cities and large towns, where pauperism is hardest to deal with. In Suffolk County, for example, with a present population of perhaps 285,000, the pauper expenses, which were but $ 129,443 in 1870, and in the two preceding years less than $ 131,000, in 1871 went up to $ 144,303, — an increase in one year of nearly $ 15,000, or more than eleven per cent. In the city of Boston alone the increase was $ 15,078, the rest of Suffolk County having expended less than in 1870. In Boston also the whole number of persons fully supported rose from 960 in 1870 to 1,009 in 1871, and the average number from 434 to 523, showing a more permanent class of paupers; the number relieved rose from 5,246 in 1870 to 6,104 in 1871. Very much of this increase is due to the operation of the new settlement laws, which transfer persons from the State-pauper class to the list of municipal poor; something is owing, no doubt, to the gain in population, and something to other causes. The number of the State poor has,

one eighth of the whole pauper expenditure of the city authorities; in Philadelphia it was in 1869 - 70 only $ 86,003, or scarcely more than one eighth of the whole cost of the poor ($ 488,346). The whole number of persons receiving this out-door relief in New York is not stated, but is probably about 30,000; in Philadelphia, though given by Professor Fawcett as 110,000 (!) it did not probably exceed 20,000.

* Although the number of these vagrants looks formidable when made up to include all who have had lodgings during the year at the three hundred almshouses and police-stations which receive them, it should be remembered that those lodged at any one time are comparatively few, — never more than 500 in a single night for the whole State, and averaging less than 300, or not a twentieth part of all the paupers relieved and supported. Even in England, with its 22,000,000 people, and its six or seven hundred workhouses, the average number of these vagrants lodged at the public cost does not exceed 7,000. (See Twenty-Second Report of the Poor-Law Board, p. xxxii.)

of course, diminished since 1870, and the cost of their support is also somewhat less, especially in the lunatic hospitals, where the new laws of settlement have greatly changed the proportion between the two classes of pauper lunatics. Two years ago, the three State hospitals contained about an equal number of State and of town patients, — 430 of each class, — the private patients being a little more than one fourth of the whole number. On the 1st of October last the State patients had fallen to 348, or but little more than a fourth of the whole number (1,238); while the town patients had gone up to 528, and the private patients from 301 in 1869 to 362.* The average number of State poor of all classes, including the convicts at Bridgewater, the school-children at Monson, and the sick poor supported by the State in the towns, was a little less in 1871 than in 1870, — about 2,120; but the number supported October 1, 1871, was about 1,925 against a few less than 1,900 a year before. This slight increase was not in those strictly classed as paupers, but among the convicts and the school-children, especially the latter, in consequence of the vigorous operation of the new Visiting Agency Act, which reduces the number of children in the prisons and reformatories, but swells that in the State Primary School. The boys and girls in the three State reformatories, who numbered 620 in October, 1870, and 704 in October, 1869, were but 547, October 1, 1871, — a decrease of more than one fifth in two years, attended with a corresponding reduction in the cost of their maintenance.

These figures will have little meaning or interest for the casual reader, but they have been introduced to serve as evidence and justification for the conclusions about to be drawn, and the statements with which this essay will close. It may be said, without the least fear of contradiction, in view of the facts presented, and in spite of the seemingly adverse opinions main-

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* Out of 1,965 insane persons in the seven hospitals and asylums of Masachusetts, October 1, 1870, 663 were supported by the State, 728 by the cities and towns, and 574 by their own property or that of their friends. About one hundred of the last class were from other States, so that about three fourths of the patients belonging to Massachusetts were paupers. On the 1st of last October the State patients were about 644, the town patients 810, and the private patients 575.

tained by the Massachusetts Labor Bureau, that pauperism in New England, as a whole, and in Massachusetts particularly, has ceased to keep pace with the growth of the population, and is in fact declining; that the condition of the class immediately above the paupers, and from which they are chiefly drawn, was rarely, if ever, better in New England than now, so that fewer and fewer of this class every year fail of self-support, although the proportion of women among them constantly increases; that one cause of the check given to pauperism in Massachusetts has been the improved poor-law administration for the past eight or ten years, for which the Board of State Charities is mainly responsible; and that the good results of that administration may now be proved by figures and by the testimony of all well-informed persons. The general policy of Drs. Howe, Allen, and Wheelwright, and their associates on this board, was briefly described in these pages in 1870 as "one of thorough classification and of diffusion among the people, as far as possible, of the exceptional classes with which public charity is compelled to deal"; and the outlines of the work done in developing this policy were hastily sketched. Mention was made of the creation of a State Workhouse, a State Primary School for poor children, a Visiting Agency for these children, and an agency to care for the out-door relief of a portion of the State paupers. In the two years since elapsed the work has been steadily carried forward, especially by the three establishments last named, while the Bridgewater Workhouse, though by no means perfect in its plan or its management, has, on the whole, served a useful purpose. The acts relating to the Workhouse are twofold; one disposes of the vicious and lazy who are actually committed to the State almshouses; the other intercepts them in the cities and towns, and causes them to be sentenced at once without the interposition of such commitment, which can readily be effected by the co-operation of the local authorities. If the whole number of the vicious adult poor committed to the almshouses for the past five years exceeds twelve hundred, more than eleven hundred have been actually sentenced to the State Workhouse. For the vicious children and those exposed to vice, three State reformatories were provided as long ago as 1860, — two on land and one at sea.

The State Primary School at Monson is not strictly a reformatory, for it does not receive children because they are vicious, but because they are poor and friendless. Although coming from the pauper class, its pupils are not State paupers in the eyes of the law, but wards and pupils whom the State has undertaken to teach and provide for. It is established in the buildings erected for a State almshouse, and naturally, in the minds of many persons, is still regarded as an almshouse school; but such was not its character when first opened in 1866, and every succeeding year has raised it higher in grade and made more evident to the public the function which it performs, and the necessity for its existence. The Visiting Agency was first created by the Board of Charities as an auxiliary to this school, but when established by statute in 1869 it became much more extensive in its operations, and may now be regarded as a peripatetic reformatory, intermediate between the three previous ones and the Monson School. It has constantly under its charge more wards of the State than are found in all the public reformatories in Massachusetts, the number being in the neighborhood of 2,000, and fast increasing. It received and disposed of more than 500 children during the year ending October 1, 1870, of whom less than half were sentenced to the three State reformatories, while nearly one half were provided for without sending the children to any public establishment whatever. It probably relieves the public institutions of at least 200 children every year who would otherwise be committed, and it shortens the period of detention for all those who are committed. It deals, in course of a single year, with more unfortunate and vicious children than have ever come under public supervision in Massachusetts before, and disposes of them with greater wisdom and humanity than had ever been officially directed to this class of the poor.* The officers of the

* Mr. Gardner Tufts, the present Visiting Agent, said in his Report for 1870: "There were on the 1st of October, 1870, 952 children in the institutions named. There were admitted during the year 663; 245 of these were dependent children, 250 new commitments, 130 returned from places and escape; 38 received by transfer and from Visiting Agent. There went out by the several ways of discharge, probation, indenture, etc., 670 children. The average number of minors under sixteen years arraigned before the courts for offences of which the Agency has cognizance — violation of town by-laws or city ordinances, and crimes punishable by imprison-

Agency are to attend the trials of all children under sixteen, and see that their interests are protected and themselves properly disposed of. At each trial the Agent or his assistant appears, listens to the testimony, and sifts the evidence by examination of the witnesses; then gives the judge the information gained elsewhere by the investigation, and urges such considerations as are proper in favor of the accused. His policy is not to secure in all cases an acquittal of the child, but to bring about his reformation or preserve him from a vicious life. If the offence proved is a trivial one, he is not sent to a reformatory, but placed on a farm or in a workshop; if he is too young or too ignorant to have comprehended the nature of his offence, he is sent to the Primary School, where he is reckoned neither a pauper nor a criminal, and has a chance for education without contact with convicted offenders. If the offence appears exceptional, and if the child's appearance and surroundings are such as to give promise of future correct behavior, and if it be the first offence, he is put on probation, and becomes one of the wards of the State by adoption. In other cases he is formally and legally committed to the Agent and comes under his control independent of the parents, except as the Agent permits; but is allowed to return to the parents and remain with them so long as he does well. Those intended for the Primary School and those placed in the custody of the Agent for indenture, are also legally committed to the Board of Charities, and the control of parents is suspended.

The practical working of this instrumentality for preventing crime and pauperism by looking after the neglected children and giving them a chance in the world, is most satisfactory. No reformatory does so much for its pupils as this Agency does, and it more than justifies the forecasting wit of Judge Hoar, who, when asked (in the days of John Augustus, the Boston philanthropist, who bailed boys brought before the courts for petty crimes) to support in the General Court a scheme to enlarge the great reform school at Westborough, objected, but said he would favor an appropriation "to put a couple of wings

ment for life are excepted — is five and two thirds daily, or 1,773 annually. These statements show the number of children with whom the Visiting Agency has to do, and in a general way the conditions and circumstances which connect it with them."

to John Augustus." The new Visiting Agency furnishes the wings, and sets three or four Augustuses flying over the State, doing their work even better than the original John.

Quite as important in another way, as leading back toward the former system of local support for the poor, with careful State supervision, are the results of the Agency to visit the sick State poor, and to audit the bills for their support at or near their own homes. Formerly there was no out-door relief granted to the State paupers, except at the expense of the towns and cities, and the money thus expended was only reimbursed by the State in a very few special cases. The rule was to carry the State poor, when ill, to a State almshouse, though it might be a hundred miles off, and the poor creatures might die on the journey. Since 1865 this has been changed, and the experience gained under the law of 1865, as set forth in the reports of Dr. Wheelwright, proves that the sick are now cared for no less tenderly, more economically, and with less risk of pauperizing their families, outside of the State almshouses than inside. It appears that nearly 1,600 sick and infirm persons are aided or supported at an expense, during the year, of about $25,000, including the whole cost of supervision. From one fifth to one half this number of sick persons were formerly supported during the year at Rainsford Island, at a yearly cost exceeding $25,000; while the mere supervision of this number of inmates in the State almshouse at Tewksbury during the past year has cost more than half the sum named. It is further to be considered that there were dependent upon these 1,600 invalids, or closely connected with them, as many more persons, children and others, who must have gone to a State almshouse, or otherwise been thrown upon the public for support, if the invalids themselves had been sent thither. And once in an almshouse, it often happens that such persons, especially children, remain there much longer than their own good or that of the public requires. It is easier to get into an almshouse sometimes than to get out, and the period of dependence, in many cases, is unnecessarily lengthened by commitment to an almshouse. An observation of this fact, and of the "pauperization" that results from such commitments, long ago led the Board of Charities to favor a change in the practice, and now they are

disposed to go still further, and extend out-door relief to persons not invalids.* This is clean contrary to the maxim of Josiah Quincy, fifty years ago, and to the hypotheses of Professor Fawcett and a good many modern theorists, but it seems to be approved by experience, and is likely to become the practice of Massachusetts, particularly if the almshouse departments at Bridgewater and Monson shall be closed this year, as they ought to be. The changes gradually wrought, by which a school and a workhouse have practically been substituted for two of the State almshouses, have been generally accepted as a great improvement; but these changes now need to be completed by devoting the establishments at Monson and Bridgewater entirely to what is now their main purpose. When this shall have been done, there will be but one State almshouse in Massachusetts, — that in Tewksbury, — and the State poor of the western and southern counties, to whom Tewksbury is virtually inaccessible, will most naturally be provided for in their own locality, as the sick now are.

Respecting the treatment of insanity, and the questions thence arising, the Massachusetts policy now is to classify the insane more carefully than has usually been done, to place the chronic and virtually incurable by themselves, in some degree, and to favor the experiment of boarding out the harmless patients in private families, as is done at Gheel and in Scotland. Dr. Howe, for seven years the chairman of the Board of Charities, and lately re-elected for the present year, warmly advocates this experiment, but he can hardly be said to have converted his associates as yet to his faith, though several of them would like to see it tried. The majority are agreed with him, however, in opposing the building of any more great hospitals on the old plan, and would recommend the citizens of Boston to content themselves with a modest building, frugally

* In his last annual address, in 1868, Governor Bullock took this view, and said: "I earnestly recommend a thorough investigation of the expediency of encouraging the towns to assist at home worthy and industrious families which have no settlement, with a partial or full reimbursement from the State, in the same manner and under the same supervision as that now adopted for the relief of the sick poor therein. It is clear, to my apprehension, that the grant of a little temporary aid, in the way of fuel or supplies, may save the maintenance of the entire household for months in a public institution."

managed, for the two or three hundred lunatics of that city. The general condition of the insane poor has been improved of late years in Massachusetts, as it has in Connecticut and Rhode Island; but the number increases considerably every decade, and there is now urgent need of some extension of the facilities for treating the insane of all classes in New England.*

Upon the whole, it would seem that the poor-law administration of New England is well conducted, and that its results in Massachusetts are noteworthy and may be found instructive to other States and communities. At a time when European economists are debating whether the condition of their poor, always bad enough, is not steadily growing worse, and when there is doubt and discouragement about this in some parts of America, it is consoling to find a more cheerful doctrine held in Massachusetts. The volume on Pauperism, by Professor Fawcett, the member of Parliament for Brighton, has been cited on a preceding page, and it is worth reading for the information it contains, but hardly for its arguments and suggestions. A paper by a much more obscure writer, Mr. Charles Lamport, read before the British Social Science Association, at Newcastle, in October, 1870, is far wiser in its treatment of the inveterate plague of England, — pauperism, and its compulsory relief. Holding a middle course between those who denounce and satirize the poor-law system of England, without pointing out an available substitute, — such as Fawcett and Dickens, — and those who perfunctorily defend the existing method, Mr. Lamport points out, with much acuteness, the actual bane of the system. He says: —

"The poor-law *theory* is, that all occupiers of houses and lands shall contribute to a general fund, localized for better administration, to make provision against the wants and claims of the destitute. Its *practice* is that no destitute person, however meritorious, can benefit by this organization without having to pass under something very like the old Roman yoke. On the one side of the Caudine forks, a man stands erect, self-

* At the suggestion of the Board of Charities, the asylum for the harmless insane at Tewksbury, Mass., in connection with the State almshouse, is to be enlarged this winter. The number of insane and imbecile persons there is now about three hundred.

respecting and respected, and with name unstained; on the other side he crouches, a changed and degraded being. He has become a social pariah, hopes destroyed, spirit crushed, reputation gone. Society, before it yields what it dare not refuse, so imbitters the morsel by contempt, that neither giver nor receiver is blessed in the act. The terms 'pauper,' 'parish,' 'poor-relief,' all savor of social reproach. The poor are taught that it is virtuous to shrink from everything appertaining to the whole system. A beggar, even, will unblushingly ask for alms 'to keep himself off the parish.' On the other hand, the rich avoid the whole system as something tainted by social leprosy, and equally shrink from all but enforced contact. From father to son, through many a generation, the unconscious legacy of contempt and hard dealing has descended to us. Nothing testifies so clearly to the prevalent feeling of the upper classes as the persistent rigor of all legislation affecting the poor for eight hundred years. From Saxon serfdom down to modern pauperism the old key-note of contempt and isolation vibrates unchanged." *

A volume could not make clearer the fundamental mistake at the bottom of poor-law administration in England. Whatever success has been achieved in dealing with pauperism there or here has been gained by reversing this practice of suspicion, contempt, and abasement, by classifying the poor according to their real character and needs, and treating the fund for their relief as an insurance fund, to which they or their representatives had contributed their full share. The poor-rate is, properly, an insurance premium; the poor-law system of any country should be what Mr. Lamport desires to make that of England, a "National Friendly Society." This is what the Massachusetts Board of Charities has always held and taught, and its policy for checking and controlling pauperism is the same as Mr. Lamport's scheme, only more extended and reaching into details which the English writer did not consider. His four points are,— (1) punishment for vagrancy; (2) utilization of the weak or vicious portion of the lowest poor; (3) prevention, by voluntary effort, of any pauperizing influence upon the independent poor; and (4) to afford an opening for voluntary almsgiving, without the evils attending either individual effort

* Pauperism, its Diagnosis and Treatment. By Charles Lamport. Transactions of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, Newcastle-upon-Tyne Meeting, 1870. pp. 527 – 536.

or institutional organization. All these have been put in practice in Massachusetts; the first and third by the instrumentality of the Board of Charities, and with gratifying success, especially in what has been done for the children of the poor by means of the State Primary School and the Visiting Agency. Moreover, special efforts have been made to induce the kindred of the poor to provide for them, and to have those needing public relief cared for by that community to which they properly belong; and a vigilant supervision has been exercised, so far as the power of the board extended, over the expenditure of money and the methods of relief and of discipline. That the plague of pauperism has never spread widely in America is due mainly to our institutions and the opportunity which is offered to the poor man; that it has been controlled and diminished where a dense population and the varied competitions of industry had given it a foothold must be ascribed, in part at least, to the measures adopted in Massachusetts since 1863, which have been indicated rather than described in this paper.

F. B. Sanborn.

Art. II. — American Criticism; its Difficulties and Prospects.

Many persons have found Crabb Robinson's Diary a heavy book to read through; and he has been suspected of owing the reputation which he enjoyed among his contemporaries to some lucky accidents, such as his acquaintance with more distinguished characters, or his being one of the first Englishmen who thought it worth while to make a study of German literature. But we can gather indirectly from his pages that he was a man of rare conversational power and occasionally epigrammatic speech, and he certainly uttered one sentence which deserves a place among the classic *mots* of literary history. It was his observation to a friend suspected of being hypercritical: *If all the world were like you, there would be no work done. But if there were no one in the world like you, there would be no work done well.*

Volumes, nay, libraries, might be written without improving on this definition of the critical function. It is at once the explanation and vindication of the critic. It demonstrates the irrelevance of the popular slurs on criticism, such as that which, often uttered before in a better way by stronger men,* recently asserted for itself a pseudo-originality in Disraeli's last bundle of paradoxes, namely, that the critics of any department are those who have failed in it; or the opposite suggestion of Thackeray, that critics are generally young or at least untried men, who have never experienced the difficulty of executing a conception. The vulgar form in which these and similar strictures usually appear is the assertion that the critic could not produce a work superior to that which he condemns, — a retort about equal in point of logic to the proposition that no man has a right to find fault with a house or a dinner, unless he is prepared to build or cook a better off hand.

In fact, although we have some fortunate examples, even in our own country, to prove that the parts of producer and critic are not incompatible, the leading qualities which go to make up each are so far from being identical or even analogous, that for many purposes it is safe to consider them antagonistic, and instead of inferring, for instance, that a leading producer in any branch of art or literature will naturally be an excellent critic in it, our *a priori* conclusion ought rather to be the very reverse. How and why this is we shall endeavor to show further on; this much is said for the present, in order to guard the reader against the assumption that a low standard of American criticism cannot exist in conjunction with individual instances of brilliant literary success, or that such instances disprove it.

That the current standard of our criticism is low — lower than it should be, lower than it is elsewhere — may be unpleasant to say, but would be difficult to question. In saying it we have no desire to extol unduly the performances of European workers in this field, or to view their achievements with blind admiration. We readily admit that the best French critics are tainted with Parisian cockneyism, and that the overwhelming accuracy of some English authorities is occasionally

* Notably by Swift and Balzac.

relieved by very extraordinary blunders in the literary history, not only of the Continent, but even of England. It may also be conceded that partisanship, unfairness, and bad *animus* are not altogether unknown among the best representatives of the critical world abroad. Still, to the candid and well-informed reader, the broad, general impression is irresistible, that the European's work is more workmanlike, inspired by more thorough knowledge, guided by a more cultivated taste, and proceeding under a higher sense of responsibility.

Now what are the particular causes of our deficiency in criticism, considered as a special branch of literature apart from creation or production?

Some are on the surface, others lie deeper. Among the former the first place may be assigned to our national good-nature. All the levelling and equalizing tendencies of the age have failed to make the individual *par sibi*, and the character of a great community must be fertile in contradictions. It certainly seems odd that a people who have acquired — we wish we could say undeservedly — the worst reputation in the world for manners, should be also remarkable for easiness of temper and patience under imposition of all sorts; but the fact, however hard to explain, is impossible to deny. And the quality is not so wholly and purely virtuous as some of us may be disposed to claim. Good-nature, whether in the individual or the class, is composed of at least two elements, — benevolence and moral indolence. The desire to be rid of a beggar's importunity, the unwillingness to take the trouble of finding out the truth or falsehood of his claim upon the charitable, are motives which exercise as potent an influence on the pocket of the average passer-by, as a veritable desire to relieve distress. The same lazy long-suffering which allows the American public to be bullied and discomforted in the travel which is part of its daily life, by hotel clerks, express clerks, railroad officials, and the whole tribe of jacks-in-office, has also made it and many of its literary representatives who knew better, culpably lenient to a multitude of literary pretenders. A habit of promiscuous praise long ago deprived praise of all real meaning and value. In one sense the practice may be called honest; it is not generally the result of downright bribery.

Purchased panegyric is not more common here than elsewhere, —indeed, is less common, though some of our reckless journalists have insinuated, if not openly asserted, the contrary. But in another sense it is dishonest,—as much so as giving a good character to a worthless servant.

The habit of good natured approval may be, indeed has been, defended on the ground that, during our early absorption in material interests, any effort, however feeble, to show that there were other things worth living for besides building, buying, and selling, deserved encouragement and support. But while the positive mischief was done, the hypothetical good was not attained. The founders of our literature were lifted to fame and (so far as they enjoyed it) fortune, not by the undiscriminating eulogy of home reviewers, but by the more balanced approval of European critics. This fact was strictly in accordance with the precedents and canons of art, and there is little sense in trying to shirk or disguise it, as if it were a national humiliation. On the other hand, the habit continued long after the supposed necessity had ceased to exist, long after our literary stocks were flourishing with sufficient hardihood to need no artificial protection.

For some time the principal exception to this general rule of unintelligent good-nature was an exception almost worse than the rule itself. A marked acerbity of interlocal and intersectional criticism startled at intervals the indolent propriety (so far as literature was concerned) of the press. New York and Boston, not merely as two individual cities, but also to some extent in a representative capacity, the former being supposed to stand for all New England, and the latter for the Middle and even some of the Border Southern States, were pitted against each other by a petty local jealousy, which constantly imbittered their literary relations. Between the whole North and the whole South æsthetic disputes were intensified by the intrusion of the terrible political feud which was gradually growing towards its crisis. Some of the very best men of all sections were not free from the influence of these local antagonisms, and the rank and file were of course impregnated with it. At one time there really seemed a danger that a permanent class of literary skirmishers might be formed, whose pre-

tensions to critical merit would be founded on their abuse of whatever was produced in rival localities.

A third obstacle to the formation of a true and generally diffused critical spirit was the vague notion that American literature must have some purely American flavor about it, — something that differs from European literature, as our scenery does from European scenery; something new and grand and savage. There was just enough truth about this fancy to make it a perilous delusion. That we should not produce tame copies of Transatlantic mannerisms, that we should not, for instance (to take obvious and trivial illustrations), transplant the nightingale into American groves, or decorate the American millionnaire with the manners and speech of the feudal aristocrat, — all this was good, sensible doctrine, worthy of Dr. Holland or of old Hesiod himself. But that we should disown all the established standards, not merely of our own language, but of its classical predecessors, was a dream the fulfilment of which would have required not merely the invention of a new tongue, but the construction of a fundamentally separate civilization. Equally misleading was the supposition that the grandeur of national objects must and ought to be a source of inspiration. In poetry, above all, it was contradicted by the plainest historical facts. The bards of Switzerland are yet to come, and some of the most charming English lyrics have been suggested by ordinary, we may even say by vulgar objects, — a bird or a barmaid. To make the desired experiment under proper conditions, it would be necessary, not to complete the civilization of our people, but to throw them back into barbarism; and were this impossibility possible, we should still have to consider that the natural scenery of Greece and Asia Minor supplied but a small part of Homer's inspiration, and that his perfection of the picturesque was a formal garden. Yet otherwise sensible men have talked as if Niagara and the prairies and the Rocky Mountains must of their own virtue supply the divine *afflatus*.

The idea of making size do duty for grandeur was nothing new. It had been tried by the Orientals ages ago. It had been tried by that "very German Milton," Klopstock. And doubtless there is a certain amount of grandeur, or, it might be

more accurate to say, appearance of grandeur, in great size and magnitude. We may make a sponge-cake big enough to impress the ordinary spectator with its quasi-majesty. A drunken revel assumes a sort of sublimity, if we can crowd topers enough and liquor enough into it. But such contrivances are always more or less barbarous, and altogether at variance with the highest cultivation and refinement.*

Fully as erroneous was the analogous assumption, that great national actions must call forth great poetry in their own day. The epic seems to be a very lost art, and the only serious attempt at one in the present century was founded on the more than semi-fabulous adventures of a scarcely less than mythical British king. We can hardly possess our souls in patience to wait for *the* American epic.†

It may not be immediately evident to all readers how this craving for a peculiarly "American" literature could influence American criticism unfavorably. But the effort was in no degree less potent for being somewhat indirect. In the hope of originality, any extravagance, anything irregular or spasmodic, was received with toleration, if not welcomed with applause. The impossibility of finding a royal road to learning had passed into a proverb, but there was a seductive fantasy of a republican road to literary eminence.

After all, however, the great cause of our critical deficiency was the want of men prepared for the office of critic by direct education and indirect influence of what the French call the *milieu*. This was the fountain and source of our weakness.

If we go back to first principles, there may well be some doubt whether the *nil admirari* or the *omne admirari* is the primal condition of the untutored mind. The traditional im-

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* Though we are dealing more particularly with literature, most of what we have to say applies equally well to art. The corner of a wood, the little reaches of a stream, a bit of dead wall, rendered with sentiment and true artistic feeling, may be worth more than the biggest panorama of the biggest mountain in the world, though reproduced with almost photographic precision. And here it is not amiss to observe, with reference to another branch of our subject, that the men who have written best about art have not generally been the greatest painters,—far from it. Neither are the greatest musicians the best musical critics.

† "The work of each immortal bard appears
The single wonder of a thousand years."

mobility of the red man and of some Orientals may be the result of stoic self-control. If it is natural and unaffected, then not only must we hold the gray barbarian lower than the Christian child, but the Indian, as some have supposed that he should, must take intellectual rank below the negro. A question of more practical interest comes up when we inquire if the stage of childish admiration is necessarily succeeded by that of Aristarchian scrutiny and general fault-finding, and if this second stage is in its turn the prelude to a period of just and evenly balanced judgment. That a belligerent and savage critical disposition is the natural reaction from the *omne admirari* seems a fair conclusion from the testimony of literary annals; but we can be less sure that this state of things must necessarily be followed by a proper medium between the extremes. Perhaps the next reaction may carry us back nearly to the original position.

But whatever answer to these queries some Taine or Arnold might suggest, this one thing is certain, that the genuine critic must be the product of a high intellectual cultivation. Not of material civilization necessarily; he may be a boor to the fashionable exquisite: not of scientific progress; he may be an object of real or feigned contempt to the positivist: but he must be most liberally educated in all that concerns the humanities. He must be a scholar in the true sense of that often and much abused word. He must understand literary history. The man who is utterly unacquainted with Theocritus, even at second-hand through a translation (and there are many such among our would-be critics), cannot discuss Milton without making an absurd figure; neither can he who is ignorant of the commonest Greek idioms. And he who has not read Homer, and a trifle of Lucretius to boot, must utterly fail in appreciating the first and best of Tennyson's Arthurian fragments. The island Valley of Avilion has but a partial charm to the reader unacquainted with its double prototype, and the writer similarly deficient is wellnigh certain to stumble among its bowery hollows.

Some decades ago, before German had become a popular study, much doubtful Teutonic philosophy, and some rather better Teutonic poetry, was palmed off on our public as origi-

nal. Even at the present day ignorance of French, which by an amiable social fiction every person claiming to be educated is supposed to know, proves a constant source of blunders and impositions. But all this touches only the elementary and, as we may say, negative qualification. It is very important that the critic's eye should be a microscope of wit, but it must also have the comprehensive range of a very different instrument. Accurate and exacting when classical English is to be written, he must enjoy all the humor of a Biglow's or a Breitmann's dialect. While revelling in the boundless forest of Shakespeare, he must discern their own perfection in the trim *parterres* of Racine. He must be able to see the genius of Victor Hugo through all the clouds and rubbish of his manifold absurdities, and pick out the kernels of good wheat from the multitude of Swinburnian chaff. Plautus will not be too light for him, nor Seneca too heavy. The critic is often, perhaps in a majority of cases, called on to blame; but if he only understands the art of blame, he has taken a partial and one-sided view of his profession, just as the lawyer or novelist who has studied the worst aspects of human nature can only be said to have a partial knowledge of it, though he may be more advanced than the fashionable parson, before whom people are always on their good behavior.

Here it is eminently that a little learning proves dangerous. There is a condition of the critical mind which, perhaps, rather than the sanguinary and abusive, should be considered the second stage of progress, — though, indeed, the two are not unfrequently synchronous, — when the literary talent of a community has worn for itself a deep but narrow channel, and can see nothing beyond its own banks.

What we have said and hinted about the critic's qualifications shows us indirectly the antagonism, sometimes amounting to incompatibility, between the constituting elements of the critic and of the maker. The training of the former is such as to render him essentially eclectic; the latter has, in most cases, either by nature or formation, his own peculiar way of work. He is a leader or follower of some school, with which he is most conversant, and to which his preferences naturally gravitate. Deficiency of imagination and entire

absence of the creative power do not interfere with the excellences of the one; the genius of the other may be alloyed with prejudice and ignorance. If we admit Balzac's assertion, that the critic is impotent as an author, it will still be no less true that the author is apt to make wild work when he assumes the *rôle* of critic on his rivals.

It would be an old and a sad story to repeat our lack of the necessary appliances, direct and indirect, for providing critics of the true stuff. And the worst feature of the unpromising prospect was, not the existence of the deficiency (though that was bad enough), but the inability to see, perhaps it would be more fully correct to say, the disposition to deny that there was a deficiency. Our shortcomings, if frankly acknowledged, we might hope to supply in course of time by probable progress of cultivation; but when influential men set themselves steadily against the higher cultivation as a supposed obstacle to material progress, what is to be said or done? To take but one out of countless melancholy instances, it is on record that the proprietor of one of the most widely circulating newspapers in the country, when expressing his opinion about the different varieties of young men whom he had occasion to employ, spoke of "college graduates" in terms of contempt worthy of Shakespeare's Jack Cade. Fortunately men are often obliged to be better than their principles or apologies for principles; this very person has been compelled to make frequent use of the despised graduates, but the *animus* remains the same, and its results may be seen when any branch of learning somewhat recondite and out of the way has to be reported to the public. If, for instance, the members of the *Philological Association* were men to be much affected by newspaper notice, the extraordinary relations of their sayings and doings last summer by such members of the press as condescended to mention them at all, must have made them ready to tear their hair, break their spectacles, burn their Corssens and Ritschls, and subside doggedly into the old commonplace pedagogue routine.

Whenever pleasant incidents of this sort are mentioned with disapprobation, a number of worthy but mistaken patriots, who do not like to admit the inferiority of our country in any possible respect, usually have their answer ready. Sometimes it

takes the vulgar form of the *tu quoque*, and consists in pointing out some foreign instance of misappreciation or neglect; but more generally it appeals to individual cases of home work which, in their opinion at least, challenge comparison with the best produced abroad. And it is difficult to make these good people understand that their argument is mostly irrelevant, and that the question is one to be decided, not by particular examples here and there, but rather by what lawyers call the general issue. The *milieu*, to borrow again a pet term of our French friends, is different; the whole tone of respectable and what is supposed to be educated feeling on the subject is different. The European author, who addresses himself to any branch of literature worth the name, is certain to be noticed, and well noticed. If he be a pretender, his shortcomings and impostures are pretty sure to be exposed; if he have merit, some one will find it out, and explain it and encourage it. In no case will he be utterly neglected or dismissed with a few unmeaning words, because there is not a public to take interest in him, or a class of professional writers to understand him. Thus, to continue our illustration from philology and classics, it is little to the purpose that Professor West may be as good a scholar as Professor East. The latter has half a dozen well-known channels of communication with a comparatively large and general public whenever he pleases; the former will frequently be obliged to take refuge in some religious or semi-religious periodical of limited circulation, which admits the philology only as a species of padding to the theology. As for plain Mr. West, who has no college at his back, and no more imposing handle than A. B. or A. M. to his name, his lucubrations will sometimes fail to find even that honorable interment. What has been said of one branch is true of all, *mutatis mutandis*. The current standard is nowhere decided by isolated essays, however brilliant or acute, but by the general supply and the general support. We have been told that the "Saturday Review" lives by advertising dressing-cases; but we may be sure that if there were not a writing public behind, and a reading public before the "Saturday," all the dressing-cases in London would not save it. There was no lack of swells or dressing-cases in New York, but they did not save the "Round Table." That paper

went out, according to its own ingenuous dying speech and confession, because it could not find men enough of the right sort either to write for it or to read it. There was only room for one such weekly in the country, against three in England, counting the "Athenæum" for nothing. If high-priced advertisements of fashionable wares were the desideratum in such cases, why might not the reading matter begin just as well at the other end of the intellectual scale, say with something like "Our Society"? What would the Englishman need beyond his "Morning Post"?

Such, in our view, are the principal causes which have impeded the formation of an adequate standard of American literary criticism. The important question now presents itself, how far have they or any of them been removed, or come into process of removal.

Our national good-nature certainly continues to put forth its worst as well as its best developments. In morals and politics its effects have been most deplorable. But in literature the best men are less affected by it than formerly; and the increase of really good as well as of second-rate matter has forced some sort of discrimination on the most indiscriminating. On the whole, we may consider this impediment diminished, though not entirely removed.

In reference to the second obstacle we can take a more sanguine tone. It has virtually disappeared. As our capitals became less provincial and more cosmopolite, as our different sections were brought into closer contact, local prejudices have vanished and our republic of letters has acquired something like what European politicians call a solidarity. It is no uncommon circumstance for a periodical published in one city to be largely supported by contributions from another. Although the broadest and most desirable schemes for literary union are still in an embryotic state, smaller associations in their particular spheres have done much to combine their specialities all over the country. Of course it is impossible to suppress all local jealousies and cliques till we have a literary millennium, but they no longer assume formidable or even serious proportions.

Perhaps the consideration of the third difficulty had better

be included in that of the fourth and principal. And here the prospect is from some points very encouraging. Our workshops of critical stuff, if the expression may be allowed, have been established on deeper and firmer foundations. The progress of our colleges and universities during the present generation is not merely creditable, it is surprising. We may say, without exaggeration, that the good average student of to-day knows more than was thought sufficient to make a good average professor thirty years ago; knows more in the true sense of knowledge, though his apparent range may be less. This is owing not merely to the general progress of the learned world in such matters, but also to the fact that the age of entering and consequently of graduating at our colleges having advanced about two years, the period of liberal education is lengthened by that time. It is almost a truism to say that we must depend for our supply of critics chiefly on the men who have gone through the universities in the regular fashion. Those who have picked up some sort of liberal education otherwise — as, for instance, later in life, by travel and residence abroad — are insufficient in number and apt to be imperfectly grounded. Whatever, therefore, advances the classical standard of our colleges, acts directly to raise the standard of literary criticism, unwritten as well as written. In this connection we are reminded of some of the paradoxical old proverbs, such as the half being greater than the whole, and the propriety of making haste slowly. It is probable that English literature, and the immediate application of the fruits of college study to it, occupied a larger part of the student's nominal attention thirty years ago than now; but the absence of a proper foundation and sufficient training generally deprived these premature attempts of vitality and permanence. The barbarous term *sophomoric* became a popular designation for the rhetoric of collegians; and if their criticism acquired no similar stigma of epithet, it was because the popular mind really did not know enough about criticism to distinguish one kind of it from another.

Other and broader influences, such as easier and more frequent communication with Europe, have lent their assistance. The operation of these influences must not be mis-

understood or misinterpreted. It does not consist in any immediate imitation of foreign models or transplanting of foreign ideas. The man, for instance, who undertook to reproduce the processes of Taine in an Anglo-American form, would only succeed in giving us some of the Frenchman's mannerism and pet words (like that one which we have had occasion to quote); the volatile essence, the fine Gallic wit, would everywhere be wanting in the Saxon imitation. The most valuable lesson to be learned from acquaintance with the current work of French critics is the knowledge how extensive and serious a business criticism can be; and the most valuable to be derived from a corresponding English familiarity is the knowledge how very respectable a business it is. When a young man is once impressed with the fact that cabinet ministers and noblemen of the highest rank are not ashamed, indeed are rather proud of writing reviews on purely literary subjects and publishing volumes of critical essays under their own names, he will be less impressed by the other fact that this pork-merchant or that member of Congress at home thinks such work a waste of time.

The result of all which is that the critic occupies a recognized position and has something like a professional standing. Yet we must not be too hasty in accepting the favorable changes and neglecting the contrary symptoms. While learning and taste are strengthening their strongholds, ignorance and brutality are also sending out their champions. The self-made man is happily unable to do as much mischief in literature as in morals and politics, but he does enough. We cannot overlook, however we may wish to despise, a school of writers in comparison with whom Walt Whitman is a deep scholar and refined artist. Nay, learning of a certain kind, as well as ignorance, has enrolled itself among the foes of literary taste. But here perhaps we should rather say pretence of learning; for our own real *savans* have not generally thought it worth while to participate in the *querelle d'Allemand* which some English positivists have endeavored to fasten upon English literature.

Moreover, a new danger has recently shown itself. The increase of literary production has developed out of what many

persons would hail as a sign of progress, a tendency altogether damaging to critical investigation. The great demand on all sides is for *short* books, *short* articles, *short* sketches; no elaborate essays, no complete monographs, are wanted. Length, if admitted anywhere, must find refuge in those insatiable devourers of manuscript, the fine-print columns of the daily triple sheet. Condensed thought, brief expression, the laconian method everywhere, except on the platform, where man is still allowed to inflict himself on his fellow-mortals for two long hours at a time. The volume shrinks to an article, the article dwindles to an item, to conciliate the demands of the public and the needs of the publisher.

Now, however desirable or necessary the laconic method may be for many purposes, it is assuredly not adapted to the requirements of criticism. The true critical spirit detests broad assertion and sweeping generality and curt dogmatism. It loves to proceed by caveats and qualifications and nice distinctions carefully worked out. It must do so, for it is a complex art and has to deal with complexities. Any style of writing, therefore, which admits, even indirectly and remotely, the item and paragraph as its bases and models, is directly antagonistic to the critical spirit and hostile to critical progress. Once more we allow that for certain purposes *systematically* condensed thought may be of great value; in morals and politics, for instance, where it is often necessary to detect and sweep away a great deal of irrelevant rubbish, introduced by ignorance or sophistry. Yet even here we meet with so many complications and find so many errors which are owing to imperfect and partial views, that we must be careful about applying a naked principle too hastily and laying down the very clearest positions too broadly. And in æsthetic matters, hurry and abbreviation are fatal to proper treatment. Most of all are they so in literary criticism. A book which deserves to be called a book is not a whole in the same sense that a work of art — a picture or a statue — is a whole. The most exhaustive description of the largest and best filled canvas could not be made to occupy a volume; a book, nay, a single poem may contain whole galleries of pictures. Take, as a single illustration, Tennyson's "Palace of

Art," note the wonderful wealth of description in the single stanzas, the separate rooms of that lordly pleasure-house; mark the figures boldly drawn in single adjectives. Let us glance at another example of suggestive painting by the same poet. Hamerton tells us that when Tennyson mentions the long fields of barley and of rye that lie on either side the river round about Shalott, he imports to us no information as to the *color* of these fields. He does not *directly*, it is true; but, given the time of the year and the state of the atmosphere, both which we learn from the context, any artistic reader may form a tolerably clear conception of the hue wherewith they would be clothed. The criticism of which we are speaking is very different from that which has been, with some reason, objected to, as encouraging a spasmodic school of literature. It is not looking out for and calling attention to "powder words and thunder words." It is just the contrary, the investigation of deft touches, of little epithets and phrases that are at the same time recondite and natural; and this involves of course the exposure of the diction which is of an opposite character, fussy and false. Much popular literature contains imagery and action and sentiment as untrue to nature as are the landscape delineations of some of the old masters so boldly denounced by Ruskin, but in the one case as in the other a well-trained mind is necessary to detect the error.

And here the sham-American, the stage-patriotic idea comes in with mischievous effect. The people are too active, too busy, too much engrossed in commerce and speculation, to read elaborate and many-sided expositions. They must take their criticism (and indeed all their literature) in pills. Even grammatical accuracy is a superfluous refinement, so long as a writer can make himself tersely intelligible.

Were such opinions to gain universal currency, we should end by having a public led and fed by publishers' puffs, and completely at the mercy of any literary charlatan who could let off from time to time a volley of verbal pyrotechnics. There is a style of *soi-disant* criticism which bears about the same relation to the real article that the American mode of tanning leather does to the European. The process is very much shorter, but the product is inferior in the same proportion.

Still, on a survey of the whole ground, after taking account of all influences favorable and unfavorable, the present condition gives reasons for satisfaction, and the future prospect is not without hope. A positive progress has been made; there is more learning, better training, clearer understanding, and a more cosmopolitan spirit. It would be ridiculous to deny that there remains a great deal to be done before we can reach the level of England or France, but every year diminishes the distance. And we have at least this crumb of comfort to console us for the vices of our political system, that they cannot touch the *edita templa*, the safe seat of the gods, the quiet seats which are not shaken by the wind of faction nor drenched by the showers and snows of political calumny.

And among the causes which tend to inspire hope we shall take the liberty of mentioning one which, occurring under less favorable circumstances, might have had just the contrary effect, — the transfer of the literary sceptre from New York to Boston. The old New York school did its work well, and to pour mock libations of dirty water on its grave is very sorry business. It was not forcibly supplanted; it died a natural death, and this being the case, there were several reasons why Boston should, in no arrogant or monopolizing sense of the term, be the headquarters of American literature. Discriminating in a broad and general way between the two cities, we may say that for the formation of a permanent literary body having serious claims to be judges and arbiters as well as producers, coherence is required on the one hand and a cosmopolitan spirit on the other. The practical difficulty is, that the two qualities are apt to interfere with each other, the former degenerating into a narrow and provincial cliquism, the latter into a desultory want of system; and these were precisely the respective dangers that threatened the two cities. But it was and is easier to get the cosmopolitanism into Boston than to establish the concentration and unity of purpose in New York; and therefore, were there no other reason, the former would naturally be the more feasible locality. But there is another reason and a very good one. The preponderance of commercial interests in our largest metropolis had imparted to literature an unduly commercial tinge, and given

some currency to a popular estimate of it as foreign to the true appreciation as an ideal of upholstery and millinery would be foreign to the highest conception of art. Nothing can be more hostile to the critical and æsthetic spirit than any influence which tends to place the publisher, and not only the publisher proper, but the book-manufacturing variety of the species in the position of the author's maker and judge, the creator of the creator. If Boston can resist this influence more successfully than it has been resisted in some other places, and can also shake off the last lingering traces of her intellectual provincialism, there is nothing to prevent her from forming a true school of deep, wide, and conscientious investigation, and placing New England criticism where it has never yet been, on the level of New England production.

CHARLES ASTOR BRISTED.

ART. III. — ORATORY AND JOURNALISM.

FROM the great epochs of English eloquence, we have entirely lost the oratory of Pym, Hampden, Wentworth, and Falkland; of Bolingbroke, Pulteney, Windham, and Walpole; nearly all the speeches of Sheridan, the greater part of Fox's, many of those of the earlier and greater day of Chatham, and have received Burke's only as set down by himself in forms often differing widely from those in which they fell upon the ears of his hearers. Where the speeches of these men have survived, accuracy in their substance only, not in their diction, is the utmost that can be claimed for them. Chatham's earlier speeches were perpetuated by Dr. Johnson, who had not even the advantage of hearing them himself, but composed them from notes taken by others, and who once broke in upon a company engaged in praises of the eloquence of Pitt with, "That speech *I* wrote in a garret in Exeter Street." The remains of American orators of the same age are equally unsatisfactory and much rarer. Patrick Henry's speeches perished with their delivery; that notable favorite of declaiming schoolboys — "Mr. President, it is natural to man to indulge in the

illusions of hope" — being due in reality to the imagination of his biographer, Wirt. The scarcely less esteemed oration of John Adams before the Continental Congress was in like manner fabricated and put into his mouth by Daniel Webster.

When reporters like Johnson, Wirt, and Webster could be found, the orators scarcely need condolence. In many cases, moreover, their fame might not have been enhanced by however faithful a record. Sheridan's wonderful speech upon the Begum princesses and Warren Hastings was deliberately allowed to perish by its author, although it had chiefly been put in writing before its delivery and could easily have been reproduced. "He contented himself," says his biographer, Tom Moore, "with leaving to imagination, which in most cases he knew transcends reality, the task of justifying his eulogists and perpetuating the tradition of their praise."* The same policy was carried to a much greater length by the famous "Single-Speech" Hamilton, who, having borne away the laurels from even Pitt and Fox during the memorable fourteen hours' assault upon the Duke of Newcastle's administration, sat mute at Westminster during the sessions of sixty

* Such was the almost marvellous instant triumph of this effort, that Sheridan probably did well to refrain from imperilling it by seeking its prolongation. Burke declared it "the most astonishing effort of eloquence, argument, and wit united of which there was any record or tradition." Fox said that "all that he had ever heard, all that he had ever read, when compared with it, dwindled into nothing, and vanished like vapor before the sun." Pitt avowed that "it surpassed all the eloquence of ancient or modern times, and possessed everything that genius or art could furnish to agitate and control the human mind." Sir William Dolben, moving an adjournment, alleged that, "in the state of mind in which Mr. Sheridan's speech had left him, it was impossible for him to give a determinate opinion." Mr. Stanhope, seconding this motion, observed that "when he entered the House, he was not ashamed to acknowledge his opinion inclined to the side of Mr. Hastings. But such had been the wonderful efficacy of Mr. Sheridan's convincing detail of facts and irresistible eloquence, that he could not but say that his sentiments were materially changed. Nothing, indeed, but information almost equal to a miracle could determine him not to vote for the charge; but he had just felt the influence of such a miracle, and he could not but ardently desire to avoid an immediate decision." Mr. Logan, who was the author of a defence of Hastings, and had gone to the House strongly prepossessed in his favor, at the close of the first hour of the speech observed to the friend beside him, "All this is declamatory assertion without proof"; after the second hour, "This is a most wonderful oration"; after the third, "Mr. Hastings has acted very unjustifiably"; after the fourth, "Mr. Hastings is a most atrocious criminal"; and at the close, "Of all monsters of iniquity, the most enormous is Warren Hastings!"

years, rather than endanger them; although before the less formidable Parliament at Dublin he used subsequently to speak with great effect as the secretary of Lord Halifax.

No doubt the orators of that day had good reason to regard reports with apprehension. We have seen, indeed, that Pitt was no sufferer by having his speech flow through Johnson's pen; but the Doctor — whose morality, like his Dictionary, though an accepted prodigy in his own time, scarcely bears comparison with modern standards — said of his parliamentary reports in the "Gentleman's Magazine" that he "took good care that the Whig dogs should not have the best of it." That the average reporter was worse by many degrees than the Great Moralist could have brought himself to be, may be inferred from Sir Robert Walpole's remarks during a debate upon the systematic misrepresentations in vogue. "I have read some debates of this House," he said, "in which I have been made to speak the very reverse of what I meant. I have read others wherein all the wit, the learning, and the argument has been thrown into one side, and on the other nothing but what was low, mean, and ridiculous; and yet, when it comes to the question, the division has gone against the side which, upon the face of the debate, had reason and justice to support it. So that, had I been a stranger to the proceedings and to the nature of the arguments themselves, I must have thought this to have been one of the most contemptible assemblies on the face of the earth." Horace Walpole's "Short Notes of My Life" contain this specific verification of his father's complaint: "March 23, 1742. I spoke in the House of Commons for the first time, against the motion for a secret committee on my father. This speech was published in the magazines, but was entirely false, and had not one paragraph of my real speech in it." Even when deliberate perversion had ceased, there remained between the orator and reporter the same antagonism which has animated authors and printers from time immemorial. Lord Loughborough embodied the grievance in his reply to a motion of Lord Stanhope's, that the amanuenses should read to the House the proceedings of the Hastings trial. "God forbid," said the Chancellor, "that ever their lordships should call upon the shorthand writers to publish their notes;

for, of all people, shorthand writers were ever the furthest from correctness, and there were no man's words they ever heard that they again returned. . . . . By catching the sound, and not the sense, they perverted the sense of the speaker, and made him appear as ignorant as themselves." That, to a certain extent, this standing complaint is well founded, is quite true; but, on the other hand, the orator is very often unsuspicious of the extent of his indebtedness to the maligned class, who remedy many a slip and oral carelessness. Reports such as Charles Dickens made of Parliamentary proceedings, or Henry J. Raymond of Daniel Webster's speeches, have contributed in no small degree to orators' fame, by producing speeches which contained all their felicities and were less faulty in some points than their own. Till a very late day, nevertheless, opposition to the reporter has survived, even to the extent of advocating his entire suppression. Mr. Pitt, who used to say that he would rather recover a speech of Bolingbroke than the lost books of Livy, was yet averse to Parliamentary reporting. Lord Derby — Bulwer's "Rupert of debate" — met a motion that the House should provide for the publication of its proceedings, by an ironical argument that foreign powers ought to be informed of every momentous word that fell from the lips of the mover of the reform, so that they might know how to shape their policy. When verbatim reporting was introduced in this country by the New York "Courier and Enquirer," the innovation was strenuously opposed by Daniel Webster, who afterwards owed so much to it. Another great orator, who combined equal objections to reporters with exceptional facilities for baffling them, was Daniel O'Connell. At the time of his oratorical tour in Ireland on the occasion of the Repeal agitation, Mr. W. H. Russell, who attained eminence in this country as the non-observer of Bull Run, was detailed by the London "Times" to report his speeches. The reporter made himself and his errand known to the "Liberator," who affected an excess of cordiality, and, assuming an extraordinarily pungent brogue, announced to the expectant multitude that "until the jintleman was provided with all writin' convayniencies he would not spake a wurrud." Having whetted the appetite of his hearers by reiterated inquiries whether "the

London jintleman was entirely ready," the orator delighted his auditory by addressing them in the Irish tongue.

Thoroughly as the point has been conceded, and invaluable as the reform has long been acknowledged to be, English servility to precedent and capacity for legal fiction are yet exemplified in the fact that to this day Parliamentary reports are, in theory, prohibited. It is still competent for a single member to enforce the unrepealed standing order for the exclusion of strangers, among whom reporters are included. On the debate upon renewing the war with France, in 1803, the speaker made arrangements respecting the admission of strangers by which the reporters were excluded, and a speech of Pitt's was lost. In 1807 a member of the House of Lords called attention to the fact that a person in the gallery was taking notes. As lately as 1849 the doors have been closed against strangers, and the debates thereby suppressed. And, although in the new Houses of Parliament there are galleries for the accommodation of the reporters, theoretically it still remains "a high breach of privilege" to publish any speech or proceeding in the Commons; and it is still "irregular" to allude in debate to any newspaper report, except for the purpose of animadverting upon the breach of privilege.

An usage clung to with such tenacity as was the secrecy of debate, long after valid reason for it had ceased to exist, will usually be found originally to have had sound justification. In this case the privilege so cherished had originated in an age when the Crown and the Parliament were in conflict, when a Tudor or a Stuart sovereign had little hesitation in committing to the Tower an active member of the opposition, or one who had spoken or even given his vote against a court measure. Long after the contest had ended in the complete ascendency of Parliament, it clung to its privilege from a diversity of motives, — from the instincts of that kind of traditional conservatism which is indistinguishable from stupidity, from the exigencies of an infinite complexity of briberies and corruptions which could not endure publicity, from oligarchical indisposition to incur any accountability to the populace or extend to them any influence upon the cause of legislation. These motives may be traced in the language held on the occasions when

punishment of offenders against the privilege was under consideration. During the time of William of Orange "newsletter-writers" — persons, be it observed, who printed nothing — were proceeded against by the Commons for "intermeddling with their debates and other proceedings," and enjoined against "giving any account or minute of the debates." About the same time it was declared that to print a vote was "destructive of the freedom and liberties of Parliament." Long after this, during the reign of George II., Lord Danvers gave utterance to the jealousy with which his class regarded any popular intrusion into its prescriptive domain. "I believe," he said, "the people of Great Britain are governed by a power that never was heard of as a supreme authority in any age or country before. This power, sir, ... is the government of the press. The stuff which our weekly newspapers are filled with is received with greater reverence than acts of Parliament; and the sentiments of one of these scribblers have more weight with the multitude than the opinion of the best politician in the kingdom."

In truth, the crude and scurrilous productions of the minor journalist of the days of Anne and the earlier Georges were little calculated to suggest to statesmen or to reconcile them to the fundamental changes he was destined to work, alike in the process of legislation and — which more immediately concerns our more limited inquiry — in the character and functions of oratory. To trace the means by which he made good his place in political life, in the face of the combined opposition of the Crown and of both Houses of Parliament, and the extent to which his success early became identified with that of popular principles, it will be necessary to revert to the rise and establishment of journalism in England.

English vanity for a long time found gratification in the belief that both the Venetian "Gazetta" — so called from the price, *gazza*, a small coin, for which was sold a sheet of news from the Turkish war in which the Republic was engaged in 1563 — and the still-surviving "Gazette de France" — which appeared in 1631, under the editorship of Renaudot, a physician, and included Louis XIII. and Richelieu among its patrons

and contributors — had been anticipated by the "English Mercurie," a journal published at the suggestion of Burleigh, and under the authority of Queen Elizabeth, during the excitement of the Spanish Armada, "for the prevention of false reports." On investigation of the genuineness of the alleged specimens, however, this journal, which had till lately been treated as authentic, has been added to the long list of literary forgeries; and the germ of the English newspaper must be sought in the "news-books" and pamphlets which, beginning to appear in the time of James I., were so eagerly sought during the crises of the Thirty Years' War and the exploits of Gustavus Adolphus, that, in 1622, one Nathaniel Butter ventured upon the regular weekly publication of "The Certain Newes of this Present Week." Under the auspices of the Stuarts and the Star Chamber the newspaper made but little progress. The Commonwealth brought a flood of political tracts and pamphlets, nearly a score of "Diurnals" and "Mercuries" having been established during the single year 1643, while each of the armies carried with it a printer for the dissemination of controversial sheets, of which the "Weekly Discoverer" and the "Weekly Discoverer Stripped Naked" may be named as specimens. The Long Parliament, however, not even affecting toleration, withstood the royalist and prelatical writers by passing ordinances for the restraint of printing severe enough to elicit from Milton, partisan and politician as he was, a protest against the work of the licenser, the slayer of "an immortality rather than a life." With the Restoration came a new licensing act, which vested the entire control of printing in the government, and provided a censorship which was intrusted by Clarendon to the hands of Sir Roger L'Estrange, a Tory pamphleteer and most scurrilous libeller, who himself established, in 1663, a journal called the "Intelligencer," which, in its way, was highly successful. This paper contained only essays, without news; another, consisting entirely of news without comment, the "London Gazette," was conducted by a clerk in the office of the Secretary of State, and gave no intelligence other than that functionary thought it expedient to impart to the public. Periodical sheets made up of political dissertations now became quite numerous;

but the embargo upon news was maintained with a rigor which may be estimated from Chief Justice Scroggs's charge to a jury, at a time when the licensing act had temporarily expired, not only that "all writers of false news, though not scandalous or seditious, are indictable on that account," but that "to print or publish any news-books or pamphlets of news whatsoever is illegal," and that "it is a manifest intent to the breach of the peace."

With the Revolution came a change. So disgusting had been the hangings, quarterings, mutilations, floggings, exposures in the pillory, fines, and imprisonments of authors under Charles II. and James II., that, on the accession of William and Mary, the Commons refused to renew the licensing act, and the censorship of the press disappeared forever from the law of England. Newspapers at once multiplied, — small and dingy, it is true; issued but once or twice a week, even these intervals being irregular; yet sometimes, when a dearth of news left space to be filled, containing essays which answered to the modern editorial article, and were by no means contemptible in point of composition. At the outset, while there still remained an uncertainty whether their trade might not be illegal, the editors were not only upon their good behavior, but so far exerted themselves to propitiate King William and the partisans of the Revolution, that the government, which doubtless preferred to evade any issue of the kind, connived at the publications. From similar reasons the newspapers carefully abstained from any allusion to the doings of Parliament. This period of inoffensiveness fortunately lasted for two years — long enough to accustom the public to depend largely upon the journals for amusement and instruction — before there occurred a journalistic outrage which for a moment threatened to undo all that had been accomplished, yet served in its result to place the liberties of the press upon a tenable footing. In 1697, at a critical juncture in the French war, when much depended upon the maintenance of English credit, one John Salisbury, who edited a paper, called the "Flying Post," in the interest of certain cliques of London stock-jobbers, published a paragraph calculated to bring the exchequer bills into discredit. In extreme indignation, the House of Com-

mons ordered the arrest of the offender and unanimously resolved to bring in a bill to prohibit the unlicensed publication of news. Forty-eight hours, however, elapsed before the bill was offered, and by that time the members had considered the matter. "There was scarcely one of them," says Lord Macaulay, "whose residence in the country had not, during the preceding summer, been made more agreeable by the London journals. . . . . No Devonshire or Yorkshire gentleman, Whig or Tory, could bear the thought of being again dependent, during seven months of every year, for all information about what was going on in the world on news-letters." When, therefore, the demand for the renewal of the censorship was brought forward, it was replied that, if the Attorney-General would file information against offending and mischievous newspapers, adequate remedies would be found to exist under the common law; and the bill, which had been introduced without a division, failed on its second reading by a vote of sixteen to two hundred. Through this incident journalism passed under the control of the laws; and through their over-strained enforcement in a succeeding reign came its ultimate emancipation and the development of its powers and usefulness.

Under Queen Anne journalism assumed the proportions of a great political power, combining intelligence with discussion at a time when party zeal was intense and universal, and conducted by men whose talents in their peculiar province are unrivalled in English literature. To the influence of three of these writers, representative men and journalists, however widely differing from one another, there may be traced many of the characteristics of subsequent English literature as well as of the modern newspaper. The work of each of these three — De Foe, Addison, and Bolingbroke — was so significant as to call for a digression.

Daniel De Foe, who had previously manifested his political proclivities by joining the insurrection of the Duke of Monmouth, entered definitely upon his political career by joining, as a common soldier, the army which escorted the Prince of Orange to London and the throne. For some fifteen years his

robust intellect and strongly marked genius were employed with marvellous activity in the almost monthly production of the pamphlets and poems which formed so conspicuous an element in the political warfare of the times. One of these — composed in answer to "a vile, abhorred pamphlet, in very ill verse," as he designates "The Foreigners," in which John Tutchin "fell personally upon the king and then upon the Dutch nation" — was called "The True-born Englishman." The poetical merit of this effusion was not high; and its irony, as was usual with De Foe, was over-subtile, and cut friends as well as foes; yet it was an effective retort upon the king's enemies, gaining an instantaneous popularity and a larger sale within the year than any book had yet enjoyed in England; and, above all, it obtained for the author the acquaintance and friendship of William, who, during the brief remainder of his life, employed his champion in various confidential services, alike to his honor and profit. Not only, however, was De Foe's political prosperity arrested by the death of his patron, but scarcely was Anne upon the throne before his dangerous gift of two-edged satire involved him in difficulties graver than any which had previously befallen him. By way of rebuking the inordinate exultation of the High-Church party upon the queen's accession, he published a pamphlet called "The Shortest Way with the Dissenters; or, Proposals for the Establishment of the Church." These "Proposals" included one for imitating the precedent of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes among similarly extravagant measures for getting "rid of Dissent and Dissenters"; but the irony was grave, and so excessively refined as, for the moment, to occasion the liveliest indignation among the sectaries in whose behalf it had been devised, and to effect its cordial acceptance among High Churchmen, one of whom, a fellow of one of the colleges at Cambridge, wrote to the bookseller who had sent him a copy of the work, "I join with that author in all that he says, and have such a value for the book, that, next to the Bible and the Sacred Comments, I take it for the most valuable piece I have. I pray God put it into her Majesty's heart to put what is there proposed into execution." As the nature and quality of the joke gradually dawned upon the public apprehension, the cha-

grin of the High-Church and Jacobite party at their absurd position knew no bounds; they brought to trial for wilful and malicious libel all persons concerned in the production of the book; and De Foe — who, to shield his printer and bookseller, had come out of the concealment in which he was fabricating new pamphlets, and thrown himself on the queen's mercy — was sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred marks, to stand three times in the pillory, to be imprisoned during the queen's pleasure, and to find sureties for good behavior during seven years. The punishment of the pillory was transformed into an ovation; for the instrument was hung with flowers, and the crowd assembled for the purpose of applauding and encouraging the victim, drank bumpers to his health and happiness, provided him with refreshments, and bought large numbers of his satirical "Hymn to the Pillory," and of an entirely new pamphlet, entitled "The Shortest Way to Peace and Union," an argument to reconcile Dissenters to the Established Church, both of which had been published on the morning of his first suffering. But the remainder of the punishment was not to be mitigated as the pillory had been, and to the exhaustion of his means by the costly trial and the fine was added the destruction of his pottery business, by reason of his imprisonment, so that his wife and six children were left without means of support. Here the boundless energy of the man, indomitable under any difficulties, asserted itself; for he not only persisted in his pamphleteering career, but, in Newgate as he was, and wholly unassisted, commenced the publication of his celebrated "Review," a wholly original weekly social and political review, upon the model shortly afterwards adopted by the "Guardian," "Tatler," "Spectator," and others of their kind. Not only was De Foe equal to this task, under which few men could have failed to break down, but, after eight weekly issues, he converted the "Review" into a semi-weekly, and again increased it to a tri-weekly after his release from Newgate, — a release brought about by the interest it awakened in Harley, afterwards Earl of Oxford, who interceded so effectually with the queen that she sent to De Foe, through the hands of Lord-Treasurer Godolphin, means for the relief of his family, for the payment of his fine, and for his discharge from prison.

Restored, after eighteen months' imprisonment, both to liberty and to court favor, De Foe indulged for a short time in retirement, and what he considered rest, — a "rest" which involved no intermission of the "Review," and which produced a poetical satire in twelve books (the *Jure Divino*), and one of the many poems on Marlborough's victories, which appeared at this time, and, by their general badness, contributed so auspiciously to Addison's career. For the remainder of Anne's reign — some nine years — De Foe's employments were similar to those provided for him under William. Tory and Whig ministers alike used him in a diversity of subterranean diplomacy, at home, on the Continent, and especially in Scotland, when the negotiation for the union of the realms, then pending, afforded a specially favorable opportunity for the exercise of his peculiar literary powers. Writing his "Review" regularly, wherever he chanced to be, and never intermitting the flow of pamphlets and poems, — of which it may be said once for all that, while their total number cannot be ascertained, the titles of his works which have been preserved number no less than two hundred and ten, — De Foe took up his residence in Edinburgh, and proceeded to manufacture public sentiment in favor of union with England. As one of the means to this end, he doubled his editorial labors by accepting from the corporation of the city the management of the "Edinburgh Courant," which was in their gift, and which he continued to hold, so long as his confidential embassy to Scotland lasted. Recalled to England soon after the restoration of his friend Harley to power, in 1711, he was presently obliged, in consequence of the stamp duty then imposed on newspapers, to discontinue the "Review," to the eighth and concluding volume of which he appended a sketch of his career, which contains, as a summary of his vicissitudes of fortune, the distich,

> "No man has tasted differing fortunes more,
> And thirteen times I have been rich and poor."

"I have seen the rough side of the world as well as the smooth," he goes on, "and in less than half a year tasted the difference between the closet of a king and the dungeon of Newgate." But the end of his fluctuations had not yet come; for we find him again unable to wean himself from his "Re-

view," reviving it for one hundred and six numbers more; again sent to Newgate by reason of a pamphlet called "What if the Queen should die?" in which, though it was written with the best intentions of loyalty to the Hanoverian succession, there was such a relapse into his old incomprehensible irony as persuaded the impenetrable public that it was an advocacy of the Pretender; again making his peace with the powers that be, by seizing upon the interval between Anne's death and George I.'s arrival from Hanover to fill the "Flying Post" with eulogiums upon the new monarch; and yet again employed in the secret service of the government, this time under the auspices of the Earl of Sunderland, and in the discharge of functions akin to those of a spy. Not to follow him out of his journalistic career into the years of retirement which produced, among other works, "Robinson Crusoe," "Moll Flanders," the "Memoirs of a Cavalier," and the "Account of the Plague," there remains to be mentioned, as the crowning glory of his editorial life, a newspaper enterprise to which he betook himself after the final discontinuance of his "Review." This was the "Mercator," a publication instigated by the Earl of Oxford, who supplied to it the official documents and statistics in the possession of the ministry. This paper was continued, thrice a week, for one hundred and eighty-one numbers, until Oxford's retirement from office. It is notable as showing that at that early period — ten years before Adam Smith was born — De Foe was a free-trader. The first number contained what would now be called a prospectus, which set forth the following objects: —

"Considerations on the state of British trade, particularly as respects Holland, France, and the Dutch barrier, — the trade to and from France, — the trade to Portugal, Spain, and the West Indies, — and the Fisheries of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, — with other matters and advantages accruing to Great Britain by the Treaty of Peace and Commerce lately concluded at Utrecht."

Throughout Addison's career his literary and his political employments contributed reciprocally to the advancement of each other. The Latin poems he wrote at Oxford had already won him some renown, both there and at the sister University of Cambridge, when, at the age of twenty-two, he addressed

some complimentary lines to Dryden, which introduced him to the friendship of the veteran poet. By Dryden he was made acquainted with Congreve, and by Congreve with Charles Montagu, afterwards Lord Halifax, who at this time was Chancellor of the Exchequer and Whig leader in the House of Commons. Halifax, a man of distinguished literary taste, and through life an assiduous patron of men of letters, co-operated warmly with his colleague Lord Somers in attaching young men of talent to the fortunes of their party. Discerning the capabilities of Addison, Montagu designed employing him in the service of the Crown abroad, and, that he might acquire the knowledge of the French and other languages requisite to a diplomatist, procured for him a pension of £ 300 a year, to be expended in travel on the Continent. During these travels came the fall of Halifax and his impeachment; but Addison's interests were taken in charge by the Earl of Manchester, and he had just been appointed English agent in attendance upon Prince Eugene in Italy, when the death of King William and the consequent revolution of parties interrupted Addison's fortunes only less rudely than it did De Foe's. Returning to England, Addison for a time led a life of extreme poverty in London, until the breaking up of party lines and that coalition of the Whigs and moderate Tories which followed the victories of Marlborough. The popularity of these victories was a main reliance of the ministry, and Godolphin was extremely mortified by the surpassingly wretched poems produced by his partisans in honor of the battle of Blenheim, — poems of which Lord Macaulay has preserved these specimen lines: —

> "Think of two thousand gentlemen at least,
> And each man mounted on his capering beast!
> Into the Danube they were pushed by shoals."

According to a statement to be found in one of the poet Cowper's letters, these verses were written by one Chapman, but Macaulay, for some unexplained reason, omitted the last and most absurd line as given by Cowper: —

> "Into the Danube they were pushed by shoals,
> And sunk and bobb'd, and bobb'd and sunk, and sunk and bobb'd, their souls."

Unversed in literature himself, Godolphin was nevertheless

able to appreciate the proficiency of Halifax, and appealed to him for help in his emergency. Halifax expressed resentment at the manner in which the public money which he had employed while in office for the encouragement of literature had been diverted into discreditable uses, and affected unwillingness to indicate the poet of whom the minister was in search. Godolphin, however, gently extracted from him the information that Addison was the man he needed, and having given assurances that Halifax's friend should be approached with consideration and liberally rewarded, he despatched on the embassy the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Henry Boyle, who found Addison in a garret over a mean shop in the Haymarket, and unfolded to him the desires of the ministry. The poem that resulted was "The Campaign," which contains the famous similitude of the angel who

> "Rides in the whirlwind and directs the storm,"

and which, winning immense and instant applause, effected the author's immediate appointment to a commissionership of £200 a year, with a promise of further advancement. Addison's prosperity had now commenced. The publication of a volume of travels and the opera of "Rosamond" sustained his literary reputation; while the Parliamentary election of 1705 having restored the Whigs to power and Halifax to office, he was successively employed on a mission to Hanover, as an undersecretary of state; and, having gained a seat in Parliament, as Chief Secretary for Ireland, under the Earl of Wharton as Lord Lieutenant, and ultimately as Secretary of State. It was during his official residence in Dublin that Addison was drawn into journalism. Before leaving England he had provided for his old schoolmate and fellow-collegian, Richard Steele, by procuring from Lord Sunderland his appointment to the editorship of the official "Gazette," — an office of no literary dignity, but which gave its incumbent earlier and fuller foreign intelligence than any other newspaper writer could possibly obtain. The possession of these facilities suggested to Steele a periodical paper on a new plan, — a paper which should be published on the days of the tri-weekly mails from London to the country, and which should combine exceptionally authentic foreign news with the social, literary, and theatrical gossip in which his

knowledge of the town made him an adept. The "Tatler" consequently appeared in 1709, and at once obtained from Addison such contributions that the editor himself, to use his own words, "fared like a distressed prince who calls in a powerful neighbor to his aid. I was undone by my auxiliary." Steele continues: "When I had once called him in, I could not subsist without dependence on him." It was now for the first time that Addison's real genius appeared. As a poet he was the best during the short interregnum between Dryden and Pope, and he had already established himself as an elegant and popular man of letters. But it was in the "Tatler" that he originated the "social essay" which has retained undiminished popularity from his day to ours. For an adequate analysis of the combination of powers which Addison displayed in this journal, still more in the "Spectator" and others of its successors, — the graceful facility of his style, his fine satire, his wit, invention, and observation, his diversified humor, high-bred good-temper, humanity, and unsullied moral purity, — the reader must turn to Lord Macaulay's well-known essay. It is sufficient to say here that Addison's periodical writings furnished the model which the best essayists, alike of his generation and of ours, have endeavored to imitate, but have never surpassed. The "Tatler" ceased by reason of that fall of the Whigs from power in 1710, which not only deprived Steele of his gazetteership, and consequently of the information which formed the groundwork of his journal, but cost Addison his office at a time when other pecuniary losses and personal troubles accumulated upon him. During the stormy election which now ensued, and in which Addison secured his seat without a contest, the partisans of Secretary St. John, afterwards Lord Bolingbroke, established the "Examiner," of which some account will presently be given. To repel its damaging assaults Addison brought out the "Whig Examiner," in which his abilities showed as conspicuously in political controversy as they had done in social satire. The journal, however, was designed to serve only a momentary purpose, and was discontinued after a few months' issue, or rather it passed into other hands and took another title; but it had proved so formidable an antagonist that Swift wrote in great exultation to Stella to an-

nounce that "it is now down among the dead men," — a remark to which Dr. Johnson, for all his Toryism, appends the observation, "He might well rejoice at the death of that which he could not have killed." In the next year Steele, to whom a newspaper was as much a necessity of existence as to De Foe, commenced the "Spectator," the design of which, as well as the two most notable members of its imaginary club, — Sir Roger de Coverley and Will Honeycomb, — was the creation of Addison. Addison's contributions were at once the best in the paper, and the specimens of his own writing which have taken the strongest hold upon the popular as well as the critical mind. To their merit undoubtedly it was due that the "Spectator," instead of justifying the warnings of those who censured Steele's rashness in attempting a daily publication, at once became an indispensable accompaniment of the breakfast-table of polite society, and gained a daily circulation of between three and four thousand copies, while particular numbers reached twenty thousand; a popularity which, in view of the rarity of readers at that day, has been accounted relatively equal to that of the works of Scott or Dickens, and which was so firmly established that, when the imposition of the stamp-tax had the intended effect of killing off most of the existing journals, the "Spectator" was able to double its price and still to yield a good return to its owners. Addison's further official advancements, his works in general literature, and his other journalistic enterprises — although the last include the "Freeholder," commenced during the Scottish rebellion of 1715, in behalf of the Pretender, the strangest of his political writings — present no new features, and need not be dwelt upon. It is sufficient to say that Addison's writings won him a higher place in the state than any other Englishman has gained by the same means, — for Mr. Disraeli's rise has been due to other things than literature, — and that literary and political eminence combined to give social station which enabled him to become the husband of the Countess Dowager of Warwick and the master of the world-renowned Holland House. Of his literary work there can be no more admirable summary than in the closing words of Lord Macaulay's eloquent essay, which describe it as that of "the great satirist, who alone knew how to use ridicule

without abusing it, who, without inflicting a wound, effected a great social reform, and who reconciled wit and virtue, after a long and disastrous separation, during which wit had been led astray by profligacy, and virtue by fanaticism."

Upon Bolingbroke's dark and involved political life it is not necessary to enlarge. Of his newspapers, the first was the "Examiner," brought out in 1710, when, as Secretary of State in the newly formed administration of the Earl of Oxford, it was his purpose to inflame to the utmost the popular fury against the fallen Godolphin ministry and its Whig following. Writing as often himself as was possible amid the engrossing cares of office at so stormy a period, but forced more frequently to inspire the pens of such assistants as Swift, Atterbury, Arbuthnot, Prior, and Freind, Bolingbroke for the first time made journalism a great power in the state, and displayed in the "Examiner" the earliest specimen of the capabilities of a great party organ. The unparalleled weight and ferocity of its attacks were such as to call for some counteracting influence on the side of the Whigs, which was put forth, as has been seen, in Addison's "Whig Examiner"; and this contest, especially the spectacle of two such statesmen as Lords Bolingbroke and Cowper, who answered him in the "Tatler," engaged in a newspaper controversy, has been dwelt upon by Sir Walter Scott as attesting the influence upon the public mind thus early exercised by the press. Its immediate purpose attained, the conduct of the "Examiner" was allowed to devolve almost wholly on Dean Swift, who carried it on, as he says, for some eight months, until, becoming tired of it, and disgusted with the enmities it made for him, he transferred it to the notorious Mrs. Manley, from whom it again declined into the hands of Oldisworth, who continued it until the death of the queen and the end of the Oxford ministry. Threatened with impeachment for his share in the pacification of Utrecht, Bolingbroke lapsed into exile and treason, and office in the mock court of the Pretender in France. Soon breaking with these squabbling plotters of revolutions, and pursued by them with an innocuous impeachment, he devoted himself to literature and to the vindication of his conduct, until, in 1723, he was accorded his pardon and the restoration of his inheritance, but not of his

seat in the House of Lords. Returning to England and to journalism, for the next ten years he set himself to the task of writing down Sir Robert Walpole and his ministry. The "Craftsman" was commenced as a weekly paper in 1726, under the editorship of Nicholas Amherst, who took the *nom de plume* of Caleb Danvers; but its chief contributors and master-spirits were Bolingbroke and Pulteney, the leader of the opposition in the House of Commons. Bolingbroke was at once its most copious writer and the author of its popularity, the appearance of his series of articles called "Oldcastle's Remarks" having raised its sale to a point then considered prodigious, while his immediately succeeding "Dissertation upon Parties" further increased it to a weekly circulation of twelve thousand copies. More significant, however, than their immediate effect are the facts that these political essays were adopted as the model of those which Bolingbroke's strong admirer, Lord Chesterfield, afterwards contributed to the "World," that to them is traceable the inspiration which at a later day animated Smollett and Junius, — that their form and manner were those employed by the daily papers when, toward the close of the century, they began to assume strength and respectability, — that the "Craftsman" was the undoubted prototype of Canning's "Anti-Jacobin," of Leigh Hunt's "Examiner," and of Theodore Hook's "John Bull," — and that to its irresistible advocacy has been attributed that marked predominance of its opinions among the generation growing up under its influence which is illustrated by the circumstance that the men of letters under George III. were represented by such Tories as Johnson, Gibbon, Hume, Goldsmith, Smollett, while Fielding was almost the only Whig of acknowledged literary eminence. It is even claimed that, since George III. was brought up upon Bolingbroke's writings, they are measurably responsible not only for the revival of Toryism in the middle of the century, but for a formative influence upon English government throughout that long reign which outlasted the American and the French revolutions.

Nothing could be more strongly marked than the differences between these three representative men of Queen Anne's era, who yet concurred in working out the political supremacy of the

press. The difference is illustrated in their style, — De Foe's, belonging to that school of clear, strong English, of which Swift is the representative and master, was plain almost to rudeness, and the characteristic of his writings was plausible realism and common sense; Addison's classic simplicity and flowing grace furnished the best possible medium for his exquisite unlabored humor; while Bolingbroke's more ornate diction falls rather into rank with Burke's and Gibbon's, and his withering irony and invective, furious while dignified, were imitated but not improved upon by Chesterfield, Pope, and Junius. The varied parts they filled in partisan warfare are equally striking, — De Foe, fertile in resource and of boundless endurance of labor, blundering on through difficulties to the end in view, served as a kind of sharpshooter or guerilla warrior, diligently picking off the enemy's outposts, but seldom merging himself in a general movement or taking recognized rank; Addison, the accomplished executor of enterprises for the general benefit of his party, devolved upon him from no dominating interest of his own in their success, but because no other hand could carry them through with such skill as his; Bolingbroke, marshalling battalions of talent for the retention of power while he possessed it, and putting forth the utmost resources of his own splendid genius and learning to recover it when it had been lost. As distinctly contrasted were their characters and aims. De Foe, the plebeian patriot and radical, who, whatever the tergiversations which recent researches have brought to light, bent himself with ardent relish to the redress of the wrongs which came within his view; Addison, the middle-class Whig, whose fidelity to friends and party involved him in conflicts which it is difficult to harmonize with his somewhat too placid character, but in which he acquitted himself with none the less honor; Bolingbroke, the Tory aristocrat and doctrinaire, perpetually led by his self-seeking ambition into failure and disgrace, yet the only one of the three great contemporaries to bring his speculations into completeness and clear relief, and to evolve from them a coherent political system. Notably as their lives were at variance, still more so have been the posthumous fortunes of their works. De Foe, *quâ* politician and journalist, has passed into such oblivion that of the

greater part of his effusions in this capacity not even the names survive. Of his very mediocre poetry but four lines have kept their hold on life by dint of passing into the category of stock quotations, — the lines which open "The Free-born Englishman," and which possibly owe their exceptional favor to their curious exemplification of the author's besetting literary sin, the counterpart of the "squinting construction" of the grammarians: —

> "Wherever God erects a house of prayer
> The Devil always builds a chapel there;
> And 't will be found upon examination
> The latter has the largest congregation."

In spite of reproaches of this sort which he managed so often and so unintentionally to point against his co-sectaries, it is yet as the undaunted champion of Dissenters as much as by reason of his authorship of the most popular book in the language, that De Foe's name has passed into immortality. In the case of the second of our great journalists, it is not of the Right Honorable Joseph Addison, Secretary of State, that men now think, nor of the partisan, nor yet of the poet and literary oracle who held in the Kit Cat and the applauding "senate" of the coffee-houses a position similar to that of Johnson in the next generation. His readers in our time admire the graceful essayist and social moralist who purified a polluted age, and to whose memory, but for the envenomed gall of the brilliant and envious Pope, not the suspicion of even a foible would attach. Bolingbroke, whose personal power attained the greatest height of the three, and whose opinions left the deepest impression upon the minds of immediate posterity and the events of the age, is known to us only at second-hand, and recalls little more than the friendship of Pope. There are even notably well-read men who have not perused one of his works; and the general reader rarely glances into his writings, unless from curiosity or for critical recreation. Originally, perhaps, this oblivion was due to the treasonable courses which brought a similar fate upon the similarly offending Atterbury; but for its perpetuation we must look to those philosophical speculations, with their obnoxious religious tendencies, which have come to be the principal association with the name of Bolingbroke.

For this, whatever their dissimilarities, these three great contemporaries are to be held in common honor, that to them and to their fellow-workers we owe the elevation of the press to the position of a great political arbiter, and the accomplishment of a revolution in the independence of government and public opinion that only awaited the supplementary reform of which, in another generation, Wilkes was the instrument, to give us, in all except perfection of detail, the essential attributes of the newspaper of the nineteenth century.

The level to which the periodical press had been raised by the politicians of Queen Anne's era was not maintained during the earlier Hanoverian reigns. The age of Johnson, Goldsmith, Hume, Robertson, Sterne, Gray, Fielding, Smollett, was pre-eminently a literary one; but the newspaper fell into the hands of party hacks, the bravos of the government and of the opposition, and becoming the mere tool of faction, even while it retained the influence which we have seen Lord Danvers complain of, sunk into disrepute. The ministerial journalists of this period were characterized by Pulteney as "a herd of wretches, whom neither information can enlighten nor affluence elevate"; and the ministerial leader, Sir Robert Walpole, who was no great reader and was singularly indifferent to what was written about himself, completed the sketch by saying, "I have never discovered any reason to exalt the authors who write against the administration to a higher degree of reputation than their opponents." In his "Citizen of the World," Goldsmith attributes to the pen of his Chinese observer of English manners an account of the newspaper of the day. "The universal passion for politics," writes this philosopher, "is gratified by daily 'Gazettes,' as with us at China. But as in ours the Emperor endeavors to instruct his people, in theirs the people endeavor to instruct the administration. You must not, however, imagine that they who compile these papers have any actual knowledge of the politics or the government of a state; they only collect their materials from the oracle of some coffee-house; which oracle has himself gathered them the night before from a beau at a gaming-table, who has pillaged his knowledge from a great man's porter, who has had his information from the great man's gentleman, who

has invented the whole story for his amusement the night preceding." It was nevertheless during this period of journalistic degradation that precise knowledge of public affairs began to be embodied in something answering to Parliamentary reporting. From the time of Anne until the earlier part of George III.'s reign, pretty correct accounts of the debates were given in an annual publication called "Boyer's Historical Register." Hitherto, in order to escape the censure of Parliament, these reports had only been printed during its recess; but in 1738 the Commons forbade their publication "as well during the recess as the sitting of Parliament," and gave warning that they should "proceed with the utmost severity against offenders." When, therefore, about this time, regular monthly reports of the debates began to appear in the "London" and "Gentleman's" magazines, it became customary to adopt various disguises, as a means of eluding the vengeance of the two Houses. The debates were assigned in one set of reports to the "Political Club," and were put into the mouths of such Roman worthies as Brutus and Mark Antony; and in Dr. Johnson's to the "Senate of Great Liliput"; while the speakers and personages alluded to were either designated by such initials as "the E. of B.," the "P—— of W——s," "the K——," "the Q——," or by such perversions as calling Mr. Constantine Phipps and Mr. Jeremiah Dyson, representatives respectively of Lincoln and Weymouth, "Mr. Constantine Lincoln" and "Mr. Jeremiah Weymouth." "This ridiculous affectation of concealment," says Hallam, "was extended to many other words in political writings, and had not wholly ceased in the American war," — an affectation which often makes the memoirs and diaries of that period such exasperating reading, and which is to this day cherished, as an amusing archaism, by "Punch" and his followers, and, on grounds best known to himself, by the "fashionable reporter" of ladies' toilets. For the transition from this system of subterfuge and circumlocution to one of blunt straightforwardness, and for making possible the public scrutiny of men and measures by the unreserved daily publication of full intelligence, we are indebted to the resolute pertinacity of the famous John Wilkes.

There is no character which more certainly excites the ire of the historian than that of the demagogue, and it has fallen to the lot of Wilkes to receive very hard measure even at the hands of those most indebted to the reform he brought about. Undoubtedly he was not a personage whom the most perverse of hero-worshippers could exalt into an idol. One disqualification existed in an insuperable physical deformity which caused endless taunts to be flung at him. Even in our own time and country we have had illustrations, perhaps intensifications, of the popular inability to conceive that, in public men at least, an obliquity of vision may be unaccompanied by a corresponding deviation from moral rectitude ; and Wilkes was disfigured by what so recent a writer as Lord Brougham has seen fit to call " his inhuman squint and demoniac grin." From his own day to ours Wilkes's squint has been persistently forced upon the eye and the imagination of the public. Hogarth was seduced by royal patronage to turn upon his friend and immortalize it in caricatures which hold a conspicuous place in his own story and Wilkes's, and in the politico-literary feuds of the day. Southey, who had passed from the " pantisocratic " form of communistic radicalism into the laureateship, a pension, and the post of High Tory literary gladiator to the house of Hanover, introduced Wilkes into that very poor production, " The Vision of Judgment," in a passage containing these lines: —

> " Beholding the foremost,
> Him by the cast of his eye oblique, I knew as the firebrand
> Whom the unthinking populace held for their idol and hero,
> Lord of Misrule in his day. . . . .
> Discontent and disloyalty, like the teeth of the dragon,
> He had sown on the winds; they had ripened beyond the Atlantic;
> Thence in natural birth, sedition, revolt, revolution,
> France had received the seeds, and reaped the harvest of horrors."

Byron, in that " Second Vision of Judgment," in which he retorted upon what he called Southey's " Apotheosis of George the Third," before bringing in the Laureate with his " spavined dactyls " and the recitations which put angels, devils, and gibbering ghosts to flight, and set Michael's teeth on edge to that degree that he was unable to drown the poetic flow with his trump, introduced Wilkes as one of the witnesses sum-

moned by Satan against the miserable monarch, describing him as

"A merry, cock-eyed, curious-looking sprite."

Socially, indeed, there could not have been two more congenial spirits than Wilkes and Byron, had they but been contemporaries. With all the personal fascination which afterwards marked the noble poet, the popular agitator managed to attain, even among the dissolute "wits and men of honor about town" of his time, a bad eminence for the extravagance of his debaucheries and the wild excesses of Medmenham Abbey. A graphic enumeration of the orgies at this place would read more like a leaf from one of Ingoldsby's most bizarre extravaganzas than a sober recital of the dissipations of Young England a century and a half ago. In brief, it may be said that the ruins of an old Cistercian abbey on the banks of the Thames had been restored by a band of profligate men of fashion which comprised such ornaments to society as Wilkes, Bubb Dodington (Lord Melcombe), Sir Thomas Stapleton, Thomas Potter (son of the Archbishop of Canterbury), Paul Whitehead (the poet so despised by Johnson, and secretary to the brotherhood), the Rev. Lawrence Sterne (though this has been questioned), the Earl of Sandwich (eminent as the most dissolute man in England, and afterwards Secretary of State), and Sir Francis Dashwood, who, when Chancellor of the Exchequer, became conspicuous as the most incapable of financiers, and who now officiated as father-abbot of the order, which was styled, in his honor, Franciscan. Each member had his cell and monastic robes, in which he officiated at revels so indecent that chroniclers by no means squeamish refuse to dwell upon their nature, and performed, in a chapel adorned with obscene embellishments, rites which blended the ceremonial of the Roman Catholic Church with the mysteries of Bacchus and Venus, and of which one of the features was the administration of the eucharist to an ape. Whether or not these proceedings were youthful excesses which he afterwards outgrew, it is certain that Wilkes was hailed by acclamation one of the most agreeable of companions, that his taste and reading were highly esteemed, his wit universally quoted, and his company in great request. Nothing in the Life of Johnson is

more amusing than Boswell's account of the labored diplomacy by which he prevailed upon the Tory Doctor to meet Wilkes at a dinner and not to insult him, the sulky stand made by his patron against the blandishments of the demagogue, and his final capitulation to the irresistible charm. "His name," said Johnson of Wilkes, after the conversion, "has been sounded from pole to pole as the phœnix of convivial felicity." When his dialect was more in dishabille he observed of him, "Jack has a great variety of talk; Jack is a scholar; Jack has the manners of a gentleman"; and again he writes to Mrs. Thrale, "I have been breaking jokes with Jack Wilkes upon the Scotch. Such, madam, are the vicissitudes of things." Still more impressive is the testimony of Lord Mansfield, who, after having been one of his most assiduous persecutors, said, "Mr. Wilkes was the pleasantest companion, the politest gentleman, and the best scholar I ever knew." Such were the contrasting features in the sufficiently vulnerable character of the man upon whom it devolved to assert and to establish the liberty of the press, in the face of the imbittered combination of every branch of the government, and through a struggle of a dozen years which involved his own ruin.

Wilkes's first political operation miscarried, but not for want of energy or pluck. In 1754 he contested the borough of Berwick-upon-Tweed, and learning that his opponent's voters were to be brought thither by sea, he bribed the captain to land them on the coast of Norway, but was outvoted nevertheless. His second attempt was made three years later, when he was elected at Aylesbury, by dint of an expenditure of £ 7,000. Attaching himself at once to the fortunes of Pitt, he promptly became conspicuous for the intensity of his aversions to the French and the Scots, — aversions which swayed the thoroughgoing Englishman of that day to an almost incredible extent. The displacement of Pitt by the Earl of Bute, a Scot, would no doubt have impelled Wilkes into violent opposition, even had the provocations been less than they were; but if the favorite had deliberately proposed to himself the task of making his ministry and his compatriots obnoxious, he could scarcely have done so more effectually. He at once began to reverse the prosperous and popular policy of Pitt; he bestowed upon his

personal adherents the richest prizes in the public gift; he affected to patronize letters, but refused a professorship to the accomplished Gray, the author of the "Elegy," to confer it on an obscure Scot, the tutor of his son-in-law; and he bestowed both a pension and a sinecure office upon Home, whose countrymen, in honor of his tragedy of "Douglas," were shouting in the theatres, "Wha 's your Wullie Shakespeare noo?" The popular hatred of Bute became intense; a mob attacked him in his sedan-chair, and was with difficulty dispersed by a troop of guards; he was forced to go about in disguise; on all sides he encountered, hung upon a gallows, a jack-boot, — a pun upon his Christian name and title, — coupled with a petticoat, representative of the king's mother, of whom the Earl was popularly believed to be the paramour. Into this turmoil Wilkes plunged with zest. The ministry had established Smollett in charge of a paper called the "Briton," written by Scotchmen, and intrusted with the defence of the existing order of things. Wilkes lost little time in associating with himself the satirist and poet, Charles Churchill, then in the height of his great popularity, and setting up an opposition paper, the famous "North Briton," whose mission it was to assail the Scotch and bring odium upon the Bute ministry. The paper embodied the popular wrath, and instantly rose to a large circulation, being written with extreme clearness and plausibility, and with an audacity illustrated by the circumstance that in it, for the first time, initials and dashes were discarded, and persons of the highest station assailed by name. Unquestionably it was libellous; and there is a story, recorded by Crabb Robinson on the authority of the poet Rogers, that Wilkes said, probably in allusion to it, "Give me a grain of truth, and I will mix it up with a great mass of falsehood, so that no chemist shall ever be able to separate them." The odium thus cherished and fermented by the "North Briton" became so intense that Bute was absolutely terrified into submission, and resigned in April, 1763; being succeeded by a ministry having Mr. George Grenville at its head, and among its members Sir Francis Dashwood (now Lord le Despenser) and Lord Sandwich, both former Franciscans of Medmenham Abbey. Supposing its point carried, Wilkes suspended the publication of

his paper at its forty-fourth number; but it at once became apparent that the changes had been only ostensible, and that Lord Bute continued the adviser of the king and the inspirer of the ministry; so, after three weeks' intermission, there appeared the famous "No. 45" of the "North Briton," and the long struggle commenced.

So far from being exceptionally violent, the number of the paper upon which the government joined issue was subdued and tame by contrast with its predecessors, being, in the words of Burke, "a spiritless though virulent performance, at once vapid and sour." But George III. was bent on suppressing Wilkes, and Grenville was anxious at once to distinguish his ministry by some vigorous measure and to avert from it the assaults which had overwhelmed his forerunner. Accordingly, it was given out that the "North Briton's" comments upon the king's recent speech, proroguing Parliament, were disloyal, and that their designation of one of its statements as untrue amounted to a direct personal insult to the king, who was thus charged by a subject with falsehood.* Not content with filing an information for libel in the Court of King's Bench, the ministry revived an antiquated relic of royal prerogative, and issued a general warrant against "the authors, printers, and publishers of the 'North Briton,' No. 45," — of whose identity it sought no evidence, — and Lord Halifax, giving verbal instructions for the apprehension of Wilkes and Churchill, left

* As the position of the government, with respect to the libel, depends essentially upon the question whether Wilkes had *personally* assailed the king, it became important to examine the offensive words. Of the principal passage selected by the attorney-general to rest his charge of seditious libel upon, these sentences contain the pith: "The king's speech has always been considered by the legislature and by the public at large as the *speech of the minister*. It has regularly, at the beginning of every session of Parliament, been referred by both Houses to the consideration of a committee, and has been generally canvassed with the utmost freedom, when the minister of the crown has been obnoxious to the nation. . . . . This week has given to the public the most abandoned instance of ministerial effrontery ever attempted to be imposed on mankind. The *minister's speech* of last Tuesday is not to be paralleled in the annals of this country. I am in doubt whether the imposition is greater on the sovereign or on the nation. Every friend of his country must lament that a prince of so many great and amiable qualities, whom England truly reveres, can be brought to give the sanction of his sacred name to the most odious measures, and to the most unjustifiable public declarations, from a throne ever renowned for truth, honor, and unsullied virtue."

the remaining arrests to the discretion of the officers. So diligently did these bestir themselves, and so credulous were they of rumors and guesses, that they soon had forty-nine publishers and printers under arrest, and carried away all their books and papers. Wilkes himself demanded of the king's messenger a sight of the warrant, and, discovering the blunder of the Crown lawyers, declared that it did not respect him, that "such a warrant was absolutely illegal and void in itself," and that it was "a ridiculous warrant against the whole English nation." During this interview Churchill entered the room, and Wilkes, with great presence of mind, addressed him with, "Good morrow, Mr. Thomson. How does Mrs. Thomson do to-day? Does she *dine in the country?*" And Churchill, taking the hint, said that she did, and that he had come to bid farewell, and removed himself and his papers to a place of security. Carried before Lords Halifax and Egremont, the Secretaries of State, Wilkes's keen retorts entirely baffled their inquiries; but he was committed to the Tower, and held in such close confinement as to be denied writing-materials or the sight of friends or of legal advisers, until — after the government had several times baffled his allies by transferring him from the custody of one prison to another — he was released on a writ of *habeas corpus*, on the score of his privilege as a member of Parliament. The next move was on the side of Wilkes. Provided with means by Lord Temple, the printers brought actions in the Court of Common Pleas against the messengers who had arrested them, and — Chief Justice Pratt delivering his judgment that the general warrant was illegal, that it was illegally executed, and that the officers were indemnified by statute — recovered £ 300 damages. Wilkes also sued a Mr. Wood, an under-secretary of state, who had superintended his arrest and seized his papers, and, in addition to the triumph of putting Lord Halifax on the stand, was awarded by the jury £ 1,000 damages. The publishers likewise recovered £ 400. Besides all these judgments, — which, being appealed from, were reaffirmed by Lord Mansfield and three other judges in the Court of King's Bench, on the ground that general warrants were illegal, and that "no degree of antiquity can give sanction to a usage bad in itself," — Wilkes brought actions for false

imprisonment against Lords Egremont and Halifax, and recovered from the latter — for Egremont died during the delays that were interposed — £ 4,000 damages.

In Parliament, on the contrary, the Court was able to carry things with a high hand. In the House of Commons, on the night of its assembling, Mr. Grenville read a message from the king detailing the proceedings against Wilkes; and this being responded to by a unanimous vote of thanks, Lord North moved a resolution condemnatory of Wilkes in the bitterest terms. During the heated debate which followed, it is said that Pitt — who disliked Wilkes, but perceived that he now represented the liberty of the subject and the independence of Parliament — spoke forty times; but the adherents of the king were immovable, and carried the resolution by a large majority, as well as another directing that the "North Briton" should be publicly burned by the common hangman. Wilkes hereupon, with excellent temper, narrated the circumstances of the arrest, and offered to waive his Parliamentary privilege, in order that the libel might be tried before a jury. He was answered by a Mr. Martin, — a ministerial placeman, who, having been assailed as such in the "North Briton," had prepared himself by pistol practice for the opportunity which now offered, — with a declaration that the author of the "North Briton" was "a malignant and infamous scoundrel, who had stabbed him in the dark." When the House next assembled, and it was proposed further to consider what measures should be taken against Wilkes, it was announced that he had fallen in a duel with Mr. Martin, and was not expected to survive. In the House of Lords the proceedings were still more extraordinary. As soon as it had assembled, the Earl of Sandwich, one of Wilkes's former Medmenham associates, complained to the Peers of an obscene poem called "An Essay on Woman," a parody of Pope's "Essay on Man," and accompanied by notes which burlesqued those of Bishop Warburton on Pope's Essay, and were attributed to that prelate. This poem, although its first few lines were such that Lord Hardwicke begged their ears might be spared the rest, delighted Lord Sandwich so intensely that he persisted in reading it to the end; whereupon Bishop Warburton rose to express his surprise and indignation

that his ears and those of his Episcopal brethren should be polluted with such filth, to protest strenuously against the association of his name with its notes, and to exclaim that "the blackest fiends in hell would not keep company with Wilkes when he should arrive there," — an outburst of which the sincerity may be estimated from this passage in a letter written by Lord Sandwich to Mr. Grenville a week before Parliament met: "I have been this morning with the bishop, and showed him the papers. He comes heartily into the affair, says he will not only authorize me to complain in his name of this outrage, but will take any part in it himself that shall be judged proper by the king's administration, and he seems much pleased with the scheme in general." Of the *rôle* taken by Lord Sandwich, the popular appreciation was embodied in the saying of Lord le Despenser, — lately Sir Francis Dashwood, the father-abbot of the Franciscans, — that he had "never before heard Satan rebuke sin"; while a more public and enduring impression, recorded by Horace Walpole, was given a few nights after at Covent Garden Theatre, where Captain Macheath's observation, in the "Beggars' Opera," "That Jemmy Twitcher should 'peach me, I own surprises me," elicited from the audience roars of perceptive appreciation, and fixed the nickname of Jemmy Twitcher upon the reprobate earl until his dying day. To complete the galaxy of virtue blended in this accusation, it should be added that among the most strenuous reprehenders of Wilkes's libertinism was the Earl of March, afterwards Duke of Queensberry, and the original of Thackeray's inimitable portraiture of the Marquis of Steyne. The poem thus commented upon — and used, on the score of the liberties taken with Bishop Warburton's name, as a protest for an abortive order by the Peers for taking Wilkes into custody — has been generally assumed by historians, by Macaulay and May, for instance, to have been the production of Wilkes; and Lord Brougham's imagination included among the charges against him that he had "prostituted the printing-press to multiply copies of a production that would dye with blushes the cheek of an impure." Now there has never been any evidence that Wilkes was the author; whereas there is reason to suppose that the poem was written, for the delectation of a

circle of rakes of which Lord Sandwich was a member, by Mr. Thomas Potter, already named as a Franciscan, the son of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and notorious for his amours with the wife of Bishop Warburton. Instead, again, of copies having been "multiplied," or even published, there never existed more than thirteen, which had been struck off at Wilkes's private press, the copy produced by the ministry having been used in correcting the proof, and obtained, by bribery, from the printer. Beset by spies, pursued with a variety of petty persecutions, his life menaced, and on one occasion attempted by an infuriate Scot who forced his way into the house, Wilkes sought refuge in Paris until his wound should heal, and for this session the Parliamentary proceedings against him were suspended. On the reassembling of Parliament there was presented to the speaker a medical certificate that Wilkes's wound had broken open, and rendered his movement impossible; but the House refused to accept this, on the ground of its informality in not having been sworn to before a notary, and by a large majority declared him expelled; while in the Court of King's Bench he was convicted in the matters of the "North Briton" and the "Essay on Woman," and, on his non-appearance to receive sentence, was outlawed. With the populace, which had sympathized with the original offence, the result of this unrelenting persecution was to exalt Wilkes to the position of a martyr. "Wit, Beauty, Virtue, Honor," — "ironic designations," Horace Walpole explains, "of the king, queen, princess dowager, and Lord Bute," — became the popular toast in the city. Chief Justice Pratt, in delivering his judgment on the illegality of general warrants, had remarked that it might be reversed by a higher court, in which event he must "submit, as will become me, and kiss the rod; but I must say I shall always consider it as a rod of iron for the chastisement of the people of Great Britain." At once he became one of the most popular men in the kingdom; his portrait, painted by Sir Joshua Reynolds, and bearing an inscription "In honor of the zealous asserter of English liberty by law," was hung in the Guildhall; and foreigners thronged to see so incredibly intrepid a judge. When the hangman appeared to carry out the sentence of burning the "North

Briton," it was torn from his hands by the mob, and in its stead a petticoat and jack-boot were thrown into the flames; while the offending number was reprinted and largely circulated; and when the printer, Williams, was sent to the pillory for this offence, he went thither in a coach marked "No. 45," and was presented with the sum of £ 200, contributed on the spot by the spectators, who likewise erected beside the pillory a gallows bearing the inevitable jack-boot and a Scotch bonnet.

In two years the Duke of Grafton became Premier, and Wilkes visited London and petitioned for a pardon, but was met with an evasive answer, — a course which is explained by these words in a letter written at the time by the Bishop of Carlisle to Mr. Grenville: "The ministers are embarrassed to the last degree how to act with regard to Wilkes. It seems they are afraid to press the king for his pardon, as that is a subject his Majesty will not easily hear the least mention of; and they are apprehensive, if he has it not, that the mob of London will rise in his favor, which God forbid." In 1768 there was a Parliamentary election, and Wilkes again returned and made a personal application to the king, which was neglected on the score of informality. Unpardoned as he was, he at once issued an address as candidate for the city of London, but, though he polled 1,247 votes, he was unsuccessful; whereupon he next day offered himself in Middlesex, and was elected by a vote of 1,292 to 827 for one of his opponents and 807 for the other. On the one side the mob of London compelled the citizens to illuminate their houses and shout for "Wilkes and Liberty." On the other, the king wrote to Lord North, "The expulsion of Mr. Wilkes appears to be very essential, and must be effected." Before bringing matters to this issue, however, another measure was taken for his suppression, and the old sentence of £ 1,000 fine and two years' imprisonment was put in force. On his way to prison the mob rescued him, but he again surrendered himself, and there was no new disturbance until the day of the meeting of Parliament. Expecting that he would be released to take his seat, a multitude assembled before the prison to escort him to the House, and, finding itself disappointed, became tumultuous. Soldiers were brought up and ordered to fire, which they did, killing several persons.

At the inquest verdicts of wilful murder were rendered against the magistrate who ordered the firing, and one of the soldiers to whom the act was brought home; but the former was acquitted on his trial, and the latter, though dismissed the service, was granted a pension for life; while Lord Barrington, by the king's express command, issued an order from the War Office, assuring the troops that had been employed "that every possible regard shall be shown to them; their zeal and good behavior on this occasion deserve it; and in case any disagreeable circumstance should happen in the execution of their duty, they shall have every defence and protection that the law can authorize and this office can give." With this order Wilkes coupled a despatch issued in advance of the riots by Lord Weymouth, Secretary of State, directing the use of force without scruple, and published a letter commenting unreservedly upon the course of the Secretary and what he termed the "bloody massacre." By the Peers this publication was voted "a breach of privilege," and by the Commons "an insolent, scandalous, and seditious libel." With it the latter House coupled the "North Briton" matter, — now five years old, and already punished by fine, by imprisonment, and by expulsion, — and a large majority voted his fresh expulsion, though it was strongly opposed by Burke, Pitt, Dowdeswell, Beckford, Cornwall, and Grenville; the latter of whom, though he had initiated the persecution, urged the impolicy of perpetuating the demagogue's popularity by continuing it, and predicted his re-election. Within ten days Wilkes was re-elected, only five votes being cast against him; whereupon at its next meeting the House resolved "that John Wilkes, Esquire, having been in this session of Parliament expelled this House, was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in this present Parliament," declared the election void, and issued a writ for a new one. At the new election Wilkes was returned with no opposing votes whatever; and the process was gone through with yet again, but with this difference, that Colonel Luttrell, a ministerial member, vacated his seat, stood against Wilkes, managed to get 296 votes against Wilkes's 1,143, procured from the House a vote that Wilkes's election was null and void, and was declared entitled to the contested seat by a Parlia-

mentary vote of 197 to 143. Thus, the Court had triumphed, but at a cost of which its expenditure of £100,000 in the proceedings formed a minor item. Wilkes's popularity became enormous; £20,000 was subscribed within a few weeks to defray the debts incurred by his resistance; and his cause was espoused in quarters where he had originally been regarded with the liveliest abhorrence; even the Prince of Wales, as Thackeray records for almost the only redeeming trait he can discern in the character of "the first gentleman of Europe," poking his head into the royal closet, on the occasion of a difference with his father, and shouting, "Wilkes and Liberty forever!" The sentiment of the people found expression in electing him, as soon as he was discharged from prison, to the office, at that time highly esteemed, of Alderman, then of Sheriff, then of Lord Mayor of London, finally to that of Chamberlain of the city, which he held for nearly twenty years, until his death. In 1774, moreover, he carried his point by taking his seat as member of Parliament from Middlesex, when he moved that the several resolutions which had been passed against him should be expunged from the journal of the House, "as subversive of the rights of the whole body of electors," — a motion on which he was defeated in the Parliaments of 1775, 1776, 1777, 1779, and 1781, but at last carried in 1782 by a vote of 115 to 47.

Much as these events, and the simultaneous prosecutions of the publisher of Junius's letters and other similar offenders, had done to bring discredit upon the existing doctrines respecting the law of libel and to vindicate the liberty of the press, it was reserved for Wilkes, in his capacity of Alderman, to inaugurate the proceedings with which our inquiry is chiefly concerned, and by which, in the words of Chancellor Campbell, "the right of publishing Parliamentary debates was substantially established." The new agitation grew out of the old one. By way of neutralizing Lord Chatham's vehement opposition to the anti-Wilkes procedures in 1770, the ministerial majority in the Lords had exercised their privilege of closing the doors, and so suppressed the debate. In the Commons similar measures were adopted; but as the reports nevertheless continued, Colonel George Onslow — who had been mentioned

in them as "little cocking George," "the little scoundrel," and "that little paltry, insignificant insect" — made a complaint against two of the offending journals, and obtained an order for the production of their printers at the bar of the House. Although their apprehension was prevented for the time by their servants resisting the officers, similar orders were issued against six more journals which persisted in the same offence; the minority of the House, comprising many who foresaw the impending difficulties in addition to the natural opponents of the principle at stake, delaying the vote until four o'clock in the morning by a process of "filibustering" which involved the unprecedented number of twenty-three divisions. Some of the printers submitted, apologized, and were reprimanded; but others took a well-concerted stand. One of them, Wheble, by advice of counsel, wrote to the Speaker declaring his resolve "to yield no obedience but to the laws of the land"; and having been collusively arrested by virtue of a royal proclamation which offered a reward for the offenders, he was brought by prearrangement before Alderman Wilkes. Wilkes, who had set the whole thing in motion, discharged the prisoner, after binding him over to prosecute for assault and false imprisonment the person who had made the arrest, and wrote to his old enemy, Lord Halifax, Secretary of State, announcing that Wheble had been apprehended by one who was "neither a constable nor peace-officer of the city," which was "in direct violation of the rights of an Englishman, and of the chartered privileges of a citizen of this metropolis." A similar arrest was similarly dealt with on the same day by Alderman Oliver. Next day a messenger of the House attempted to arrest Miller, another of the printers, in his shop; but Miller sent for a constable, accused the messenger of assaulting him in his own house, and brought him before the Lord Mayor and Aldermen Oliver and Wilkes, who, setting aside the Speaker's warrant as having not been backed by a city magistrate, and consequently illegal, discharged Miller and committed the messenger, although the deputy sergeant-at-arms of the Commons was present and demanded them both. Matters were now brought to this pass, that, whereas the printers were still at large, the House of Commons and the city of London were in open con-

flict. Even members who had deprecated the contest now admitted that there was no retreat. George III. had been persuaded from the first that, in the words of one of his notes to Lord North, "it is highly necessary that this strange and lawless method of publishing debates in the papers should be put a stop to"; and he now wrote to the same favorite to say that "the authority of the House of Commons is totally annihilated if it is not in an exemplary manner supported to-morrow by instantly committing the Lord Mayor and Alderman Oliver to the Tower; as to Wilkes," continued the king, "he is below the notice of the House." For several successive days the Lord Mayor (Brass Crosby) and Oliver, both of whom were members of the House, were called to its bar, the Commons taking the king's hint and declining, somewhat ignominiously, again to measure their resources against Wilkes. After protracted and violent proceedings, — during which the conduct of the House, in Chatham's words, was that "of a mob, and not of a Parliament," while Oliver on his side declared that he was unconcerned at their threatened punishment, and that, "as he expected little from their justice, he defied their power," — the popular magistrates were consigned to the Tower. Hither they were escorted by a vast mob, which had previously smashed the carriages of Lord North and Charles James Fox, and violently handled other champions of privilege as they made their way into the House. In the Tower they were waited upon by the most distinguished members of the opposition and by deputations from all parts of England, lauded in complimentary addresses, tendered the freedom of many cities, and loaded with presents. After six weeks of this ovation, the prorogation of Parliament set them at liberty, and the transaction was at an end.

Ostensibly Parliament had vindicated its privileges and punished their infringement. In reality a renewal of the conflict was palpably out of the question, and the publication of debates was nevermore challenged.

Great as have been the changes occasioned by the newspaper in the processes of legislation and the moulding of public opinion, those it has wrought in the characteristics of oratory

have been even more thorough. Abstaining from the greater subject for the closer pursuit of an immediate inquiry, a contrast of the later Parliamentary models of the bygone school with those of the present will exhibit the altered elocutionary fashions that have attended the new conditions under which the orator speaks and the entire transformation in the auditory whom he addresses. The younger Pitt was the first of the great statesmen to come into eminence after the admission of the press to legislative councils had been conceded, and it is noteworthy that it was he who introduced what Windham called "the state-paper style" of speaking. To his sagacious discernment it must have been evident that the impression upon the four hundred legislators before him, though he by no means overlooked that, was of inferior moment to the effect he could produce upon hundreds of thousands of readers throughout the land, and that the powers on which thenceforth it behooved a Parliamentary leader to rely were no longer such as work fascination, but those which carry conviction.

From Pitt, accordingly, may be dated the decline of the old ornate, rhetorical school, which trusted so largely to epigram and theatrical effect; and the rise of that which prefers thoughtful argument to enthusiasm and display, and seeks the deliberate approval of the public and the critics rather than the instant applause of oratorical connoisseurs. Tried by our more sober standards, the extent to which artifice and by-play and trickery in voice and manner were formerly in vogue seems to us incredible. Lord Bute, for instance, who was so unfortunate as to make his maiden speech before a very full House on the occasion of his first appearance as Prime Minister, adopted the conceit of making a long pause, not of hesitation but of affectation, before each emphatic word; drawing from Charles Townshend the exclamation, "Minute guns!" In exposure of a kindred mannerism, this specimen of Lord Folkestone's reduplicative rhetoric was supplied by Sir Robert Peel to the "New Whig Guide": —

"He objected — he objected to all estimates, original or supplemental — or supplemental. He saw portentous signs — signs in every street, that this — this country was on the eve of becoming a military — a military country; Punch — Punch, who in the days of our ancestors

was accompanied — companied by a fiddle, or a — fiddle or a dulcimer, was now accompanied — companied by a drum — by a drum and fife — and fife; every servant wore cock — cockades, and several cocked — cocked-hats. These were enormities — ormities not to be borne."

Most tricks of this sort have maintained a more or less modified existence down to our own day. In the Democratic Presidential Convention of 1863 the nomination was made by a gentleman, — now a conspicuous United States Senator, — who is said to have employed a constantly ascending shriek and the following terms: "Mister-r Chairman, as P'r-r-r-hesident of *the* United Sta-hates, I no-hominate Ma-hajor Gehen-eral Ge-horge Be-he Mac Cl-l-l-l-l-ellan!" Returning to the "New Whig Guide," we find an example of another kind of exaggeration in its sketch of the manner of Grattan, who "strode up and down the House, as if he was measuring ground for a duel; when he spoke his action was so violent that I observed he scratched off the skin of his knuckles against the floor; ever and anon he gave the red box on the table a thump that electrified the House." Grattan, Lord Byron relates, used to be mimicked by Curran as "bowing to the very ground, and thanking God that he had no peculiarities of gesture or appearance." The once famous "Orator" Hunt was noted for the same sort of violence; but its most conspicuous adoption by a really great orator was doubtless in the case of Fox, who, beginning with a stutter, a shrill keynote, and a lifted fist, would presently reach what Macaulay has called "the full paroxysm of inspiration, foaming, screaming, choked by the rushing multitude of his words." Among living orators this practice has fallen to Gladstone, whom Mr. Disraeli, as he has taken occasion to hint, is fortunate in being separated from in the House by a substantial table, although observers are said to speculate upon the chances of the Premier's some day flying over this barricade and falling bodily upon his rival. "As he advances to the table and steps back," says the "Saturday Review," "glaring and thundering, hitting the box before him, and clapping his hands together with resounding slaps which sometimes drown his most important words, Mr. Gladstone seems to be purposely piling fuel upon his own fire."

That this particular extravagance may be unconscious or involuntary is attested by Mr. Gladstone's persisting in a blemish whose absurdity is so at variance with modern taste and has often enough been forced upon his attention. Not so were the theatrical devices which used to be deliberately introduced, and sometimes no doubt to prove effective, if at others they miscarried. Thus Burke, illustrating the atrocity of the French Revolution, dashed a dagger on the floor, — to which Sheridan alluded, calling it a knife, and asking whether the gentleman had remembered to bring the fork. Equally premeditated, obviously, was the concluding touch which Sheridan himself gave to the second of his great speeches in the Warren Hastings impeachment, — a speech which lasted two days, and tempted enthusiasts to pay fifty guineas for tickets of admission to Westminster Hall, — sinking back with its last sentence, as if fainting from exhaustion, into the arms of Burke, who hugged him in rapture. The success of the most recent conspicuous case of histrionic display was not such as to encourage its repetition. It was on the occasion of the passage of the Reform Bill, when Lord Brougham, then Chancellor, concluded a four hours' speech — stimulated at intervals by five tumblers of wine with an infusion of brandy — with the plea, "I warn you, I implore you, — yea, on my bended knees I supplicate you, — reject not this bill," and suited the action to the word. "He continued for some time as if in prayer," says his biographer; "but his friends, alarmed for him lest he should be suffering from the effects of the mulled port, picked him up and placed him safely on the woolsack." Indulgence in pseudo-pathos is a similar piece of stage art, failure in which is particularly ignominious. Of Sir Robert Peel, admirable as he was in argument and debate, Mr. Disraeli has told us that "when he attempted to touch the tender passions it was painful. His face became distorted, like that of a woman who wants to cry, but cannot succeed." An illustration furnished by Chancellor Elden, which is not parliamentary, but is too apt to be omitted, occurs in Mr. Goldwin Smith's sketch of Pitt. Lord Eldon, at that time Attorney-General Sir John Scott, "opened his attempt to procure the capital conviction of a man who he knew had done nothing worthy of death with a pathetic exordium on his own

disinterestedness and virtue. 'He should have nothing to leave his children but his good name.' And then he wept. The Solicitor-General wept with his weeping chief. 'What is the Solicitor weeping for?' said one bystander to another. 'He is weeping to think how very little the Attorney will have to leave his children.'" Undoubtedly orators were led into *faux pas* of this sort by witnessing the supreme sway which pathos exerts over large audiences when employed by a master of it, such as Fox was. When he spoke, Chateaubriand has recorded, "It was in vain that the stranger tried to resist the impression made upon him; he turned aside and wept." When Burke, almost distraught by the progress of French anarchy, declared in the House that after a quarter of a century of companionship his path and Fox's lay in different ways, that "he had done his duty at the price of his friend; their friendship was at an end," Fox rose to reply and broke down, his voice choked with sobs, while there was scarcely a dry eye in the House. But not only are such emotions by their nature rare, but they can only be evoked by the touch of one possessed of the almost unique personal charm and lovableness that characterized Fox. It is difficult to perceive how any one who had witnessed the affected grief of Joseph Surface during his exquisitely hypocritical *tête-à-tête* with Sir Peter Teazle could expose himself to similar degradation. Nor is precisely this lapse recorded against Sheridan; but it is certain that his artificiality and study of effect were such that any oratorical device in which he might indulge encountered the ready suspicion of his familiars. With the record of the very dramatic prostration which closed his great Westminster Hall speech, for instance, we find coupled the statement that, on the day before it commenced, Mrs. Sheridan, overpowered by the eloquence of Burke, was carried from among the hysterical ladies who filled the galleries, in a fit. Nor is it easy to repress a mistrust that his professional eye had noted, with its wonted reference to future availability, the sympathy which attended oratorical exertion under physical disadvantages in the case of the great orator of the preceding generation. Before quoting Macaulay's picture of that scene, it is to be premised that his opponents of the Bute and Grenville faction having displaced Pitt from the

royal councils, but not from the popular affection, were staking their fortunes upon success on negotiating the close of the Seven Years' War by the Peace of Paris; and that the friends of the opposition leader had ineffectually tried to postpone the debate on the treaty until his health permitted his presence.

"The great day arrived. The discussion had lasted some time, when a loud huzza was heard in Palace Yard. The noise came nearer and nearer, up the stairs, through the lobby. The door opened, and from the midst of a shouting multitude came forth Pitt, borne in the arms of his attendants. His face was thin and ghastly, his limbs swathed in flannels, his crutch in his hand. The bearers set him down within the bar. His friends instantly surrounded him, and with their help he crawled to his seat near the table. In this condition he spoke three hours and a half against the Peace. During that time he was repeatedly forced to sit down and to use cordials. It may well be supposed that his voice was faint, that his action was languid, and that his speech, though occasionally brilliant and impressive, was feeble when compared with his best oratorical performances. But those who remembered what he had done, and who saw what he suffered, listened to him with emotion stronger than any that mere eloquence can produce."

A similar triumph of the will over the body was made long after by a great American orator, Henry Clay. Seventy-two years of age, broken and infirm, he persisted in attending the Senate during the framing of the slavery compromise of 1850; and though he had frequently to be assisted to his seat, he spoke seventy times during the session, and delivered finally, in defiance of dissuading representations that it would kill him, that great oration of which so much was heard during the Rebellion, and to which there is little doubt his death was attributable, — an oration of which Mr. Parton has written: —

"When he rose to speak, it was but too evident that he was unfit for the task he had undertaken. But, as he kindled with his subject, his cough left him, and his bent form resumed all its wonted erectness and majesty. He may, in the prime of his strength, have spoken with more energy, but never with so much pathos and grandeur. His speech lasted two days, and though he lived two years longer, he never recovered from this effort. Toward the close of the second day his friends repeatedly proposed an adjournment; but he would not desist until he had given complete utterance to his feelings. He said afterwards that

he was not sure, if he gave way to an adjournment, that he should ever be able to resume."

An appeal, more adroit than ingenuous, is said to have been made to this instinct of compassion by Sydney Smith, in behalf of Lord John Russell. The stalwart Devonshire farmers, who had expected to find in the hero of the Reform Bill a personage of Herculean proportions commensurate with his exploits, felt excessively mortified at being asked to vote for the little creature so familiar to the student of "Punch." The difficulty was overcome by the ready-witted Dean's assurance that Lord John was naturally a large man, but had been worn down by his labors in the cause of Reform to what they now saw.

Sincere or affected, all those appeals to the emotions which require the direct mental contact of speaker and hearer have lost the high regard in which they used to be held, now that the orator has come to address himself in effect to an unseen public over whom his ascendency must be gained by intellectual processes if at all. Beyond this natural influence of the newspaper to repress emotionalism and spontaneity, there must not only be taken into account the natural impatience with which men accustomed to put their thoughts into the terse and impregnable statements required for print regard anything like diffuseness or tentative unprecision in the elocutionary pleas which come under their criticism; but there must further be borne in mind the existing fashion among literary men to sneer at enthusiasm, however manifested, and the tendency of the working exponents of modern culture toward a certain cynical hardness and brutality; such, for instance, as marks the English "Saturday Review" and in some degree the "Times." The completeness of the revolution required to bring public speaking into conformity with such standards appears by contrasting them with the question which Fox used to put concerning a printed speech, "Does it read well?" rejoining, if the reply was affirmative, "Then it was a bad speech." There has nevertheless always lingered in England — as among the actual auditory there, no doubt, always will linger — a strong prepossession in favor of extempore efforts and against those which it is possible to stigmatize as "cut and dried." It was reckoned

a most serious blunder in Warren Hastings's conduct of his defence that, instead of opening it with a brief and earnest rejoinder to Burke, he proceeded to read what was really an able and convincing state paper, but which the members of the House listened to only long enough to satisfy their curiosity about the renowned stranger, and then went away, leaving the reader to pursue his task until midnight for the enlightenment of the Parliamentary clerks and sergeant-at-arms. At a later day the brilliant Irish declaimer, Sheil, was censured through his whole career for the practice described by Christopher North in one of the "Noctes Ambrosianæ": "He weighs his periods in his study with the nicety of an apothecary in his shop, and models his madness into not unskilful tropes." The practical inexpediency of his plan, in addition to its damaging effect upon his reputation, was shown on one occasion when he undertook to withstand Cobbett and Hunt before an anti-Catholic meeting, and, before leaving London, had his speech put in type for publication in the next morning's "Sun," where it accordingly appeared, although the turbulence of the meeting had been such that he relinquished the attempt to speak after his first sentence. Rogers condensed the general sentiment about memorized eloquence into a neat couplet of epigrammatic bitterness: —

> "Ward has no heart, they say; but I deny it.
> He has a heart. He gets his speeches by it."

In the recorded usage of eminent orators in this matter we find the variations in practice which might be anticipated from the genuineness of the men's characters and the nature of their oratory. Unpremeditated efforts were so in accordance with Chatham's genius, that in his few prepared discourses he signally failed; and his most labored production — an ornate panegyric on General Wolfe, the hero of Quebec — has been pronounced the very worst of all his performances. Of the habits of Sheridan, — to whom one rarely turns in vain for examples of showy hollowness, — Tom Moore has related that the multitudinous note-books and scraps of paper upon which he used to set down the same ideas, over and over, with minute variations, in fastidious quest of verbal felicities, rarely gave much space to the points of his argument, but were devoted almost

wholly to the experimental elaboration of the fineries of speaking; to the precise place in a sentence, for instance, where the interjection, "Good God, Mr. Speaker," could be most effectively introduced. Burke, on the contrary, worked out his argument with the utmost logical precision, trusting to his fertile imagination and the inspiration of the moment for the redundant and luxuriant imagery he used to pour forth with almost bewildering profusion. Brougham's eloquence was, beyond question, full of thought and of force; but the justice of the criticism he early incurred, that in his perorations he became too melodramatically splendid and artificial, is borne out by his own avowal: "I composed the peroration of my speech for the Queen [Caroline] in the Lords, after reading and repeating Demosthenes for three or four weeks, and I composed it twenty times over at least, and it certainly succeeded in a very extraordinary degree, and far above any merits of its own." * The prevalent modern usage is probably that of the most effective of living orators, — John Bright, — who blends offhand digressions and bursts of passion with a careful preparation that appears very evidently in the highly artistic rhythmic flow both of thought and diction and the rhetorical sequence of subjects and contrasts of style.

For consummate oratorical success there must be superadded to the powers of logical thought and of forcible statement requisite for deliberate conviction a certain tact in following the mind of the audience and keeping in consonance with it, — a tact which involves a keen eye and the utmost delicacy of apprehension. The Autocrat of the Breakfast-Table should have limited his remark to the circumstances of conversation when he said that, whereas writing is like rifle-practice, in which you may hit or miss the public mind; "talking is like playing at a mark with the pipe of an

* The letter in which this characteristic confession occurs was one of advice to the Rev. Zachary Macaulay upon forming the powers of his son, the future Lord Macaulay, then twenty-three years of age. It was upon the father that the interlocutors of the "Noctes Ambrosianæ" — whose unvarying treatment of the son is one of the most striking instances conceivable of the fatuity into which partisan prepossessions can betray really clever men — fixed the acrid rhyme, —

"How smooth, persuasive, plausible, and glib
From holy lips is dropped the specious fib."

engine; if it is within reach, and you have time enough, you can't help hitting it." The mind of a critical audience is, if not fickle, elusive and highly impatient of the least overdoing of an impression which may for the instant have been thoroughly felicitous; and the thread of personal magnetism, once so overstrained, can no longer be trusted to vibrate in accord. The supreme importance of this kind of perception has been illustrated by the fact brought to light as a means of accounting for the inadequate effect produced by the brilliant and subtile addresses of Mr. Robert Lowe, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the only instances in which English political parties have been successfully led by near-sighted men were those of Lord North and Lord Derby, the latter of whom, as if by instinct, was notably adept in this very point. Its further enforcement, if it were needed, might be found in the long educating process by which Charles James Fox and Benjamin Disraeli, after painful and humiliating failure, acquired the rapid accuracy of eye and flexibility of mind that brought ultimate mastery. It is far from strange, therefore, that there should so rarely be conjoined the diversity of powers essential to make oratory potent alike with hearers, with contemporary readers, and with posterity. Few of the great speeches whose electric effect is most warmly attested by tradition can be perused without disclosing a large infusion of rhapsody and rant; and those we now read with the greatest intellectual satisfaction fell, we are told, on inattentive ears, and, but for the printer, would have perished with their birth. No similar productions in the language are so read or quoted or pillaged as the speeches of Burke; yet it is notorious that he was always listened to with impatience and at last not at all; that he became, in short, the Parliamentary "dinner-bell." "In vain did his genius put forth its superb plumage, glittering all over with the hundred eyes of fancy," says a hearer, Tom Moore; "the gait of the bird was heavy and awkward, and its voice seemed rather to scare than attract." His speech on the Nabob of Arcot's debts, in the Warren Hastings affair, now held in the highest admiration, awakened so little response in the House, that Pitt and Grenville, after consultation whether it was worth while to answer it, concluded that it would be a

waste of trouble. The fortune of Sir James Mackintosh was similar; men of infinitely inferior minds commanded far more attention. "His luminous and philosophical disquisition on the Reform Bill," wrote Macaulay in the "Edinburgh Review," shortly after his death, "was spoken to empty benches. Those, indeed, who had the wit to keep their seats picked up hints which, skilfully used, made the fortune of more than one speech. But 'it was caviare to the general.'" More striking was the failure of Lord Jeffrey, who entered Parliament with the reputation of a reviewer of almost ideal excellence, and a possessor of distinguished forensic and judicial accomplishments. For the account of his first appearance we must turn again, making due allowance for "Blackwood's" ultra Toryism, to the "Noctes Ambrosianæ": —

"Instead of the quick, voluble, fiery declaimer of other days or scenes, I heard a cold thin voice doling out little, quaint, metaphysical sentences, with the air of a provincial lecturer on logic and belles-lettres. The House were confounded; they listened for half an hour with great attention, waiting always for the real burst that should reveal the redoubtable Jeffrey, but it came not. . . . . At last he took to proving to an assembly of six hundred gentlemen, of whom I take it at least five hundred were squires, that property is really a thing deserving of protection. 'This will never do,' passed round in a whisper. Old Maule tipped the wink to a few good Whigs of the old school, and they adjourned up stairs; the Tories began to converse *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis;* the Radicals were either snoring or grinning; and the great gun of the North ceased firing amidst such a hubbub of inattention, that even I was not aware of the fact for several minutes. After all, however, the concern read well enough in the newspapers."

Upon that pestilent elocutionary phenomenon known as talking Buncombe, — though it is palpably a result of the newspaper, and involves a curious deliberate subordination of the actual hearers to an extremely circumscribed portion of the public, — it is unnecessary to enter further than to recount what possibly may pass for its earliest recorded employment, and which produced upon different sets of minds impressions that conflicted to a very unusual degree. It was on the occasion of George III.'s insanity, when the friends of the Prince of Wales were bending every effort to secure his appointment as

Regent, and the almost frantic struggles of the antagonizing factions were headed respectively by the ministers actual and the ministers expectant. Lord Chancellor Thurlow, who was of the former, was bent on remaining Vicar of Bray, — a fact disclosed by his missing his hat when the king's friends rose from a cabinet meeting, and its immediate production from the room where the Prince and his allies sat in conclave. In the debate which presently came on, the unction of the Chancellor was unbounded, and found expression in the burst, "When I forget my king, may my God forget me!" — a sentiment to which the affectionate loyalty of the people responded by making it a watchword and having it engraved upon snuff-boxes and rings; whereas, in the House, Burke had growled forth, "The best thing he can do for you"; Pitt had run out, exclaiming, "O, what a rascal"; and Wilkes had ejaculated, "Forget you! he 'll see you d—d first!" Within a very few years, in a not wholly dissimilar emergency, the Commons have taken occasion to confront Buncombe in an unparalleled and signal manner. The offender was a Mr. Rearden, who, responding to the quite unquestionable dislike of a great part of the English public for the entire royal family, suggested the abdication of the queen; whereupon the House, in equally faithful accord with the feelings of the social orders it represents, deliberately called the obnoxious member upon his feet, and with one consent hooted and hissed him into permanent silence.

Non omnia possumus omnes may perhaps be taken as an expression of much that has been established by the growth of the newspaper and the division of political labor it has effected. There has been a disintegration, followed by a new development, of functions which used to be indiscriminately blended in the hands of an oligarchical ruling body jealous of any intrusion upon what it conceived its province, but capable of only a very crude and inadequate execution of its work. We have seen how, during this reconstructive period, many of the features of oratory once most relied upon have been gradually discarded as inapplicable to modern exigencies; and it probably would not be too much to claim that, as a motive-power in government, reliance upon oratory itself has imperceptibly passed away. As a useful incidental appliance it must always

be cultivated more or less assiduously; but, by comparison with the days when oratorical eminence was among the supreme ambitions of statesmen, it must be admitted that oratory is, not certainly a lost art, but a declining one, and that the orator has abdicated his power in favor of the journalist. In the long struggle between debate and the press, the victory of the press has been complete. In the presence of the nation — which, in countries like England and our own, is the true deliberative body, determining upon public measures long in advance of legislative action — the journalist, though unseen, holds the relative position of the legislator in the assemblage which, though pretending to originate, only goes through the process of formulating enactments already decreed by public opinion. The newspaper has become the natural outlet for the talent which once could find no expression but in oratory, and for the ambition which seeks power rather than applause.

DORSEY GARDNER.

ART. IV. — THOMAS WATSON: *Poems*, viz. *The Hecatompathia, or Passionate Century of Love; Melibœus, an Eclogue upon the Death of Sir Francis Walsingham; The Tears of Fancy, or Love disdained.* Reprinted and carefully edited by EDWARD ARBER, 5 Queen Square, Bloomsbury. London. 1870. (Arber's "English Reprints.")

GENERALLY just as the world's verdict is upon an artist, when time enough for maturing its judgment has gone by, there are cases where, through accidents of various nature, this verdict may require revisal. One of these accidents is the simple material limitation or scarcity of a man's work. The fame of the early painters Duccio and Angelico was long obscured, through the fact that their pictures were locked up in buildings not often visited. Pordenone and Moretto have suffered because the towns where they painted lie out of the common route. Archilochus, placed by a long series of ancient criticism amongst the very highest poets of Greece, named, indeed, often with Homer, has lost his honors through some

malignant destiny which swept away the last surviving manuscript before transcription recommenced.* Literature presents only too many such gaps, which history records under the brilliant rubric of conquests, — Alexander at Babylon, Alaric at Rome, Baldwin at Constantinople, the allied armies at the Summer Palace, and, what would have been had the dominant rabble worked its lust six months since in Mazarin Street. Many a gallant nation has been thus beggared of its annals, and turned forth like a *parvenu* on history, by the brutal conqueror or the brutal mob. But we are rather concerned here with individual loss of fame by external causes. The last period, when this was frequent in England, falls within the reigns of Elizabeth and her successor. Half of Shakespeare himself was saved for us by the wholly exceptional literary taste of four players in his company. The fate of some among his contemporary dramatists is well known. And little but the empty name would have survived for the vast majority of his contemporary lyrical poets, had not the zeal of editors and publishers, rewarded only by the gratitude of those who love poetry, reprinted some unique copy for the benefit of the present generation.

In this small and honorable band Mr. Arber (whom we know solely through his publications) is one of the latest volunteers: having brought out more than thirty volumes of rare prose and verse, belonging mostly to the Elizabethan period, within the last two or three years. These books are published at a price which would, in England, be very low, even for modern popular works; a handsome large-paper volume, giving the reader for four shillings what he might have spent years in waiting for, and would have expended twenty or thirty pounds to purchase. They are also edited with great completeness; every book having sufficient prefatory notes to put us in possession of the main facts, whether biographical or bibliographical, connected with it; whilst the reprints themselves follow the

* This, if we take the verdict of ancient literature upon itself, is considerably the greatest calamity, in point of lost genius, which the modern world has sustained. And there is a quality about the short fragments of Archilochus which confirms this estimate; although there are a few Greek writers whom, for charm and pleasure's sake, one would sooner recover.

proper rule for reprints of this class, in literally reproducing the text of the originals. Gosson's works, Lyly's, Gascoigne's, Puttenham's and Webbe's books on poetry, Tottel's "Miscellany,"— these names, which we take from the list, will suggest to those who care for the great Elizabethan age the value of Mr. Arber's series, and, we hope, may encourage them to support him in a work which cannot (we suppose) be remunerative, even if it be to the editor a work of love.

But the most interesting name among all Mr. Arber's reprints, to our thinking, is that Thomas Watson's, whose love sonnets it is proposed here to consider. "He is," says the editor in his Preface, "a lineal successor of Surrey and Wyatt. Among all English poems published during his lifetime, his English poetical works, if an opinion might be ventured, should rank next to Spenser. That is, he should be placed before Sidney as a poet." We shall give reasons for dissenting from this latter judgment, whilst, on the other hand, we should place Watson's sonnets above Spenser's. At any rate, we claim for him a place in the first rank of the Elizabethan "Amourists," Shakespeare, always and in every circumstance exceptional, being here excepted. There is no room for comparison between him and any other man in Europe, from Chaucer before to Milton after, nor then, again (we hold), till we reach Sterne and three or four writers of this century. But this by the way. We return to Watson, giving first the few particulars hitherto recovered of his life, as recorded by Mr. Arber.

Watson was born in London, probably about 1557, and closed his short but active career in 1592. He is heard of first as a student at Oxford (his college not specified), where his bent towards literature drew him off from the academical course of the day. Returning to London, he studied at the common law. Before 1581 he visited Paris; but the brief remainder of his life seems to have been spent in London, where he produced five Latin and three English works, besides much left in manuscript, and lived in friendship with many of the best people of his time, including Lords Arundel and Oxford and the Sidneys.

A translation of the "Antigone" into Latin was his earliest

publication (1581); "Aphoclis Antigone," as it stands registered by a clerk of Dogberry's order in the old books of the Stationers' Company. This is dedicated to Philip Howard, Lord Arundel. Next year the "Hecatompathia" must have followed, for it is entered in March, 1582, as "Watson's Passions," a phrase which he employs to designate the separate pieces which compose the book, "manifesting the true frenzy of love." He thus put in his first claim to rank in that array of poets who glorify the century; but fortune did not allow him to sustain it. For, although in 1590 appeared his "Madrigals," printed in collaboration with Byrd, yet these and the "Eclogue" of the same year are chiefly translations, the first from the Italian words set by Luca Marenzio, the latter from Watson's own Latin "Melibœus," and it was not till the year after his death (1593) that his "Tears of Fancy" came forth. This posthumous child of the youthful poet had no ostensible editor, and "appears to have received little attention while passing through the press." It is, in fact, identifiable only as Watson's by his initials at the close, and by the evidence of style; and although these evidences are quite sufficient, yet we may reasonably conjecture that in those days, when reviews were not, a book thus published had not its fair chance of success. At any rate, Watson, though several times placed with the best poets of his time during his life or shortly after, soon was forgotten; and even the single copy in which his last and best poetry had survived, and only reprinted three hundred years distant from his death, wants two leaves. This poet is not a man of commanding genius, *magis spes*, perhaps, *quam res;* yet we think that readers will acknowledge that he is very much above those whom the world might "willingly let die," and that fate has hitherto been hard upon him. *Nunc tandem redit animus.*

"Though Watson apparently took no degree at Oxford, he must have been a prodigious student in those branches of knowledge to which he addicted himself. Greek, Latin, Italian, French, with his own mother tongue, were at his command. He made himself at home with the entire body of Greek and Latin poets," says Mr. Arber; at least, he shows a competent acquaintance with many of them, at a time when the study of

Greek was yet young in England. "He early occupied himself with translating Petrarch's sonnets into Latin, and seems to have delighted in many of the minor Italian poets of that school"; quoting, indeed, one or two of the early lyrists, although (so far as we have observed) making no reference to Dante. "William Bird and he first published madrigals in English," music and words together. "With the works of Pierre de Ronsard, Estienne Forcadel, and other like French poets, he seems also to have been familiar"; he quotes the "Eroticon" of Hercules Strozza, the "Erotopægnicon" of Gervase Sepinus, the "Silva" of Girolam Parabosco, Seraphine's "Strambotti," Agnolo Fiorenzuola of Florence, and other names now little remembered; and he refers to Chaucer and Spenser amongst his own countrymen.

This is a sufficiently copious magazine of material, though certainly not more than a poet should have, who desires adequately to fulfil his high function of elevating men through that pure and permanent pleasure which is the proper aim of his art. Yet in the "Hecatompathia," to which we now turn, Watson's genius appears often weighted down by his own learning. He has, as will be seen, prefixed to each poem a sort of preface, which must be assigned to his own authorship; and when we read these and the poems themselves, we feel strongly how new a thing in England was then the whole range of classical and "polite" literature; the peculiar air of the Renaissance hangs about the book; it is like a gay and genial school-boy exulting in his studies; it breathes a kind of innocent and attractive pedantry. Indeed, the essential idea of the work — as with Surrey and Wyatt before Watson, with Shakespeare and Spenser and Drummond beside and after him — is a "Renaissance" idea. The impulse to throw the subject of the poet's song into lyrical form, or to string passionate lyrics in series (an impulse which must be taken as the symbol that some unusual intensity of life was working in a nation), has thrice appeared in Europe, and thrice only. The first was that great movement of Æolian and Ionic minstrelsy, which is represented to us by Archilochus, Alcæus, Sappho, Simonides, Pindar, and other soul-stirring names. The fraction of their work which survives proves that this was the widest

and deepest of the lyrical outbursts of Europe, and that its almost entire loss is the greatest of all the bitter losses in literature. The second outburst (for Catullus and Horace were Greeks in Italy) is that which broke forth almost at once, with the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, in Provence, in Sicily, in Italy, in Swabia. The genius of this movement was not only different from that which will be most clearly, though unsatisfactorily, expressed by the word "mediæval," but in many ways antagonistic to "mediævalism." For the lyrical poets, from Troubadour to Minnesinger, not only worked in a style and form wholly unlike that of the romances and fabliaux and monastic legends of the time, but express generally a tone of feeling — express often distinct and conscious sentiments — opposed to the common theology and morality of "mediæval" Europe. The third lyrical outburst is that which, with a somewhat over-cultured and "Alexandrian" character, great as has been the genius thrown into it, began in Germany a hundred years ago, under the ill-chosen name "Romantic," warmed the academic muse of France to a fervor and a spontaneity hitherto hardly displayed, but reached (in our opinion, indubitably and irresistibly) its highest and most exquisite development in our own poets, from Scott to Tennyson. What a noble subject for a truly critical survey does the barest of sketches suggest, if handled by one who should combine (for both are essential to first-rate and permanent criticism) the clear analysis of a Sainte-Beuve with the penetrative glow of a Ruskin! Under what a galaxy of great stars do we find ourselves! But we must go back to our own little field in this heaven.

The "Renaissance" movement (part of which we have found in the lyrical outburst of Dante's age), it is now beginning to be recognized, must be traced to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and may indeed be felt there at least as essentially (though sometimes under curious disguises) as in the centuries often identified with it. But this movement was nearly spent, as a creative power, in its first seats, when it reached the later civilization of Spain, Northern France, and England. The last wave of Italian poetry, we might almost say, wafted the lyrical impulse to Britain; for Tasso (contemporaneous with Elizabeth's reign) was in his poetry, not less than his life, like one

born a little out of his due time. And, owing to the particular period when lyrical poetry (with literature generally in the modern sense) awoke in England, it was mingled with elements absent from the original outburst three centuries and a half before. The first period of our literature (say from Edward VI. to Charles I.) coincides with the last period of the "Renaissance"; it is hence affected by three great powers, comparatively unfelt in the thirteenth century, — the spirit of Greece and Rome, the spirit of theological reformation, the spirit of physical science. These powers of course penetrated our writers in varying degrees: we may trace them distinctly, as they stand above, in Watson and the writers of the "Helicon," in Hooker and the writers of the "Paradise of Dainty Devices," in Lord Bacon and George Herbert; and all combined in Milton, who is the proper close and consummation of this epoch, as Chaucer is of the strictly "mediæval." The presence of these elements gives a wider scope to our "Elizabethan" lyrical poets than was covered by the early poets of Provence or Italy. At the same time, there was so much before Englishmen of that day to be learned and attempted and incorporated, that there is something "Alexandrian" and artificial about them also; more material than they could fuse (and even Shakespeare's earlier plays contain examples) with the perfect spontaneity and freshness which marks the outburst of Hellenic lyrical song.

These remarks may, we hope, serve as a general criticism upon those specimens of Watson's "Hecatompathia" which we shall now offer. This was his first English work; he was probably not above twenty-five years of age when it was written, and portions are clearly of earlier date. Some allowance must hence be made for the immaturity of his genius, especially in case of a man who had obviously thrown himself with more than common earnestness into the new currents of culture then running, who had (as we have said) more material before him than he could completely fuse. To this must be added (what, indeed, may, without discourtesy, be conjectured of many other "amourists," ancient and modern*), that Watson does not

* The veracity of Dante's passion for Beatrice and Petrarch's for Laura has been repeatedly questioned by the sceptical and the unsentimental; and even Shake-

make profession of any predominant real feeling as the source of his hundred "passions." The "Hecatompathia," which, after the manner of that ceremonial age, when even an act of Parliament could not be introduced without a moral preface, is preceded by a little group of prefaces (four by the author) and commendatory verse, with the candor that everywhere lends a charm to Watson's writing, avows its imaginary character. *My pains in suffering them*, he says of his "love-passions," *though but supposed.* And again in the Elegiac address to his book: —

> Si qua tui nimium Domini miseretur amantis,
> Sic crepita foliis, ut gemuisse putet.
> Tetrica si qua tamen blandos damnaverit ignes,
> Dic tu, *mentito me tepuisse foco.*

With the introduction of our own, now let the author himself speak in the prefatory "Quatorzain unto this his book of Love Passions": —

> "My little book, go hie thee hence away,
> Whose price (God knows) will countervail no part
> Of pains I took to make thee what thou art:
> And yet I joy thy birth. But hence! I say: —
>
> "Thy brothers are half hurt by thy delay:
> For thou thyself art like the deadly dart
> Which bred thy birth from out my wounded heart.
> But still observe this rule where'er thou stay.
>
> "In all thou mayst, tender thy father's fame;
> 'Bad is the bird that 'fileth his own nest.'
> If thou be much misliked, they are to blame
> Say thou, that deeds well done to evil wrest.
> Or else confess a Toy to be thy name:
> 'This trifling world a Toy beseemeth best.'" *

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speare's fervid sonnets have found commentators to give them every meaning except that which they naturally bear.

* Mr. Arber, reviving an almost unique volume, has properly provided us with an exact textual reprint. But the old spelling and stopping are real hindrances to the enjoyment of poetry, which should always be allowed to penetrate our minds with the very least external friction possible. We therefore, — quoting for the general reader, not editing a lost classic in a "monumental" form, — with equal propriety (we think), give to Watson's text the appearance which, were he now republishing his book, it may be presumed he would himself give it.

Let us here add, for the benefit of those who may care to possess the book, that although Mr. Arber (whom may the gods reward, for man assuredly never will) offers it for sixteen pence, yet the large-paper issue (four shillings) is the one which the wise will elect.

"Thy brothers" may allude to other writings by Watson, waiting publication; or to similar poetry, then in the field.

This poem is the only true sonnet in the volume. The "hundred passions" follow, including, however, one extra poem (twenty lines in Latin) not numbered in the series. Perhaps Watson inserted this to compensate for No. 80, which is a prose preface to the two following poems, pointing out their ingenuities: 81 being a "Pasquin Pillar," as he calls it, "erected in the despite of Love"; and No. 82, a somewhat similar device, — half acrostic and half typographical arrangement, — turning upon the "posy," or motto, *Amare est insanire.* Poetry is, of course, not to be thought of in these conceits, something similar to which may be found even in George Herbert; but they, happily, recur nowhere else in the "Hecatompathia." Nos. 6 and 66 are translations from Petrarch into the Latin hexameter; and the book ends with another by way of epilogue. With these exceptions, the separate pieces each consist of three six-line stanzas printed together. We quote the third, which is a specimen of Watson's simpler style, with its little preface.

"This passion is all framed in manner of a dialogue, wherein the author talketh with his own heart, being now through the commandment and force of love separated from his body miraculously, and against nature, to follow his mistress; in hope, by long attendance upon her, to purchase in the end her love and favor, and by that means to make himself all one with her own heart.

"Speak, gentle heart, where is thy dwelling-place?
With her, whose birth the heavens themselves have blest.
What dost thou there? Sometimes behold her face,
And lodge sometimes within her crystal breast:
She cold, thou hot, how can you then agree?
Not nature now, but love doth govern me.

"With her wilt thou remain, and let me die?
If I return, we both shall die for grief:
If still thou stay, what good shall grow thereby?
I'll move her heart to purchase thy relief.
What if her heart be hard, and stop his ears?
I'll sigh aloud, and make him soft with tears.

"If that prevail, wilt thou return from thence?
Not I alone; her heart shall come with me.
Then will you both live under my defence?
So long as life will let us both agree.
Why then, Despair, go pack thee hence away!
I live in hope to have a golden day."

This metrical system, it will be seen, escapes the hard constructions or forced rhymes almost inseparable from the (English) sonnet proper, when used as stanzas in sequence, as in Wordsworth's "Ecclesiastical" series, but at the cost of a certain monotony. The form adopted by Shakespeare, which is sonnet only to the eye (consisting in reality of three four-line stanzas and a closing couplet), perhaps is a compromise better suited to our language. Watson's elegantly managed dialogue, which may remind some readers of similar passages in the Greek drama, could not, however, have been presented with equal ease in the true sonnet, with its graceful intricacy of structure. The piece which follows is a good example of his mythological vein, and appears to be partly founded upon a set of Latin elegiacs by "Forcatulus, the French Poet," of which Watson quotes some lines in his preface: —

"Sweet Venus, if as now thou stand my friend,
As once thou didst unto King Priam's son,*
My joyful Muse shall never make an end
Of praising thee and all that thou hast done;
Nor this my pen shall ever cease to write
Of aught wherein sweet Venus takes delight.

"My temples hedged in with myrtle boughs
Shall set aside Apollo's laurel-tree,
As did Anchises' son, when both his brows
With myrtle he beset, to honor thee.
Then will I say, The rose of flowers is best,
And silver doves for birds excel the rest.

"I'll praise no star but Hesperus alone,
Nor any hill but Erycinus mount;
Nor any wood but Idaly alone,
Nor any spring but Acidalian fount,
Nor any land but only Cyprus' shore,
Nor gods but Love, — and what would Venus more?"

* Paris.

To the line "As did Anchises' son," Watson has appended as a note Virgil's

Materna redimitus tempora mirto.

There is no doubt too much antique allusion here, and that of an order with which school-boys are now familiar; yet more may perhaps be urged for the style than it would at first sight be held to merit. For these echoes from the past, although in one sense the mythology to which they relate is dead, yet bring necessarily before our minds the thoughts and passions of those ancients of our race who lived and felt in ways at once like and unlike our own, and whose existence has a closer tie to us, and a more really vital influence, than "natural facts," however important. And Watson has handled his Venus-invocation, we think, with much grace and tenderness; avoiding (as he claims for himself in one of his prefaces) any mere sensuousness of idea, and looking at love, as indeed he does throughout, from a more ideal, and yet a more human, point of view than if he had sought for the sensational effect which he might have reached by the free introduction of "Venus' slipper."

Our next specimen is built upon an old legend, though in a different way: —

"Actæon lost in middle of his sport
Both shape and life, for looking but awry;
Diana was afraid he would report
What secrets he had seen in passing by.
To tell but truth, the selfsame hurt have I
By viewing her, for whom I daily die.

"I lose my wonted shape, in that my mind
Doth suffer wrack upon the stony rock
Of her disdain, who, contrary to kind,
Doth bear a breast more hard than any stock:
And former form of limbs is changéd quite
By cares in love, and want of due delight.

"I lose my life, in that each secret thought
Which I conceive through wanton fond regard,
Doth make me say, that life availeth naught
Where service cannot have a due reward:
I dare not name the nymph that works my smart,
Though love hath graven her name within my heart."

We have here the qualities which mark Spenser's long series of sonnets,—facile fluency, with a certain thinness of feeling and thought; we are sensible of the "feigned fire." The following "passion" is in a deeper key:—

"I marvel, I, why poets heretofore
Extolled Arion's harp, or Mercury's,
Although the one did bring a fish to shore,
And th' other as a sign adorned the skies.
If they, with me, had heard an angel's voice,
They would unsay themselves, and praise my choice.

"Not Philomela now deserves the prize,
Though sweetly she recount her cause of moan;
Nor Phœbus' art in musical devise,
Although his lute and voice accord in one:
Music herself, and all the Muses nine,
For skill or voice their titles may resign.

"O bitter-sweet, or honey mixed with gall!
My heart is hurt with overmuch delight:
Mine ears well pleased with tunes, yet deaf with all:
Through music's help, love hath increased his might:—
I stop mine ears, as wise Ulysses bade,
But all too late, now love hath made me mad."

How fully charged is this poem with the Elizabethan atmosphere! How naturally one may read here the young enthusiast who first rendered the exquisite madrigals of Marenzio accessible to our speech!*

There is yet another picture very brightly fancied:—

"This latter night amidst my troubled rest
A dismal dream my fearful heart appalled,
Whereof the sum was this: Love made a feast,
To which all neighbor saints and gods were called.
The cheer was more than mortal men can think,
And mirth grew on, by taking in their drink.

"Then Jove, amid his cups, for service done,
'Gan thus to jest with Ganymede, his boy:
'I fain would find for thee, my pretty son,
A fairer wife than Paris brought to Troy.'
'Why, sir,' quoth he, 'if Phœbus stand my friend,
Who knows the world, this gear will soon have end.'

* Should Mr. Arber ever reprint the volume, we trust he will include in it these madrigals, with any other scattered pieces of Watson's English verse.

"Then Jove replied that Phœbus should not choose
But do his best to find the fairest face;
And she, once found, should neither will nor choose,
But yield herself, and change her dwelling-place.
Alas! how much was then my heart affright,
Which bade me wake, and watch my fair delight!"

The "saints" and "sir" here, with the simple plain-spoken phrases about the feast of the gods, belong to the first stage of the English Renaissance; they have a tinge of mediævalism, like the Gothic details which one sees in the Anglo-Italian architecture of that time.

We must find space for one more specimen from the "Hecatompathia," before passing on to the later and even less-known work. Watson has been long gone, and fortune proved a hard executor to him and his fame; the reader, if the pathetic and the poetical have any hold over him, we trust will pardon us in our brief revival of his memory.

His saltem accumulem donis.

"XXVI.

Here the author, as a man overtaken with some deep melancholy, compareth himself unto the *Nightingale*, and conferreth his unhappy estate (for that by no means his *Mistress* will pity him) with her nightly complaints: to whose harmony all those that give attentive ear, they conceive more delight in the musical variety of her notes, than they take just compassion upon her distressed heaviness: —

"When May is in his prime, and youthful spring
Doth clothe the tree with leaves, and ground with flowers,
And time of year reviveth everything,
And lovely Nature smiles, and nothing lowers:
Then Philomela most doth strain her breast
With night complaints, and sits in little rest.

"This bird's estate I may compare with mine,
To whom fond love doth work such wrongs by day,
That in the night my heart must needs repine,
And storm with sighs to ease me as I may:
Whilst others are becalmed, or lie them still,
Or sail secure with tide and wind at will.

"And as all those which hear this bird complain
Conceive in all her tunes a sweet delight,

Without remorse, or pitying her pain :
So she, for whom I wail both day and night,
Doth sport herself in hearing my complaint, —
A just reward for serving such a saint."

Let us now turn from the book of 1582 to that of 1593. The poet, it will be remembered, had closed his short life in 1592. The "Tears of Fancy," consequently, were printed posthumously ; they have no series of prefaces or commendatory verses ; they came forth as orphans, and, receiving orphans' treatment, survive apparently in the one mutilated copy which adorns the library of "S. Christie-Miller, Esq., of Britwell, near Maidenhead." To this gentleman's disinterested kindness (we presume) the present reprint is due. He has parted with the uniqueness of his property, a quality so dear to the mere collector, in favor of his countrymen ; and it is hoped that he will accept, from a stranger, these thanks for the liberality, not so universal in a selfish world as to be taken for granted, which has thus preferred pleasing others to reserving pleasure for himself.

Next to nothing is known of Watson's life, except the few bare facts, mostly relating to his literary career, which we have already enumerated. But there is a difference in the tone and the treatment between the "Hecatompathia" and the "Tears of Fancy" (a word used then where we now should say *imagination*), which leads at once to the inference that in the later work we have no longer the "supposed pains" of the youth, but the record of some "love that never found his earthly close." We are in presence of a *vera causa*. Beyond this conclusion (which we submit to the reader's judgment, after perusal of the specimens presently to be given), nothing can be inferred ; nor is it likely that time has spared us any yet undiscovered information. Watson's is one more life amongst the many which have all but passed into the abyss ; a strange loss, and a sad, if we realize to ourselves for one moment the vast freight of hopes and passions, thoughts and deeds, which every human life that reaches manhood must bear with it ; and this especially when a man possessing the poet's sympathetic nature, and "the many motions of his mind," is concerned. Many are the gains of humanity ; but the unperceived losses, are they

less? Here was a life passed during a golden period of English history, by one not only gifted more than the average, but living in friendship with some of our best and most moving men, and probably acquainted with more; and these few pages lately recovered, and of no appeal to the general mass even of his countrymen, are all that is left of it. What a singular thought is this! What a pathetic destiny! And should we feel the pathos or the strangeness less, because what was true of this one is true of other uncounted millions?

> "What is it that will last?
> All things are taken from us, and become
> Portions and parcels of the dreadful past."

Whatever the true story may have been, the "Tears of Fancy" bear abundant evidence that the tale told cannot have been far from the fact. To his surviving friends the book, if it ever passed into circulation, must have come as a voice of sadness from beyond the grave. Our literature has strains of greater intensity and color in the rendering of grief than any that can be found here, — many of Shakespeare's sonnets, some of Drummond's, Gray's Elegy, Byron in a few poignant stanzas, certain lyrics by Shelley, the personal portions of "In Memoriam." But we know no complete series (unless Shakespeare's be the exception) of a more uniform sadness. This would be wearisome, were not the genuineness of the writer's feelings always impressed so strongly upon us, — the strange, unmistakable, irresistible note of true passion. This note will never want its fit audience; and every reader can decide at once for himself whether he is of it. Watson might have prefixed one of the little prefaces from his earlier book to his latest: "The sense contained in these sonnets will seem strange to such as never have acquainted themselves with Love and his laws."

Or he might have written in Petrarch's exquisite manner some

> Ove sia chi per prova intenda amore,
> Spero trovar pietà nonchè perdono.

But our Amourist's soul was bent on one thought only, and the "Tears of Fancy" (as we have noticed) has none of the prelusive introduction and recommendation to the world common in the Elizabethan age.

"Go, idle lines, unpolished, rude, and base,
Unworthy words to blazon Beauty's glory;
Beauty that hath my restless heart in chase,
Beauty the subject of my rueful story.

"I warn thee, shun the bower of her abiding,
Be not so bold nor hardy as to view her;
Lest she, enraged with thee, fall a-chiding,
And so her anger prove thy woes' renewer.

"Yet if she deign to rue thy dreadful smart,
And reading laugh, and, laughing, so mislike thee;
Bid her desist, and look within my heart,
Where she may see how ruthless she did strike me.

"If she be pleased, though she reward thee not,
What others say of me regard it not."

This is the only preface; and no one who is familiar with the literature of that age will doubt (we think) who the model was, whose influence, together with that of real passion, wrought so great a change as will be felt by comparing this sonnet with that, before quoted, which precedes the "Hecatompathia." The graceful dignity of march, the increased simplicity of style, even the use of double rhymes (over-familiarized to our eyes by three hundred subsequent years of poetry), all point to Watson's admirable friend, Sir Philip Sidney. We have already remarked that Watson, though entitled to rank above Spenser as an "Amourist," must, in our judgment, be held inferior to Sidney. In support of this opinion, and of the remarks just made upon Sidney's influence over Watson, we quote a sonnet from the "Astrophel and Stella," and that lovely song on the Nightingale, in which (as in others by Sidney) we yet hear the far-off plaintive melody of some old Italian air:—

"Muses, I oft invoked your holy aid
With choicest flowers my speech to engarland so
That it — despised in true but naked show —
Might win some grace in your sweet grace arrayed.

"And oft whole troops of saddest words I stayed,
Striving abroad a-foraging to go,
Until by your inspiring I might know
How their black banner might be best displayed.

"But now I mean no more your help to try,
Nor other sugaring of my speech to prove,

But on her name incessantly to cry.
For let me but name her whom I do love,
So sweet sounds straight mine ear and heart do hit,
That I will find no eloquence like it."

To the tune of Non credo gia che piu infelice amante.

"The nightingale, as soon as April bringeth
Unto her rested sense a perfect waking,
While late-bare earth, proud of new clothing, springeth,
Sings out her woes, a thorn her song-book making.

"And mournfully bewailing,
Her throat in tunes expresseth
What grief her breath oppresseth
For Tereus' force on her chaste will prevailing.

"O Philomela fair! O take some gladness
That here is juster cause of plainful sadness;
Thine earth now springs; mine fadeth:
Thy thorn without; my thorn my heart invadeth."

After Watson's prefatory sonnet follows at once the rest of the "Tears of Fancy." The book contained but sixty sonnets, eight of which are lost.* It opens with a little allegory.

SONNET I.

"In prime of youthful years, as then not wounded
With Love's empoisoned dart or bitter gall,
Nor mind nor thoughts on fickle Fancy grounded,
But careless hunting after pleasure's ball,

"I took delight to laugh at lovers' folly,
Accounting beauty but a fading blossom;
What I esteemed profane, they deemed holy,
'Joying the thraldom which I counted loathsome.

"Their plaints were such, as nothing might relieve them,
Their hearts did wellnigh break, love's pain enduring;
Yet still I smiled to see how love did grieve them;
Unwise they were their sorrow's self procuring.

"Thus, whilst they honored Cupid for a god,
I held him as a boy not past the rod."

* One line in the thirty-ninth sonnet appears to have been omitted; and the last but one contains *four* quatrains and the closing couplet. The rest are constructed like Shakespeare's, except that the arrangement of the rhymes is occasionally varied.

SONNET II.

"Long time I fought, and fiercely waged war
Against the god of amorous desire,
Who sets the senses 'mongst themselves at jar,
The heart inflaming with his lustful fire.

"The winged boy upon his mother's knee,
Wantonly playing near to Paphos' shrine,
Scorning that I should check his deity,
Whose dreaded power tamed the gods divine,

"From forth his quiver drew the keenest dart
Wherewith high Jove he oftentimes had wounded,
And fiercely aimed it at my stubborn heart;
But back again the idle shaft rebounded.

"Love saw, and frowned that he was so beguiled;
I laughed outright, and Venus sweetly smiled."

Venus and Love combine their stratagems, until he triumphs at last, though not until after a second defeat.

"Then, on the sudden, fast away he fled,
He fled apace as from pursuing foe:
Nor ever looked he back, nor turned his head,
Until he came whereas he wrought my woe.

"Though* casting from his back his bended bow,
He quickly clad himself in strange disguise,
In strange disguise that no man might him know;
So couched himself within my lady's eyes.

"But in her eyes such glorious beams did shine
That wellnigh burnt Love's party-colored wings;
Whilst I stood gazing on her sun-bright eyne,
The wanton boy she in my bosom flings.

"He built his pleasant bower in my breast:
So I in love, and love in me doth rest."

Thus far there is nothing to indicate how the course of true love will take itself. But presently we reach the gap in the Britwell copy, from which two leaves seem to have been torn out. The eight sonnets thus lost must have told the lover's first consciousness of passion, (and it may be presumed) its rejection by his mistress, not in those forms of denial which

* Is this used, or a misprint, for *Then*?

love could interpret in any sense contrary to their meaning. Henceforth there is that atmosphere of sadness struggling with hope which we have noticed. The twentieth sonnet, which we next quote, may be compared with the third of the "Hecatompathia," "Speak, gentle heart," as a specimen of the "Amœbæan" style, to which Watson appears to have been partial. It is a dispute between eyes and heart, which had wrought most sorrow: —

"My heart accused mine eyes, and was offended,
Vowing the cause was in mine eyes' aspiring:
Mine eyes affirmed my heart might well amend it,
If he at first had banished love's desiring.

"Heart said, that love did enter at the eyes,
And from the eyes descended to the heart:
Eyes said, that in the heart did sparks arise
Which kindled flame that wrought the inward smart.

"Heart said, eyes' tears might soon have quenched that flame;
Eyes said, heart's sighs at first might love exile:
So heart the eyes, and eyes the heart did blame,
Whilst both did pine, for both the pain did feel.

"Heart sighed and bled, eyes wept and gazed too much; —
Yet must I gaze, because I see none such."

"None such other," we should say. The next is a vision, which reminds us more of Spenser's manner than is frequent in Watson: —

"I saw the object of my pining thought
Within a garden of sweet nature's placing:
Wherein an arbor, artificial wrought,
By workman's wondrous skill the garden gracing,

"Did boast his glory, — glory far renowned, —
For in his shady boughs my mistress slept,
And with a garland of his branches crowned
Her dainty forehead from the sun y-kept.

"Imperious Love upon her eyelids tending,
Playing his wanton sports at every beck,
And into every finest limb descending,
From eyes to lips, from lips to ivory neck.

"And every limb supplied, and to every part
Had free access, — but durst not touch her heart."

There is an exquisite suppressed warmth of tenderness about this; the veil of allegory, like some fine Ionic drapery, serves only to reveal and emphasize the beautiful form within. Then follows a little series of sonnets, wherein some real scene may be painted, which transacted itself within the pleasure-grounds of one of Watson's noble friends. We quote two of these sonnets: the first, mainly because of the closing lines. The poet is by some fountain of tears, which he discovers within the woodland: —

"About the well which from mine eyes did flow,
The woful witness of heart's desolation,
Yet tears, nor woe, nor aught could work compassion,
Did divers trees of sundry natures grow.

"The myrrh, sweet bleeding in the latter wound,
Into the crystal waves her tears did pour;
As pitying me on whom blind love did lower;
Upon whose back I wrote my sorrow's ground,

"And on her rugged rind I wrote forlorn,
Forlorn I wrote, for sorrow me oppressed;
Oppressing sorrow had my heart distressed,
And made the abject outcast of love's scorn.

"The leaves conspiring with the wind's sweet sounding,
With gentle murmur plained my heart's deep wounding."

Spontaneous coincidences, both of thought and of expression, between poets wholly unconscious of each other's work, are far more common than is believed by the captious critic, the

"Word-catcher who lives on syllables."

Yet the coincidence here with the lines in Shakespeare's "Venus and Adonis" (published 1593, the same year as Watson's book) may, perhaps, not be the result of accident: —

"Melodious discord, heavenly tune harsh-sounding,
Ear's deep-sweet music, and heart's deep-sore wounding."

The following sonnet concludes this little series, as the one which we next quote is the last word of poor Watson: —

"Those whose kind hearts sweet Pity did attaint,
With rueful* tears bemoaned my miseries;

* *Rueful* is probably used here for *ruthful*, — full of pity.

Those which had heard my never-ceasing plaint,
Or read my woes engraven on the trees,

"At last did win my Lady to consort them *
Unto the fountain of my flowing anguish,
Where she unkind and they might boldly sport them,
Whilst I meanwhile in sorrow's lap did languish.

"Their meaning was, that she some tears should shed
Into the well in pity of my pining:
She gave consent, and putting forth her head,
Did in the well perceive her beauty shining.

"Which seeing, she withdrew her head, puffed up with pride,
And would not shed a tear, should I have died."

SONNET LX.

"Who taught thee first to sigh Alas! sweet heart?
Who taught thy tongue to marshal words of plaint?
Who filled thine eyes with tears of bitter smart?
Who gave thee grief and made thy joys so faint?

"Who first did paint with colors pale thy face?
Who first did break thy sleeps of quiet rest?
Who forced thee unto wanton love give place?
Who thralled thy thoughts in fancy so distrest?

"Who made thee bide both constant, firm, and sure?
Who made thee scorn the world, and love thy friend?
Who made thy mind with patience pains endure?
Who made thee settle steadfast to the end?

"Then love thy choice, though love be never gained:
Still live in love; despair not, though disdained."

The answer is written against each of these twelve inquiries, *Love;* in Sidney's phrase,

"Only with this my song begins and endeth!"

Then follow "FINIS. T. W." There is, apparently, nothing but this signature to connect the book with Watson, so far as external evidence is concerned; but the similarity in style with the "Hecatompathia" seems to render the ascription certain. If any further proof were needed, we should find it in the *dissimilarity;* which is precisely what would occur in the natural development of a genius and a temperament like

* *Consort,* accompany.

Watson's, as he passed from boyhood to manhood; from the sweet fancies of youth, melancholy for fashion's sake, to the sadder yet sweeter passion of real life: "though love be never gained, steadfast to the end."

We have noticed the descent of our Elizabethan lyrical love poetry from that of Italy and Provence; for the other early school, that of Swabia, does not seem to have affected England. It would be a curious task (worthy of Mr. D. G. Rossetti's taste and knowledge) to compare the English with the Tuscan Amourists, or rather with the whole range of Italian sonnet and canzone writers from Ciullo d' Alcamo to Tasso; for if our sixteenth-century movement answers in some degree to that of the thirteenth in Italy, it is the later Italian writers, from Petrarch to Tasso, whose direct influence may be traced in England. This comparison of course cannot be attempted here; but we will note a few points in hope that others, more competent and with more leisure, may deal with the subject. The Italian lyrical school, from Dante to Petrarch, has more spontaneity than the Elizabethan; though not so purely fresh as the Æolian, it is less composite in its elements than ours. It is also more perfect and homogeneous in style and structure; reaching in Petrarch (when at his best) an exquisiteness of tender simplicity which is more like perfect Greek art than any other post-Hellenic poetry known to us.

Alma felice, che sovente torni
A consolar le mie notti dolenti
Cogli occhi tuoi, che Morte non ha spenti
Ma sovra 'l mortal modo fatti adorni:

Quanto gradisco ch' i miei tristi giorni
A rallegrar di tua vista consenti!
Così incomincio a ritrovar presenti
Le tue bellezze a suoi usati soggiorni.

Là 've cantando andai di te molt' anni,
Or, come vedi, vo di te piangendo,
Di te piangendo no, ma de' miei danni:

Sol un riposo trovo in molti affanni,
Che quando torni, ti conosco, e 'ntendo
All' andar, alla voce, al volto, a' panni.

Three or four of Shakespeare's sonnets may perhaps equal

work like this ; but the Elizabethan age has nothing else to show of rival perfection within the sphere of poetry before us ; neither Sidney, nor Watson, nor Spenser, nor the delightful writers of the " Helicon," nor Drummond, who is an Elizabethan born a little after date, and who makes Petrarch his model more peculiarly. On the other hand, our Amourists keep much more strictly within the limits of their art. They very seldom attempt to clothe morality or politics with the disguise of love ; they are more free from scholastic pedantry, whilst, at the same time, they profit by the advance of European civilization, as we observed at the beginning of this paper, and range allusively over a wider scope of human experience. Our poets also greatly enlarged the lyrical style, extending it beyond the formal though admirably devised structure of the sonnet (which strains our rhyming capability a little), the canzone, and the ballata, to a hundred charming stanza-metres, which in some of the interspersed songs in Shakespeare's plays reach a lightness and airy music, both of words and of idea, rarely, if ever, discoverable (at least to an English ear) in the long series of Italian minstrelsy.

What place shall we give to our newly regained poet in this noble army ? Below Sidney, but above Spenser, and the rest of that day, as an Amourist, was that which we proposed at the outset of our notice ; Shakespeare being excepted from the survey. It is hoped that the specimens here given may carry the reader with us in this conclusion. If not, we shall yet venture to hope that he will not think the time wasted which he may have given to these reliques of Watson. Spenser, at least, we may claim on our side. Three years after Watson's death appeared the " Colin," in which these lines are unquestionably devoted to his memory ; and with them our imperfect tribute may best be closed : —

> " There also is (ah no ! he is not, now,)
> But since I said he is, he quite is gone,
> Amyntas quite is gone and lies full low,
> Having his Amaryllis left to moan.
> Help, O ye shepherds, help ye all in this,
> Help Amaryllis this her loss to mourn :
> Her loss is yours ; your loss Amyntas is, —
> Amyntas, flower of shepherds' pride forlorn.

He, whilst he lived, was the noblest swain
That ever piped in an oaten quill:
Both did he other, which could pipe, maintain,*
And eke himself could pipe with passing skill."

F. T. PALGRAVE.

ART. V. — 1. *Old Cambridge and New.* By THOMAS C. AMORY. Reprinted from the New England Historical and Genealogical Register. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co. 1871.

2. *Edward Everett's College Life: An Autobiographical Fragment.* Old and New, July and August, 1871.

MR. AMORY'S little work contains some curious and not uninteresting details of local history, all the more welcome because it is not an easy matter for the historian to pursue small game of this kind through the forests of manuscript in which it is their custom to hide; and any one who will undertake the labor, or happens to know the secret places of forgotten and curious facts, has a right to claim the historian's gratitude, even though the actual result of the sport is not precisely rich. Cambridge to the world at large is a place of limited importance, no doubt, and even in the eyes of Boston, her neighbor, is only a considerable suburb, which contains an University; but the principle of solidarity in modern society extends even to suburbs, and Cambridge has some right to claim that neither Massachusetts nor America would have been the better for losing Cambridge from their roll of cities. Nature has not been prodigal to her; art has added but few attractions to the small number of those that nature conferred; but she is, nevertheless, one of the largest cities in the Commonwealth, and she contains its only considerable school of knowledge. Her history is therefore a fair subject for more than local interest.

Nevertheless, to the great mass of persons who know Cambridge only by name, it is the College and not the town which

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* In our ignorance of Watson's life, it is doubtful whether these words refer to some act of liberality to another poet, or to his translations from Greek and Italian poetry.

lends the subject such interest as it has. Indeed, under the most flattering light, the public or popular concern in the College itself, or in its sister at New Haven, is by no means deep, and the traveller who undertakes to cross the continent soon reaches the limits beyond which the two Universities, if mentioned at all, present only vague ideas to the listener. Yet such general interest as there is attaches itself to the University, and as the small circle of cultivated readers is reached, this interest becomes very decided, and extends to matters which are apparently trivial, and certainly have only a very slight historical or literary value. This feeling was curiously shown in the attention which Mr. Everett's reminiscences excited, as they were printed in the course of last year. Mr. Everett himself belonged to the present century. He took his degree in 1811, and there are graduates in plenty who could amplify his short sketch indefinitely. Yet the public seemed to feel a certain amount of active interest in the little account, extracts from which may without harm be quoted, of student life and manners in the first decade of the century: —

"I was thirteen years old in April, 1807, and entered as freshman the following August, being the youngest member of my class. I lived the first year with my classmate, Charles P. Curtis, in a wooden building standing at the corner of the Main and Church Street. It was officially known as the 'College House,' but known by the students as 'Wiswall's Den,' or more concisely, 'The Den,' whether from its comfortless character as a habitation, or from some worse cause, I do not know. There was a tradition that it had been the scene of a horrid domestic tragedy, and that it was haunted by the ghosts of the Wiswalls; but I cannot say that during the twelvemonth I lived in the Den this tale was confirmed by my own experience. We occupied the southwest corner chamber, up two flights of stairs, — a room about fourteen feet square, in which were contained two beds and the rest of our furniture, and our fuel, which was wood, and was kept under the beds. Two very small closets afforded a little additional space; but the accommodations certainly were far from brilliant.

"A good many young men who go to college are idlers, some worse than idlers. I suppose my class in this respect was like other classes; but there was a fair proportion of faithful, studious students, and of well-conducted young men. I was protected in part, perhaps, by my youth from the grosser temptations. I went through the prescribed

studies of the year — which were principally a few books of Livy and Horace for the Latin, and Collectanea Græca Majora for the Greek — about as well as most of the class; but the manner in which the ancient languages were then studied was deplorably superficial. It was confined to the most cursory reading of the text. Besides the Latin and Greek languages, we had a weekly recitation in Lowth's English Grammar, and in the Hebrew grammar *without points;* also in arithmetic and history, the last from Millot's compend as a text-book. In all these branches there was an entire want of apparatus, and the standard compared with that which now exists was extremely low. And yet, in all respects, I imagine a great improvement had taken place in reference to college education over the state of things which existed in the previous generation. The intense political excitement of the Revolutionary period seems to have unsettled the minds of men from the quiet pursuits of life.

"President Webber was at the head of the University when I entered it, having succeeded to President Willard, who died in 1804. . . . .

"President Webber was a man of great worth, but destitute of popular gifts. He was a person of tradition and routine, and never attempted to say a word to the students except from a manuscript prepared beforehand. He could not be said to be popular with the young men, but it was simply from the want of the art of kindly intercourse. I remember going to his office in my freshman year to ask leave of absence for one night, that I might be at home for some family gathering, as I did not like to have to return to Cambridge at a very late hour. I found the whole academic corps assembled in the President's office, — a circumstance which did not diminish my trepidation at being there for the first time. I modestly stated my request and the reason. I had never asked a favor nor incurred a penalty; and I had never passed an hour away from the college without permission. I received my answer, however, in the monosyllable "No," without the addition of a word to soften the flat refusal. Such was the tone of authority in those days.

"The mode of life of students in Cambridge is greatly changed since my day. We then lived in commons; the five classes assembling daily for the three meals in the Commons Hall, where the tutors and other parietal officers occupied an upper table. Till the year 1806, the evening meal was not even served in the hall, but was received by the students at the kitchen window, and conveyed to their rooms. The disagreeable nature of this operation in bad weather in a New England winter may easily be conceived. This practice was done away with, and supper, like the two other meals, provided in the hall, the year be-

fore I entered college. The tables were served by beneficiary students, according to the custom formerly existing in the English colleges; and I believe it may with strict truth be added, that the said position of the 'waiters,' as they were called, was in no degree impaired by performing this office for their fellow-students. Although commons were attended with some inconveniences and evils, I have regretted that some other remedy could not have been found than entire discontinuance. The rooms were furnished in a very simple style. I do not recollect that there was a carpet, a window-curtain, a sofa, or an easy-chair in any student's room; and nearly all the young men brought their own water from the pumps, and trimmed their own lamps. A little luxury in this respect crept into the higher classes. One or two persons got their living about college as general boot-blacks. Charles Lennox, a respectable colored man, became in this way, I have heard, the richest man of his complexion in the State. He used to bring in his bill so much for brushing *bootes*.

"The practice of fagging, borrowed from the English schools, or rather, perhaps, growing out of that amiable propensity in human nature which leads the strong to find pleasure in oppressing the weak, prevailed to some extent in the last century at Cambridge. A member of the freshman class was obliged to take off his hat in the presence of members of the higher classes, and to do their errands if required. As a check on the abuse of this latter obligation, each freshman placed himself under a member of the senior class, who was called his senior; and it was a lawful excuse for not obeying the orders of any other student, that you were doing an errand for your senior. These practices in my time were obsolete, though it was still not unusual for a freshman to have 'his senior,' usually some family friend, to whom he could go in case of need for a word of advice.

"I was considered, I believe, as taking rank among the best scholars in the class; although there was no branch in which I was not equalled, and in several was excelled, by some one of my classmates, except, perhaps, metaphysics.

"I have mentioned metaphysics as a study in which I succeeded. I mean, of course, only that I prepared myself thoroughly in the text-books. Watts's Logic was the first book studied in this branch; not a very inviting treatise compared with that of Archbishop Whately, but easily comprehended, and not repulsive. The account of the syllogistic method amused me; and the barbarous stanzas describing the various syllogistic modes and figures dwelt for a long time in my memory, and have not wholly faded away. Locke's 'Essay on Human Understanding' came next. This was more difficult. We recited from it three

times a day the four first days of the week; the recitation of Thursday afternoon being a review of the rest. We were expected to give the substance of the author's remarks, but were at liberty to condense them, and to use our own words.

"At the close of the junior year I received the appointment of English orator at the public exhibition. This appointment, according to the usage then prevailing, implied that I was considered by the faculty one of the three first scholars in the class. I called my subject the 'Prejudices of Criticism,' a not very significant phrase, borrowed from the phraseology at that time prevalent at college.

"I passed the winter vacation of this year at college, principally employed in miscellaneous reading. Among other standard works, I read Gibbon's 'Decline and Fall' with considerable care, with a considerable portion of Burke. The gorgeous style of the latter, and the stately eloquence of Gibbon and Johnson, caught my youthful fancy, and pleased me more than the simple diction of Goldsmith and Addison. These last I had always read with pleasure; but I thought the three great masters I have just named were rather to be imitated as models of style; an error which it took me some years to discover and correct.

"During my senior year I relaxed a little from my studious habits, though I did not fall into serious neglect of my college duties, still less into any vicious indulgence. But I had become weary of the restraints of college life, and the natural restlessness of the age I had reached (seventeen) rendered me impatient of academic confinement and routine. I was in some danger of going astray.

"In August, 1811, I took my degree, and delivered the valedictory oration of the class on Commencement Day. I called my subject 'Literary Evils,' an unmeaning phrase, like that which I chose as the subject of my exhibition oration. It was, I suspect, an inferior performance. Not much can be effected, even by a mature mind, in a set discourse of only twelve minutes in length, of which some portion had to be given up by the valedictory orator to the enumeration of some of the chief benefactors of the College, — a practice borrowed from the 'commemoration,' of the English universities, and now discontinued at Harvard. Our class was the first to which these English orations had been assigned, and it was some years before the example was followed. An entire change in the arrangement of the literary exercises of Commencement Day has since taken place, and there is still room for great improvement. At present, they are greatly too numerous, and the time devoted to them necessarily too long. The average character of these juvenile efforts is now vastly beyond the standard in my time."

This is certainly entertaining, so far as it goes, but one cannot help wishing it went further. For the large and increasing class of instructors, or persons interested in the improvement of instruction in this country, there could be few more entertaining and suggestive books than a history of instruction at Harvard College; an account, not of the numbers of students, nor of the gifts of donors, but of the processes tried, the experiments that failed, the discipline enforced, the customs observed, and, above all, the steady improvement in scholarship, if any such can be shown to have existed. One wishes to know with what standard the College started, and to what extent this standard has been raised or lowered. In fixing once for all the facts of the case, whatever they may be, and in ascertaining precisely what direction the College has followed during its two centuries and a half of activity, some light might perhaps be thrown on the very disputed question of the future. Since its foundation the College has vastly altered its character, and there is every reason to suppose that it will continue to experiment with new methods and in new directions as rapidly as is safe. There is all the more reason for bearing in mind that its history is of no small importance as illustrating the growth of American society and as indicating its future progress. Both as a social and as an educational question, therefore, the matter is of considerable interest.

Such a story, however, to be well told, should come directly from first sources, and, with the exception of the College records, first sources are not easily reached. The College records, too, have the disadvantage that they tell a somewhat stiff and often ludicrously formal tale of boys' experiences and petty discipline, without in the least entering into boys' feeling. For after all it is primarily with students that education deals, and the opinion of students is therefore an essential part of all successful education. One wishes to know what the student, at any given time, thought of himself, of his studies and his instructors; what his studies and his habits were; how much he knew and how thoroughly; with what spirit he met his work, and with what amount of active aid and sympathy his instructors met him in dealing with his work or his amusements. The past brings down traditions of solid learning and

careful training in the branches of study it assumed to deal with. One would like to know how such learning was gained, the methods and the instruments by which great results were reached. In short, one cannot but feel that one's self-esteem is a little at stake in the question whether the present generation, in making what it calls its progress, has sacrificed anything which was once useful to its predecessors, and this too, quite aside from the further question whether such a sacrifice, if ever made, was a matter of necessity or of mere recklessness.

If it were possible by some chance to disinter from the repositories of old manuscripts a series of students' diaries throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, from which, by any careful process of sifting out the chaff, a certain continuity of thought and experience could be discovered, the greatest difficulty would be overcome. Unfortunately, students' diaries are apt to be so feeble productions that the writers, if they ever think to read them in later years, commonly put them in the fire. Yet feeble as they are, they represent the most important part of any educational system, and their place can by no means be taken by mere reminiscences, no matter how entertaining or extensive the latter may be. A skilful instructor ought, perhaps, to derive as many ideas from the absurdities or extravagances of the scholars who are in his charge, as he does from their better qualities; and, above all, no instructor can well be allowed to forget the fact, which, nevertheless, is extremely apt to be forgotten in practice, that the teacher exists for the sake of the scholars, not the scholars for the sake of the teacher. No system of education can be very successful which does not make the scholar its chief object of interest; a principle which may sound like a truism, but which, in fact, will be found to have been rarely put in practice on any great scale, and which, in the daily work of education, is the most difficult of all principles to act upon. In the great majority of cases the teacher is, in his own eyes, the most important part of a school; the institution or school or system itself ranks next, and the scholar comes last of all. To reverse this order of things in an historical treatment of the subject may seem trivial enough to grown men who look upon a great and influential corporation like Harvard College in the

same light as a railway or a banking corporation, with a history which is thoroughly economical, made up of charters, deeds, and statistics of passengers carried, discounts effected, boys educated, and stock watered; but it is, nevertheless, the true historical method, if there were but the means of carrying it out.

Unfortunately, as has been already said, the means are wanting. But it is not only the means which are wanting. The work itself could only be done to advantage by some one peculiarly constituted. Attempts without number have been made to use college life as a groundwork for fiction, and the result has almost if not quite invariably been failure, for the reason that the field of interest is too narrow, and that the attempt to enlarge it by introducing forced situations is more fatal to success than the narrowness of the field itself. The same difficulty would be found in a more practical treatment of the same subject. The details are numerous and fatiguing; the possible combinations few and simple; the treatment itself must make atonement for the want of incident, and such treatment could only come from a master critic who could employ his labor to more effect in matters of wider and deeper interest. The student must probably, therefore, remain content to have no history which shall deal with education from his stand-point.

Nevertheless, such material as exists, which can throw light on the movement of high education in America, ought not to be wasted. No doubt the family records of more than one household in New England contain papers that might be of service in following out this path of inquiry; but one such manuscript record at least lies before us, and offers a curious and extremely characteristic picture of the education which was given at Cambridge towards the close of the last century. The record in question is a student's diary for fifteen months in the years 1786–87; years, it will be remembered, of great depression in America, immediately following the peace with Great Britain, but preceding the establishment of a responsible national government. The winter was famous for the outbreak and forcible repression of Shays' rebellion, which was the principal subject of interest in Massachusetts, and threatened for a time to affect Cambridge itself The student in

question was a young man in his nineteenth year, who came late to the University, and joined the junior class on the 15th March, 1786. As will be seen, he had a fair share of youthful crudities, but he appears to have been as free from extreme prejudices as could reasonably be expected from a young man of his age, while his manner of looking at things occasionally indicates a mind which had come into closer contact with grown and educated men than with people of his own age. It is perhaps almost unduly mature.

In the present days of ever-increasing severity in examinations for admission to college, it is interesting to inquire what the requisites were in the last century. The student here gives, it is true, no indication of what examination was required for entrance into either of the two lower classes. He applied for admission to the junior class, and not only that, but for admission in the third term of the junior year, when more than half of the year's work was done. His examination, therefore, indicates the minimum required by the College after about three years of college education. The examination itself appears to have been a very formal proceeding, and although the proportion of absolute rejections was smaller then than now, yet admission was far from a matter of course. In this particular instance the applicant appears to have had a special examination as he applied for admission at a time when no one else wished to enter. He tells his own story, as follows: —

"15 *March*, 1786. Between 9 and 10 in the morning I went to the President's, and was there admitted before the President, the four tutors, three professors, and Librarian. The first book was Horace, where Mr. J——, the Latin tutor, told me to turn to the Carmen sæculare, where I construed three stanzas and parsed the word *sylvarum*, but called *potens* a substantive. Mr. J——, the Greek tutor, then put me to the beginning of the fourth book of Homer. I construed — lines, but parsed wrong ἀλλήλους. I had then παραβλήδην given me. I was then asked a few questions in Watts's Logic by Mr. H——, and a considerable number in Locke on the Understanding, very few of which I was able to answer. The next thing was geography, where Mr. R—— asked me what was the figure of the earth, and several other questions, some of which I answered, and others not. Mr. Williams asked me if I had studied Euclid and arithmetic, after which the President conducted me to another room and gave me the

following piece of English to turn into Latin, from the World: 'There cannot certainly be an higher ridicule than to give an air of importance to amusements, if they are in themselves contemptible and void of taste; but if they are the object and care of the judicious and polite and really deserve that distinction, the conduct of them is certainly of consequence.' I made it thus: 'Nihil profecto risu dignior quam magni æstimare delectamenta, si per se despicienda sunt atque sine sapore. At si res oblatæ atque cura sunt sagacibus et artibus excultis et revera hanc distinctionem merent, administratio eorum haud dubie utilitatis est.' I take it from memory only, as no scholar is suffered to take a copy of the Latin he made at his examination. The President then took it, was gone about ¼ of an hour, returned and said, 'You are admitted'; and gave me a paper to carry to the steward."

Certainly the examination was not a very difficult one, and the candidate, according to his own account, does not appear to have made a very brilliant figure at it. Setting aside Watts and Locke, which are no longer so important a part of the liberal education as they formerly were, one may perhaps say that the freshman of our day would think himself the happiest of beings if he could escape with no more severe an examination than this. But the most remarkable fact of all is, that this examination, so far as the classics are concerned, represents not the minimum but the maximum of requirements, not for the junior year, but for the entire college course. Homer, Horace, Terence, and Cæsar were all that the student attempted to study. With the junior year, instruction in the classics ended. As evidence of the condition of classical studies in the University at this time the following entry would seem to be very significant: —

"*July* 5, 1786. Mr. J—— gave us a piece of Latin to make; the first the class have had since I have been here. This is the last week that we attend the Latin tutor, and last week we closed with Mr. J—— (Greek). In the senior year there are no languages studied in college. It is very popular here to dislike the study of Greek and Latin."

All that the student could do in college, at least in the direction of classical acquirements, was therefore limited within a very narrow margin, which is perfectly represented by the examination described above. Another extract will illustrate this fact: —

"*May* 10, 1786. We finished the Andria of Terence this morning. The class began it last February. I went through it at Haverhill in three evenings. However, it must be said that they study it only one week in four, and that week only four mornings, but even in that way it has taken thirteen lessons to go through this one play. We recite afternoons the Latin week in Cæsar, but I have had nothing to say this week. The class is so numerous that he (the tutor) cannot hear more than one half of them recite at once, and so he takes turns."

It seems tolerably clear, therefore, that where students dropped the classics at Cambridge in the last century, there students begin the study in the present one. If this be the case, an interesting question rises as to how and where the last generation, or any preceding generation in America, got its classical knowledge, if it had any. Cambridge was its best school, and at Cambridge the classics were unpopular and neglected. Homer and Horace or Terence and a simple sentence in Latin composition represent all the classical knowledge that Harvard gave; and it is quite clear that beyond the simple construing of the text and the application of the elementary rules of grammar, nothing was even attempted.

In regard to mathematics, the same relative position seems to have been held. Euclid and arithmetic are no further advanced as mathematics than Homer and Horace as classics, if indeed they are so far. But mathematics were continued through the senior year, and apparently with comparative energy. Any other requirement, with the exception of logic and metaphysics, seems to have been unknown, unless geography were something more than the mere form which the single question repeated in the diary would imply.

So far, then, as the standard of knowledge was concerned, it was low enough; and to judge from the account of the student himself, his success in satisfying even this low standard was not so brilliant as it might have been. Yet the best acquirements of the highest scholars in his class appear to have been no greater. At all events there was no one of sufficient superiority, among the fifty graduates of his year, to prevent him from carrying away an English oration at his Commencement, a prize commonly given only to the best scholars.

The examination being over, the new student was fairly a

member of the College. The first matter of interest is naturally his studies. One who is familiar with the elaborate system of instruction now in use, is curious to know the steps which have led up to it. And so far as the student himself is concerned, his information is reasonably exact. He did not appear at the college exercises until a week after his admission, when he went to the President.

"*March* 22. Immediately after prayers I went to the President, who said, 'You may live with Sir Ware, a Bachelor of Arts.' I made a most respectful bow, and retired."

To persons who have forgotten this use of the title *Sir*, another extract may be of interest: —

"*July* 19. Commencement Day. The new Sirs got quite high in the evening, at Derby's chamber, and made considerable of a noise."

Recitations now began. For one week the class recited in Euclid. The following week it recited in Homer and the Greek Testament; the third week, in Locke; the fourth, in Terence and Cæsar. This was the round of studies, and when the four weeks were passed, the process was begun again. But the weeks were classed as mathematical, metaphysical, Greek, and Latin weeks, and no two of these subjects were ever recited at the same time.

There appear to have been six recitations in these branches every week. On Mondays and Wednesdays, both morning and afternoon; on Tuesdays and Thursdays, only in the morning. Friday was a leisure day for the whole College, so far as recitations were concerned. On Saturdays there was one early recitation in Doddridge's Divinity, a work which appears not to have been a favorite text-book. This seems to have been all the work of the College in respect to recitations. In addition to this, however, there were frequent lectures, both philosophical and doctrinal, which the students of all classes seem to have attended, and there were also literary exercises, as well as a regular exercise in declamation.

As the description of a single day, the following is sufficiently clear: —

"*May* 3, 1786. Wednesday and Monday are our two busiest days in the week. This morning (Wednesday) at 6 we went into prayers,

after which we immediately recited (Homer). This took us till 7¼. At 7½ we breakfasted. At 10 we had a lecture on Divinity, from Mr. Wigglesworth. It was upon the wisdom of all God's actions, and justifying those parts of Scripture which some have reproached as contrary to justice. At 11 we had a philosophical lecture from Mr. Williams upon the mechanical powers, and particularly the lever and the pulley. At 12½, dinner. At 3, an astronomical public lecture upon the planet Mercury, a very circumstantial account of all its transits over the sun's disk. At 4 again we recited (Greek Testament), and at 5 attended prayers again, after which there are no more exercises for this day, but we are obliged in the evening to prepare our recitation for to-morrow morning. This I think is quite sufficient employment for one day, but the three last days in the week we have very little to do; Thursdays and Saturdays reciting only in the morning, and Fridays a philosophical lecture."

A modern student would not think this work very severe, for except the two recitations there is nothing which requires preparation. Perhaps the most curious part of the old arrangement is the very subordinate place filled by recitations, and it is certainly interesting to hear a student in 1786, who has but seven recitations a week, finding fault with the system in language like this: —

"*September* 4, 1786. As we have no metaphysical tutor here at present, we supposed that for the ensuing fortnight we should have no reciting. But the government have determined that we shall continue to attend Mr. R——. This is not an agreeable circumstance. A person who does not belong to the University and hears only the word reciting, naturally concludes that the scholars are an idle set of fellows, because they are always averse to recitations. Now the fact is just the contrary. A person fond of study regards the time spent in reciting as absolutely lost. He has studied the book before he recites; and the tutors here are so averse to giving ideas different from those of the author whom they are supposed to explain, that they always speak in his own words and never pretend to add anything of their own. Reciting is indeed of some service to idle fellows, because it brings the matter immediately before them and obliges them at least for a short time to attend to something. But a hard student will always dislike it, because it takes time from him which he supposes might have been employed to greater advantage."

A change in the recitations occurred in the senior year. Greek and Latin were entirely dropped, and during the whole

first quarter the seniors recited in mathematics alone, because the tutor in metaphysics had resigned, and his place had not been filled. Only on the 3d October did the new tutor make his appearance and begin upon Burlamaqui's Natural Law, after which the two studies alternated during the rest of the year. The lectures were continued, and a new course, "very dry," was added, upon language. The principal professor would seem, however, to have not satisfied the more zealous students, if the following extract can be trusted: —

"*April* 5, 1787. At 11 this forenoon Mr. Williams gave us the second philosophical lecture. It was upon the incidental properties of matter, and, excepting very few deviations, was expressed in the same terms with that we had last year upon the same subject. Indeed, whether the professor's time is taken up by other studies, or whether he is too indolent to make any improvements in his lectures, it is said he gives every year the same course, without adding or erasing a line.

"*April* 7. Mr. Williams gave us this forenoon a lecture upon motion, the same which we heard a twelvemonth past upon that subject."

The fourth year appears, therefore, to have been principally occupied by the study of mathematics. Indeed, except for reading Burlamaqui and writing a large number of literary disquisitions, of a somewhat stereotyped and academic class, for college societies and public occasions, it is difficult to see that even the best students had any other employment at all. After the winter vacation, that is, after the middle of February, afternoon recitations were dropped in the senior year, and the class had but five recitations a week for nine weeks, at the end of which recitations entirely ceased.

This analysis of the College studies leads naturally to the conclusion, which is enforced by every word of this diary, that, for the ordinary enjoyments of university life, the last century was the golden age of the College. It was hard, indeed, if the most modest capacity could not manage to maintain itself upon such a level. This seems to have been the impression which prevailed among the students themselves, for the writer of this diary, in speaking of a classmate who was in his twenty-fifth year, says: —

"He was, as he says himself, too old when he entered the University.

From fourteen to eighteen I should suppose the best age for entering. The studies which are pursued here are just calculated for the tender minds of youth."

In comparison with the present system, the simplicity of the older one seems marvellously attractive. One cannot detect a sign of unreasonable coercion on the part of the College government. An examination of any kind within the college career was still a thing unheard of among our happy ancestors. Rank was apparently unknown, except so far as it was vaguely intimated in the assignment of parts at exhibitions. These parts, if the President is to be believed, were the *only* incentive to study; at least such is the inference from the following curious entry: —

"*April* 11, 1787. I went down this morning to the President to know the determination of the corporation with respect to a private Commencement, and was told that the petition of the class was rejected, because they supposed that *if public Commencements were lain aside, there would be no stimulus to study among the scholars*, and they are afraid that by granting our petition they might establish a precedent which the following classes would take advantage of, and claim as a right what we only request as a favor. Another reason which Mr. Willard said had weight, although the gentlemen did not choose to avow it publicly, was the fear of offending the future Governor by depriving him of that opportunity to show himself in splendor and magnificence."

Here is another extract, delightful in its patriarchal simplicity. It was the student's first day in college: —

"*March* 23, 1786. I did not hear the bell ring this morning, and was tardy at prayers. Every time a student is tardy at prayers he is punished a penny, and there is no eluding that law; so that a student must prefer not attending prayers at all to being half a minute too late."

The instructors appear to have trusted only their general impressions in awarding distinctions. Misdemeanors, absences, and other shortcomings were punished by fines. As for the recitations themselves, here is a picture of them: —

"*June* 13, 1786. This reciting in Locke is the most ridiculous of all. When the tutor inquires what is contained in such a section, many of the scholars repeat the two first lines in it, which are very frequently

nothing to the purpose, and leave the rest for the tutor to explain, which he commonly does by saying over again the words of the author."

In regard to vacations and permissions of absence, there was no rigidity in the College law. In April the students had two weeks holiday by law, but in practice at least three. On the 13th July the summer vacation began, and closed by law on the 16th August, lasting five weeks, but recitations were only resumed on the 21st. There were two weeks more in October, with the same liberal margin. And in the middle of December, 1786, the supply of wood fell short, and as none could be obtained from the country, the students were sent home and enjoyed a vacation of eight weeks, till February 7th. Recitations began on the 12th. On the 23d "about half the class" had arrived. Thus in the course of the year the College had seventeen weeks of actual vacation, and twenty-one weeks of freedom from all required exercises. Add to this a very liberal interpretation of the rule of attendance, and an equally liberal practice in regard to leaves of absence, and it cannot be disputed that the actual working terms of the College were by no means unreasonably long or severe. In point of fact, when the exercises were most regular, there were many interruptions, and the amount of work accomplished would seem, from a modern point of view, to have been but small.

In proof of these statements, the following extracts will be sufficient: —

"*April* 26, 1786. Put my name in at the buttery. At the end of each vacation every scholar must go in person and give his name to the butler. Any scholar who stays away after the expiration of the vacancy, unless he gives good reasons for it, forfeits 1 *s.* 6 *d.* every night.

"*April* 27. No reciting this day, nor indeed this week. The scholars that live near Cambridge commonly come and enter their names in the buttery, and then go home again and stay the remainder of the week.

"*April* 28. About half the college are now here. The bill at prayers is not kept till the Friday after the vacation ends.

"*May* 1. We recite this week," etc.

"*August* 17. The scholars are coming in very fast.

"*August* 19. Almost all the college have got here now, and the new

monitors, who must always belong to the junior class, took their seats yesterday.

"*August* 21. We recite this week," etc.

"*December* 12. The government this morning determined that if more than half the students should be destitute of wood, the college should be dismissed. The President went to Boston to consult the corporation upon the subject, and he informed Little this evening that the students would be permitted to disperse to-morrow morning.

"*December* 13. This morning, immediately after prayers, the President informed us that the vacation would begin at present, and be for eight weeks, and hinted that the spring vacation might on that account be omitted."

But the spring vacation was not in the least shortened by the hint.

Perhaps it is no concern of the public to inquire how the student occupied these eight weeks. He had a right to do what he pleased with them. Nevertheless, since it is possible that the extreme exertions which were evidently not made in term-time may have fallen on the vacation, it is worth the while to ask how the most distinguished students of the oldest standing occupied their two months of winter vacation. The particular student now under consideration remained in college rooms to devote his time to his work, with less interruption than was otherwise possible.

"As I thought I should be able to study much more conveniently here than anywhere else, I obtained leave to remain in town. Bridge proposes staying likewise, and we shall live together. Bridge engaged for us both to board at Professor Wigglesworth's."

Other young men remained, no doubt for the same purpose, since their names occur afterwards on the list of parts at Commencement, attached to English orations and other unusual honors. Immediately afterwards, however, an entry occurs which is calculated to raise some interesting doubts in the reader's mind: —

"*December* 18, 1786. The young ladies at Mr. Wigglesworth's dined at Judge Dana's. I went down there with Bridge to tea, and passed the evening very sociably. The conversation turned upon divers topics, and among the rest upon love, which is almost always the case when there are ladies present."

Nowhere in this diary is love mentioned as one of the College studies; but if it is always discussed when there are ladies present, these young gentlemen would seem during this vacation to have devoted far more attention to it than ever they had paid to Locke or Euclid. The next day, however, a slight improvement in tone is visible: —

"*December* 19. Several of the class still remain, and until they are gone it will be impossible for us to study much. As they expect to go every day, they are rather dissipated, and more or less make us so.

"*December* 20. I have been rather more attentive to-day, and have written considerably."

After this spark of energy, however, comes a fearful relapse. Descriptions of young ladies recur with alarming frequency, while, except for a single reference to Montesquieu, there is by no means any indication of absorbing mental application.

"*December* 22. Miss —— is but eighteen, rather giddy and unexperienced. She has a very fair complexion and good eyes, of which she is sensible. Her face is rather capricious than beautiful, and some of her features are not handsome. Of this she is not so well apprised. Her shape is not inelegant, but her limbs are rather large. She is susceptible of the tender sentiments, but the passion rather than the lover is the object of her affection.

"*December* 26. Mason finally took his leave and left us to ourselves, so that we shall henceforth be able to study with much less interruption than we have hitherto done.

"*December* 27. In the evening we went down with Mr. Ware and Freeman to Judge Dana's. We conversed, and played whist, and sung till 10 o'clock. The ladies seem to have settled that we are to be in love; but ideas of this kind are very common with the ladies, who think it impossible to live without love."

Exemplary young man! And yet it would be instructive to learn what is the meaning of a succession of remarks like these: —

"*January* 17, 1787. After tea we went down to Mr. Dana's. Miss E—— was there, and Miss J—— with her. Bridge accompanied this lady home, and after they were gone I had a deal of chat with Miss E——, who has a larger share of sense than commonly falls to an individual of her sex. We conversed upon divers subjects, but I can never give anything but general accounts of conversations, for I cannot

always keep this book under lock and key, and some people have a vast deal of curiosity.

"*January* 22. Almy [the young gentleman no doubt meant to write Miss Almy E——] has a larger share of sense than commonly falls to the lot of her sex, and that sense is cultivated and improved, a circumstance still more uncommon.

"*March* 2. I went to take tea at Mr. Pearson's. I got seated between Miss E—— and Miss H——, but could not enjoy the pleasures of conversation, because the music was introduced. Music is a great enemy to sociability, and however agreeable it may be sometimes, there are occasions when I should wish it might be dispensed with."

Perhaps it is best to quit this subject here, since the vacation has already expired, and the student has returned to the labors of five recitations a week. Besides the Spirit of Laws, he had read, so far as can be gathered from his diary, Watson's Chemical Essays, Sheridan's Lectures on Elocution, a volume of the Idler, and some algebra, in two months. He had also developed an uncommonly strong fancy for the study of female character, — a study not embraced in the College curiculum, either then or afterwards.

The 7th of February began the new term. On the 12th recitations began, one every day, except Friday. On the 15th there was a ball, at which it need hardly be said that Miss E—— heads the list of ladies. The young gentlemen, among whom were most of the first scholars, retired to bed "at about 4 o'clock," and "rose just before the commons bell rang for dinner, quite refreshed, and not more fatigued than I commonly am." In fact, the dances have now become nearly as frequent as the recitations. On the 23d, "about one half the class are here." On the 27th, "almost all our class have arrived." Among other lectures, on March 5th, "Professor P—— gave a lecture with which he concluded his observations upon the article. I did not hear many of them"; but the same evening there was a meeting of the Φ *B* *K* at Cranch's chamber, at which a dissertation was read, of which the text is here preserved, on the extremely erudite question, "Whether love or fortune ought to be the chief inducement to marriage." This essay is done with much calm reflection and elaborate knowledge of the human heart, but is not precisely a college exer-

cise. On the 7th March he went to Haverhill, probably to obtain relief from the severe pressure of recitations, and returned on the 10th. On the 12th the parts were distributed for the next exhibition, and he received an English "Conference," with Freeman and Little, upon the Comparative Utility of Law, Physic, and Divinity.

"*March* 14, 1787. Was employed almost all day in thinking upon the subject of my Conference. Wrote a few lines with much difficulty. Did not like the subject. Wished the Conference to the Devil."

Little and Freeman, it seems, were of the same mind. After a week's labor, however, the Conference was written, and the next week was devoted to the voluntary work of calculating the elements for a solar eclipse for May 15, 1836. This was also for an exhibition.

"*March* 30. I have been somewhat idle for several days, and expect to continue so till the exhibition is over, for so long as that is before me I can pay very little attention to anything else. I found this to be the case last fall, and do now still more so, but thank fortune I have only one more trial, at the worst, of this kind to go through, which will be at Commencement, unless we should obtain a private one. Distinctions of this kind are not, I think, very desirable; for besides the trouble and anxiety which they unavoidably create, they seldom fail of raising the envy of other students. I have oftentimes witnessed this with respect to others, and I am much deceived if I have not lately perceived it with respect to myself.

"*April* 9. This is the last week on which our class attend recitations."

If such were the laborious duties of the most distinguished scholars, one would like to know what was done by those students who were not remarkable for scholarship; but on this point no certain information is given, beyond allusions to gunning, fishing, and an occasional "high-go."

Meanwhile a difficulty had occurred: —

"*August* 26, 1786. Immediately after prayers we had a class meeting for the purpose of choosing a Valedictory Orator, and Collectors of Theses. When the votes were collected it was found that there was no choice. A second attempt was made, equally fruitless. It was then resolved that the choice of an Orator should be deferred, and that the class should proceed to that of the choice of Collectors. The one for Technology, Gram-

mar, and Rhetoric was first balloted. Abbot 2d was chosen. The second Collector, for Logic, Metaphysics, Ethics, Theology, and Politics, was then chosen. Fiske was the person. The Mathematical part fell to Adams, and the Physical to Johnstone. The meeting at about 7 o'clock was adjourned till Monday evening, when we shall proceed to the choice of an Orator.

"*August* 28. After prayers the class met by adjournment. The second ballot was between Freeman, Little, and Waldo. The third was between Freeman and Little, who finally carried it by a considerable majority. The class then all went to his chamber, but did not stay there more than an hour.

"*August* 31. We had a class meeting immediately after prayers. The committee of the class that was appointed to inform the President of the choice for an Orator, etc., reported that the President had not given his consent to have the Oration in English, because he thought it would show a neglect of classical learning. I motioned that the vote for having it in English should be reconsidered, but there was a considerable majority against it. It was then voted that the President should be informed that the class had determined to have an English Oration or none at all. The former committee all declined going again. Johnstone, Fiske, and Welch were chosen, but declined. It was much like Æsop's fable of the mice, who determined to have a bell tied round the cat's neck; they were all desirous that it should be done, but no one was willing to undertake the performance of it. The meeting was finally adjourned till Monday next.

"*September* 12. We had a class meeting after prayers for determining the matter concerning a Valedictory Oration. By dint of obstinate impudence, vociferation, and noise, the minority so wearied out those on the other side that several of them went out, after which a vote was passed ratifying the proceedings of the last meeting. Johnson, Sever, and Chandler 3d were then chosen as a committee to inform the President of the proceedings in the class.

"*September* 18. We had a class meeting after breakfast. The committee that was sent to inform the President of the proceedings of the class, informed that he had said he feared he should be obliged to direct the class to have the Oration in Latin. Notwithstanding this, it was voted by a majority of two that the class should still persist."

The result was that the President carried his point in so far that there was no Class Day. In consequence of this, the members of the class began to leave Cambridge long before the 21st of June, the usual day for separation. The parts for Commencement were distributed on the 17th May: —

"*May* 24, 1787. Our class having no College exercises to attend to, and many of them having now finished their parts for Commencement, are generally very indolent. Riding and playing and eating and drinking employ the chief part of their time.

Long before Class Day the graduating students were scattered in every direction, only to return on the 18th July to Commencement. Thus, to sum up the result of the half-year since the 13th December, the students who were now to take their degrees had attended recitations at the rate of five per week, for nine weeks, and had further prepared exercises for one exhibition and Commencement. They had listened to one course of lectures, which they had for the most part already heard, and another on "the parts of speech," which the best of them thought a mere waste of time. And they dispersed in May, without the faintest conception that there could be such a thing in the student world as an examination for degrees.

One or two more extracts, to illustrate the stringency of rules during term-time, must be admitted: —

"*May* 4, 1786. No reciting this morning, on account of last night's class meeting. This is a privilege that all the classes enjoy, and I am told there have been in our class fellows so lazy and so foolish as to call a class meeting merely for that purpose."

Naturally, class meetings were very frequent.

"*April* 10, 1786. No reciting this day, because the government met to examine the reasons of those scholars that are absent, or have been within the last two quarters."

"*September* 22. Mr. R—— sent for me this morning, informed me that the exhibition was to come on next Thursday, and offered to excuse me from recitations till then, in case I was not prepared, as the time that had been given for getting ready was so short. But, as it happened, I was not in need of more time.

"*October* 9. No reciting. Mr. B—— is engaged to preach several Sundays at Hingham, and does not return early enough for the next morning recitation."

These extracts need not be multiplied. The rules were not more rigidly applied in regard to required exercises than they were in other respects, and neither instructors nor students considered themselves to be under any very inflexible law.

Students who lived under so mild and beneficent a govern-

ment as this should have had no just cause of complaint, unless it were that the means of the College did not reach far enough to satisfy all the requirements of a liberal education. They might, indeed, urge that Euclid and Burlamaqui were only dry nutriment to satisfy the hunger of a whole year, but they could scarcely maintain that it was a step-mother's hand which, when they cried for bread, threw them these husks. This leads naturally to the further subject of the relations between the teachers and the taught. There seems to have been no obvious reason why, under a system so nearly voluntary, a thorough accord should not exist between the instructors and their best scholars. And if such a harmony was wanting, it may be of some practical value to inquire what the causes were which stood in its way, and whether the fault, if there was a fault, lay with the older or the younger men.

The President, Mr. Joseph Willard, was a graduate of the year 1765, and therefore still a comparatively young man. Many instructive hints as to his character are scattered through this diary, as for example the following: —

"It is against the laws of the College to call any undergraduate by any but his Sir name, and I am told the President, who is remarkably strict on all those matters, reproved a gentleman at his table for calling a student Mr. while he was present."

Again: —

"*March* 24, 1786. After prayers I declaimed, as it is termed; two students every evening speak from memory any piece they choose, if it be approved by the President. It was this evening my turn, and I spoke from 'As You Like It': 'All the world 's a stage,' etc. When I came to the description of the Justice, in fair, round belly with good capon lined, tutors and scholars all laughed, as I myself truly represented the character. But the President did not move a feature of his face. And indeed I believe it is no small matter that shall extort a smile from him when he is before the College.

"*September* 10, 1786. Cranch and myself dined at the President's. He is stiff and formal, attached to every custom and trifling form, as much as to what is of consequence. However, he was quite sociable; much more so, indeed, than I should have expected."

A little portrait of the President in the pulpit: —

"*February* 18, 1787. The President preached in the afternoon,

when we were improved by a very laborious encomium upon Moses. Whatever the President's literary talents may be, he is certainly not an elegant composuist nor a graceful orator.

"*June* 21, 1786. Class Day. This day the seniors leave college. There is no recitation in the morning, and prayers are deferred till 10 o'clock. The class then went down in procession two by two with the Poet at their head, and escorted the President to the chapel. The President made a very long prayer, in which, in addition to what he commonly says, he prayed a great deal for the seniors; but I think he ought to get his occasional prayers by heart before he delivers them. He bungled always when he endeavored to go out of the beaten track, and he has no talent at extempore composition.

"*April* 6, 1786. Fast Day. The President preached two sermons; that in the afternoon especially I thought excellent. No flowers of rhetoric, no eloquence, but plain common sense, and upon a liberal plan. But the President has by no means a pleasing delivery. He appears to labor and struggle very much, and sometimes strains very hard; and making faces, which do not render his harsh countenance more agreeable."

The description is evidently true to the life, and certainly indicates no ill-feeling towards the President. There is no indication throughout this diary that the President was disliked by the students, or that he failed in any way to maintain the dignity of his position. But it is clear that a man cast in such a mould was not likely to throw much life or much novelty into the system over which he presided. He was one of those men already mentioned, in whose eyes it was not the students whose interests stood first; nor, to do him justice, was it merely his own importance which filled his thoughts; it was the institution, the University, as one of the most important corporations in the Commonwealth, on which his thoughts were bent, and the students, who are quick to feel such distinctions, responded with respect and indifference. He was, after all, an excellent representative of the old New England school, which lost its hold, as a clerical body, on American education, before it had time to give an American Arnold to Harvard College.

But the President seems to have had little immediate connection with the undergraduates. The burden of labor fell almost entirely on the four tutors, and yet it may be doubted

whether even the tutors were obliged to perform so much work as would seem very alarming to the most lightly burdened tutor of the present day. Six or seven hours a week in the recitation-room, and the simplest instruction on the letter of the text-book, appear to represent the full extent of their duties, over and above the charge of the College discipline. Under these circumstances it might be supposed that a considerable opportunity for usefulness was open to the four tutors, and that at least one or two of them might have impressed the students with some appreciable degree of sympathetic activity. One may therefore feel some interest to know what the relations were between the students and their tutors; and on this point there is a great quantity of information: —

"*May* 1, 1786. The Greek tutor is a young man; indeed much too young (A. B. of 1782), as are all the tutors, for the place he occupies. Before he took his second degree, which was last Commencement, he was chosen a tutor of mathematics, in which he betrayed his ignorance often. Last fall he changed departments, and took up the Greek. His own class, the freshmen, were the first that laughed at him in that. He has improved since that, but still makes frequent mistakes. It is certainly wrong that the tutors should so often be changed, and be so young as they are. It would be better to choose a person immediately after he has taken his degree, than as they do; because when a youth leaves college he is obliged to turn his attention to other studies, and forgets a great deal of what he studied at college, whereas when he has lately graduated he has all fresh in his mind. The Doctor affects a great deal of popularity in his class, and with the help of the late disagreement between the classes, he has pretty well succeeded, but he does not seem to care what the other classes think of him.

"*May* 2. Our tutor gave us this morning a most extraordinary construction of a passage in Homer. Abbot 1st was beginning to construe the 181st line of the 6th Book,

Πρόσθε λέων, ὄπιθεν δὲ δράκων, μέσση δὲ χίμαιρα,

he said: a lion before; but the Doctor corrected him by saying it meant superior to a lion. Abbot immediately took the hint and made it: superior to a lion, inferior to a dragon, and equal to a wild boar."

An account of the metaphysical tutor is still less flattering: —

"15 *May*, 1786. We recite this week to Mr. H—— in Locke. This is, upon the whole, the most unpopular tutor in College. He is hated

even by his own class. He is reputed to be very ill-natured and severe in his punishments. He proposes leaving College at Commencement, and I believe there is not an individual among the students who is not very well pleased with it. One of my classmates said the other day, 'I do not believe it yet; it is too good news to be true.' Such are the sentiments of all the students with respect to him."

The writer passes on to the mathematical tutor: —

"*May* 22, 1786. We recite this week to our own tutor, in Gravesande's Experimental Philosophy. This gentleman is not much more popular than the rest of the tutors. He is said to be very prejudiced and very vindictive. He is liked in general by the class, however, and this may be a reason why I have not heard as much said against him as against the others."

He closes the list with a blast of indignation: —

"*May* 8. We recite this week in Terence and Cæsar to Mr. J——. This is the tutor of the oldest standing in the College; he is very well acquainted with the branch he has undertaken, and persons that are not students say that he is much of a gentleman. But it seems almost to be a maxim among the governors of the College to treat the students pretty much like brute beasts. There is an important air and a haughty look that every person belonging to the government (Mr. [Professor] Williams excepted) assumes, which indeed it is hard for me to submit to. But it may be of use to me, as it mortifies my vanity, and if anything in the world can teach me humility, it will be to see myself subjected to the commands of a person that I must despise. Mr. J—— is also accused of having many partialities and carrying them to very great length, and moreover that those partialities do not arise from any superior talents or virtues in the students, but from closer and more interested motives. There are some in our class with whom he has been particularly severe, and some he has shown more favor than any tutor ought to show to a student. I wish not his favor, as he may prize it too high; and I fear not his severity, which he can never display if I do my duty."

Some light is thrown on the "interested motives" by the following: —

"*May* 3, 1786. We had after prayers a class meeting about making a present to our tutor. It is customary at the end of the freshman year to make a present to the tutor of the class, but it has been delayed by ours to the present time, and many would still delay it and lay it wholly aside. The custom, I think, is a bad one, because it creates

partialities in a tutor, because it increases the distinction between the wealthy and the poor scholars, because it makes the tutor in some measure dependent upon his class, and because to many that subscribe it is a considerable expense; but the salaries of the tutors being so low, and it having been for many years an universal custom, I am sorry to see our class so behindhand, and several who could well afford it and have really subscribed meanly endeavoring to put off the matter from quarter to quarter till they leave College."

A year later the writer has become aware that there is another side to the question. Speaking of one of his classmates, he says: —

"His spirit he discovers by relating how many times he has insulted the President and the tutors, particularly Mr. R—— (the class tutor). He damns Mr. R—— for being partial towards those who have always treated him with respect, and against those who have always made it a practice to insult him."

In short, it is quite evident that the relations between instructors and scholars were far from satisfactory. Thoroughly cordial these relations never could be and never can become so long as any means of coercion or any connection with college discipline remain in the hands of the instructors. To be "subjected to the commands of a person," rarely teaches humility and almost inevitably breeds ill-feeling. The duty of giving instruction, and the duty of judging offences and inflicting punishment, are in their nature discordant, and can never be intrusted to the same hands, without the most serious injury to the usefulness of the instructor. This evil was conspicuous at the time now under attention. Gentle as the rein was, and mild as were the punishments, an invincible hostility between students and instructors was one of the traditional customs of the College, and the one which created most annoyance to both divisions of the University, the teachers as well as the taught.

There is perhaps a certain amount of practical interest in this matter still. The question as to the allotment of responsibility for such a state of things as these extracts describe, is one worth considering in connection with all systems of education, since it leads directly to the problem, so difficult to solve, how the necessary friction between young and old, students and

instructors, can be reduced to the lowest possible point. That young men of twenty or thereabouts are not always distinguished for courtesy and good-breeding, is a fact that no one will question; but that the habit of instruction and the incessant consciousness of authority tends to develop extremely disagreeable traits in human character, especially wherever character naturally inclines towards selfishness, is another fact which is better known to young men than to old. Between these two influences it is natural that incessant annoyance should be generated, and it is equally natural that each party should invariably throw the blame on the other.

Nevertheless, after setting aside exceptional cases of individual character, which make themselves disagreeably prominent both in old and young, and which can be controlled by no law, something is always due to the assistance or discouragement which the system itself offers to the development of discordant influences. And in the last century the system was radically a wrong one. It was a system which, while perhaps more liberal in its forms than anything which has succeeded it, rested on an assumption of social superiority such as invariably galls to the quick every one who is subjected to it. This assumption was due in part perhaps to the fact that the instructors had commonly belonged to that clerical body which in the early history of New England formed what one may almost call a caste, and which stood towards the public in something like the same insulated and dominating attitude which it assumed towards the young; but it was also in part due to the fact that in regard to the student there existed, not only the consciousness of social superiority, but the consciousness of power to enforce obedience. The jealousy of this assumption, backed as it was by force, naturally created a spirit of opposition in the students' minds, and the records of the College show how persistent the attempt was, on the part of the students, to break down the social barrier. Generation after generation followed the same course. Rebellion after rebellion broke out among the undergraduates. And it was only in proportion as the College government began to concede and act upon the principle that the student was in all respects the social equal of the instructor, entitled to every courtesy due to equals, that these disor-

ders began gradually to subside. Even then, however, the question of discipline remained a source of incessant uneasiness, and the instructor who was known as a strict disciplinarian, who in other words attempted to combine his duty of acting as police-officer, judge, jury, and executioner, with his duties of instruction, necessarily sacrificed no inconsiderable share of his usefulness as instructor, in consequence of the same jealousy in the students' minds.

That the spirit of insubordination so persistently exhibited was not due to any mere distinctions of age, or to any peculiar hostility to the instructing body as such, is proved by the fact that it was by no means shown in conflicts with the instructors alone. Another series of extracts will illustrate this point: —

"*August* 21, 1786. This afternoon, after prayers, the customs were read to the freshmen in the chapel. They are read three Mondays running in the beginning of every year, by the three first in the sophimore class, who are ordered to see them put in execution.

"*March* 27, 1786. After prayers the senior class had a class meeting, in order to check the freshmen, who, they suppose, have taken of late too great liberties. By the laws of the College all freshmen are obliged to walk in the yard with their heads uncovered, unless in stormy weather, and to go on any errand that any other scholar choses to send them, at a mile distance. But the present freshmen have been indulged very much with respect to those laws, and it is said they have presumed further than they ought to have done.

"*March* 28, 1786. After prayers, Bancroft, one of the sophimore class, read the customs to the freshmen, one of whom (McNeal) stood with his hat on all the time. He, with three others, were immediately *hoisted* (as the term is) before a tutor, and punished. There was immediately after a class meeting of the freshmen, who, it is said, determined they would hoist any scholar of the other classes who should be seen with his hat on in the yard, when any of the government are there.

"*June* 14, 1786. The freshmen, by their high spirit of liberty, have again involved themselves in difficulties. The sophimores consider themselves as insulted by them, and in a class meeting, last evening, determined to oblige all the freshmen to take off their hats in the yard, and to send them. There has been a great deal of business between them to-day. Mr. H—— has had several of them before him.

"*June* 15, 1786. The struggle between the freshmen and sophimores still continues. They have been mutually hoisting one another all day.

"*July* 12, 1786. The freshmen carry their enmity against the sophimores a great deal too far. They injure themselves both in the eyes of the other class and in those of the government. This afternoon, while Cabot was declaiming, they kept up a continual groaning and shuffling and hissing, as almost prevented him from going through."

The freshmen ultimately carried their point and established their right to complete social equality; but they were obliged to struggle violently both against the College system and against their immediate masters. These disorders committed by them were but a repetition, as against a different authority, of still greater disorders on the part of older classes, in their attempt to establish their own social rights as regarded the College government.

It is true that the manners of the time were far from polished. A glimpse of students' amusements is furnished by the following: —

"*March* 22, 1786. As we passed by Milton Hall, we saw the ruins of the windows. On the 21st of March the junior sophister class cease reciting at 11 in the forenoon. They generally, in the evening, have a frolic. Yesterday they had it at Milton Hall, and as they are not by any means at such times remarkable for their discretion, we saw many fractures in the windows of the hall they were in.

"*March* 15, 1786. The sophimore class had what is called in College an high-go. They assembled all together in the chamber of one of the class, where some of them got drunk, then sallied out and broke a number of windows for three of the tutors, and after this sublime manœuvre staggered to their chambers. Such are the great achievements of many of the sons of Harvard! Such the delights of many of the students here!"

The manners indicated by these extracts were certainly rude enough. But it does not appear that such offences were looked upon as extremely heinous by the College government or by public opinion. And it is plain from other facts that the severity of discipline in the College was by no means such as to explain the ill-will between the students and the government. Although the students undoubtedly considered this discipline as very annoying at the time, they learned afterwards to accept, without a murmur, punishments which, in the last century, would have been thought monstrous; and this submission was

due principally to the fact that the old antipathy to the government was beginning to subside. Had they supposed that they were still treated as a body with the old haughtiness, the modern discipline, made necessary by an extreme compactness of organization such as no European University knows, would not have been accepted at all. The old punishments, so far from being severe, were remarkably light, notwithstanding the loud complaints against them. A number of amusing passages will show this to have been the case. As mentioned above, certain members of the College had, on the night of March 15, 1786, indulged themselves in a very drunken disturbance in the College grounds: —

"*March* 23, 1786. After prayers the President read a paper to this effect: That on the evening of the 15th it appeared the sophimores had assembled at the chambers of one in the class, and had behaved in a tumultuous, noisy manner; that at length they sallied out and were very riotous, to the disturbance and *dishonor* of the University. But as their conduct till then had been such as deserved approbation, and was submissive, and as they early shew a proper repentance for their fault, having presented an humble petition to be forgiven; therefore it had been voted that no further notice should be taken of it, but it was hoped the students would not abuse the lenity of the government, but rather show that they were deserving of it. The freshmen, who are always as a class at variance with the sophimores, thought the government had been partial; and the consequenee was that Mr. ——, the tutor of the sophimore class, and who was supposed to have favored them, and to have been the means of saving them from severe punishment, had four squares of glass broken in his windows. Such was the effect of the lenity which was to induce the students to do their duty."

A more curious case, which showed a considerable sense of humor on the part of our ancestors, was the following: —

"*May* 23, 1786. This morning a number of the seniors were sent for by the President to go to his house at 8 o'clock. They went, and the parts were distributed thus: Thompson, English Oration, A. M. Champlin, Latin Oration, A. M. Fowle and Gardner 2d, each a Poem. Blake, English, and Andrews 1st, Latin Orations, P. M. Harris, Dwight, Hubbard, and Parker, a Conference. Bigelow and Crosby, Lowell and Taylor, Loring and Sullivan, Forensics. Lincoln and Warland, a Greek Dialogue. Bradford, Norton, Simpkins, and Wyeth, respondents in Syllogistics, and all the rest opponents to the same. These

Syllogistics are very much despised by the scholars, and no attention seems to be paid to them by the company at Commencement. The scholars in general think that the government, in giving them those parts, write on their foreheads DUNCE in capital letters. Notwithstanding this, some of the most learned men in the country had Syllogistics when they graduated here. The good parts, as they are called, are more numerous this year than they have ever been. Before this there has been only one English and one Latin Oration, and no Poems. It is a doubt whether they intend to establish this as a precedent or whether it is only a distinguished favor to the present class, who pretend to be the best class for learning and genius that ever graduated here. It is said that the parts have been exceedingly well distributed, and all the College are pleased. However that may be, the syllogists all got together this evening and drank till not one of them could stand straight, or was sensible of what he did. A little after 9 they sallied out, and for a quarter of an hour made such a noise as might be heard at a mile distant. The tutors went out and after a short time persuaded them to disperse. Mr. —— had two squares of his windows broke.

"*May* 24. It is feared that some bad consequences will ensue from the high-go of the syllogists last evening. Borland, it seems, was the most active of them all; he collared Mr. —— and threw an handful of gravel in his face, and was rather disrespectful to Mr. ——. He went this morning to the former to make an apology for his conduct, but was told it could not be received, as the matter was already laid before the government. Thus those fellows play the tyrants here; they have no regard, no allowances for youth and circumstances. They go out when they are almost certain of being insulted, and then bring the scholar for a crime of which he knew nothing under public censure. They cannot with any face say that a scholar ought to be so severely punished for depriving himself of his senses. For there are here in College persons who have seen —— as much intoxicated as Borland was yesterday and behaving quite as ill. But compassion is too great a virtue ever to be admitted into the breast of a tutor here. It is supposed, however, that Borland's punishment will not be very severe, because it requires an unanimous vote among the governors of the College to punish a student, and they are said to be at such variance one with the other that they can very seldom all agree.

"*May* 25. Government met and were assembled almost all this day to determine what punishment to inflict upon Borland. He was informed of it in the evening, and the class petitioned that it might be mitigated, but probably without much success.

"*May* 26. This morning after prayers Borland was called out to

read an humble confession, signifying his repentance of his conduct, etc. The President read the votes of the government; the affair was stated, and it was said that Borland had insulted, in a flagrant manner, two of the governors of the University: whereupon it was voted, that he read a confession; and secondly, that he be degraded to the bottom of his class, and that he take his place there accordingly. The other scholars were warned by this example not to run into such excesses, and to behave respectfully. I wanted, I think, neither of these warnings, but the event has warned me to alter my opinion concerning ——. I thought him the best of the tutors, but now I do not think he is a jot better than the rest."

Six weeks afterwards Borland was restored to his regular place in class.

This is certainly a proof that the spirit of liberty in the Americans of the last century has not been underrated. No student of a later day would have dreamed of calling such a penalty severe. Any undergraduate of the nineteenth century who indulged in the agreeable but dangerous amusement of collaring an unpopular tutor and rubbing gravel in his face, would have accepted the extremest penalty of the law without a murmur, recognizing the fundamental principle of society, that no man can violate the law and enjoy it at the same time, can eat his cake and have it too. And further the notion that drunkenness is anything but an aggravation of the offence hardly commends itself to modern New England.

Such difficulties were by no means uncommon under this *régime*. But it is fair to say that they appear occasionally to have been due in no small part to the instructors themselves. The following seems to have been such a case: —

"*May* 31, 1786. Election Day. There is a custom among the scholars here which some of the classes follow and others do not. It is choosing a Governor and Lieutenant-Governor for the class. They commonly take some rich fellow who can treat the class now and then. The seniors this morning chose Champlin Governor, and Lowell Lieutenant-Governor. The Lieutenant-Governor treated immediately, and they chose their other officers. At commons they all went into the hall in procession. Thomas, who was appointed Sheriff, marched at their head, with a paper cockade in his hat, and brandishing a cane in his hand instead of a sword. He conducted the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor to their seats, made his bow, and retired to the other

table, for which Jackey H—— punished him four shillings. However, he performed his part so well that the spectators were much pleased and clapped their hands. H—— happened to see Baron, the junior, clapping, and sent orders for him to go to him after commons. Baron, not happening to go before 2 o'clock, was punished five shillings for impudence, and four for disobedience. That is the way these modest tutors tyrannize over us. As there was a little noise in the hall, H—— struck the handle of his knife three times on the table to still it, but instead of that almost every knife in the hall was struck on the table three times. At last the tutors rose, and as they were going out about half a dozen fellows hissed them. They were enraged, turned round and looked as if they would devour us, but they did not discover one person, which made them look silly enough. When they turned their backs again, there was nothing but hissing and groaning and clapping hands and stamping heard in the hall, till they got into the yard, where a few potatoes were sent out to meet them."

A difficulty of such a kind would, probably, in later times, have been avoided by a little good-nature and forbearance on the part of the tutor. But it made little difference to the student whether he was in the right or the wrong. The true grievance lay in the assumption of social superiority; in the fact that the College government set itself in a position of semi-hostility to the students, and refused to acknowledge them as entitled to active assistance and sympathy. The manner, not the act, of discipline, was the cause of the evil. Hence the mildest punishments were made a cause of as much complaint as the most arbitrary vexations.

"*March* 14, 1787. The junior class being displeased with the distribution of parts for exhibition, so far as respected their class, assembled this evening at Prescott's chamber and made a great deal of noise.

"*March* 17. The government met this forenoon to make inquiries concerning the noise at Prescott's and at Wier's chamber.

"*March* 19. This morning, the juniors Prescott and Wier were publicly admonished for having had riotous noises at their chambers last week. The sentence is considered all over College as uncommonly severe, and by many as wholly unmerited, at least on the part of Prescott.

"*March* 22. In consequence of the late severity of the College governors there has been, yesterday and this day, a subscription paper handed about among all the classes, to promote a meeting of the whole

College to-morrow evening in the chapel, every person having a pipe, a glass, and a bottle of wine, and there to convince the government that the students are possessed of 'a noble spirit, a spirit which shall nip the bud of tyrannical oppression.' They will get as drunk as beasts, and probably break every tutor's windows in College. This absurd and ridiculous plan has found so many votaries, that a large majority of every class, except ours, have already subscribed; but I am happy that in our class there are but few who have joined the association, and, as it is to take place only upon condition that there be a majority of every class, the plan will most probably fail."

At the risk of serious injury to the dignity of history, already gravely compromised by this sketch, the fact of the extreme leniency of the government in the punishment inflicted in this case must be shown by a final extract from the diary so often quoted. Some verses, which are not absolutely contemptible, represent all the facts, and the general impression made by the different members of the government on the students, more exactly than anything which the regular entries of a prosaic diary can be expected to supply. The verses in question are entitled

"LINES UPON THE LATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COLLEGE GOVERNMENT.

BY A STUDENT.

"The government of College met,
And Willard ruled the stern debate.
The witty J—— declared
That he had been completely scared.
'Last night' (says he) 'when I came home
I heard a noise in Prescott's room.
I went and listened at the door,
As I have often done before.
I found the juniors in a high rant;
They called the President a tyrant;
They said as how I was a fool,
A long-eared ass, a sottish mule,
Without the smallest grain of spunk;
So I concluded they were drunk.
From Xenophon whole pages torn
As trophies in their hats were worn.
Thus all their learning they had spread
Upon the outside of the head;
For I can swear without a sin
There 's not a line of Greek within.

At length I knocked, and Prescott came;
I told him 't was a burning shame
That he should give his classmates wine,
And he should pay an heavy fine.
Meanwhile the rest grew so outrageous,
That though I boast of being courageous,
I could not help being in a fright,
For one of them put out the light,
And 't was, as you may well suppose,
So dark I could not see my nose.
I thought it best to run away
And wait for vengeance till to-day.
For he 's a fool at any rate
Who 'll fight when he can rusticate.
When they found out that I was gone,
They ran through College up and down,
And I could hear them very plain
Take the Lord's holy name in vain.
To Wier's chamber they repaired,
And there the wine they freely shared.
They drank and sung till they were tired,
And then they peacefully retired.'
When this Homeric speech was said,
With drawling tongue and hanging head,
The learned Doctor took his seat,
Thinking he 'd done a noble feat.
Quoth Joe: 'The crime is great, I own.
Send for the juniors one by one!
By this almighty wig I swear,
Which with such majesty I wear,
And in its orbit vast contains
My dignity, my power and brains,
That Wier and Prescott both shall see
That College boys must not be free!'
He spoke, and gave the awful nod,
Like Homer's Dodonean God.
The College to its centre shook,
And every pipe and wineglass broke.
Williams, with countenance humane,
Which scarce from laughing could refrain,
Thought that such youthful scenes of mirth
To punishments should not give birth.
Nor could he easily divine
What was the harm of drinking wine.
But P——, with an awful frown,
Full of his article and noun,
Spoke thus: 'By all the parts of speech,

Which with such elegance I teach,
By all the blood which fills my veins,
By all the power of Handel's strains,
With mercy I will never stain
The character which I maintain.
Pray tell me why the laws were made,
If they are not to be obeyed.'
J—— saw 't would be in vain t' oppose,
And therefore to be silent chose.
R——, with his two enormous eyes
Enlarged to thrice their common size,
And brow contracted, staring wild,
Said government was much too mild.
'Were I' (said he) 'to have my will,
I soon would teach them to be still.
Their wicked rioting to quell,
I'd rusticate, degrade, expel;
And rather than give up my plan,
I'd clear the College to a man.'
B——, who has little wit or pride,
Preferred to take the strongest side;
And Willard soon received commission
To give a public admonition.
With pedant strut to prayers he came,
Called out the criminals by name:
Obedient to his dire command,
Before him Wier and Prescott stand.
'The rulers, merciful and kind,
With equal grief and wonder find
That you should laugh, and drink, and sing,
And make with noise the College ring.
I therefore warn you to beware
Of drinking more than you can bear.
Wine an incentive is to riot,
Destructive of the public quiet.
Full well your tutors know this truth,
For sad experience taught their youth.
Take then this friendly exhortation!
The next offence is rustication.'"

This sketch of the historical development of the College has already been drawn out too far, and most readers will probably be of the opinion that it deals with the subject in too trivial a manner, and from too low a stand-point. Yet one may fairly doubt whether it is possible in any other way to obtain a correct idea of the gradual steps by which the standard of high

education in America has been slowly raised; and it is certainly the fact that, in this age, when instruction has become a science, any person who attempts to deal with the education of young men in actual practice, without attempting in some degree to understand their motives and susceptibilities, runs great danger of neutralizing the whole effect of his most conscientious exertions.

HENRY ADAMS.

ART. VI. — THE BUTLER CANVASS.

I.

THE LABOR QUESTION.

THE State Convention of the Republican party, held at Worcester on the 27th of September, 1871, brought a very extraordinary political canvass to an unexpected close. It was extraordinary in many respects, but was especially characterized throughout by a tone of discussion of the lowest possible order, conducted with a spirit of personality unusual even in American politics. The key-note of the campaign in this respect was, indeed, struck at the very outset by a master hand. It was at Springfield that the first public meeting was held. Something rather unusual was here anticipated, and the result did not in any way fall short of expectation. The meeting might not inaptly be described as a true, intellectual Donnybrook Fair, in which every head that was seen was impartially hit. General Hawley, of Connecticut, John Brown, of Harper's Ferry fame, Miss Anna Dickinson, Mr. Sanborn, of the "Springfield Republican," "Warrington," Mr. Edward Atkinson, the editors of the "Boston Advertiser" and the "Boston Journal," and many other well-known characters, were now and again dimly visible, or audible, amid the tumult of assault, which was carried on to a vigorous accompaniment of cat-calls, disorderly explanations from the assailed, and responses through the various forms of the lie circumstantial and the lie direct: the united efforts of a brass band were finally called upon, as

an ingenious substitute for the previous question, to put a stop to further debate, and the astonished audience dispersed under the influence of this, the single blast of harmony of which the occasion was guilty. Certain familiar political catch-words, such as "temperance," "labor reform," "retrenchment," etc., had, indeed, been faintly distinguished at intervals above the din of personal allusion, but they were lost as soon as heard, and attracted little attention. The initial meeting was in no respect unworthy of the entire canvass. Throughout it the political fortune of one man was the single question at issue. There was indeed a large amount of fault-finding over alleged existing abuses, though this apparently was intended only to preserve appearances; and there was also more or less blind groping after remedies; but it was nevertheless well understood upon all sides that these were but the rooks and pawns of the game. Yet in a vague, meaningless way the discussion now and again approached some of the most interesting economical and political problems of the day; never presenting them fairly or grappling with them, but showing rather a disposition to make use of them as a means to an end, if, through their agency, the end might more certainly be attained.

It is, however, these indistinct surroundings of the canvass, these mere accessories to the one issue really involved, which gave to it all its permanent interest. The past or future political fortunes of Mr. B. F. Butler do not present a very interesting subject for thoughtful discussion. Possessed of great energy, both of body and mind, and with an amount of vitality for which a parallel would probably be sought in vain in the political annals of this country, neither the military nor the political career of General Butler has hitherto afforded any indication of the possession by him of any of those lofty intellectual or moral qualities which can alone place a public man among the very small class of those who have, by their personal influence, greatly swayed the course of human events. Hitherto this gentleman's career has been more distinguished for those stage effects calculated to draw a startled round of applause from the groundlings, than by any defined and persistent line of policy indicative of one who has either reflected

much or who believes strongly. He is essentially a sensationalist. Whether coining a legal phrase to meet a military exigency, or hanging a traitor, or exploding a powder-boat, or impeaching a President, or attacking a metallic currency, or proposing a new way to pay old debts, or conducting a canvass, General Butler's eye is always fixed on his audience. His heart cannot be in his work, for he is intently watching the momentary effect he is producing; his public career, in fact, may be said to have hitherto consisted mainly of a varied pyrotechnic exhibition, not of the most successful character.

Passing at once, therefore, over the personal controversies which gave such an unattractive character to the canvass, it is here proposed to discuss at some length those other economical and political questions which gave to that canvass a real significance. First among these were those questions affecting the relations of labor and capital, which are now attracting so much anxious attention both in Europe and in America.

When the Worcester Convention at last reached a ballot, it was found that the friends of General Butler numbered about two fifths of the whole number of delegates, the exact proportion being as forty-one to fifty-nine. This formidable minority was very largely, perhaps one half, made up of those especially interested in what is known as the question of labor reform. Where so large a proportion of the more active political members of any community combine around a party name, they are certainly entitled to demand of their fellow-citizens the respectful consideration of any political views they may entertain. This is their right, which no one should seek to abridge. Every right, however, includes a correlative duty. The duty in this case is clear. It is that those advancing novel opinions, or putting forward new claims, or seeking to engraft an untried policy upon the political system of the community in which they live, shall clearly and succinctly state what they desire, to the end that it may receive an intelligent consideration. In America, from the beginning, this obligation has always been acknowledged. The very first act of the people of the United States, when they came forward to claim a place among the nations of the earth, was formally to recognize it. Jefferson then appeared as their spokesman. Out of "a

decent respect to the opinions of mankind" which required that they should declare the causes which impelled them to the course then taken, Jefferson expressed in words which will not soon be forgotten the demands of his countrymen. From that day to this, whenever any considerable portion of the American people has sought to organize itself into a separate political existence, it has not failed to follow the precedent thus created. Its first act has been to formulate its demands. When, therefore, the labor reformers of Massachusetts seek to modify the public policy of the State in conformity with their peculiar ideas, the single duty incumbent upon them before they can claim as of right a respectful consideration of their demands, is that they shall state what those demands are, that their fellow-citizens may pass upon them intelligently and decidedly.

This duty they have more than once undertaken to perform, but the success which has hitherto attended their efforts has not been encouraging. Their last attempt was made at the party convention held at Framingham, on the 4th of October, one week subsequent to the day on which the Republican Convention was held at Worcester. The declaration of principles then put forward not only failed to justify their movement, but it is not too much to say that it was an insult to the intelligence of those whose respectful consideration it challenged. In support of a criticism thus unmodified, it is only necessary to quote without comment a few words from the preamble of this singular manifesto, which began thus: "We affirm as a fundamental principle that labor, the creation of wealth, is entitled to all it creates"; and then proceeded, among other logical results of this proposition, to accept "as the best and grandest of all, the final obliteration of that foul stigma upon our so-called Christian civilization, —'the poverty of the masses.'" After this preamble naturally followed a declaration of war with things in general, including more especially the whole "wages system," the "present system of finance," "the aristocracy of capital," and "public interest-bearing debts," which last were "to be paid at once," or, rather, as the inference would seem to be, at once converted into non-interest-bearing public debts.

A declaration of principles such as this, which, if carried into effect, every common-sense human being in the community

could not but see must only result in starving the laborer by putting a stop to all production, naturally failed to recommend itself to the sober judgment of those to whom it was addressed. This important fact very shortly seemed to suggest itself to the minds of those who had assumed a leadership in the movement. Prominent among these was Mr. Wendell Phillips, who was currently reported to be himself the author of the Framingham resolutions. To one honestly attempting by a calm study of first principles to arrive at some satisfactory solution of the great social, political, and economical questions of the day, Mr. Phillips is perhaps a scarcely more profitable subject of contemplation than General Butler. This gentleman's mind, never strong in its reasoning and reflecting attributes, would seem to have been entirely thrown from its poise by the brilliant success which attended his connection with the anti-slavery struggle. Throughout that long contest he was in his element. Well adapted by nature to any work of destruction, it simply devolved upon him there to sustain a vehement and incessant assault upon an institution which was the mere creature of law. The labor question, however, manifestly required for its treatment far higher qualities of mind. In America, at least, there was no law to be repealed, no institution to be assailed and overthrown. Elated with his success as a puller down, Mr. Phillips has shown a strong disposition to thrust himself prominently forward as a builder up. The very accomplishments, however, which had constituted the essential element of his strength in carrying out the self-ordained task of his earlier life seemed peculiarly calculated to unfit him for the task now assumed in his later years. Essentially, no less by nature than by long study and habit of mind, a rhetorician, and a very brilliant one, rhetoric has long since become with Mr. Phillips a disease. He is a leading advocate of the cause of temperance as well as of that of labor reform, but his temperance does not extend beyond the use of alcoholic stimulants, and includes no moderation in the use of language. A striking figure of speech or a brilliant metaphor is to him what his dram is to the confirmed inebriate. Neither discretion nor logic nor fact nor reflection seem able to restrain this diseased appetite; the temptation is irresistible, — he is nothing unless

rhetorical. Accordingly the marginal glosses, as they from time to time, and with short intervals between, emanated from the author of the Framingham resolutions, did not greatly promote the cause of his followers. At one time he resorted to illustration, reverting like an American Rousseau to some imaginary condition of human affairs antecedent to all civilization. He pictured the naked savage gathering the natural fruits of the earth, and in this case he declared that the fundamental principle enunciated at Framingham held true. The ingenious savage next contrives a hoe, and uses it himself; and still the fundamental principle was there. Pleased with his invention, the simple child of rhetoric makes another hoe, and using this himself, proceeds to allow a less ingenious contemporary to make use of the old hoe — for a consideration. At this point the fundamental principle seemed in jeopardy, but its author, nothing daunted, rushed forward and imagined the savage creation of his eloquence abandoning the handling of his hoe and betaking himself wholly to hoe-making and hoe-letting, and then, at last, he fearlessly denounced him as a monopolist. The fundamental principle might tolerate the letting of one hoe and perhaps the letting of ten; nevertheless, somewhere the line must be drawn, and clearly the fundamental principle could not tolerate a thousand hoes.

Not unnaturally this lucid abandonment of a position calmly assumed but a few days before, failed to commend itself to the general judgment. In a few days Mr. Phillips tried again. He struck deeper now; he was more radical and more rhetorical than was customary even with him. He took for his text the words, "In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread until thou return unto the ground," and proceeded to denounce that natural order of things which had resulted in making toil a condition precedent to eating. The inference was not to be avoided that a vigorous labor-reform movement had been greatly needed at the time of the expulsion from Eden, and that even yet well-organized political action might result in the reversal of the primal curse and in the restoration of mankind to its prehistoric privileges.

It is scarcely necessary to say that this utterance fell upon the astonished ears of his fellow-citizens with scarcely more

practical effect than the previous ones. Once more Mr. Phillips had recourse to his rhetoric. There are two ways of stating the proposition he next enunciated. There is the way prosaic and the way sensational. Mr. Phillips naturally resorted to the latter, and in this form it had a certain aspect of novelty; in its prosaic form, however, the identical proposition had been stated of another people at least forty years before. In 1830 an American clergyman returning from a visit to Europe had remarked, no less wisely than wittily, "The people of France don't know what they want, and will never be satisfied till they get it." On behalf of the labor-reformers of Massachusetts, Mr. Phillips now assumed exactly this position; he took the epigrammatic saying of Mr. Harness, revolved it in his own mind, and gave it to the public in this rhetorical dress: "Well, there are a set of men, with everything convenient about them, with two suits a year, as Dogberry says, — enough to spend, and a good credit at the bank, — and they say, 'Hulloa, what is your remedy? Tell us now, right off.' 'Why,' we say, 'we are not prepared to tell you, and *you have no right to ask.* All we know is, that there are uncounted millions of men that have not a fair chance in the world, and somehow or other we mean to right it, and if you want to help us, come on, and if you do not we will trample you under our feet.'" (Applause.)

Of course further discussion was useless. The destroyer had ignominiously failed in his self-assumed task of construction. Not only had he failed, but there was something which touched the verge of the ludicrous, in his utter inability to appreciate the cause of his failure; he could only vaguely be conscious of it, and then, angrily resorting to his familiar weapons, threaten dire destruction to all around if they did not do for him what he had so confidently undertaken to do for himself. It was with no such poverty-stricken declamation as this that slavery was assailed, and it very fitly concluded with an appeal to brute force and to fear. Paris has long been accustomed to this mode of reasoning, and it is very remotely possible that Mr. Phillips may succeed in importing it into Massachusetts. The labor-reform party of the State as a political organization may develop great strength at the polls,

and secure a strong hold on the popular sympathy, such as a similar party has long enjoyed and used in France; guided by the brilliant rhetoric of their leader, it is possible that they may achieve great political success in America, as more than once they have done in Europe; they may remodel the statute-book to suit their views, recording upon it perhaps an indignant repeal of the obnoxious "sweat-of-the-brow" law; they may decree that all property is robbery, and that all toil is but one form of oppression; they may perhaps do all this and much more, for others have already elsewhere done no less, and as much will often be done hereafter: one thing, however, they cannot do; they cannot, appearing as a distinct political organization in the calm forum of reason and common sense, — they cannot demand a discussion of the political remedies which shall go to the root of their grievances, until they are in some degree prepared to state what those grievances and their remedies are.

Meanwhile it is certainly a most noticeable fact that so large an element of inarticulate discontent should exist in Massachusetts. There it is, however, and because it is discontented, because it is inarticulate, not being able to express what it wants, it instinctively resorts to political agitation and seeks comfort in rhetoric. The result is that a vague despairing sort of cry goes up from all political circles that something must be done; that one party must take decided and advanced ground upon the labor question, or else that the other will. In other words, political success is to be purchased by throwing a tub to this whale. It nevertheless remains to be proved that any such ground can be taken which will constitute anything more than a mere tub to a whale. There is, in fact, a frightful gap in the labor-reform logic. The leaders of the movement assert that great poverty and distress and inequality of fortune exist in this world. Yes; so do much disease and sickness and deformity. When they take the next step, however, and declare that the remedy for the evils of the first class is to be worked out through political agitation, they assume a position for which some ground may exist in Europe, but which, in view of the political system which has always obtained in America, is apparently as unwarranted as it would be to as-

semble in convention the lame, the halt, the blind, and the insane, and, after duly denouncing "that foul stigma upon our so-called Christian civilization," — the disease of the masses, — they were to organize for the purpose of emancipating mankind from it "by the conquest of political power." In each case both premise and conclusion are at fault. The masses in New England are no more afflicted with poverty than they are with disease; unless the poverty-stricken class is made to include the whole of those ninety-nine out of every hundred in New England who in some way have to work, and work hard, for a living. Even, however, if the premise was sound, unless this general poverty was the result of legislation, how could legislation remedy it? Mr. Phillips confesses his inability to point to any law which either has caused or will mitigate the woes which he asserts exist. His complaint then reduces itself to this, that in a community where almost every one "earns his bread by the sweat of his brow," the toil of one man commands from the community a higher price than the toil of some or most other men. This is doubtless in the eyes of many conclusive evidence of the unjust and clumsy handiwork of the Almighty, and, perhaps, an advancing civilization may remedy this evil, and, through some ingenious state machinery, may turn out men and women, like bullets or Waltham watches, on a standard pattern of exact equality. Then, of course, the capacity of all men being exactly equal, the services of none will command a premium, and inequality of condition will disappear. Meanwhile, now and for a long time to come, neither the individual American nor that social system of which he is a part at all partake of the character of those ductile substances which may be run in a uniform mould. Individuality, indeed, rather than uniformity, is the characteristic of the race. It would apparently, therefore, be futile even to attempt a radical measure of reform, and Mr. Phillips himself would seem to recoil from it. The average man is, however, singularly subject to all kinds of political deception; he loves, in fact, above all things, to be doctored; and, if political organizations desire, it will call for no great degree of cunning skill to compound some soothing-syrup, or even an infallible nostrum, to meet the present demand; an additional "lie upon the statute-book" is a

matter of no great consequence. But to the honest investigator, the good citizen, or the practical philanthropist, such a course is not satisfactory, — it partakes too much of the nature of a trick. Here is a serious question ; it deserves serious consideration. The presence of a recognized discontented class is perhaps the most alarming symptom which can develop itself in a free country. When the existence of such a class is once acknowledged, as it now is in Massachusetts, those who wish well to the public can hardly apply themselves to a more profitable work than to a study of the causes from whence this discontent originated, and to the conditions upon which its development depends. Such an investigation is not likely to lead to any brilliant remedial results, for few except the ignorant or cunning have any faith in the statute panaceas, — the labor-reform Buchus and the temperance Mandrake Pills with which the political Helmbolds and old Dr. Jacobs are constantly drenching the body politic ; it is scarcely probable that this generation will see the Garden of Eden restored by act of Legislature. Nevertheless, if a disorder is confessed in the body politic, the discussion of its causes and conditions will be far from unprofitable, if it only induces a few to value at their real worth the infallible nostrums of political knaves and charlatans.

The change of political character which has of late become so noticeable in Massachusetts is a thing of no sudden growth. For many years the State has been passing through a phase of social alteration as complete as it was gradual. It was the peculiar growth of its people which made New England, as a whole, the force which it had ever been upon this continent at the time this change began. Exacting a scanty subsistence out of a penurious soil, under a temperate but rugged climate, its population seemed to afford a certain illustration of the Darwinian principle of natural selection. The rough, variable climate and the harsh east winds killed off all but the more robust and enduring, who slowly developed in the course of generations into a race characterized it may be by not a few unattractive qualities, but withal shrewd, saving, energetic, and conservative ; hard-headed, perhaps, but singularly self-balanced. The introduction of railroads revolutionized New England even more completely than most other countries. It did this in two

ways: in the first place by opening to the New-Englander an easy path out of his native land to the fertile regions of the interior; and, on the other hand, it opened into New England a way no less easy for all the products of that rich interior. To any person endowed, not with a gift of prophecy, but with an uncommon degree of human foresight, the future of the New England population in 1830 would have seemed wellnigh hopeless. How was this people to continue to produce, when the results of production did not pay for their cost? Then it was that the New England population displayed once more that singular fertility of resource which has never yet proved unequal to an emergency. Up to that time, or very nearly up to it, the sea and the soil had been the two great sources from which this people had forced a subsistence; and it was the contact with their rugged sea and scarcely less rugged soil which, as a people, had made them what they were. They were gradually driven from the sea by the principle of protection to home industry, which was engrafted upon the policy of the national government; and they were driven from the soil by the superior productive power of the West. In the one case protection deprived them of their occupation, and in the other free-trade put it out of their power to raise food. Crushed apparently between the upper and the nether millstone, they took counsel, not of politicians and orators and legislatures, but of their own ingenuity. The sea and the farm ceased to be their chosen fields of labor, and they turned their busy brains and cunning hands to the manufacture of those myriad useful and ingenious articles of which others stood in need. The whole population, however, as a consequence of this change in physical life, entered upon a new phase of development; it passed from being an active, out-of-door race of fishermen and farmers, living in small villages and enjoying a singular equality of human possessions, into a manufacturing community drawn closely together in large towns and working under cover, with a vast accumulation of worldly possessions very unequally divided.

The political system of the community, meanwhile, underwent no corresponding change. It was still in outward form the old, democratic system of New England; a system based upon local self-government, and real as well as theoretical

equality. For the democracy of New England from the beginning had little in it of the doctrinaire, nor was it run to order in any statute mould; no Rousseau nor Voltaire, no Victor Hugo nor Louis Blanc, had ever acted as sponsor for it, but it had grown up the gnarly offspring of the farm and of the fishing-smack, so that, like most good things of natural growth, it possessed in no small degree the strong, racy flavor of a native product of the soil. It was a practical, as contradistinguished from a theoretical rule of the people. Every one took part in the government, because the government was simple in form and every one felt a direct interest in having it good. Though the forms have remained to the present time in all material respects the same, yet that subtle influence which from the beginning communicated to them their essential principle of life long since began to disappear. A manufacturing population cannot fail in the long run to develop characteristics very unlike those of a rural or sea-going people. So it has been in the case of New England, and especially of Massachusetts. Fifty years ago there was not a city government in the State; the citizens governed themselves from their own town-halls. In the year 1820 — at which time the industrial change referred to was in its earliest stages of development — there were but six towns in Massachusetts which numbered a population of over five thousand souls. These were all situated upon the seaboard and took rank in the following order: —

Boston	43,298
Salem	12,731
Newburyport	6,852
Charlestown	6,591
Gloucester	6,384
Marblehead	5,630
Total	81,486

They were all commercial or fishing communities, and were accounted the flourishing and wealthy centres of a Commonwealth, the entire population of which amounted to only 523,287 souls. But sixteen per cent of the population of half a century ago in Massachusetts dwelt in towns of over

5,000 inhabitants. Then began the growth of manufactories and the rise of interior towns. The figures of the recent census reveal the progress of this industrial revolution with startling significance. Instead of only six towns of over 5,000 inhabitants, as in 1820, the returns of 1870 showed nineteen cities and towns of over 12,000. They ranked as follows: —

	Population in 1870.	Population in 1820.
1. Boston,	250,526	43,298
2. Worcester,	41,107	2,962
3. Lowell,	40,928	——
4. Cambridge,	39,634	3,295
5. Lawrence,	28,921	——
6. Charlestown,	28,323	6,591
7. Lynn,	28,233	4,515
8. Fall River,	26,766	1,594
9. Springfield,	26,703	3,914
10. Salem,	24,117	12,731
11. New Bedford,	21,320	3,947
12. Taunton,	18,629	4,520
13. Chelsea,	18,547	642
14. Gloucester,	15,389	6,364
15. Somerville,	14,685	——
16. Haverhill,	13,082	3,070
17. Newton,	12,825	1,850
18. Newburyport,	12,595	6,852
19. Adams,	12,090	1,836
Totals,	674,420	107,981

The second town of the Commonwealth in 1820 was the tenth in 1870, while the third in the first period ranked as the eighteenth in the second; and three manufacturing cities, which in 1820 had no corporate existence at all, in 1870 exceeded in population the six leading places of Massachusetts taken together at the earlier date. In 1820, again, 84 per cent of the population of the State lived in communities which averaged less than 1,500 inhabitants each; in 1870, 50 per cent lived in communities of over 10,000 each. To those in any way acquainted with the industries of Massachusetts, a single glance at the list of cities just enumerated will sufficiently indicate the change which has taken place in the character of the occupations of her people; were such proof not at hand, however, conclusive evidence of it would be found in the fact that, in the twenty years between 1845 and 1865, the proportion in

money value of the manufactures of the State to her entire industry increased from 61 to 73 per cent, while the value of her fisheries and foreign imports, though positively undimished, had experienced a proportional decrease of from 22 to 8 per cent of the whole. Meanwhile this shifting of the population from the deck and the farm to the mill and the workshop, this abandonment of out-of-door in favor of in-door occupation, has not yet had time fully to develop its results. One half of the population of the State still live in towns of the smaller size, and cling to the forms of New England town government. This cannot, however, much longer continue to be the case. The census of 1890 will, not improbably, find three quarters of the inhabitants of Massachusetts crowded together at a comparatively few centres, belonging to the operative class, and dwelling under representative, municipal governments. Yet twenty years should in the life of a commonwealth be regarded as hardly more than a day; certainly 1852 does not now seem very far removed from the present time. Since 1850, however, the growth of the population of the nineteen towns just enumerated has been 90 per cent, while the three hundred and nineteen remaining towns of the Commonwealth have averaged an increase of but 21 per cent. The same proportional growth during the next twenty years would, in 1890, place nearly two thirds of the inhabitants of the State within these nineteen municipalities alone.

Hence it seems not improbable that it must soon devolve upon the Massachusetts community to grapple with the difficult task of maintaining a government, republican in spirit as well as in form, with a population a majority of which is congregated in cities. Now there are many things in the nature of conditions precedent essential to the stability of any form of popular government; for, popular cant to the contrary notwithstanding, a republic can no more spring from the smoke of a street-fight, than a self-contained population can be improvised in a day. Long training in the school of self-restraint, intelligence, a sufficiency of education, a spirit of accustomed respect for the law as contradistinguished from the sentiment of dynastic loyalty, a belief in their own destiny springing from that indefinable something known as public spirit, —

all these are essential to the permanence of popular government; but both above and below all these there must exist throughout the mass of the people a solid basis of general contentment and average prosperity. The old English catchword, that the country must be governed by those who have a stake in the soil, contains in it not only a considerable element of solid sense, but, when broadly considered, a vast deal of human happiness; for there is no possible community at once so contented, so conservative, and so tenacious of the rights of property as one largely made up of those who have by their own efforts made themselves the owners of a moderate competence. It matters little whether this be a stake in the land, in the public debt, in the railroad system, or in the savings banks, — the ownership of that which a person has toiled for hard and long, of that which, in spite of all rhetorical denunciation, he has "earned by the sweat of his brow," makes of that person a conservative in politics. Where wealth accumulates, education and reflection not infrequently make men radical reformers; they see, or think they see, through and beyond many human regulations, and they chafe at the obstinacy with which mankind insists on hampering its own progress. It is this class which commonly furnishes the great reformers — the Smiths, the Benthams, the Cobdens, the Romillys, and the Mills — who leave landmarks in history. Among the less wealthy, however, the case is otherwise. Education is with them rarely elaborated to that point which enables a man to look through the superficial aspect of problems and clearly see the hidden truth beyond. Accordingly, when persons of this class possess any property, they are apt to meet in a spirit of fierce hostility any attack upon what custom has taught them to consider the vested rights or established muniments of that property. There is probably no community in the world today so intensely and hopelessly conservative as the rural population of France; that population which, three quarters of a century ago, in the abject despair of utter destitution, recognized no rights of property and cared for no form of government. The provisions of the code Napoleon regulating the transmission of land worked the complete metamorphosis of this people in a single generation. The soil was divided up,

and each new subdivision was a reinforcement of conservatism. The Empire gave to French peasants "a stake in the soil," and the Empire failed to sustain itself simply because it was unable to give the same bribe to the dwellers in large cities.

Passing away from these general considerations, it remains to state the essence of the problem now confronting Massachusetts. That a social and political change is going forward in the State is indisputable; its nature and course of probable development have already been pointed out. The old divisions of population are shifting; industry and growth are passing from the country into the towns, from the yeoman to the operative. Political control is thus passing out of the hands of those who have a direct and easily perceptible stake in the government into the hands of those who, under the existing social and economical arrangement, either have no such stake, or if they have, enjoy it only in some more remote form, as government securities or savings-bank deposits, the connection of which for profit or loss with the political changes they may seek to inaugurate is not to them immediately apparent. It is this last class, the remotely interested, which is now the most growing political element in Massachusetts. There are few indeed of the citizens of this State who have nothing. The tax returns, it is true, apparently indicate that forty-two per cent of the voters of the Commonwealth pay only the poll-tax. Numerous alarming conclusions have been drawn from them, but these, like many official figures, are calculated only to deceive. The statement is in fact rather assuring than alarming. The return includes only those property-holders who themselves pay a property in addition to a poll tax. The savings banks of the State, however, also return 488,797 depositors; how many of these pay any tax other than the poll-tax? Yet the deposits amount to $135,745,097, in nearly every dollar of which some voter has an interest direct or indirect, and the total number of voters in the State is probably less than 285,000 in all. The holders of United States securities, again, pay no tax upon that class of property, which has lent to it a practical value in the eyes of many citizens who do not deposit in savings banks, but who have a strong antipathy to taxes. Finally, there is an immense mass of stocks,

bonds, and securities of all kinds in regard to property in which no record exists, but which are eagerly sought, because, in practice, it rests solely with the holder whether he will contribute his share to the public expenditure or not. It is probably safe to say of the voting population of Massachusetts, that, instead of being nearly equally divided between those who have and those who have not, nine out of every ten should be classed among those who have, and, of those nine who have, probably not less than six hold their possessions as bought "by the sweat of their brows." The vast majority of the people are therefore capitalists; they themselves belong in a greater or less degree to the class of oppressors with whom some of their number declare such relentless war. Let a new plank be inserted in the next Framingham platform, denouncing the aggressions of the savings-bank capitalists, and proposing to curtail the profits which these "privileged classes" extort from needy debtors, and probably a good deal of new light would be shed upon the ownership of property in Massachusetts. At present the great political difficulty in the case arises from the fact that the smaller holders of this class of property fail to appreciate what is known as the solidarity of capital; they do not understand how a war waged on capital in one form in which they are not interested can possibly affect capital in some other form in which they are interested. Yet upon no interest in the Commonwealth would an honest reduction to practice of the Framingham declaration fall more fatally than upon the savings banks; for through the machinery of these savings banks the working men and women habitually lend their capital in vast amounts to the capitalists, and then the labor-reform leaders, so called, fiercely denounce them for using it. When the connection is one step less remote, the depositor is not slow to perceive it. This was seen in the case of General Butler's earlier proposition to tax the coupons on United States bonds. With the mass of the people this fell upon wholly unsympathetic ears, and in no small degree because so large a proportion of these securities ($23,000,000 in Massachusetts alone) were held by the savings banks; thousands who had never seen a United States bond yet had a sense of proprietorship in them.

The mass of the American people, including all the labor reformers, are therefore already capitalists, and, as such, are subject to all those appeals to which capitalists are of all men most liable. The difficulty in the case is that, through the agency of savings banks, etc., they prefer to lend their money to be used by others, rather than to use it themselves. Every dollar of the $136,000,000 held by this class in Massachusetts is somewhere used in production; and it is against its aggressions that in part they are so fiercely contending. The savings-bank capitalists, for instance, in very great degree built the Western Railroad of Massachusetts, and the operation they found a very profitable one. The marvellous complexity of modern civilization, however, has made the interconnection and interdependence of all the parts hard to understand. Formerly, in the early, simple days of Massachusetts, almost every man himself owned or was directly interested in the tools with which he worked; the share of that which he produced which fell to his lot was sufficiently apparent to give him a sense of ownership. But the operative of to-day, as production is now carried on, has no perceptible interest in the quality or quantity of that which results from his labor; his tools do not belong to him, and that they ever will is very remotely possible. As a rule, therefore, the Massachusetts operative has two different characters, — in so far as he is a capitalist, he belongs to the savings-bank system; in so far as he is a laborer, he belongs to the manufacturing system: it will then invariably be found that *quoad* capitalist he is the most conservative of mortals, while *quoad* operative he is the most radical.

Unquestionably this indicates a but partially developed condition of intelligence. It would, however, be possible to bring home these great principles of solidarity to the minds of the mass of mankind only through a slow process of education. One thing, however, is appreciated by the lowest order of intelligence, that is, ownership. As the operative class in America have, through the agency of savings banks, been taught during the last half-century to make themselves capitalists, it now remains in the next half-century to carry the system of education one step further in advance, and to teach

them to use their own capital, or, in other words, to make themselves capitalists in the line of their own occupations.

Labor, says Mr. Mill, needs capital, not the capitalist. This may be true of England, but it is not of America; labor with us has capital; it has superabundance of capital, but it has not yet learnt how itself to employ it. Up to this time the subdivisions of labor have greatly outstripped the combinations of capital belonging to labor. The end to which all true friends either of labor reform or of free institutions should now, and for a long time to come, direct their efforts, is the development among all classes of this savings-bank system, but extending its field of operation beyond being a mere machinery for the safe-keeping of hoardings, over the wide field of all other occupations in which capital is the most important tool which labor needs. The mill and the factory must be made the savings bank of the future. The operative must again feel as he works that he himself has accumulated by the sweat of his brow, not an account in the institution over the way, but a share in the building in which he works, in the machine with which he works, and in the results of his daily labor. The sense of proprietorship, that dignity of ownership which has in all times and in all countries accompanied the possession of any part, no matter how small, of the soil, must be imparted to those who handle the tool. In this way, and in this way only, can that subtle essence of conservatism, which is the underlying strength of all free institutions, be widely disseminated among the operative class. When at last it is, as in progress of time it surely will be, so disseminated, then, and not till then, will labor have capital, itself being the capitalist; and should New England work out for itself this new problem in its existence, the last and greatest danger confronting the existence of free institutions in America would be postponed to a remote future.

Nor indeed is this great change so remote as many suppose. It is but the first step which costs, and in the institution of savings banks the first step was long since taken. It now only remains for the individual members of the laboring class themselves to take control of that which they have long accumulated. It is in this respect that New England is now behind the head of the movement. Yet the

most flourishing of all the New England cities, that in which the growth most nearly resembles the mushroom development of the West, fails but little of being a monument both of the feasibility and of the great material success of this theory reduced to practice. The spindles of Fall River have multiplied from 241,218 in 1865 to 1,017,114 in the present year. The great secret of this development lies in the fact that almost every person at all prominently concerned in the operation of any mill in that thriving town is himself a stockholder directly interested in it. The division of capital and of industry has not as yet experienced its complete development; but the principle is established; the rest can hardly fail to follow.

No matter how soon it may follow, the initiative in this reform cannot now be claimed by the operatives of Massachusetts. They are already and must long continue far behind those of England. They may learn much more from the statistics of Oldham than from the rhetoric of Mr. Phillips. They might learn that in this single manufacturing borough, numbering only twice the population of Fall River, there are now seven thousand operatives who have not only "declared war upon the wages system," but have emancipated themselves from it. That these men and women now have a capital of $1,500,000 invested in cotton mills and in looms, and that in a single one of these mills, itself representing not less than half a million of dollars, nine tenths of the shareholders are workingmen. Lest they should be doubtful of their own capacity to take charge of their own savings, they might further ascertain that eight per cent was the average profit on the investments of these people, and that their profit on cotton-spinning was over twelve per cent. Should they desire to examine the accounts of any particular institution, they might select those of the Sun Mill, which during six years has averaged sixteen and a half per cent of profit, and in the third quarter of 1871 realized not less than forty per cent.*

* The profits here specified seem large, and yet a suggestive illustration of the increased economy resulting from a direct interest of the employee in the results of his saving has recently been furnished in the experience of the Pennsylvania Railroad. The superintendent of motive-power and machinery of that company says

That with all their great natural adaptation and resource, and that with all their vast accumulation of savings at command, the operatives of New England have not already accepted and bettered this instruction can hardly be considered as otherwise than evidence wellnigh conclusive that the wages system has not yet pressed very harshly upon them. When the mill-owner becomes oppressive, we may be tolerably sure that a large portion of our operatives will own their own mills. As yet in Massachusetts the workshop has, as a rule, proved a less remunerative place of deposit than the savings bank. A few experiments have succeeded, such as those at Somerset, at Wakefield, and at North Adams, and it is pleasant to read of these in an official report that "the operatives speak with pride of their new feelings of self-reliance and freedom, as well as of the quality of their work and the tendencies developed toward a more economical production than before." In spite, however, of an incipient restlessness, it is very evident that in Massachusetts at least no spirit of dissatisfaction as yet exists too deep to be satisfied with the dry husks of political agitation.

Meanwhile it is not probable that this simple and humane solution of a question which they are striving to convert into one of great political magnitude will seem in any way satisfactory to those who have assumed the leadership of the labor movement. Their object is the incorporation into the statute-book of something which shall have the appearance of regulating the relations between capital and labor. This in fact is the *ignis fatuus* of the Anglo-Saxon mind, — this faith in legislation. That a vision, a dream, should be stereotyped into a law, is the ultimate idea of the doctrinaire reformer. That this law

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in a recent report: "The plan adopted by my predecessor for encouraging the engineers and firemen to economize in the use of fuel and stores has also been beneficial in reducing the expenses in these items, and for this year there has been a saving of $63,576.44 (total expenditure, $728,719.08), one half of which will be divided as premiums among the men. . . . . In the economical use of oil for lubricating freight and passenger cars there has also been a saving over that of 1869 amounting to 49,096 quarts; and, taking the consumption of 1868 as the basis, the moneyed value of saving at the average cost for this year is $11,682.23, one third of which will be distributed in premiums." — *Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company*, pp. 51, 52.

may seek to regulate something far too subtle to admit of regulation through the machinery of the statute-book is a matter of secondary consideration; the mere existence of the law, though it be violated openly and notoriously, though its friends delight in proclaiming it "a lie upon the statute-book," is still considered a something worth struggling for. With such a sentiment it is useless to reason; it is, after all, little more than the Anglo-Saxon method of appealing to force, after the moral sense of the community has long since refused to allow the use of force. Accordingly with that solid good sense which constitutes the surest guaranty of social stability, the whole community, agitated simply upon the surface, subsides into a tacit agreement that every one shall have all that he desires; upon the one hand, he who wants it places his law upon the statute-book, and, on the other hand, he who does not desire it commits almost unmolested the acts forbidden by it. Such a singular compromise may for a time bear the outward aspect of an ingenious solution of a troublesome problem; in reality, however, it is effected only at the cost of that deep respect for the law which corresponds in republics to that loyalty which is the essence of monarchical institutions. A free community which purchases a temporary repose at this price is continually expending its capital.

Massachusetts should then meet this grave question neither in the spirit of the doctrinaire nor of the charlatan; her citizens can learn no good lesson from the doings of the Commune nor from the teachings of the Internationals. Hitherto when questions not less nearly affecting social or material well-being have confronted them, the difficulty has been overcome, not so much by tricks of speech or cunning sleight-of-hand, as by the exercise of a hard, practical common sense. It must be the same here now, if any results worthy of the past record of the State are to ensue. Every citizen must from his inmost soul desire to see each industrious member of the community enjoying that sense of dignity which is inseparable from the consciousness of proprietorship; can this, however, be communicated by law? There is no man who himself has a stake in the country who must not wish that every other citizen had a stake in it also; but is this a matter for statute

regulation? When, therefore, politicians and party organs cry out despairingly that some ground must be taken on these questions; when they cast about vaguely to see what new and meaningless enactment, to amuse and dispel a recognized popular discontent, can be recorded on the statute-book, it is then especially incumbent upon every honest and thinking citizen to assert distinctly, not only that reform does not lie in this direction, but also that every such new departure is but one more false departure, the worst feature of which is that it distracts attention from the real remedy. He should at all times and in all places, steadily and temperately, maintain that what the occasion demands of Massachusetts is to make of herself one great voluntary industrial copartnership, — a vast co-operative workshop, in which every industrious man might, should he so desire, feel, in the midst of his toil, that he worked with his own tools and to his own profit. He should point out that here capital already belongs to labor, and in no stinted measure also; and that capital, intelligence, skill, and industry, every condition necessary to success, being thus at hand, the Massachusetts community might now enter upon this momentous experiment with a great assurance of success. Above all, he should denounce every attempt to promote the interests of labor through political agitation as a dangerous error, calculated only to postpone that which it seeks to expedite. If, therefore, it should prove to be one consequence of the Butler campaign, that the attention of the so-called workingmen is distracted from the pursuit of those solid results for the attainment of which they need seek no aid outside of themselves, then will that campaign have inflicted a lasting injury both upon the laboring men and upon the Commonwealth. An experience, none the less bitter because very old, will finally convince them also that the millennium, when it comes, will not be heralded by a constable enforcing a law. In spite of all the politicians and party exigencies and campaign platforms that ever existed, neither this generation nor many succeeding ones will ever materially improve the condition of mankind in any way other than by a considerable expenditure of muscle in honest toil, under the direction of an educated brain. Epigrams and promises will no more elevate labor than they will produce wealth.

The relation of labor to capital was not the only subject discussed during the Butler canvass. Many other questions of equal, if not in America at least, of more general interest were remotely involved, — questions closely affecting the existence of all government under written constitutions, because they affect the practical working of those governments; such questions, for instance, as those relating to the allocation of powers among the several departments, — the relations of the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary to the community and to each other, — the evils of excessive and the absurdities of special legislation, — the creation and usefulness of commissions charged with the care of particular interests, and indeed most of those important features in constitution-making with which Frenchmen always, and Americans of late, have shown so strong a disposition to try logical and theoretical experiments. It cannot truthfully be asserted that General Butler's discussion of these topics was any more creditable to his taste, honesty, or political knowledge, or any more respectful to the intelligence of his audience, than were the personalities or the economical doctrines which marked his treatment of the other subjects which he saw fit to present. At this time, however, so peculiarly prolific of constitutional conventions, these questions of government will have an interest, no matter who may belittle their discussion. The Constitution of Massachusetts is the most time-honored of all the written constitutions now in existence, and the day is evidently not very remote when it must again pass into the hands of the workmen. In another paper, in a future number of this Review, it is proposed to follow up the discussions of the Butler canvass in its other aspect, no longer as stimulating class enmities, but now as initiating an agitation which seems likely to lead in Massachusetts, not to the personal aggrandizement which the agitator promised himself, but to that of which probably he never thought, and for which certainly he did not care, — a convention to revise the Constitution of the State, after half a century of continuous and successful working.

Art. VII. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — *Synonyms of the New Testament.* By Richard Chenevix Trench, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. Seventh Edition, revised and enlarged. London: Macmillan & Co. 1871. 8vo. pp. xxvi, 363.

The treatise of Archbishop Trench on the Synonyms of the New Testament first appeared in 1854, and was at once republished in this country. After passing through five editions, it was followed in 1863 by a "Second Part," likewise reprinted in New York in 1864. The two parts were published in one volume in 1865; and now the seventh edition, "revised and enlarged," attests the well-merited favor with which the work has been received. The Preface to this new edition is much enlarged, and contains some excellent observations on the value of the study of synonyms, and on the method in which it should be pursued. Other parts of the book bear marks of the careful revision which it has undergone. The amount of new matter, however, is not very large. Sections xlix., l., lxviii., xcii.–xcvi., xcviii., xcix., and part of section c., are new, as compared with the first and third editions, reprinted in this country; section xlix. of the third edition has been cancelled. In sections ix., xix., xxii., lxxxiv. (= xxxiv. of Part II.), the synonyms οἰκέτης, ἐντροπή, ἄρτιος, and κακός are added.

I do not propose to enter upon a general review of a work which is universally recognized as the best on the subject of which it treats. It is enriched with observations gathered from a wide range of reading, and is full of acute remarks and fruitful suggestions; but the ingenious author has not elaborated all its parts with equal care, and in some cases his distinctions appear to be strikingly at variance with the actual usage of the words which he undertakes to discriminate. One example of this kind, involving questions of considerable theological interest, particularly deserves to be pointed out, as the statements of the Archbishop have been incautiously adopted by several respectable scholars both in England and Germany, and are likely to be received without question by the generality of readers. I refer to his distinction between the words αἰτέω and ἐρωτάω, discussed in section xl. of his work. He says: —

"The distinction between the words is this. Αἰτέω, the Latin 'peto,' is more submissive and suppliant, indeed the constant word for the seeking of the inferior from the superior (Acts xii. 20); of the beggar from him that should give alms (Acts iii. 2); of the child from the parent (Matt. vii. 9;

Luke xi. 11; Lam. iv. 4); of the subject from the ruler (Ezra viii. 22); of man from God (1 Kin. iii. 11; Matt. vii. 7; Jam. i. 5; 1 John iii. 22; cf. Plato, *Euthyph.* 14; εὔχεσθαι [ἔστιν] αἰτεῖν τοὺς θεούς). Ἐρωτάω, on the other hand, is the Latin 'rogo'; or sometimes (as John xvi. 23; cf. Gen. xliv. 19) 'interrogo,' its only meaning in classical Greek, where it never signifies to ask, but only 'to interrogate,' or 'to inquire.' Like 'rogare,'* it implies that he who asks stands on a certain footing of equality with him from whom the boon is asked, as king with king (Luke xiv. 32), or, if not of equality, on such a footing of familiarity as lends authority to the request.

"Thus it is very noteworthy, and witnesses for the singular accuracy in the employment of words, and in the record of that employment, which prevails throughout the N. T., that our Lord never uses αἰτεῖν or αἰτεῖσθαι of himself, in respect of that which he seeks on behalf of his disciples from God; for his is not the *petition* of the creature to the Creator, but the *request* of the Son to the Father. The consciousness of his equal dignity, of his potent and prevailing intercession, speaks out in this, that often as he asks, or declares that he will ask, anything of the Father, it is always ἐρωτῶ, ἐρωτήσω, an asking, that is, as upon equal terms (John xiv. 16; xvi. 26; xvii. 9, 15, 20), never αἰτέω or αἰτήσω." — *Synonyms*, etc. pp. 136, 137.

The view here presented by Archbishop Trench, which is, I believe, original, so far as his account of ἐρωτάω is concerned, has been substantially adopted by Düsterdieck in his commentary on 1 John v. 16 (*Die drei johan. Briefe*, II. 417), by Wordsworth (Greek Test.) on John xvi. 23 and 1 John v. 16, and by Webster and Wilkinson, Alford, and Braune in Lange's *Bibelwerk*, in their notes on 1 John v. 16. Braune says, without qualification, "ἐρωτᾶν is = *rogare*, and implies equality on the part of the asker with him from whom the favor is sought" (p. 171, Amer. transl.).

In opposition to these assertions, I shall endeavor to show that there is in the word ἐρωτάω no implication of equality on the part of the asker with him from whom the favor is sought, any more than there is in the English word *ask*; that there is not only no ground whatever for connecting such a notion with the word, but that its common use is totally inconsistent with this assumption.

The materials for forming a judgment upon this matter fortunately lie within a small compass. The use of ἐρωτάω in the sense of *to request*, as Archbishop Trench has remarked, does not belong to classical Greek; and in the later Greek, outside of the New Testament, it seems to be infrequent. After a pretty extensive examination of the general Greek Lexicons, from Stephens's *Thesaurus* in its several editions to the great work of Professor Sophocles on the Greek of the Roman and Byzantine

* "Thus Cicero (*Planc.* x. 25): 'Neque enim ego sic *rogabam* ut *petere* viderer, quia familiaris esset meus.'"

periods, and also of the special Lexicons, Commentaries, etc., illustrating the New Testament, I cannot find that more than nine examples of it have hitherto been adduced; while in one of these the meaning is questionable, and in another the text is uncertain.* In the New Testament, however, we have thirty-six clear examples of the use of the word in the sense referred to, besides one (John xvi. 23) in which its meaning has been disputed. The comparative frequency of this use of ἐρωτάω in the New Testament, though some have considered it a Latinism, is probably to be explained by the influence of the Hebrew or Aramæan on the Greek-speaking Jews, the Hebrew שָׁאַל, with its cognates in Chaldee and Syriac, being freely employed in both of the principal senses of the English word *ask*.

Let us then try the theory of Archbishop Trench by a few examples of the use of ἐρωτάω in the New Testament. (In quoting, I give the rendering of the common English version.) The first instance of its occurrence is in the account of the woman of Canaan or Syrophœnicia in Matt. xv. 23, where we read that the disciples of Jesus "came and *besought* him (ἠρώτων or ἠρώτουν), saying, Send her away," etc. Were the disciples of Jesus on a footing of *equality* with their Master, or of such familiarity as to lend *authority* to their request? The next example is in Mark vii. 26, where we are told respecting the Syrophœnician woman herself, that she "came and *fell at his feet*, and *besought* him (ἠρώτα) that he would cast forth the devil out of her daughter." Did she address Christ on a footing of equality? In Luke vii. 3 the centurion is represented as sending elders of the Jews to Jesus, "*beseeching* him (ἐρωτῶν) that he would come and heal his servant." So far from this petition having "authority" in it, or implying "a consciousness of equal dignity," the centurion says (vv. 6, 7), that he was not worthy that Jesus should enter under his roof, and that he did not think himself worthy to come to him. In Luke viii. 37 we read that the Gadarenes "*besought* Jesus (ἠρώτησαν) to depart from them; for

* They are as follows: Sept. Ps. cxxi. 6 (doubtful). Joseph. *Ant.* v. 1. 14 (text uncertain). Hermog. *De Meth. Eloq.* c. 3, condemning this use of the word. Apollon. Dysc. *Synt.* p. 289, l. 20, ed. Bekker. Hermas, *Vis.* i. 2. Mart. Polyc. c. 12. Strato, *Epigr.* liii. 8 (Anthol. Gr. ed. Jacobs, iii. p. 80). Babr. *Fab.* xcvii. 3. Charit. viii. 7. — To these may be added the twenty-four following, which I have not seen before referred to: Jos. *Ant.* vii. 8. 1. Barnab. *Ep.* 4, 21 (*ter*). Hermas, *Vis.* ii. 2; iii. 1 (*bis*), 2, 10; iv. 1; *Sim.* v. 4; ix. 2, 11. Duæ Viæ vel Judic. Petri, in Hilgenfeld's *N. T. extra Canonem*, iv. p. 100, l. 20; 105, l. 1. Orac. Sibyl. ii. 310; viii. 355. Const. Apost. ii. 16. Babr. *Fab.* x. 8; xlii. 3. Suidas, s. vv. ἐρωτῶ σε and ἠρώτα. Zonaras, s. vv. ἐρωτῶ σε. The more important of these passages will be cited hereafter.

they *were taken with great fear.*" In Luke xvi. 27 the word is used of the petition addressed to Abraham by the rich man in Hades, "I *pray* thee therefore, father" (ἐρωτῶ οὖν σε), etc. Did he, when he lifted up his eyes, being in torments, consider himself as on a footing of equality with the patriarch?

But perhaps the usage of John may favor the Archbishop's theory. Let us see. If the disciples of Christ addressed their Master with authority (John iv. 31), if the Samaritans when they "*besought* Jesus that he would tarry with them" (iv. 40), and the nobleman at Capernaum, who "*besought* him that he would come down and heal his son" (iv. 47), the Greeks who "came to Philip and *desired* him, saying, Sir, we would see Jesus" (xii. 21), the Jews who "*besought* Pilate that the legs of the crucified might be broken, and that they might be taken away" (xix. 31), and Joseph of Arimathæa, who "*besought* Pilate that he might take away the body of Jesus" (xix. 38), made these requests "as being on a footing of equality," and if it is also clear that this idea is expressed in these passages by the word ἐρωτάω itself, then, and not otherwise, is Archbishop Trench's view confirmed by the usage of John. In reference to the last passage cited, it deserves particular notice that the first three evangelists, in describing this request of Joseph of Arimathæa, use the word αἰτέομαι (ἠτήσατο τὸ σῶμα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, Matt. xxvii. 58, Mark xv. 43, Luke xxiii. 52), where John employs ἐρωτάω (ἠρώτησεν τὸν Πειλᾶτον . . . ἵνα ἄρῃ τὸ σῶμα, κ. τ. λ.).*

It can hardly be necessary to proceed much further in the citation of passages from the New Testament. The first example in the Book of Acts (iii. 3) may seem alone decisive of the question. There, in the account of the man lame from his birth, it is said that he was laid daily at the Beautiful Gate of the Temple to ask alms (αἰτεῖν ἐλεημοσύνην) of those who went into the Temple, and seeing Peter and John about to go into the Temple he *asked* alms (ἠρώτα ἐλεημοσύνην λαβεῖν). Did he ask this as a right, or as being "on a footing of equality"? We may

* I am indebted for this observation to "a Clergyman of the Church of England," the anonymous author of "An Examination of Canon Liddon's Bampton Lectures on the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ" (Lond. 1871), p. 263, note, to whom belongs the credit, so far as I know, of first pointing out the untenableness of Archbishop Trench's statements respecting the use of the word ἐρωτάω. This able writer, however, enters into no full discussion of the subject, and is far too liberal in conceding that "about the general accuracy of the distinction on which the Archbishop insists, there can be no dispute," contending merely for an exception in the New Testament usage. We shall see that the examples of the word outside of the New Testament are equally at war with the Archbishop's theory.

further observe that αἰτέω is here *interchanged* with ἐρωτάω, though this is one of the very passages adduced by Archbishop Trench to illustrate the distinction between the words. The other passages in which the word ἐρωτάω occurs in the Acts are ch. x. 48; xvi. 39; xviii. 20; xxiii. 18, 20. None of them favors the Archbishop's view.*

What now are the facts adduced by Archbishop Trench in proof of his position that ἐρωτάω implies a certain equality between the asker and the person asked? The reader may be somewhat surprised to learn that no evidence is adduced by him or his followers except what is contained in the extracts from his article already given. Passing by the mere assertion that in certain passages of John's Gospel ἐρωτάω is used by Christ with this implication, we find that the only passage of the New Testament referred to in support of this theory is Luke xiv. 32. Here the argument is, that as one king is represented as asking another king for conditions of peace, "the word implies that he who asks stands on a certain footing of equality with him from whom the boon is asked."

Now the mere fact that, in any single case of the use of the word ἐρωτάω, the parties in question are equals, obviously cannot prove that such equality is implied by the word itself. The only possible proof of the Archbishop's thesis must consist in establishing the fact, by induction from a large number of examples, that the word is always, or at least generally, used of requests made by one who is regarded as standing on a footing of equality with him from whom the favor is sought. That the word is not so used has already been shown. But waiving all this, the Archbishop seems to forget that the king in the passage referred to is represented, not as conscious of equality with the hostile king, but of his *inequality*, — his inability to meet, with ten thousand men, him that cometh against him with twenty thousand; so that, when the other is a great way off, he sends an embassy "to ask for conditions of peace," or, as Campbell and Norton in their translations have very naturally phrased it, "to sue for peace."

It is difficult to imagine that this passage of the New Testament, or any other, could have suggested the notion which the Archbishop has affixed to the word. He seems to have been really influenced by the supposed analogy of the Latin *rogo*, which does correspond, in its

* For completeness, the only passages in the New Testament not already cited in which ἐρωτάω has or may have the meaning "to request" are here referred to, with the rendering of the word in the common English version: *Ask*, John xvi. 23, first part? *Desire*, Luke vii. 36; xiv. 32. *Pray*, Luke v. 3; xiv. 18, 19; John xiv. 16; xvi. 26; xvii. 9 *bis*, 15, 20; 1 John v. 16. *Beseech*, Luke iv. 38; xi. 37; 1 Thes. iv. 1; v. 12; 2 Thes. ii. 1; 2 John 5. *Entreat*, Phil. iv. 3.

double meaning and otherwise, very closely with ἐρωτάω, and is used as its representative throughout the Latin Vulgate. Trench, as we have seen, asserts that "*rogo* implies that he who asks stands on a certain footing of equality with him from whom the boon is asked," while *peto*, corresponding with αἰτέω, is the word appropriate to an inferior; and the following passage of Cicero is quoted to prove it: "Neque enim ego sic *rogabam*, ut *petere* viderer, quia familiaris esset meus" (*Planc.* x. 25). This statement in regard to the use of *rogo* I believe to be incorrect, though something like it may be found in Doederlein's Latin Synonyms, and in the valuable English-Latin Dictionary lately published by Dr. William Smith and Theophilus D. Hall (see the art. *Ask*). The passage from Cicero quoted above seems to have been supposed by Trench and Alford (who, with Düsterdieck, has quoted it after him) to have the following meaning: "For I did not *ask* in such a way as to seem to *beg*, because he [of whom I asked the favor] was my intimate friend"; though a careful reader who should thus construe the words might be a little staggered by the subjunctive *esset*, where *erat* would seem to be required by the laws of grammar. Now nothing like this is the real meaning of the passage. The object of *rogabam* and *petere* is not the person spoken of as "familiaris meus." The sentence is imperfectly quoted, and the Archbishop appears to have caught it up hastily from his Latin Dictionary, without taking the trouble to look into Cicero. It is necessary, therefore, to point out the connection in which it stands, and to explain the true force and bearing of the words. Plancius was accused of having obtained the ædileship by bribery of voters. Cicero in defending him urges, among other things, that he had himself secured many votes for him by his personal influence. Cicero's private obligations to Plancius were so great that the friends of Cicero were constrained to vote for him. *Rogabam* in the passage in question is a technical term, denoting the soliciting of votes for a candidate for office. The full sentence reads as follows: "Neque enim ego sic rogabam, ut petere viderer, quia familiaris esset meus, quia vicinus, quia huius parente semper plurimum essem usus, sed ut quasi parenti et custodi salutis meæ." It may be thus translated: "For I did not solicit the votes of the people in such a way as to seem to beg them for Plancius because he was my intimate friend, because he was my neighbor, because I had always been on terms of the most familiar intercourse with his father; but as asking them for one who was as it were my own parent, and the guardian of my safety." The meaning of the passage does not turn, as Trench seems to suppose, on a contrast between *rogare* and *petere*. On the contrary, the words are here interchanged, — the *rogatio* is described

as a *petitio;* and Cicero had just before spoken of it in the following terms: ". . . . *precibus* aliquid attulimus etiam nos. Appellavi populum tributim; *submisi me et supplicavi.*" Instead, therefore, of favoring Archbishop Trench's view of the use of *rogare*, the passage is directly opposed to it.

It would lead us too far from our proper subject to discuss the uses of *rogo* and its distinction from *peto*, but it may be worth while to refer to a few passages which show how false is the supposition that it implies the asking of what one has a right to, or carries with it any notion of equality. "Molestum verbum est, onerosum, demisso voltu dicendum, *Rogo*," says Seneca. "Properet licet, sero beneficium dedit, qui *roganti* dedit." (*De Benef.* ii. 2. Comp. also c. 1.) "In blandiendo, fatendo, satisfaciendo, *rogando*," says Quintilian, the voice should be "lenis et summissa." (*Inst. Or.* xi. 3. 63.) Comp. Ovid, *Met.* vii. 90, "auxilium submissa voce rogavit," and *Pont.* iv. 3. 41. Finally, *rogare* is often used of prayer to the gods, who are not usually supposed to be addressed on terms of equality; e. g. "Deos supplex *rogavi*," Ovid. *Ep.* ii. 17; "Suppliciter *rogate* Deos," Id. *Pont.* i. 10. 44, comp. ii. 3, 100, iv. 8, 3; "Otium divos *rogat*," Hor. *Carm.* ii. 16. 1.

We have seen that Archbishop Trench finds in the use of ἐρωτάω and the non-use of αἰτέω on the part of our Lord in his prayers to the Father, "the consciousness of his equal dignity." We shall consider hereafter the real distinction between the words, and shall not find, I think, that the phenomenon in question requires us to assume that, in the passages to which he refers, an idea is implied in the word ἐρωτάω which cannot be shown to belong to it anywhere else. And the Archbishop does not seem to have observed that very different and rather startling conclusions might be drawn, with equal plausibility, from the premises which he assumes in regard to this word. We might say, for example, that it is very noteworthy, and witnesses for the singular accuracy in the employment of words which prevails throughout the New Testament, that αἰτεῖν or αἰτεῖσθαι, the constant word for the seeking of the inferior from the superior, is never used in respect of that which the Apostles ask of Christ, but is appropriated to their petitions to God (Matt. xviii. 19; xxi. 22; John xv. 16; xvi. 23, etc.). When they are represented as requesting anything of Christ, the word ἐρωτᾶν is employed (Matt. xv. 23; Luke iv. 38; John iv. 31), implying an asking as upon equal terms. The only exception is in Mark x. 35, but in that case, as we learn from the parallel passage (Matt. xx. 20), the petition was not really presented by the Apostles James and John directly, but through their mother, who fell down before Jesus and

begged the favor, so that the apparent exception really confirms the rule. — This may suffice for an *argumentum ad hominem.*

The concluding paragraph of Archbishop Trench's article reads thus in the seventh edition (p. 138) : —

"It will follow that the ἐρωτᾶν, being thus proper for Christ, inasmuch as it has authority in it, is not proper for us; and in no single instance is it used in the N. T. to express the prayer of man to God, of the creature to the Creator. The only passage seeming to contradict this assertion is 1 John v. 16. The verse is difficult, but whichever of the various ways of overcoming its difficulty may find favor, it will be found to constitute no true exception to the rule, and perhaps, in the substitution of ἐρωτήσῃ for the αἰτήσει of the earlier clause of the verse, will rather confirm it."

The passage in question is as follows in the common version : —

"If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask (αἰτήσει), and he shall give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death; I do not say that he shall pray for it" (οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ).

It should be noted here that the word translated "it" in the last clause of the verse is emphatic in the original, and should have been rendered "that" or "this."

The Archbishop unfortunately does not favor us with his view of the passage, and indeed seems to be doubtful about its meaning; he is only sure that, at all events, the true explanation will present no exception to his rule about the use of ἐρωτάω. In the earlier editions of the Synonyms reprinted in this country he did propose an explanation, which, though adopted by Alford and others, seems now to have been discreetly abandoned by its original propounder. According to his former view, it was the design of the Apostle by the use of the word ἐρωτήσῃ in the last clause to declare that "the Christian intercessor for his brethren shall not assume the authority which would be implied in making request for a sinner who had sinned the sin unto death" (*Syn.*, p. 198, Amer. ed.). The Archbishop has probably since perceived that the result of assigning this meaning to ἐρωτάω here, and laying stress on the supposed difference between it and αἰτέω, must be to suggest that, though a person is not permitted ἐρωτᾶν, to ask with authority for the pardon of a sin unto death, he is permitted αἰτεῖν, to ask humbly for it. But this is evidently contrary to the meaning of the Apostle, as it would render nugatory the restriction in the first clause of the verse. Saint John, moreover, would hardly deem it necessary to tell his readers that he did not mean to have them address their prayers to God "as being on a footing of equality" with him.

Bishop Wordsworth gives a different explanation. He adopts the

view of Archbishop Trench, that ἐρωτάω expresses "the request of an equal, who has a right to ask and obtain," but does not introduce that meaning here. His translation of the passage is certainly remarkable: "I am not speaking concerning that, in order that he (the Christian brother) should ask"; and the explanation matches it. He understands Saint John "to intimate that no *interrogatory questions* are to be addressed to God concerning the person who is sinning a sin unto death." The view of Webster and Wilkinson is similar: "The Apostle checks the approach to the throne of grace as to an oracle to inquire (ἐρωτᾶν) with the intention of αἰτεῖν." Whether this is the view which Archbishop Trench is now inclined to entertain, I do not know; it does not appear to have occurred to any commentator, ancient or modern, except those whom I have just quoted.

Dismissing, then, these unnatural explanations, which seem to have been suggested by the exigencies of a theory, let us turn once more to the passage. Is it not evident that the Apostle is stating in a positive form, in the last clause of the verse, the restriction implied in the first? "There is a sin unto death"; [when I say that he shall ask, αἰτήσει,] I do not say that he shall pray (or, "I do not bid him pray") for *that* (οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ).* He has been speaking of *petitions*, not of an "oracle," or of "interrogatory questions addressed to God."

We may now consider the use of the word ἐρωτάω outside of the New Testament. The earliest example adduced is from the Septuagint, Ps. cxxi. (Heb. cxxii.) 6, ἐρωτήσατε δὴ τὰ εἰς εἰρήνην τὴν Ἰερουσαλήμ, which has been translated, "Pray for the peace of Jerusalem." This is probably the true rendering of the original Hebrew (see Maurer and Hupfeld *in loc.*), though some understand it differently. But if we follow the analogy of precisely the same phraseology in other passages of the Septuagint (see 1 Sam. x. 4, ἐρωτήσουσί σε τὰ εἰς εἰρήνην, also xxx. 21; 2 Sam. viii. 10; 1 Chr. xviii. 10), we shall make the verbal meaning of the Greek translation to be, "Ask Jerusalem concerning her peace," that is, as the phrase is used elsewhere, "*Salute* Jerusalem," wish her all prosperity. (Comp. the rendering of Symmachus, ἀσπάσασθε.) If ἐρωτήσατε is here taken in the sense of "pray,"

* If λέγω here means "to say," and not "to speak" (for which λαλέω would be the proper word), ἵνα cannot mean "in order that," but introduces an object-clause, as in Acts xix. 4, John xiii. 29, comp. Rev. vi. 11, ix. 4, Matt. iv. 3, etc., and Sophocles, Gr. Lex. art. λέγω. The word as used here and in the other examples cited is nearly equivalent to κελεύω. The preposition περί is to be connected with ἐρωτήσῃ, as in Luke iv. 38, John xvii. 9, etc. Comp. δέομαι περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν, Ecclus. xxi. 1, xxviii. 4, xxxix. 5.

we must suppose an ellipsis of τὸν θεόν as the being addressed, which would give us the extraordinary construction of three accusatives after the verb. We should expect, instead of the third accusative, τῇ Ἱερουσαλήμ, as the verse is inaccurately quoted by Bishop Ellicott on 1 Thess. iv. 1, and by Webster in his "Syntax and Synonyms of the Greek Testament." It is also to be observed, that we thus assign to ἐρωτάω a meaning which it has nowhere else in the Septuagint. Such being the state of the case, although the passage is adduced by Bretschneider, Robinson, Bloomfield, Grimm, Sophocles, and other lexicographers, as an example of ἐρωτάω in the sense of "to pray," I shall not urge it against Archbishop Trench's theory.

The next passage in chronological order is in Josephus, *Ant.* v. 1. 14, where, after giving the prayer of Joshua, he says, ταῦτα μὲν Ἰησοῦς ἐπὶ στόμα πεσὼν ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν. Here, if the text is correct, ἐρωτάω is clearly used of the prayer of man to God. This is the reading in the editions of Hudson and Havercamp, and in the earlier editions of Josephus. Dindorf and Bekker, however, have substituted for ἠρώτα τὸν θεόν, τὸν θεὸν ἱκέτευε. Notwithstanding the authority of these eminent critical editors, it seems to me that not only does the external evidence, as given in Bernard's note in Havercamp's edition, decidedly favor the reading ἠρώτα, but the internal still more. This use of ἐρωτάω being rare, and condemned by some of the rhetoricians, it was very natural that a glôss like ἱκέτευε should be substituted for it in some MSS.; just as Zonaras (*Ann.* i. 20), in copying this account of Josephus, has substituted ἐδέετο τοῦ θεοῦ. Comp. Suidas: Ἠρώτα· παρεκάλει, ἔθυεν, ηὔχετο, ἱκέτευεν,* and see also his art. ἐρωτῶ σε, cited on the next page.

But whatever may be thought of this passage of Josephus, a plenty of unquestionable examples may be cited of ἐρωτάω used in reference to prayer addressed to God, or to heathen deities. See Hermas, *Vis.* i. 2, ἐρωτήσω τὸν κύριον, ἵνα ἱλατεύσῃ [Sin. ἱλατεύσηται] μοι, also *ibid.* ii. 2, iii. 1 (*bis*), iv. 1; *Sim.* v. 4, ix. 2, in all of which passages κύριον is the object; Orac. Sibyl. ii. 310, Πολλὰ δ' ἐρωτήσουσι ματὴν θεὸν ὑψιμέδοντα, and viii. 355, Πολλὰ δ' ἐρωτήσουσι θεόν γε τὸν αἰὲν ἐόντα (so Alexandre; Friedlieb makes the line identical with ii. 310); and Babr. *Fab.* x. 8, τὴν Ἀφροδίτην . . . Ἔθυεν, ηὔχεθ', ἱκέτευεν, ἠρώτα.

Other passages may be adduced in opposition to Archbishop Trench's

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* Here, however, as ἔθυεν is inappropriate as an explanation, I would suggest that Suidas needs emendation, and that we should read, Ἠρώτα· παρεκάλει. Ἔθυεν, ηὔχετο, ἱκέτευεν, ἠρώτα, taking all after παρεκάλει as a quotation from Babrius, *Fab.* x. 8, to be cited below. Ἠρώτα is actually added after ἱκέτευεν, making the line complete, in three MSS. and the first edition of Suidas. See Bernhardy's note.

notion that ἐρωτάω implies "an asking as upon equal terms," or with "authority." In the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas, where the word ἐρωτάω occurs four times (cc. 4, 21 thrice) in exhortation, in the sense of "to entreat," "beseech," we read (c. 21), ἐρωτῶ ὑμᾶς, χάριν αἰτούμενος, "I entreat you, *asking it as a favor*." In Hermas it is used of the humble entreaty addressed by the writer to the woman, representing the Church, who appeared to him in a vision (*Vis.* iii. 2, πεσὼν δὲ αὐτῆς πρὸς τοὺς πόδας ἠρώτησα αὐτὴν . . . ἵνα, κ. τ. λ., also *ibid.* iii. 10), and to the Shepherd or angel of repentance (*Sim.* ix. 11). In the epistle of the Church at Smyrna, giving an account of the martyrdom of Polycarp (c. 12), the angry multitude are said to have *besought* (ἠρώτων) the Asiarch to let loose a lion upon Polycarp. And in the Apostolical Constitutions (Lib. ii. c. 16) the word is used of the entreaty to be addressed to the bishop in behalf of a penitent brother.

The notices of the word by the old grammarians and lexicographers may now be quoted. Hermogenes (*De Meth. Eloq.* c. 3) condemns the use of ἐρωτάω and παρακαλέω in the sense of δέομαι, "to beg," "to entreat," restricting the former to the meaning "to inquire": — ἐὰν εἴπῃ τις ἐρωτῶ καὶ παρακαλῶ ἀντὶ τοῦ δέομαι, ἀκύρως εἴρηκε. τὸ μὲν γὰρ παρακαλεῖν ἢ καλεῖν ἐστιν ἢ προτρέπεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἐρωτᾶν πυνθάνεσθαι. (Walz, *Rhet. Gr.* iii. 404.)

Apollonius Dyscolus enumerates among the words "which denote supplication," ὅσα ἱκετείαν σημαίνει, — γουνοῦμαι, ἐρωτῶ σε ἐν ἴσῳ τῷ παρακαλῶ σε, λιτανεύω, ἱκνοῦμαι. (*Synt.* p. 289 ed. Bekker.)

Suidas under the word ἠρώτα has already been quoted. He also has: Ἐρωτῶ σε· παρακαλῶ σε, ἱκετεύω σε, δέομαι. Καὶ αὖθις· Ἐλθεῖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον ἠρώτα, ἀντὶ τοῦ παρεκάλει. Here the line is quoted from Babrius, *Fab.* xlii. 3. Compare also Babrius, *Fab.* xcvii. 3, τὸν ταῦρον ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον ἠρώτα, and the same use of the word in Luke vii. 36, xi. 37.

Zonaras has Ἐρωτῶ σε· παρακαλῶ σε, ἱκετεύω σε, and quotes the same passage as Suidas. The word does not appear to have been noticed by Hesychius, Photius, and the other old lexicographers and grammarians.

The few remaining examples of ἐρωτάω outside of the New Testament are not of sufficient interest to be quoted.

The preceding examination of the use of ἐρωτάω may satisfy us that Archbishop Trench's theory not only has no foundation to rest upon, but that it is directly contradicted by a large majority of the passages in which the word occurs, both in the New Testament and the later Greek writers. We will now consider the use of αἰτέω.

In the extract already given from Archbishop Trench's article, he represents αἰτέω, compared with ἐρωτάω, as "more submissive and suppliant, indeed the constant word for the seeking of the inferior from the superior," and this statement may seem to be supported by the prevailing usage of the word. His view accords also with that of Bengel (notes on John xi. 22 and 1 John v. 16), and of Webster in his "Syntax and Synonyms of the Greek Testament," p. 190.

The following passages, however, must at least be regarded as exceptions, and may suggest a doubt as to the correctness of the distinction asserted: Luke i. 63, "he *asked for* a writing-table and wrote" (αἰτήσας . . . ἔγραψεν); xii. 48, "to whom men have committed much, of him they *will ask* (require) the more" (αἰτήσουσιν); Acts xvi. 29, "Then he *called for* a light" (αἰτήσας); 1 Cor. i. 22, "For the Jews *require* signs" (αἰτοῦσιν); and 1 Pet. iii. 15, "Be always ready to give an answer to every man that *asketh* you (αἰτοῦντι) a reason for the hope that is in you." In the Septuagint we read, "What doth the Lord thy God *require* (αἰτεῖται) of thee?" (Deut. x. 12.) See also 2 Macc. vii. 10. Similar examples from Philo and Josephus are given by Loesner, *Obs.* p. 118, and Krebs, *Obs.* p. 117, though ἀπαιτέω is generally used to express the idea of *demanding*.

If we are guided by the actual usage of the words, we shall be led to the conclusion that the distinction between αἰτέω and ἐρωτάω in Hellenistic Greek does not depend upon the relative dignity of the asker and the person asked. In this respect they seem to be neutral, as much so as our English word *ask*.

The main distinction appears to be this: Αἰτέω is, in general, to ask for something which one desires to *receive*, something to be *given*, rarely for something to be done; it is therefore used when the *object sought*, rather than the person of whom it is sought, is prominent in the mind of the writer; hence also it is very rarely employed in exhortation. Ἐρωτάω, on the other hand, is to request or beseech a person to *do* something, rarely to give something; it refers more directly to the *person* of whom the favor is sought, and is therefore naturally used in exhortation and entreaty.

Doederlein notes a similar distinction between *petere* and *rogare*. "As compared with *petere*," he says, "*rogare* refers immediately to the *person* who is applied to for a service; *petere*, on the other hand, to the object sought. Cic. *in Verr.* Iste *petit a rege* et *eum* pluribus verbis *rogat*, uti ad se mittat," etc. (*Lat. Syn.* v. 229, 230.)

In confirmation of this view, I will give the results of an examination of the use of αἰτέω in the New Testament, the Septuagint, the so-called Apostolical Fathers, and some other early Christian writings.

For the canonical books of the Septuagint I have used the Concordance of Trommius, and for the Apocrypha Wahl's *Clavis;* for Clement of Rome, Polycarp, and the Ignatian writings, Jacobson's Index to his edition of the *Patres Apostolici;* for Barnabas and Hermas, the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, and the Epistle to Diognetus, my own notes. The classical use of the word is not important for our present purpose.

To illustrate the distinction referred to, little will be needed besides the statistics of the *construction* of αἰτέω as contrasted with ἐρωτάω. Both words must of course have both a person and a thing as their objects, expressed or implied. But the different construction of the words shows that their relation to these objects was usually conceived of differently. In the case of αἰτέω, which occurs in the New Testament seventy-one times, we have:

1. The thing only expressed, thirty-six times. Twice (Luke xxii. 23; Acts iii. 14) the object is an accusative with the infinitive; twice (Acts vii. 46; Eph. iii. 13) an infinitive only; once (Col. i. 9) ἵνα with the subjunctive.

2. Thing, and person with the preposition παρά or ἀπό, three times.

3. Person and thing, two accusatives, ten times; thing expressed by accusative with infinitive, once (Acts xiii. 28).

4. The person only expressed, in the accusative case, six times; Matt. v. 42; vi. 8; vii. 11; Luke vi. 30; xi. 13; John iv. 10.

5. Neither person nor thing expressed, but the thing more prominent in the context, fifteen times.

One who shall examine the New Testament examples by the aid of his Concordance, will find that in a great majority of the seventy-one passages the request is for something to be *given*, not *done;* and that the *thing asked for*, rather than the *person*, is chiefly prominent in the mind of the writer. Even in the six examples cited under number four, where the personal object alone is expressed, the exception is rather apparent than real; e. g. Matt. v. 42, "give to him that *asketh* thee," where the thing to be given is not specified on account of the comprehensiveness of the injunction.

In the Septuagint αἰτέω occurs about eighty-two times, including thirteen in the Apocrypha. We have:

1. The thing asked for only expressed, thirty-six times. (In 1 Sam. xii. 13 I adopt the reading of the Alexandrine manuscript.)

2. Thing in the accusative (with one exception), and person in the genitive with παρά, twenty-six times.

3. Person and thing both expressed in the accusative, ten times. Passive participle, perhaps with accusative of thing, once (2 Macc. vii. 10).

4. Person only, in the genitive with παρά, four times. There is *no* example of the construction with the accusative of a person only. (In Esth. vii. 7 I adopt the reading of the Roman edition and the Alexandrine manuscript.)

5. Neither person nor thing expressed, five times.

The result is that in nearly all, perhaps in all, the examples found in the Septuagint we may reasonably regard the object asked for as made more prominent than the person. This object is also almost always something to be *given*, rather than something to be *done;* and accordingly is only once expressed by ὅπως with the subjunctive, never by ἵνα, and never by an infinitive of which the person asked is the subject. We shall see a striking contrast in the construction of ἐρωτάω.

In the Apostolical Fathers and other early Christian writings before mentioned I have noted forty-four examples of αἰτέω or αἰτέομαι, namely: Clem. Rom. *Ep.* i. 50, 53, 55. Barn. 21 (in c. 19 probably spurious). Polyc. *Phil.* 7. Ignat. *Trall.* 12; *Rom.* 1, 3, 8 (*bis*); *Polyc.* 1, 2. Mart. Ignat. 6. Hermas, *Vis.* iii. 3, 10 (four times); *Mand.* ix. (eleven times), xii. 5; *Sim.* iv., v. 3, 4 (five times), vi. 3. Ep. ad Diogn. 1. Test. xii. Patr., *Jud.* 9, *Jos.* 15, 16 (three times; I adopt the reading of the Oxford MS.). They are constructed as follows: —

1. Thing only expressed, twenty times.

2. Thing, and person with παρά or ἀπό, ten times.

3. Person and thing, two accusatives, twice. Person in accusative, and object represented by λέγοντες with imperative, once (Test. xii. Patr., *Jos.* 15).

4. Person only in genitive with παρά, seven times.

5. Person only, in the accusative, twice.

6. Neither person nor thing expressed, twice.

Without going into a more minute analysis, we perceive that the result is essentially the same as in our examination of the usage of the New Testament and the Septuagint.

Contrast now the construction of ἐρωτάω, of which we have in all sixty-six or sixty-seven examples. We find:

1. The person only directly expressed (in the accusative), eighteen times. The object sought is understood nine times (Luke iv. 38; John xiv. 16; xvi. 26; Barn. 21; Const. Apost. ii. 16; Apollon. Dysc. *Synt.* p. 289; Babr. x. 8; Suidas, s. v. ἐρωτῶ σε; Zonaras, do.); — indirectly signified by an imperative, six times (Luke xiv. 18, 19; Phil. iv. 3; Barn. 21 (*bis*); Duæ Viæ, p. 100, l. 20, ed. Hilgenf.); by an imperative preceded by λέγοντες, twice (Matt. xv. 23; John iv. 31); by λέγοντες introducing a sentence with the verb in the indic-

ative, once (John xii. 21). The passive participle is used, without object expressed, twice (Strato, *Epigr.* liii. 8; Charit. viii. 7).

2. Accusative of person; thing variously expressed, viz. (a) by an accusative, five or six times (John xvi. 23? Jos. *Ant.* v. 1. 14; Barn. 4; Herm. *Vis.* ii. 2; Orac. Sibyl. ii. 310; viii. 355). (b) By an infinitive, eight times (Luke v. 3; viii. 37; John iv. 40; Acts x. 48; 1 Thes. v. 12; Jos. *Ant.* vii. 8. 1; Duæ Viæ, p. 105, l. 2; Babr. xcvii. 3). (c) By ἵνα with subjunctive, fifteen times (Mark vii. 26; Luke vii. 26; xvi. 27; John xix. 31, 38; 1 Thes. iv. 1; 2 John 5; Mart. Polyc. 12; Herm. *Vis.* i. 2; iii. 2, 10; iv. 1; *Sim.* v. 4; ix. 2, 11). (d) By ὅπως with the subjunctive, three times (Luke vii. 3; xi. 37; Acts xxiii. 20). (e) By εἰς τό with infinitive, once (2 Thes. ii. 1). In all, thirty-two or thirty-three times.

3. Thing only expressed; (a) by an accusative, once (Luke xiv. 32). (b) By an infinitive, four times (Acts iii. 3; xvi. 39; xxiii. 18; Babr. xlii. 3). (c) By ἵνα with subjunctive, four times (John iv. 47 (Tisch.); xvii. 15, 20; Herm. *Vis.* iii. 1). In all these cases the *person* is prominent in the context. (Nine times.)

4. Neither person nor thing expressed, five times (John xvii. 9, *bis*; 1 John v. 16; Herm. *Vis.* iii. 1, *bis*).

The difference of construction illustrates palpably the reality of the distinction pointed out. Of the sixty-six or sixty-seven examples of the use of ἐρωτάω, there are only six or seven in which the object asked for is expressed by an accusative; in a great majority of cases it is expressed by an infinitive, or by ἵνα or ὅπως with the subjunctive, or indirectly by an imperative, the thing asked for being usually something which the person asked is requested to *do*. In the one hundred and ninety-seven examples, on the other hand, which have been cited of the use of αἰτέω or αἰτέομαι, there is not a single instance in which the thing asked for is something which the person is directly requested to do; generally, it is something to be *given*, and the object asked for is expressed by an accusative. Thus we see why in Matt. xxvii. 58 and the parallel passages in Mark and Luke we have ἠτήσατο τὸ σῶμα κ. τ. λ., but in John ἠρώτησεν τὸν Πειλᾶτον . . . ἵνα ἄρῃ τὸ σῶμα, κ. τ. λ. In John xiv. 16 and xvi. 26, ἐρωτάω may be preferred to αἰτέω, because the *personal object* not only is prominent, but is alone expressed; in the prayer John xvii. 9, 15, 20, the personal object indeed is not expressed, but is prominent in the mind from the nature of the case. It may also be true that ἐρωτάω, though not implying "equality" or "authority," accords better than αἰτέω with the intimate personal relation between Christ and the Father, and also with that between Christ and his disciples. In Acts iii. 2, 3, the transition from αἰτεῖν to

ἐρωτᾶν may perhaps be explained by the prominence given in the third verse to Peter and John, the *persons* from whom the alms was asked, though the personal object is not expressed after the verb. It is further evident that with ἐρωτάω the idea of earnestness is often associated; see, e. g. Mark vii. 26; Luke viii. 37; xvi. 27. Our translators have felt this, in rendering the word so often "beseech" or "entreat." This is much more rarely the case with αἰτέω or αἰτέομαι, which is accordingly seldom used in exhortations. The exception in Ignat. *Trall.* 8 is so unusual, that Vossius insists that the true reading there must be παρακαλῶ. The use of αἰτοῦμαι in Eph. iii. 13, Διὸ αἰτοῦμαι μὴ ἐνκακεῖν ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσίν μου ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, accordingly favors the rendering, "Wherefore I pray that I may not be disheartened in my afflictions in your behalf," rather than, "I entreat you not to be disheartened," etc., though many of the best scholars prefer the latter.*

If the preceding statements are correct, we cannot accept the distinction between ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω which Huther proposes, in the last edition of his Commentary on the First Epistle of John (note on 1 John v. 16). He says that ἐρωτᾶν, properly "to inquire" (*fragen*), is a milder asking than αἰτεῖν, which properly means "to demand" (*fordern*), and expresses greater urgency. Bengel, in his note on the same passage, regards ἐρωτᾶν as denoting the "*genus*," of which αἰτεῖν is a "*species humilior*"; in other words, ἐρωτᾶν is "to ask," in general, while αἰτεῖν is "to ask humbly," "to beg." (Compare his note on John xi. 22.) But we have seen that this view is not sufficiently supported by usage.

In the comparison which has been made between ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω, it must be borne in mind that the former word, in the sense of "to request" or "entreat," appears never to have had a wide currency. It seems to have been familiar in this sense to Luke, John, Paul, Hermas, the author of the Epistle ascribed to Barnabas, and Babrius; it does not occur in the Septuagint, is rare in Josephus, and seems to be very rare in the later Greek generally. We find commonly in its place ἀξιόω, δέομαι, or παρακαλέω. Though this use of παρακαλέω is condemned by Hermogenes, it is remarkably frequent in Josephus; it occurs a few times in the Septuagint, but there we have more commonly δέομαι or ἀξιόω. One might suppose from its etymology and classical use that

* On the side of the former construction (for which comp. Ignat. *Trall.* 12, αἰτούμενος θεοῦ ἐπιτυχεῖν) are the Syriac version, Theodoret, Bengel, Rückert, Harless, Baumgarten-Crusius, Olshausen, Wahl, Bretschneider, Conybeare, Braune, Ewald; the latter is supported by Theophylact, Grotius, LeClerc, Beausobre, Wolf, Matthies, De Wette, Meyer, Bleek, Schenkel, Alford, Ellicott, Eadie, Noyes, and the majority of expositors.

the latter word would have the sense which Archbishop Trench ascribes to ἐρωτάω, of asking for something to which one has a certain right; but it is not so. It is used in the simple sense of to express a desire for something; or, with reference to a person, "to ask," "request," "pray." It often occurs with τὸν θεόν or κύριον as its object; and is even used absolutely, as we should use "to pray" in English. Δέομαι is also frequently thus used; and, what will seem very strange to a merely classical scholar, is often followed in the Septuagint, and once in the New Testament, by πρός with the accusative, like εὔχομαι and προσεύχομαι.

We will conclude this long discussion with the examination of a passage of considerable interest, in which the meaning of ἐρωτάω has been disputed. I refer to John xvi. 23, which reads as follows in Tischendorf's last edition: Καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐρωτήσετε οὐδέν. ἀμὴν ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἄν τι αἰτήσητε τὸν πατέρα, δώσει ὑμῖν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου. "And in that day ye will ask nothing of *me*. Truly, truly do I say to you, if ye ask anything of the Father, he will give it to you in my name."

The question is, whether ἐρωτάω is here used in the sense of "to inquire," as in vv. 19, 30, or "to request," as in ver. 26. Archbishop Trench remarks: —

"Every one competent to judge is agreed, that 'ye shall ask' of the first half of the verse has nothing to do with 'ye shall ask' of the second; that in the first Christ is referring back to the ἤθελον αὐτὸν ἐρωτᾶν of ver. 19; to the questions which the disciples would fain have asked of him, if only they dared to set these before him. 'In that day,' he would say, 'in the day of my seeing you again, I will by the Spirit so teach you all things, that ye shall be no longer perplexed, no longer wishing to ask me questions (cf. John xxi. 12) if only you might venture to do so.'" — *Syn.*, p. 136.

The explanation given by Archbishop Trench is supported by Lampe, Bengel, Rosenmüller, Kuinoel, De Wette, Meyer, Ewald, Godet, Bloomfield, Alford, and a large majority of modern expositors; also by Wakefield and Norton in their translations of the New Testament. But it seems to involve serious difficulties, which are not satisfactorily explained by these eminent commentators. Our Saviour is referring to the time when he was to be personally withdrawn from the disciples, and another Helper (παράκλητος), the Holy Spirit, should, as it were, take his place. But why should he say that then they would *ask him no questions?* Was it worth while to tell them that they would not do what from the nature of the case was impossible? It is to be observed further that *me* is the emphatic word in the sentence, — emphatic

both by form (ἐμέ) and position. We have then the meaning, "In that day you will ask no questions of *me*," but — what is the antithesis? We are told that the meaning is, You will have *no need* to question me, because the Holy Spirit will enlighten you. But is not this putting violence on the simple ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐρωτήσετε οὐδέν? Further, though an antithesis is so strongly demanded by the emphatic ἐμέ, according to this explanation we have none expressed, and none which is plainly suggested by the immediate context.

If now, on the other hand, we take ἐρωτήσετε in the sense of "to request," all is smooth and natural. The emphatic ἐμέ finds its immediate antithesis in τὸν πατέρα; and we have no sudden transition from the subject of putting questions to that of petitioning. We have similar examples of the interchange of ἐρωτάω and αἰτέω in Acts iii. 2, 3, and 1 John v. 16; and it accords with the ordinary use of the words, ἐρωτάω being elsewhere employed of the requests addressed by the disciples to Christ, αἰτέω of their petitions to God. Though after the departure of their Master from the earth the disciples would not address their petitions directly to him, as they had done when he was personally present with them, they would have all needed aid; whatever they should ask of the Father, he would give them in his name, that is on his account, or on account of their relation to him, they being as it were his representatives, carrying on his work upon the earth; comp. ch. xiv. 26, also Matt. xviii. 19, 20.

Though a majority of the best scholars adopt the other interpretation, it is too much to say, with Archbishop Trench, that "every one competent to judge is agreed" that the words must be so understood. Among the scholars who take ἐρωτάω here in the sense of "to request," are Henry Stephens in his *Thesaurus* s. v. ἐρωτάω, Grotius, Vossius (*Harm. Ev.* i. c. 18, § 18; *Opp.* vi. 151), Le Clerc (*Nouv. Test.*), Beausobre and Lenfant (*N. T.*), Schoettgen, Archbishop Newcome in his translation, Baumgarten-Crusius, Weizsäcker (*Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol.*, 1857, ii. 183, note), and Weiss (*Der johan. Lehrbegriff*, Berl. 1862, p. 278), who in a pretty full discussion of the passage does not hesitate to call this an "evidente exegetische Resultat." Schleusner, in his *Lexicon*, though explaining the clause in question by "habebitis idoneam et perfectam scientiam," says, "Alii non minus commode reddunt, tum nihil amplius a me petetis. Confer sequentia," and Schirlitz (*Wörterb. zum N. T.*, 3e Aufl., 1868) assigns to ἐρωτάω here the meaning *bitten*, "to request." Bretschneider, Wahl, and Robinson do not notice the passage. Among our American commentators who have assigned this meaning to ἐρωτάω here may be mentioned Barnes (though he thinks there may be a reference to both meanings of the

word), and Dr. Howard Crosby in his "Notes on the New Testament." According to Bloomfield (*Recensio Synoptica* in loc.), ἐρωτάω is explained in this passage as meaning "to request" by Chrysostom, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodore of Heraclea, and Theophylact. This is, however, not quite correct. Chrysostom, Theophylact, and also Euthymius recognize *both* meanings of ἐρωτάω in their notes on the verse, kindly allowing the reader his choice. The expression used by Nonnus in his Paraphrase may be regarded as ambiguous. There seems to be nothing bearing on the point in the writings of Theodore of Mopsuestia (Migne's *Patrol. Græca*, Vol. LXVI.). Theodore of Heraclea is probably the author of some of the notes on the Gospel of John, of which fragments have been preserved in a Gothic translation published by Massmann under the title *Skeireins Aivaggeljons thairh Johannen*, München, 1834; but there appears to be among them no note on John xvi. 23, nor do I know on what the statement of Bloomfield respecting this writer can be founded.

Whatever view may be taken of the disputed passage, the interpretation just given has too much in its favor, and is supported by too many respectable scholars, to be dismissed at once with contempt.

It may be said, however, that the above explanation of ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐρωτήσετε οὐδέν is forbidden by the fact that the early Christians habitually addressed their prayers to Christ, as is shown by the use of the expression "to call upon the name of the Lord," Acts ix. 14, 21; xxii. 16; Rom. x. 12 – 14; 1 Cor. i. 2 (comp. Acts ii. 21; 2 Tim. ii. 22); and by the examples of Stephen (Acts vii. 59) and Paul (2 Cor. xii. 8). I admit that if the phrase οἱ ἐπικαλούμενοι τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ κυρίου as applied to the early Christians implies that their *petitions* were habitually addressed to Christ instead of to the Father in his name, this fact is an objection to the interpretation proposed. The question is one of no little interest; but to discuss it here would carry us much too far, and might lead into the thorny paths of dogmatic theology.

E. A.

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2. — *National Debts.* By R. Dudley Baxter, M. A. Partly read before the British Association at Liverpool, September, 1870. London. 1871. 8vo. pp. 139.

That the expenditures of the principal nations of Europe have, since the French Revolution, greatly exceeded their income, that the payment of the mere interest on the debts now accumulated absorbs a large fraction of the annual revenue, and that every war largely increases the total accumulation, are familiar facts. But the history of the suc-

cessive steps by which these debts have been incurred, and the present state and rate of progress of the debt of each individual nation, are subjects of which little is known by the general public, and of which the sources of knowledge are not readily accessible. In the work before us the more important parts of this subject are presented in a form which, so far as perspicuity is concerned, leaves little to be desired. Under the head of each nation, we find the amount of its public debt at the principal epochs of its history, with allusions to the circumstances which lead to its increase or diminution. With this is generally given the annual charge for interest, the author being careful not to include under this head any payments on account of principal. As it is impossible to judge of the pressure of the debt without knowing the number of people or the amount of wealth by which it is supported, two additional exhibits are given; the one, amount of annual interest per head of population; the other, percentage of annual interest on total income of population. The last is about as good a measure as statistics can furnish of the ability of a people to sustain a debt, but it is still totally inadequate. Willingness of the people to be taxed for the continued payment of interest or principal is really the most essential condition. A people determined to carry out the object for which money is to be raised may give up a fourth of their income as readily as a discontented people will give up a fortieth. In such a case the former are, for all practical purposes, possessed of ten times the tax-paying ability of the latter. In the facts that such countries as France and Austria have not for twenty years found it politically expedient to raise enough revenue for their current expenses, we have evidence of unwillingness to be taxed which no statistics can invalidate, and which seems tantamount to absolute inability to continue the payment of interest on their debt.

Mr. Baxter's work seems arranged rather with a view of instructing the general reader than of forming a repository of original information. We notice, for instance, that all the sums are expressed solely in sterling money, without any indication of the actual moneys in which payment is made, — a feature very convenient for the reader, but not at all scientific. His data have the appearance of being carefully collected, but in his statements of our own debt he shows that proneness to neglect official sources of information which so generally marks English writers on American affairs. His principal authority on this subject seems to be some "American Year-Book," from which he finds that the Federal debt, on July 1, 1865, was £551,000,000. If he had consulted the Treasury Reports he would probably have selected the date at which the debt reached its maximum, which was two months

later. Its amount was then $2,757,000,000, or, in round numbers, £569,000,000.

Among the most important facts brought out by Mr. Baxter is the enormous general increase in the public debts of the world within the present generation. From 1848 to 1869–70 the aggregate debt of Europe increased from fifteen to twenty-nine hundred million pounds, without reckoning the French war indemnity. The addition of this would make the entire increase more than double. Omitting Great Britain, whose debt in 1848 was greater than all the rest together, we find that the Continental debts have more than trebled during this interval. If the future is as fruitful of wars as the past, what is to become of nations which, even in times of peace, cannot raise surplus revenue to pay the interest on their accumulated debt? We conceive that an encouraging answer can be given only by assuming an improbable rate of growth, or an improbable increase in the power of governments to levy taxes. Experience seems to preclude the latter supposition, the general tendency of modern civilization being to diminish the power of the government over the individual. Indeed, this diminution is what has led to the borrowing system, governments borrowing only when they find it impracticable to meet their expenditures by taxation. The relief thus obtained is not only temporary, but must ultimately increase the evil through the necessity of providing indefinitely for the interest. If, indeed, a debt is incurred only under extraordinary circumstances, to be paid off again before another emergency arises, the case is different. But this is not the policy of Continental nations, and the financial future of Continental Europe can hardly be regarded as encouraging from any admissible point of view.

There are several things conducive to a clear understanding of the subject which we should have been glad to see added. One is the annual expenditure of each nation for other purposes than the payment of interest, which would enable the reader to estimate the real difficulties the government has to deal with in providing the interest. Another is a statement of the present policy of each nation with respect to the management of its debt. On the latter point our author is entirely silent.

Mr. Baxter's work attempts the double task of giving information and teaching wisdom. A portion of the latter is scattered among his statistics, thus detracting from the unity of the subject. But most of it is found in a concluding chapter on "Debt Evils and Debt Reduction." We are disappointed in this chapter. Its principal merits are negative ones, which would perhaps be notable in an American work; the author has no startling theory to support, and his conclusions are in accordance

with the average good sense of the community. But the subject is discussed from the usual narrow stand-point, and the reasoning is imbued with the current popular fallacies which surround the subject. The question is considered for the most part as one of debt or no debt, simply. If all other conditions were equal, even if they could possibly be equal, this would be the proper mode of treatment. But they cannot be so, because something must always be done with borrowed money. Now, an economical truth which is obvious on a little careful consideration, but which is almost universally ignored, is this: The economical effect of borrowing money or raising revenue depends, mainly, not on the mode in which it is obtained, supposing, of course, that it is obtained by reasonable means, but on the mode in which it is expended. Consequently, when Mr. Baxter says that a national debt "weakens a nation by withdrawing capital from productive employments and improvements," he asserts a proposition to which, as a general truth, we beg leave to take exception. Suppose the borrowed money is employed in building a system of railways, the profits from which pay the interest on the debt: there is surely no weakening of the nation, and no withdrawal of capital from productive employment. Mr. Baxter would probably reply, that such a disposal of borrowed money is too unusual to be worth considering, and that his proposition presupposes the money to be expended in war. But, in this case, it is the war, and not the debt, that does the mischief. The latter will be about the same whether the war be supported by the system of Xerxes, by taxation, or by borrowed money, because it consists essentially, not in any mere financial operation, but in the turning of a large fraction of the industrial forces of the nation from the channels of production into those of destruction. If, then, the immediate evil is the same whether a debt is or is not incurred, it is not logical to make the debt the cause of the evil.

A large part of the chapter under review is devoted to a comparison of the effects of borrowing and taxation, and we are bound in justice to say that so long as these policies are considered solely with respect to their relative effect, the discussion is not open to the above criticism. We understand our author to give the preference to a system of temporary heavy taxation during the emergency of war, instead of depending almost entirely on loans, as the United States did during the civil war. In this we heartily agree with him, conceiving that his position may be supported by much stronger arguments than those he adduces. The one proposition of his chapter which is more important than all the rest put together, is disposed of in one sentence, without discussion. "The industrial capital of a nation is rather increased than

diminished by reducing a debt." We call this proposition most important, because it is the only one which corrects a great and widespread popular misapprehension. The general public idea seems to be that if a nation incurs a thousand millions of debt to carry on a war, raising no taxes, she is as rich as when she commenced, and that the impoverishment only commences when she undertakes to pay the debt. As a logical consequence, if she leaves this task to posterity, she throws on them all the burden of the war. We conceive this view to be entirely fallacious. The mischief is all done when the war is closed, and the operation of paying off the debt incurred is rather a process of repairing this mischief than one of further exhaustion. We wonder that any clear-headed student of this subject should fail to see the fallacy of the popular notion that, by incurring a debt, the burden of a war is thrown upon posterity, even when the nation borrows the money from its own citizens. We may, indeed, leave a debt to be paid by posterity, but it must be paid to posterity as well as by it, so that the account is balanced. War destroys wealth posterity would otherwise have inherited, so that the latter suffers by it, but this destruction and consequent suffering are quite independent of the financial policy of the combatants.

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3. — *Historical Essays.* By Edward A. Freeman, M. A., Hon. D. C. L., late Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co. 1871. pp. 406.

Mr. Freeman stands in the very front rank of living English historians. He is a legitimate successor of Hallam, Palgrave, and Grote. Any book coming from him is therefore sure to attract attention and to receive its full share of approval. Every library which has any pretensions to merit must possess it, and the literary man who neglects to examine it does so at his imminent peril.

Having said so much, we have said all that is required in recommendation of this book, the contents of which are rather necessary to an elementary education than to the attainment of any very advanced knowledge. There is little or no original investigation in these essays, and as for speculation or novel theory, Mr. Freeman cannot be charged with rashness of experiment in this direction. More than half the volume concerns points of continental history, and Mr. Freeman's special grievance, as appears here, is that French ideas of continental history are utterly distorted, and that Englishmen, and we may add Americans, are profoundly ignorant of anything except French ideas.

This is not a very lofty aim for an historian of Mr. Freeman's rank; if he stops to fight with elementary ignorance and to teach his readers their alphabet, he is not likely ever to do much more. The audience which requires to be taught that Burgundy and Guienne were once independent of Normandy and Paris, is not likely to grasp more than a very few such facts, and will not advance far into the study of real difficulties. As the best example of more serious work of the same kind, the essay on Kirk's Charles the Bold will probably most interest American readers. In three other essays, *passim*, Mr. Freeman assaults the French "Empire" with much success, but with a very vicious temper. As usual with his controversial work, he ends in producing a feeling of reaction against himself and his very just though rather commonplace ideas. That France has grown wholly at the expense of her old neighbors is naturally true; she must have done so or not have grown at all. That she has covered many very infamous violations of international comity with a special excuse of a quite imaginary national unity, is as true as it is that the German "Reich" (since Mr. Freeman objects to the word "Empire" in a narrow sense) habitually covered very ugly transactions with its Eastern neighbors under the veil of religion, and exacted tributes or annexed territory solely in the interests of Christ and the Church. But a passage like the following is altogether bungling and inartistic in effect; it would drive even a German into remonstrance, and fail to rouse anything but a laugh in the most sensitive of Frenchmen: —

"When Louis Napoleon Buonaparte first expressed his wish to become master of Savoy, the word selected for the occasion was the verb 'révendiquer,' and the actual process of annexation is expressed by the noun 'réunion' and the verb 'réunir.' At first sight this seems very much as if a burglar who asked for your money or your life should be said to 'révendiquer' the contents of your purse, and afterwards to effect a 'réunion' between them and the contents of his own. According to all etymology '*ré*vendiquer' must mean to claim back again something which you have lost, and '*ré*union' must mean the joining together of things which have been separated after being originally one. Now undoubtedly in modern French usage the particle 're' has lost its natural force, and 'réunion' has come simply to mean 'union.' . . . . It is a most speaking fact that in any language 'réunion' should have come to mean the same as 'union.' It could only have come to do so in the language of a country where a long series of fraudulent or violent 'unions' had been ingeniously passed off as lawful 'réunions.'"

Here is an ingenious etymological theory, much livelier at any rate,

if not better founded, than many of its author's favorite historical notions. But in the first place, even if it is assumed that Mr. Freeman's philology is equal to the very best German standard, one must still remonstrate against one wilful, malicious, and unjustifiable calumny of "Louis Napoleon Buonaparte," a calumny which must add a considerable sting to the sufferings of that unfortunate man. The literary style of the ex-Emperor has often been sharply criticised, as it possibly deserved, but it certainly passes the limits of fair play when Mr. Freeman actually ventures to make the Emperor responsible for Mr. Freeman's own French. We will risk a heavy stake on the assertion that the Emperor never used the word "révendiquer," and that no one but an Englishman not very much at home in French, nor very well fitted for philological theorizing, would ever have put the word in a Frenchman's mouth.

But setting aside such trifles as accents, which Englishmen have for many centuries agreed to despise, it still seems a little surprising that Mr. Freeman should ever have committed himself to such a statement as the one quoted above. It is surprising because there is in English history a curious anecdote with which Mr. Freeman must be perfectly well acquainted, which bears on this very point. The story is told of Harry Marten the regicide, who in the fervor of republicanism spoke of England, in full Parliament, as "*restored* to its ancient government of Commonwealth." Marten was at once attacked for ignorance of the English language and of history, with as much temper as if he had been a French Emperor and Mr. Freeman his critic, and as he was neither Emperor nor historian nor philologist, but only a wit, he fell back on an authority which Mr. Freeman might also consult to advantage. "There was," said he, "a text which had often troubled his spirit concerning the man who was blind from his mother's womb, but at length whose sight was *restored* to the sight *which he should have had.*"

Barring Mr. Freeman's most inveterate prejudices, he is, when there is neither a French Emperor to abuse nor an Anglo-Saxon king or earl to worship, a hard student and an honest workman. That he is or ever can be a great historian, in any high sense of the word, is difficult to believe. He has read the great German historians, and he probably admires them, but he has certainly failed to understand either their method or their aims. He shows only a limited capacity for critical combinations, and he has a true English contempt for novel theories. In spite of his labors, the history of the Norman Conquest and an accurate statement of Anglo-Saxon institutions still remain as far from realization as ever. Yet Americans owe him some love, if

only because he was not one of their English enemies in days when they had few English friends.

A few slight errors in this volume require correction. Page 190: "King *Charles* was succeeded by his son Lothair," should read, "King *Louis*"; — Louis d'Outremer. Mr. Freeman comes near treating Mr. Kington as unfairly as he does the Emperor Napoleon. Page 297: "In 1210 Frederick was elected king; two years later, Otto, in Mr. [Kington] Oliphant's words, 'rushed on his doom.'" The words are indeed Mr. Kington's, but the date belongs to Mr. Freeman. Frederick II. had the ill fortune to be three times elected king, but never in the year 1210. The election here meant is that of 1212, from which Frederick dated the years of his reign. Again, p. 186: "In 888 Charles the Fat was deposed," and "in 963 Otto the Great finally annexed the Roman Empire and the Italian Kingdom to his own Teutonic crown." Charles the Fat was deposed in 887, and setting aside the fact that Otto did not "finally" annex the Italian Kingdom to his Teutonic crown, but that the Italians continued after him to dispose of their own crown as in the case of Ardoin of Ivrea in 1002, the date itself is incorrect. Otto the Great was crowned Emperor on the 2d of February, 962.

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4. — 1. *Village Communities in the East and West.* Six Lectures delivered at Oxford by Henry Sumner Maine, Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence in the University. London: John Murray. 1871. pp. 226.
2. *Agricultural Communities of the Middle Ages.* From the German of E. Nasse. Translated by H. A. Ouvry. Published by the Cobden Club. London: Macmillan & Co. 1871. pp. 100.
3. *Die Altdeutsche Reichs-und Gerichtsverfassung.* Von Dr. Rudolph Sohm, ord. Professor an der Universität Freiburg i. Br. Erster Band. Die Fränkische Reichs-und Gerichtsverfassung. Weimar: Hermann Böhlau. 1871. pp. 588.

There are many indications that a new historical school must soon develop itself in England, with new methods and with a deeper basis than has yet been required of English historical students. It is clear that the old school is practically worn out, and in spite of various false starts and much premature theorizing, that the new one sooner or later will run its course and triumph. It is now some years since Sir Henry Maine in his "Ancient Law" sketched out with great breadth and boldness one principal path which the new student would

be obliged to follow; and as Sir Henry dealt with legal conceptions, so a French writer whose work has been translated into English and widely read — M. de Coulanges in his *Cité Antique* — has followed a somewhat similar method with forms of religious worship. Sir John Lubbock has in his turn struck into a promising path, though in a very slipshod manner, and has traced society back, on sound critical principles, to a very early stage, in which war figures as the great civilizer. All these are, however, only tentative sketches, outlines of a vast scheme which must inevitably lead to nothing less than the entire reconstruction of historical literature.

Sir Henry Maine's six lectures delivered at Oxford last year aim at illustrating one corner of this immense canvas. Having laid down the principle that the family was the great source of personal law, and that groups of families cultivating land in common — the village communities of undeveloped society — are the great source of proprietary law, he proceeds with a sound sense of critical method, to show what these village communities are, and he describes the system as it actually exists in India, where it was a part of his duty as a judge to recognize and study it. The same work, so far as concerns the traces of the same communal system in Germany, has been elaborately done by a school of German jurists of whom Von Maurer is perhaps the most eminent.

The mere fact that English historians have always known and recognized the early existence of a communal system, does not prevent this new movement from shaking the foundations, if there were any, of the old historical method. Practically neither lawyers nor historians in England ever succeeded in getting beyond the manor as the source of land law. They stopped at William the Conqueror and what they called the feudal system, and assumed that there was here a break of legal and historical continuity. If they were not too thoroughly convinced both of the merits of English law, and of the merits of English historians, to feel any slight sense of mortification, one would suppose that this translation of Nasse's Mediæval Communities would be likely to stimulate it. Here is a plodding, obscure, and far from lively German, who collects English materials which have been lying under the eyes of Englishmen for six centuries undisturbed, and by means of these he puts a new face on English history and law. That all his facts were well known before he wrote, does not alter the case at all. No English lawyer or historian has ever used them with any effective comprehension of their value. The Englishman has accepted feudal law; he has, very unwillingly but at last frankly, accepted Roman law as modifying feudal law; but he still does battle

with desperate energy against the idea that Germans as such, before they were either feudalized or Romanized, had an actual system of personal and proprietary law of their own, a system as elaborate, as fixed, and as firmly administered by competent and regular courts, as ever was needed to guarantee security of person and property in a simply constructed, agricultural community. From these laws and this society, not from Roman laws or William the Conqueror's brain, England, with her common-law and constitutional system, developed; and from similar laws by a similar process with a similar result, Rome had developed before her; as every society which is based on the principle of contract always has and always must have developed.

English literature has yet to learn that these points of historical science have already been worked out into formulas by German minds, and that there is a mass, one may even say a library, of German books, all of which bear more or less directly on the history of England, and none or few of which have ever been utilized for the explanation of that history. The latest and in some respects the most remarkable of all these works is that of Professor Sohm of Freiburg. Since the publication of Professor Waitz's "Constitutional History" some thirty years ago, although there has been a great amount of active investigation in this field, only two works have achieved any very distinguished success. The first of these was the "History of Benefices" or the origin of Feudalism, by Dr. Paul Roth, Professor at Marburg, in which some of Waitz's theories were roughly and decisively upset. This work dealt principally with the military side of the German constitution down to the tenth century. The second is the work of Dr. Rudolph Sohm, which concerns more immediately the early German system of administering justice, and which has appeared so recently that its exact place in literature cannot yet, at least at this distance, be precisely fixed. To any one who has struggled with early feudal institutions as expounded by writers like Hallam and Guizot, or even by Eichhorn and Waitz, these books of Roth and Sohm produce somewhat the same impression as flashes of lightning in an extremely dark night.

The question cannot but rise in an English reader's mind, why no such works as these, equally thorough and equally broad, have ever been produced in England. Certainly it is not because the Germans had any advantages at the outset, for English historical literature was vastly in advance of the German until a comparatively recent time. We believe that there is an obvious explanation of this difficulty if it is looked at as a purely professional question. These German works are the works of jurists rather than of historians, and there never has been a time when the training of an English lawyer admitted of the

possibility of such speculations. No doubt this was an advantage in some respects. It implied that English law had maintained itself in a course of development little disturbed from without; that it was jealous of foreign ideas and external influence; that it frowned upon unpractical theorizing. An Austin was a solitary and not a welcome apparition to the English bar. Perhaps it was well for the common law that it should have grown in this practical and healthy way; that it should have drawn assistance from the civil law only by stealth, and without acknowledgment of its thefts; that it should have created a close corporation of lawyers who knew nothing but law, and only the common law at that. But for history the disaster was enormous. In proportion as Englishmen have made themselves good lawyers they have become bad historians. The whole fabric of the common law rests on a quantity of assumptions which as history are destitute of any sound basis of fact, and these assumptions have decisively influenced the ideas even of those English historians who, technically speaking, knew no law. Just as in the Middle Ages history was appropriated by monks, who wrote with minds controlled and permeated by religious assumptions which color and distort their works from beginning to end, and which have now to be carefully strained away before a residuum of fact can be reached, so in later times the study of history in England, so far as it was legal, — and perhaps the most practical part of history is the development of law, — fell into the hands of a class of men whose purely historical knowledge and faculty for historical criticism were of the most limited kind, and whose minds were hopelessly imbued with common-law fictions. In Germany the case was different. German law may be very inferior as a science to English law; it may have been warped and biassed by its connection with Rome, and its development may not have been spontaneous and healthy. But the German lawyer was also a jurist, and his study of codes, rendered necessary as it was by his situation, has forced him to develop a faculty for comparison and criticism, for minute analysis and sweeping generalization, such as no Englishman, except perhaps Austin and Maine, has ever dared to conceive. It is evident that this state of things is now rapidly passing away in England, and it may be that in the process of overthrow the English law will suffer; but even if this prove to be the case, some compensation may be drawn from the chance that English critical literature will spring into new life, and that English history will perhaps at last be written.

5. — *The History of Napoleon the First.* By P. Lanfrey. Vol. I. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1871.

This work has been written mainly as an examination of the moral character of the Emperor Napoleon. Whoever expects to find it a history of Europe, or even of France, during his life, will be disappointed. Whoever expects to find it a brilliant or even a reasonably entertaining narrative of the dramatic events with which it is concerned, will be no less disappointed. And truth compels us to add, that no one will find the book to be a kind, a generous, or even a just estimate of character.

The writer is a Frenchman, at any rate by adoption; he is a republican, evidently; he believes that republican government in France, after the Revolution, might have been continued; and he is absolutely without mercy or excuse for him who destroyed it. There is nothing in the English histories of this epoch that even approaches the rancor of this book. It is such a book as a fifth-monarchy man might have written about Oliver Cromwell; such a book as a New England Tory might have written about John Hancock or Samuel Adams. It is not pleasant reading, we can assure the public; the hatred is too predominant; the blame is too continuous; it becomes wearisome.

This, however, may be necessary in dealing with the moral character of a man so selfish and so unscrupulous as Bonaparte confessedly was. But we surely have a right to insist that it shall be shown to be necessary. We have a right to the whole evidence, and to the argument on both sides; and the worst about this book is, that we do not get either. Not, perhaps, that Mr. Lanfrey means to be unfair: there is no need of our saying whether, in our judgment, he does or not; but that the man's mind is narrow; and, more than this, that his spirit is throughout that of the prosecuting attorney; he does not feel himself bound to give the prisoner the benefit of those facts which he conceives would be mistakenly supposed to palliate his crimes; far less does he condescend to state his defence in his own words. Nay, more, it would be a wholly inadequate idea of the part taken by M. Lanfrey in this biography did we liken him to the prosecuting attorney, as we know him in this country, or in England; it is the *procureur d'état* of his own country whom he has taken for his model; and with what success we shall endeavor briefly to show.

In the outset we see Napoleon introduced as the marplot of his age. "It [the eighteenth century] carried on the work of its forerunners, — the sixteenth, which saw the birth of the Reformation, and the seventeenth, which saw the triumph of English institutions; it was in communion

with all the stirring spirits of the past. . . . . The thinkers who had shed a lustre over its course were followed by great practical men who carried their plans into execution. After Locke, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Rousseau, rose Turgot, Franklin, Mirabeau, and Washington. The American Republic, child of experiment, irreproachable as a creation of pure reason, (!) was on the point of rising up beyond the seas to serve as a beacon to all future societies. The future appeared so assured, and the course of events so irresistible, that even the wisest were not proof against a certain intoxication. . . . . Not content with proclaiming the end of religious and political despotism, they went on to predict the end of superstition, the end of misery, the end of slavery, the end of conquest, the end of war. *It was towards this time* that there was born in a small island, obscure and nearly without history, a child who was to be called Napoleon Bonaparte. *There is little need to point out the contrast between this extraordinary man and the general spirit of his epoch;* it strikes the eye instantly. From his character and his ideas, and especially from the aim he had in view, Napoleon seems to belong to another age."

This passage really gives one a perfectly fair idea of M. Lanfrey's method. Observe the entire absence of any allusion to those facts of contemporary history, which serve in a measure to account for the character and the career of Napoleon; to the wretchedness of the lower classes and the luxury and want of public spirit of the upper classes in France under the old *régime;* to the atrocities of the Revolution; to the protracted contest in Germany, and the powerful influence of the Great Frederick, the foremost man and the best soldier in Europe; to the successful partition of Poland; to the British conquests in North America and in India; to the fame of Warren Hastings and of William Pitt. When one recalls these facts, so artfully left out of the picture of that happy, peaceful, and enlightened era which the ambition of Napoleon Bonaparte was to disturb, we cannot but admire the skill which is thus employed to prejudice the reader at the very beginning against the subject of M. Lanfrey's memoir.

This sort of thing we find at every turn. The violation of the neutrality of Venice in 1796 is one of M. Lanfrey's most grievous accusations. One would suppose that the occupation of Brescia was one of the most inexcusable injuries ever inflicted upon a neutral power. We find, indeed, that Venice had granted to the Austrians a military road through her territory, "which was indispensable for their communications with the Tyrol"; but it never seems to occur to our author that no officer in General Bonaparte's position could respect the territory of Venice after this. For all practical purposes

the territory through which an enemy's army can pass is enemy's territory, and no general, engaged, as Bonaparte was, against superior numbers, can afford to throw away his chances, because a state which allows the enemy a line of communication through its territory chooses to call itself neutral.

And in dealing with the conduct of Bonaparte toward the various Italian states, we observe the greatest fulness of detail and of arguments in convicting him of fraud and violence, and we note the significant absence of any fair presentation of these circumstances, which readily occur to any one at all familiar with the condition of Italy at this time, which would go towards mitigating our judgment. Such facts are the well-known secret leanings of all the minor states towards Austria; the inability of the maritime states to preserve the neutrality of their seaports from the English; the tremendous temptation to an officer carrying on a campaign, such as those of 1796 and 1797, to secure his communications more firmly than by merely relying on the word and the neutrality of petty principalities, whose rulers were allied by blood, or by the stronger sympathy of kindred principles of government with his enemy, in opposition to the new French Republic. All these considerations, and such as these, we are fairly entitled to; they may or they may not excuse the conduct of the French general; perhaps they should be held to be too trivial to weigh in the balance with what M. Lanfrey, from the chair of pure morality, can urge; but such as they are, they will strike most people as material facts, and they will not look upon that as a trustworthy history which ignores them.

The same perverse refusal to let his readers see but one side, and that the worst side, of the subject of his memoir, comes out in the treatment of the *coup d'état* of the 18th of Brumaire, 1799. We do not complain of M. Lanfrey that his judgment, from the facts he chooses to give us, is too harsh; the fault we find is that he omits many and important elements in the case. The fact that the Directory which was overthrown was itself an oligarchy, and a most odious oligarchy, although dwelt upon at length where the *coup d'état* of the 18th of Fructidor, 1797, is treated of, is not adverted to as palliating the course of Bonaparte in 1799. The government of that *Republic* which Bonaparte is so much abused for overthrowing, is described elsewhere as having "sealed the enslavement of France," and "destroyed all liberty of the press." Surely these facts should be brought into close juxtaposition with the narrative of the Revolution which destroyed such a government.

But one or two more instances of our author's method must suffice. In speaking of General Bonaparte's character, he adopts a mode of

criticism against which it is difficult to see how any man can defend himself. "When he was first sent to the army of Italy, and raised above generals who were mostly his superiors in age and reputation, he saw that *in order to have power over them* he must command their respect, not only by the brilliancy of his achievements, but by firmness, gravity, and character. *Hence* the severe watch he kept over himself, the *studied* simplicity of his habits, and the surprising austerity of his life," etc. Again, "If Bonaparte chose to remain incorruptible among so many venal souls, he did so from superiority of pride and ambition, and not of virtue." One cannot help being reminded of the Troppman trial, of which the following is reported: "The president of the court to the prisoner: 'Well, at Roubaix no one ever noticed in you, though you were only twenty years old, any of those irregular habits which are usually found in young men of that age. You came in regularly at eleven o'clock every night. But still you talked constantly of your craving for riches,'" etc.

Once more; here is a slight thing in itself, but it shows the animus of the writer, and is the more valuable in that respect as the means of proving M. Lanfrey in the wrong are more accessible in regard to this than in respect to most of the details of persons and of negotiations, of which he gives us so many. Speaking of the expedition to Egypt, he says: "He [Bonaparte] did not confine himself in his choice of generals to his old companions in arms of the army of Italy, but made a choice from among all the armies of the Republic, *thus depriving them of all nerve and muscle. He seemed unwilling to leave any one of any worth behind.* He took Desaix, Kléber, Davoust, Reynier, Caffarelli, and Belliard, and with them his old lieutenants, Murat, Lannes, Marmont, Berthier, Andréossy, Junot, *and every one who had youth, energy, and daring.*" The fact was, that as many good officers were left, to say the least, as accompanied him to Egypt. Among others who were engaged in the campaigns of 1799 in Italy, Switzerland, and on the Rhine, we may mention Moreau, Massena, Joubert, Lecourbe, Ney, Soult, St. Cyr, and Macdonald. How far the harsh and bitter insinuations of M. Lanfrey are justified, any one can judge.

We do not desire to be hard upon M. Lanfrey. His work was written during the Second Empire, and it undoubtedly comes under that class of (so called) historical books which are really political pamphlets, of which Napoleon's "Cæsar" is a remarkable instance. M. Lanfrey undoubtedly felt that all he could say against the first Napoleon would tell against the third Napoleon; and feeling as he did, he threw into his undertaking a bitterness and an intensity of partisan spirit to which no purely historical reflections could have given rise.

The result is a work written unquestionably with great pains, containing a large mass of facts, some of them new, and embodying what are undoubtedly the opinions of a certain class of his countrymen about the great man who ruled France with a vigor and ability never surpassed. We have no fault to find with M. Lanfrey for his conclusions; but we do find great fault with him for the thoroughly one-sided way in which he has written; for his disingenuousness in treating of controverted topics; for his want of generosity when treating of the things that present Napoleon in a favorable light. In our judgment, the work of Sir Walter Scott, with all its faults, and with all its national prejudice, will give one a much more just idea of Napoleon's character than can be got from M. Lanfrey's history.

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6. — *The Life of John Milton: narrated in Connection with the Political, Ecclesiastical, and Literary History of his Time.* By DAVID MASSON, M. D., LL. D., Professor of Rhetoric and English Literature in the University of Edinburgh. Vol. II. 1638–1643. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1871. 8vo. pp. xii, 608.

IF the biographies of literary men are to assume the bulk which Mr. Masson is giving to that of Milton, their authors should send a phial of *elixir vitæ* with the first volume, that a purchaser might have some valid assurance of surviving to see the last. Mr. Masson has already occupied thirteen hundred and seventy-eight pages in getting Milton to his thirty-fifth year, and an interval of eleven years stretches between the dates of the first and second instalments of his published labors. As Milton's literary life properly begins at twenty-one with the "Ode on the Nativity," and as by far the more important part of it lies between the year at which we are arrived and his death at the age of sixty-six, we might seem to have the terms given us by which to make a rough reckoning of how soon we are likely to see land. But when we recollect the baffling character of the winds and currents we have already encountered, and the eddies that may at any time slip us back to the reformation in Scotland or the settlement of New England; when we consider, moreover, that Milton's life overlapped the *grand siècle* of French literature, with its irresistible temptations to digression and homily for a man of Mr. Masson's temperament, we may be pardoned if a sigh of doubt and discouragement escape us. We envy the secular leisures of Methusaleh, and are thankful that *his* biography at least (if written in the same longeval proportion) is irrecoverably lost

to us. What a subject would that have been for a person of Mr. Masson's spacious predilections! Even if he himself can count on patriarchal prorogations of existence, let him hang a print of the Countess of Desmond in his study to remind him of the ambushes which Fate lays for the toughest of us. For ourselves, we have not dared to climb a cherry-tree since we began to read his work. Even with the promise of a speedy third volume before us, we feel by no means sure that we shall live to see Mary Powell back in her husband's house; for it is just at this crisis that Mr. Masson, with the diabolical art of a practised serial writer, leaves us while he goes into an exhaustive account of the Westminster Assembly and the political and religious notions of the Massachusetts Puritans. We could not help thinking, after we had got Milton fairly through college, that he was never more mistaken in his life than when he wrote, —

> "How *soon* hath Time, that subtle thief of youth,
> Stolen on his wing my three-and-twentieth year!"

Or is it Mr. Masson who has made a blunder?

It is plain from the Preface to the second volume that Mr. Masson himself has an uneasy consciousness that something is wrong, and that Milton ought somehow to be more than a mere incident of his own biography. He tells us that, "whatever may be thought by a hasty person looking in on the subject from the outside, no one can study the life of Milton as it ought to be studied without being obliged to study extensively and intimately the contemporary history of England, and even incidentally of Scotland and Ireland too. . . . . Thus on the very compulsion, or at least the suasion, of the biography, a history grew on my hands. It was not in human nature to confine the historical inquiries, once they were in progress, within the precise limits of their demonstrable bearing on the biography, even had it been possible to determine these limits beforehand; and so the history assumed a co-ordinate importance with me, was pursued often for its own sake, and became, though always with a sense of organic relation to the biography, continuous in itself." If a "hasty person" is one who thinks eleven years rather long to have his button held by a biographer ere he begin his next sentence, we take to ourselves the sting of Mr. Masson's covert sarcasm. We confess with shame a pusillanimity that is apt to flag if a "to be continued" does not redeem its promise before the lapse of a quinquennium. We could scarce await the "Autocrat" himself so long. The heroic age of literature is past, and even the duodecimo is often too heavy (οἷον νῦν βρότοι) for the descendants of men to whom the folio was a pastime. But what does Mr. Masson mean by "continuous"? To us it seems rather as if his somewhat rambling history

of the seventeenth century were interrupted now and then by the sudden apparition of Milton, who, like Paul Pry, just pops in and hopes he does not intrude, to tell us what *he* has been doing in the mean while. The reader, immersed in Scottish politics or the schemes of Archbishop Laud, is a little puzzled at first, but reconciles himself on being reminded that this fair-haired young man is the protagonist of the drama.

If Goethe was right in saying that every man was a citizen of his age as well as of his country, there can be no doubt that in order to understand the motives and conduct of the man we must first make ourselves intimate with the time in which he lived. We have therefore no fault to find with the thoroughness of Mr. Masson's "historical inquiries." The more thorough the better, so far as they were essential to the satisfactory performance of his task. But it is only such contemporary events, opinions, or persons as were really operative on the character of the man we are studying that are of consequence, and we are to familiarize ourselves with them, not so much for the sake of explaining them as of understanding him. The biographer, especially of a literary man, need only mark the main currents of tendency, without being officious to trace out to its marshy source every runlet that has cast in its tiny pitcherful with the rest. Much less should he attempt an analysis of the stream and to classify every component by itself, as if each were ever effectual singly and not in combination. Human motives can not be thus chemically cross-examined, nor do we arrive at any true knowledge of character by such minute subdivision of its ingredients. Nothing is so essential to a biographer as an eye that can distinguish at a glance between real events that are the levers of thought and action, and what Donne calls "unconcerning things, matters of fact," — between substantial personages, whose contact or even neighborhood is influential, and the supernumeraries that serve first to fill up a stage and afterwards the interstices of a biographical dictionary.

> "Time hath a wallet at his back
> Wherein he puts alms for Oblivion."

Let the biographer keep his fingers off that sacred and merciful deposit, and not renew for us the bores of a former generation as if we had not enough of our own. But if he cannot forbear that unwise inquisitiveness, we may fairly complain when he insists on taking us along with him in the processes of his investigation, instead of giving us the sifted results in their bearing on the life and character of his subject, whether for help or hinderance. We are blinded with the dust of old papers ransacked by Mr. Masson to find out that they have no relation whatever to his hero. He had

been wise if he had kept constantly in view what Milton himself says of those who gathered up personal traditions concerning the Apostles: "With less fervency was studied what Saint Paul or Saint John had written than was listened to one that could say, 'Here he taught, here he stood, this was his stature, and thus he went habited; and O, happy this house that harbored him, and that cold stone whereon he rested, this village where he wrought such a miracle.' . . . . Thus while all their thoughts were poured out upon circumstances and the gazing after such men as had sat at table with the Apostles, ... by this means they lost their time and truanted on the fundamental grounds of saving knowledge, as was seen shortly in their writings." Mr. Masson has so *poured out his mind upon circumstances*, that his work reminds us of Allston's picture of Elijah in the Wilderness, where a good deal of research at last enables us to guess at the prophet absconded like a conundrum in the landscape where the very ravens could scarce find him out. The figure of Milton becomes but a speck on the enormous canvas crowded with the scenery through which he may by any possibility be conjectured to have passed. We will cite a single example of the desperate straits to which Mr. Masson is reduced in order to hitch Milton on to his own biography. He devotes the first chapter of his Second Book to the meeting of the Long Parliament. "Already," he tells us, "in the earlier part of the day, the Commons had gone through the ceremony of hearing the writ for the Parliament read, and the names of the members that had been returned called over by Thomas Wyllys, Esq., the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery. His deputy, *Agar, Milton's brother-in-law, may have been in attendance on such an occasion.* During the preceding month or two, at all events, Agar and his subordinates in the Crown Office had been unusually busy with the issue of the writs and with the other work connected with the opening of Parliament." (Vol. II. p. 150.) Mr. Masson's resolute "at all events" is very amusing. Meanwhile

"The hungry sheep look up and are not fed."

Augustin Thierry has a great deal to answer for, if to him we owe the modern fashion of writing history picturesquely. At least his method leads to most unhappy results when essayed by men to whom nature has denied a sense of what the picturesque really is. The historical picturesque does not consist, in truth, of costume and similar accessaries, but in the grouping, attitude, and expression of the figures, caught when they are unconscious that the artist is sketching them. The moment they are posed for a composition, unless by a man of genius, the life has gone out of them. In the hands of an inferior artist, who fancies that imagination is something to be squeezed out of

color-tubes, the past becomes a phantasmagoria of jackboots, doublets, and flap-hats, the mere property-room of a deserted theatre, as if the life had been scenical and illusory, the world an unreal thing that vanished with the foot-lights. It is the power of catching the actors in great events at unawares that makes the glimpses given us by contemporaries so vivid and precious. And St. Simon, one of the great masters of the picturesque, lets us into the secret of his art when he tells us how, in that wonderful scene of the death of Monsiegneur, he saw, "*du premier coup d'œil vivement porté*, tout ce qui leur échappoit et tout ce qui les accableroit." It is the gift of producing this reality that almost makes us blush, as if we had been caught peeping through a keyhole and had surprised secrets to which we had no right,—it is this only that can justify the pictorial method of narration. Mr. Carlyle has this power of contemporizing himself with bygone times, he cheats us to

"Play with our fancies and believe we see";

but we find the *tableaux vivants* of the apprentices who "deal in his command without his power," and who compel us to work very hard indeed with our fancies, rather wearisome. The effort of weaker arms to shoot with his mighty bow has filled the air of recent literature with more than enough fruitless twanging.

Mr. Masson's style, at best cumbrous, becomes intolerably awkward when he strives to make up for the want of St. Simon's *premier coup d'œil* by impertinent details of what we must call the pseudo-dramatic kind. For example, does Hall profess to have traced Milton from the University to a "suburb sink" of London? Mr. Masson fancies he hears Milton saying to himself, "A suburb sink! has Hall or his son taken the trouble to walk all the way down to Aldergate here, to peep up the entry where I live, and so have an exact notion of my whereabouts? There has been plague in the neighborhood certainly; and I hope Jane Yates had my doorstep tidy for the visit." Does Milton, answering Hall's innuendo that he was courting the graces of a rich widow, tell us that he would rather "choose a virgin of mean fortunes honestly bred"? Mr. Masson forthwith breaks forth in a paroxysm of what we suppose to be picturesqueness in this wise: "What have we here? Surely nothing less, if we choose so to construe it, than a marriage-advertisement! Ho, all ye virgins of England (widows need not apply), here is an opportunity such as seldom occurs: a bachelor, unattached; age, thirty-three years and three or four months; height [Milton, by the way, would have said *highth*], middle or a little less; personal appearance unusually handsome, with fair complexion and light auburn hair; circumstances independent; tastes

intellectual and decidedly musical; principles Root-and-Branch! Was there already any young maiden in whose bosom, had such an advertisement come in her way, it would have raised a conscious flutter? If so, did she live near Oxford?" If there *is* anything worse than an unimaginative man trying to write imaginatively, it is a heavy man when he fancies he is being facetious. He tramples out the last spark of cheerfulness with the broad damp foot of a hippopotamus.

We are no advocates for what is called the dignity of history, when it means, as it too often does, that dulness has a right of sanctuary in gravity. Too well do we recall the sorrows of our youth, when we were shipped in search of knowledge on the long Johnsonian swell of the last century, favorable to anything but the calm digestion of historic truth. We had even then an uneasy suspicion, which has ripened into certainty, that thoughts were never draped in long skirts like babies, if they were strong enough to go alone. But surely there should be such a thing as good taste, above all a sense of self-respect, in the historian himself, that should not allow him to play any tricks with the dignity of his subject. A halo of sacredness has hitherto invested the figure of Milton, and our image of him has dwelt securely in ideal remoteness from the vulgarities of life. No diaries, no private letters, remain to give the idle curiosity of after-times the right to force itself on the hallowed seclusions of his reserve. That a man whose familiar epistles were written in the language of Cicero, whose sense of personal dignity was so great that, when called on in self-defence to speak of himself, he always does it with an epical stateliness of phrase, and whose self-respect even in youth was so profound that it resembles the reverence paid by other men to a far-off and idealized character, — that he should be treated in this offhand familiar fashion by his biographer seems to us a kind of desecration, a violation of good manners no less than of the laws of biographic art. Better the surly injustice of Johnson than such presumptuous friendship as this. Let the seventeenth century, at least, be kept sacred from the insupportable foot of the interviewer!

But Mr. Masson, in his desire to be (shall we say) idiomatic, can do something worse than what we have hitherto quoted. He can be even vulgar. Discussing the motives of Milton's first marriage, he says, "Did he come seeking his 500 *l.*, and did Mrs. Powell *heave a daughter at him?*" We have heard of a woman throwing herself at a man's head, and the image is a somewhat violent one; but what is this to Mr. Masson's improvement on it? It has been sometimes affirmed that the fitness of an image may be tested by trying whether a picture could be made of it or not. Mr. Masson has certainly offered a new

and striking subject to the historical school of British art. A little further on, speaking of Mary Powell, he says, "We have no portrait of her, nor any account of her appearance; but on the usual rule of the elective affinities of opposites, Milton being fair, *we will vote her* to have been dark-haired." We need say nothing of the good taste of this sentence, but its absurdity is heightened by the fact that Mr. Masson himself had left us in doubt whether the match was one of convenience or inclination. We know not how it may be with other readers, but for ourselves we always resent this hail-fellow-well-met manner with its jaunty "*we* will vote." In some cases, Mr. Masson's indecorums in respect of style may possibly be accounted for as attempts at humor by one who has an imperfect notion of its ingredients. In such experiments, to judge by the effect, the pensive element of the compound enters in too large an excess over the hilarious. Whether we have hit upon the true explanation, or whether the cause lie not rather in a besetting velleity of the picturesque and vivid, we shall leave the reader to judge by an example or two. In the manuscript copy of Milton's sonnet in which he claims for his own house the immunity which the memory of Pindar and Euripides secured for other walls, the title had originally been, "*On his Door when the City expected an Assault.*" Milton has drawn a line through this and substituted "*When the Assault was intended to the City.*" Mr. Masson fancies "a mood of jest or semi-jest in the whole affair"; but we think rather that Milton's quiet assumption of equality with two such famous poets was as seriously characteristic as Dante's ranking himself *sesto tra cotanto senno.* Mr. Masson takes advantage of the obliterated title to imagine one of Prince Rupert's troopers entering the poet's study and finding some of his "Anti-Episcopal pamphlets that had been left lying about inadvertently. 'Oho!' the Cavalier Captain might then have said, 'Pindar and Euripides are all very well, by G—! I've been at college myself; and when I meet a gentleman and scholar, I hope I know how to treat him; but neither Pindar nor Euripides ever wrote pamphlets against the Church of England, by G—! It won't do, Mr. Milton!'" This, we suppose, is Mr. Masson's way of being funny and dramatic at the same time. We are shocked with this barbarous dissonance. Could not the Muse defend his son? Again, when Charles I., at Edinburgh, in the autumn and winter of 1641, fills the vacant English sees, we are told, "It was more than an insult; it was a sarcasm! It was as if the King, while giving Alexander Henderson his hand to kiss, had winked his royal eye over that reverend Presbyter's back!" Now we can conceive Charles II. winking when he took the Solemn League and Covenant, but never his father under any circumstances. He may have been, and we

believe he was, a bad king, but surely we may take Marvell's word for it, that

"He nothing common did or mean,"

upon any of the "memorable scenes" of his life. The image is, therefore, out of all imaginative keeping, and vulgarizes the chief personage in a grand historical tragedy, who, if not a great, was at least a decorous actor. But Mr. Masson can do worse than this. Speaking of a Mrs. Katherine Chidley, who wrote in defence of the Independents against Thomas Edwards, he says, "People wondered who this she-Brownist, Katherine Chidley, was, and did not quite lose their interest in her when they found that she was an oldish woman, and a member of some hole-and-corner congregation in London. Indeed, *she put her nails into Mr. Edwards with some effect.*" Why did he not say at once, after the good old fashion, that she "set her ten commandments in his face"? In another place he speaks of "Satan standing with his *staff* around him." Mr. Masson's style, a little Robertsonian at best, naturally grows worse when forced to condescend to every-day matters. He can no more dismount and walk than the man in armor on a Lord Mayor's day. "It (Aldersgate Street) stretches away northwards a full fourth of a mile as one continuous thoroughfare, until, crossed by Long Lane and the Barbican, it parts with the name of Aldersgate Street, and, under the new names of Goswell Street and Goswell Road, *completes its tendency towards the suburbs* and fields about Islington." What a noble work might not the Directory be if composed on this scale! The imagination even of an alderman might well be lost in that full quarter of a mile of continuous thoroughfare. Mr. Masson is very great in these passages of civic grandeur; but he is more surprising, on the whole, where he has an image to deal with. Speaking of Milton's "two-handed engine" in Lycidas, he says: "May not Milton, whatever else he meant, have meant a coming English Parliament with its two Houses? Whatever he meant, his prophecy had come true. As he sat among his books in Aldersgate Street, the two-handed engine at the door of the English Church was on the swing. Once, twice, thrice, it had swept its arcs to gather energy; now it was on the backmost poise, and the blow was to descend." We cannot help wishing that Mr. Masson would try his hand on the tenth horn of the beast in Revelation, or on the time and half a time of Daniel. There is something so consoling to a prophet in being told that, no matter what he meant, his prophecy had come true, and that he might mean "whatever else" he pleased, so long as he *may* have meant what we choose to think he did, reasoning backward from the assumed fulfilment! But we think we detect in Mr. Masson's "swept its arcs" a

little of that prophetic hedging in vagueness to which he allows so generous a latitude. How if the "two-handed engine," after all, were a broom (or besom, to be more dignified),

> "Sweeping — vehemently sweeping,
> No pause admitted, no design avowed,"

like that wielded by the awful shape which Dion the Syracusan saw? We make the suggestion modestly, though somewhat encouraged by Mr. Masson's system of exegesis, which reminds one of the casuists' doctrine of probables, in virtue of which a man may be *probabiliter obligatus* and *probabiliter deobligatus* at the same time. But perhaps the most remarkable instance of Mr. Masson's figures of speech is where we are told that the king might have established a *bona fide* government "by giving public ascendency to the popular or Parliamentary element in his Council, and *inducing the old leaven in it either to accept the new policy, or to withdraw and become inactive.*" There is something consoling in the thought that yeast should be accessible to moral suasion. It is really too bad that bread should ever be heavy for want of such an appeal to its moral sense as should "induce it to accept the new policy." Of Mr. Masson's unhappy infection with the *vivid* style we will give an instance or two in justification of our charge against him in that particular. He says of Loudon that "he was committed to the Tower, where for more than two months he lay, with as near a prospect as ever prisoner had of a *chop* with the executioner's axe on a scaffold on Tower Hill." We may be over-fastidious, but the word "chop" offends our ears with its coarseness, or if that be too strong, has certainly the unpleasant effect of an emphasis unduly placed. Old Auchinleck's saying of Cromwell, that "he gard kings ken they had a lith in their necks," is a good example of really vivid phrase, suggesting the axe and the block, and giving one of those dreadful hints to the imagination which are more powerful than any amount of detail, and whose skilful use is the only magic employed by the masters of truly picturesque writing. The sentence we have just quoted will serve also as an example of that tendency to *surplusage* which adds to the bulk of Mr. Masson's sentences at the cost of their effectiveness. If he had said simply "chop on Tower Hill" (if chop there must be), it had been quite enough, for we all know that the executioner's axe and the scaffold are implied in it. Once more, and we have done with the least agreeable part of our business. Mr. Masson, after telling over again the story of Strafford with needless length of detail, ends thus: "On Wednesday, the 12th of May, that proud *curly* head, the casket of that brain of power, rolled on the scaffold of Tower Hill." Why *curly?* Surely it is here a ludicrous impertinence. This careful

thrusting forward of outward and unmeaning particulars, in the hope of giving that reality to a picture which genius only has the art to do, is becoming a weariness in modern descriptive writing. It reminds one of the Mrs. Jarley expedient of dressing the waxen effigies of murderers in the very clothes they wore when they did the deed, or with the real halter round their necks wherewith they expiated it. It is probably very effective with the torpid sensibilities of the class who look upon wax figures as works of art. True imaginative power works with other material. Lady Macbeth striving to wash away from her hands the damned spot that is all the more there to the mind of the spectator because it is not there at all, is a type of the methods it employs and the intensity of their action.

Having discharged our duty in regard to Mr. Masson's faults of manner, which we should not have dwelt on so long had they not greatly marred our enjoyment in the reading, and were they not the ear-mark of a school which has become unhappily numerous, we turn to a consideration of his work as a whole. We think he made a mistake in his very plan, or else was guilty of a misnomer in his title. His book is not so much a life of Milton as a collection of materials out of which a careful reader may sift the main facts of the poet's biography. His passion for minute detail is only to be equalled by his diffuseness on points mainly if not altogether irrelevant. He gives us a Survey of British Literature, occupying one hundred and twenty-eight pages of his first volume, written in the main with good judgment, and giving the average critical opinion of nearly every writer, great and small, who was in any sense a contemporary of Milton. We have no doubt all this would be serviceable and interesting to Mr. Masson's classes in Edinburgh University, and we congratulate them on having so competent a teacher; but what it has to do with Milton, unless in the case of such authors as may be shown to have influenced his style or turn of thought, we do not clearly see. Most readers of a Life of Milton may be presumed to have some knowledge of the general literary history of the time, or at any rate to have the means of acquiring it, and Milton's manner (his style was his own) was very little affected by any of the English poets, with the single exception, in his earlier poems, of George Wither. Mr. Masson also has something to say about everybody, from Wentworth to the obscurest Brownist fanatic who was so much as heard of in England during Milton's lifetime. If this theory of a biographer's duty should hold, our grandchildren may expect to see "A Life of Thackeray, or who was who in England, France, and Germany during the first Half of the Nineteenth Century." These digressions of Mr. Masson's from

what should have been his main topic (he always seems somehow to be "completing his tendency towards the suburbs" of his subject), give him an uneasy feeling that he must get Milton in somehow or other at intervals, if it were only to remind the reader that he has a certain connection with the book. He is eager even to discuss a mere hypothesis, even an untenable one, if it will only increase the number of pages devoted specially to Milton, and thus lessen the apparent disproportion between the historical and the biographical matter. Milton tells us that his morning wont had been "to read good authors, or cause them to be read, till the attention be weary, or memory have his full fraught; then with useful and generous labors preserving the body's health and hardiness, to render lightsome, clear, and not lumpish obedience to the mind, to the cause of religion and our country's liberty when it shall require firm hearts in sound bodies to stand and cover their stations rather than see the ruin of our Protestantism and the enforcement of a slavish life." Mr. Masson snatches at the hint: "This is interesting"; he says, "Milton, it seems, has for some time been practising drill! The City Artillery Ground was near. . . . . Did Milton among others make a habit of going there of mornings? Of this more hereafter." When Mr. Masson returns to the subject he speaks of Milton's "all but positive statement . . . . that in the spring of 1642, or a few months before the breaking out of the Civil War, he was in the habit of spending a part of each day *in military exercise somewhere not far from his house in Aldersgate Street.*" What he puts by way of query on page 402 has become downright certainty seventy-nine pages further on. The passage from Milton's tract makes no "statement" of the kind it pleases Mr. Masson to assume. It is merely a Miltonian way of saying that he took regular exercise, because he believed that moral no less than physical courage demanded a sound body. And what proof does Mr. Masson bring to confirm his theory? Nothing more nor less than two or three passages in Paradise Lost, of which we shall quote only so much as is essential to his argument: —

> "And now
> Advanced in view they stand, a horrid front
> Of dreadful length and dazzling arms, in guise
> Of warriors old with *ordered* spear and shield,
> Awaiting what command their mighty chief
> Had to impose." — B. i. 562 – 567.

Mr. Masson assures us that "there are touches in this description (as, for example, the *ordering* of arms at the moment of halt, and without word of command) too exact and technical to have occurred to a mere civilian. Again, at the same review . . . .

> 'He now prepared
> To speak; whereat their doubled ranks they bend
> From wing to wing, and half enclose him round
> With all his peers; *attention* held them mute.'—Ib., 615–618.

To the present day this is the very process, or one of the processes, when a commander wishes to address his men. They wheel inward and stand at 'attention.'" But his main argument is the phrase "*ported* spears," in Book Fourth, on which he has an interesting and valuable comment. He argues the matter through a dozen pages or more, seeking to prove that Milton *must* have had some practical experience of military drill. We confess that we have great doubt whether "attention" and "ordered" in the passages cited have any other than their ordinary meaning, and Milton could never have looked on at the pike-exercise without learning what "ported" meant. But, be this as it may, we will venture to assert that there was not a boy in New England, forty years ago, who did not know more of the manual than is implied in Milton's use of these terms. Mr. Masson's object in proving Milton to have been a proficient in these martial exercises is to increase our wonder at his not entering the army. "If there was any man in England of whom one might surely have expected that he would be in arms among the Parliamentarians," he says, "that man was Milton." Milton may have had many an impulse to turn soldier, as all men must in such times, but we do not believe that he ever seriously intended it. Nor is it any matter of reproach that he did not. It is plain, from his works, that he believed himself very early set apart and consecrated for tasks of a very different kind, for services demanding as much self-sacrifice and of more enduring result. We have no manner of doubt that he, like Dante, believed himself divinely inspired with what he had to utter, and, if so, why not also divinely guided in what he should do or leave undone? Milton wielded in the cause he loved a weapon far more effective than a sword.

Mr. Masson's volumes contain a great deal of very valuable matter, whatever we may think of its bearing upon the life of Milton. The chapters devoted to Scottish affairs are particularly interesting to a student of the Great Rebellion, its causes and concomitants. His analyses of the two armies, of the Parliament, and the Westminster Assembly, are sensible additions to our knowledge. A too painful thoroughness, indeed, is the criticism we should make on his work as a biography. Even as a history, we might complain that it confuses by the multiplicity of its details, while it wearies by want of continuity. Mr. Masson lacks the skill of an accomplished story-teller. A fact is to him a fact, never mind how unessential, and he misses the breadth

of truth in his devotion to accuracy. The very order of his title-page, "The Life of Milton narrated in connection with the political, ecclesiastical, and literary history of his time," shows, we think, a misconception of the true nature of his subject. Milton's chief importance, we might say his only importance, is a literary one. His place is fixed as the most classical of our poets.

Neither in politics nor theology did Milton leave any distinguishable trace on the thought of his time or in the history of opinion. In both these lines of his activity circumstances forced upon him the position of a controversialist whose aims and results are by the necessity of the case desultory and ephemeral. Hooker before him and Hobbes after him had a far firmer grasp of fundamental principles than he. His studies in these matters were perfunctory and occasional, and his opinions were heated to the temper of the times and shaped by the instant exigencies of the forum, instead of being the slow result of a deliberate judgment enlightened by intellectual sympathy with his subject. His interest was rather in the occasion than the matter of the controversy. No aphorisms of political science are to be gleaned from his writings as from those of Burke. The Areopagitica might seem an exception, but that also is a plea rather than an argument, and his interest in the question is not one of abstract principle, but of personal relation to himself. He was far more rhetorician than thinker. The sonorous amplitude of his style was better fitted to persuade the passions than to convince the reason. The only passages from his prose that may be said to have survived are emotional, not argumentative, or they have lived in virtue of their figurative beauty, not their weight of thought. Milton's power lay in dilation. Touched by him, the simplest image, the most obvious thought

> "Dilated stood
> Like Teneriffe or Atlas . . . .
> . . . . nor wanted in his grasp
> What *seemed* both spear and shield."

But the thin stiletto of Macchiavelli is a more effective weapon than these fantastic arms of his. He had not the secret of compression that properly belongs to the political thinker, on whom, as Hazlitt said of himself, "nothing but abstract ideas make any impression." Almost every aphoristic phrase that he has made current is borrowed from some one of the classics, like his famous

> "License they mean when they cry liberty,"

from Tacitus. This is no reproach to him so far as his true function, that of poet, was concerned. It is his peculiar glory that literature was

with him purely an art, an end and not a means. Of his political work he has himself told us, "I should not choose this manner of writing, wherein, knowing myself inferior to myself (led by the genial power of nature to another task), I have the use, as I may account, but of my left hand."

Mr. Masson has given an excellent analysis of these writings, selecting with great judgment the salient passages, which have an air of blank verse thinly disguised as prose, like some of the corrupted passages of Shakespeare. We are particularly thankful to him for his extracts from the pamphlets written against Milton, especially for such as contain criticisms on his style. It is not a little interesting to see the most stately of poets reproached for his use of vulgarisms and low words. We seem to get a glimpse of the schooling of his "choiceful sense" to that nicety which could not be content till it had made his native tongue "search all her coffers round." We cannot help thinking also that his practice in prose, especially in the long involutions of Latin periods, helped him to give that variety of pause and that majestic harmony to his blank verse which have made it so unapproachably his own. Wordsworth, at his finest, has, perhaps come nearest to it, but with how long an interval! Bryant has not seldom attained to its serene dignity, but never emulates its pomp. Keats has caught something of its "large utterance," but altogether fails of its nervous severity of phrase. Cowper's muse (that moved with such graceful ease in slippers) becomes stiff when she buckles on her feet the cothurnus of Milton. Thomson grows tumid wherever he assays the grandiosity of his model. It is instructive to get any glimpse of the slow processes by which Milton arrived at that classicism which sets him apart from, if not above, all our other poets.

In gathering up the impressions made upon us by Mr. Masson's work as a whole, we are inclined rather to regret his copiousness for his sake than our own. The several parts, though disproportionate, are valuable, his research has been conscientious, and he has given us better means of understanding Milton's time than we possessed before. But how is it about Milton himself? Here was a chance, it seems to us, for a fine bit of portrait-painting. There is hardly a more stately figure in literary history than Milton's; no life in some of its aspects more tragical, except Dante's. In both these great poets, more than in any others, the character of the men makes part of the singular impressiveness of what they wrote and of its vitality with after-times. In them the man somehow overtops the author. The works of both are full of autobiographical confidences. Like Dante, Milton became a party by himself. He stands out in marked and solitary individuality,

apart from the great movement of the Civil War, apart from the supine acquiescence of the Restoration, a self-opinionated, unforgiving, and unforgetting man. Very much alive he certainly was in his day. Has Mr. Masson made him alive to us again? We fear not. At the same time, while we cannot praise either the style or the method of Mr. Masson's work, we cannot refuse to be grateful for it. It is not so much a book for the ordinary reader of biography as for the student, and will be more likely to find its place on the library-shelf than the centre-table. It does not in any sense belong to light literature, but demands all the muscle of the trained and vigorous reader. "Truly, in respect of itself, it is a good life; but in respect that it is a *poet's* life it is naught."

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7. — *Latin Grammar.* By Henry John Roby. *Sounds, Inflexions, Word-formation.* London: Macmillan & Co. 1871.

The publication of this book is an event in the history of the study of Latin. The marvel is that it has been so long delayed. Certainly the advance guard of Latin scholars is very far ahead of the main body; for though it is more than fifty years since Bopp's Conjugations-System and forty since his Comparative Grammar appeared, this book seems to be the first full official information that has reached the rank and file, at least in the English-speaking division. The youth of to-day learn Latin precisely on the same principles as if Bopp had never lived, though he introduced Comparative Grammar to throw light upon all language, and made known the perfect system of Indian grammar which dates back before any one had ever thought of teaching Greek even among the Greeks themselves. This is certainly not owing to the apathy of teachers, but to the fact that in Latin at least the results of comparative grammar have not been given in an accessible form. It is too much to expect of the lay brethren that they should master three large volumes of Bopp, one immense volume of Schleicher written in a phonetic dialect, two of Corssen and twenty more of Kuhn's Zeitschrift, to say nothing of innumerable Beiträge, in order to correct the method and the errors of their Latin grammars. And we are persuaded that this book will be eagerly sought for and profitably studied, and that the scientific study of language will be greatly advanced thereby. Moreover, a want has long been felt for a book embodying the results of the latest criticism, which are for the most part concealed in "Opuscula" and in such works as Neue's "Formenlehre," containing, as our author pathetically says, "thirteen hundred closely printed pages with-

out an index." These two wants, a Latin grammar based on comparative philology, and one based on later textual criticism, the book before us undertakes to supply, and in general with entire success. The digesting of Neue's book has been done with the last degree of faithfulness, so that no one need trouble himself about the thirteen hundred pages, except for citations. And in most respects the philological part of the work is done with equal thoroughness. All the voluminous writings on the subject seem to have been examined and mastered, except, and this we regard as the only fault in the book, the Sanskrit grammar. The author, in allusion apparently to this, says: "It is not the Latin section of a comparative grammar of the Indo-European tongues." Nor in fact ought it to have been, but by this the author evidently means that he has not used other languages for comparison, except as he says sparingly the Greek. The advantage he derived from this language might have suggested the still greater advantage of a comparison with the more primitive Sanskrit. As he rightly sees: "It is no doubt true that progress in the knowledge of language is to be attained only, as in other sciences, by the constant action and reaction of theory and observation, of the comparison of phenomena in different languages with the special investigation of each for itself." Here the word "theory" is not well chosen perhaps, but the meaning is plain. He chooses the latter part. "But," he continues, "it is true all the same, that if one's eyes are but armed or practised (and some study of comparative philology alone can arm them), a closer and longer gaze detects something which might otherwise be overlooked." In the author's case the nice sense and correct judgment which are necessary for such a work are supplied in general by his own scholarly mind sharpened by a careful study of comparative philology. For the most part, therefore, the book is a safe guide for those who have not time for the study of his original sources, and his good sense and diligence make it valuable for even those who have. The book ought to be welcomed by all who wish to put classical studies on a scientific basis, and who recognize the study of language — the product of the human mind — as a science equally deserving attention with the study of nature. The book contains a hundred pages of observations explanatory of the various parts, including a justification of the improved system of pronunciation, which is very good, and indicates a more careful study of phonetics than is usually brought to bear on the subject. The question perhaps does not need this treatment, but it will no doubt be satisfactory to many. The pronunciation of *ae* as *a* in *bat* lengthened we cannot recommend. All the indications point to a diphthongal sound, something like the English word *ay*. About eighty

pages are devoted to the letters (sounds), and their phonetic changes both in Latin itself and in their descent from the mother tongue are given very fully and judiciously in an arrangement which seems to us the best one, namely, under each letter. We miss here, however, any recognition of vowel intensification or increase, which plays so important a part in Sanskrit, Greek, and Gothic, and has left its traces widely but sparsely throughout Latin. The author alludes to it elsewhere (p. xxiii), but declines to follow "Sanskrit principles" on this subject. He says this without meaning any slur, and is himself dissatisfied with the "parts of his grammar which deal with contraction hiatus, and change of vowel quantity." But, in such a connection, "Sanskrit principles" means principles of historical development from the mother tongue, of which that language is the oldest, and, if corrected by comparison with others, the truest exponent, and these principles cannot safely be lost sight of in a scientific grammar. It is as if an English grammarian should refuse to treat *man*, *men*, *foot*, *feet*, on German principles, without which they are unintelligible. The variation of vowels is as plain in *perfĭdus*, *fīdo*, *foedus*, as it is in ἔλιπον, λείπω, λέλοιπα, or *div*, *deva*, *daiva*, and is as important to account for *dūco* by the side of *dŭcis* (*dux*), *eo* by the side of *ĭtum*, and long perfect penults with short present, as any other affection of sound. Here a familiarity with Sanskrit would have given, not any more knowledge, to be sure, but a wider view and more correct feeling. Quantity is well and fully treated, even as regards the measure of early poets, an accessible treatment of which has long been wanted.

Under accent, Corssen's doctrine of the original freedom of the accent as to place does not find the recognition to which it seems entitled, although the doctrine is not as yet perfectly established.

Under gender (p. 104), we have a most careful digest of Neue's book, above referred to, which seems absolutely complete. The same completeness appears in the inflection of nouns (p. 112), and the etymology of this part is also sound. The adjective and substantive are recognized as only different uses of the same form, and hence are treated together. This arrangement is good, perhaps, to bring out more strongly their original identity, but it seems to us that practically the Latin makes a distinction between them, so that the old way is better. The peculiar tendency of the Latin adjective to the *i* declension (as *animus*, *exanimis*, *cornu*, *bicornis*) indicates so strong an effort to distinguish the two parts of speech, that it may well be recognized. The change of the old order of cases and the omission of the vocative seem unnecessary innovations in a matter of no scientific value. The separation of the forms of comparison from inflections is troublesome,

and no compensating advantage seems to be gained. The account of them is in three different places in the grammar, which is somewhat puzzling. The two forms of stems in *ro* (p. 117), those with and without original *e*, are confounded, probably on account of the great difficulty of distinguishing them, but certainly a few never had the *e* except in the nominative. The correspondence of such words as *ager* and of such forms as *sacer*, *integer*, formed apparently with the primary suffix *ra*, is too great in many languages to allow the idea of syncopation, though in some, such as *arbiter*, it has undoubtedly taken place, and in others it is doubtful. The adjectives with gen. *īus* (p. 126) are put with pronouns, where they properly belong, as their inflection shows, to say nothing of their kindred in other languages. The declension of *quis* and *qui* (p. 130) is somewhat confusing, being scattered through two pages. The two words might well be given together, as their stems are akin, and, in fact, inextricably confounded in Latin as in Sanskrit. Their etymology is sufficiently shown, however. It seems a blemish that *cujus-a-um* is called a declinable genitive (p. 130). It seems as much entitled to be an adjective as *meus*, etc. In the *u* stems, *sūs* with long *u* is not distinguished from *fructŭs*, whereas the length of the *u* is probably original, and caused it to be treated as a consonant stem. The treatment of *i* stems, both the true in *is* and the bastard in *es* (p. 136), is admirable. Here, again, it seems unfortunate that the adjectives are not distinguished as suggested above. Equally good are the consonant stems (p. 149), but the separation of *robur* as an *r* stem from *corpus* as an *s* stem is confusing. The chapter on adverbs, representing them as extinct case forms is a model of arrangement and fulness. A more extended comparison of cognate forms would be very instructive. The adverbs in *tim* it seems hardly possible to separate from *partim*, and hence we like to consider them formed as accusatives, rather than with our author as locatives.

It is in the verb that we most miss the comparison of other languages; and, on the whole, this part is less satisfactory than the rest of the book. The forms which the Latin inherited can only be satisfactorily explained in connection with the other tongues, and the want of this comparison leads, as we think, to several errors. The division into vowel and consonant stems (p. 200) seems not scientific. There can be no doubt that the first, second, and fourth conjugation are variations of the form which appears as the causal form (10th class) in Sanskrit, and it seems almost equally certain that the third conjugation corresponds to the first and other classes which form the present stem in *a*, while the second and third classes, the only true consonant verbs, (that is, which form the stem without any *a*,) have in Latin merely fragments, as in

some parts of *sum*, *edo*, etc. Thus, *voco* seems to correspond to *vāchayāmi*, *deleo* to *dālayāmi*, *veho* to *vahāmi*, *sopio* to *svāpayāmi*. In all these a vowel *a* appears, so that to speak of consonant stems is misleading, if not incorrect. Even in *estis*, the author (p. 188) speaks of the conjugation vowel as originally present, which is certainly wrong if we compare ἐστε, *sta*, *yeste*, *este*, and the numerous verbs formed in the same manner in Sanskrit. So the view peculiar to the author (p. 204), that the stem suffix *e* of the second conjugation was originally short, can hardly be maintained on any comparison of forms in other languages. A peculiarly unfortunate hypothesis is the one (p. 194) that the future indicative arises from suffixing *ī* to the stem of the present subjunctive, and it is not maintained by any other philologist so far as we know. This form cannot well be separated from the Sanskrit optative *bhareyam*, *bhares*, *bharet*, which is evidently formed by adding the imperfect (probably of the subjunctive or Lêt) of *ya* or *i* to the present stem, and of this form, or an earlier one, the Latin form is a lineal descendant. The origin of the second person singular imperative (p. 189) is not happily explained, for *es* must correspond to ἴσθι and *ēdhi* (both for asdhi), and so consists merely of the root, having lost the termination, which was probably lengthened as a kind of compensation. The shorter forms of the perfect and supine of the first and second conjugation are treated as if formed by contraction or weakening. This seems to us an error, though all scholars are not agreed on this point. It is more probable that the terminations *vi* and *tum* are added at once to the root, and that when *i* appears it is the same as the inserted *i* in Sanskrit, a kind of connecting vowel of different origin from the usual *a*. Thus the *i* of *cubitum*, *monitum*, is the same as that in *vomitum*, to which Sanskrit *vamitum* exactly corresponds. However, on the whole, a true picture of the Latin conjugation is given. Then follows a complete enumeration of all derived Latin words, under their formative suffixes, including primary suffixes, and even where the roots do not appear in Latin. In a few cases endings are confounded with suffixes, but on the whole the difficulties are successfully met. The appendices give various items of information, which are not so new nor so inaccessible as those in the main body of the work. The second part, on Syntax, is to follow.

It will be seen that this book is one that teachers cannot well do without, and it is to be hoped that a school grammar upon equally sound principles may appear as soon as possible.

8. — *Mary Queen of Scots and her latest English Historian: a Narrative of the Principal Events in the Life of Mary Stuart; with some Remarks on Mr. Froude's History of England.* By JAMES F. MELINE. New York: Hurd and Houghton. 1872.

A VERY high authority, not many years ago, contemptuously adduced the endless discussions respecting the guilt or innocence of Mary Queen of Scots as evidence of the lamentable degree to which men had wasted their time on trifles. But not having the fear of Mr. Herbert Spencer before their eyes, the chivalrous defenders of Mary have eagerly taken up the gage which Mr. Froude threw down in such an offensive manner. Indeed, the unfaltering devotion shown by those to whom the spotless fame of their heroine is rather an article of religious belief than a carefully weighed historical opinion, forbids us to indulge the pleasing hope that the dawn of the millennium of science, when the human mind will occupy itself only with "organizable" facts, is yet very near. More than three centuries have passed since the memorable night when Edinburgh was startled with the explosion of Kirk-a-Field, but the strange mystery connected with that event still baffles solution, and serves to prolong a bitter controversy. That Scotchmen should ever judge the question fairly was hardly, perhaps, to be expected; still, it was not unreasonable to hope that, on this side the water, it might be discussed apart from any national or religious bias. But we are compelled to say that the work before us is not entitled to this commendation. Mr. Meline writes with much acuteness, and evidently after a very thorough study of the subject. He has made diligent use of the new literature respecting Mary Stuart which Mr. Froude's later volumes launched upon the world, and has also added some interesting results of his own original research. In several instances he has established the subordinate points of the discussion with marked success. Considered simply as a specimen of minute historical criticism, his book is, indeed, the most searching and trenchant that has appeared for a long time. His scent for an error or misstatement is keen as a hound's. Not a phrase, not an epithet, that seems more highly colored than the quoted authority allows, escapes his eye. He notes not only every direct expression of opinion respecting Mary's conduct, but every indirect token of any lurking bias. Yet all this show of acuteness and critical sagacity only serves to leave on the mind of the reader, at best, an unpleasant but most decided impression of special pleading. Mr. Meline accuses Froude, and certainly with justice, of holding a brief for Henry, but the charge might be retorted with equal force, that Mr. Meline holds a brief for Mary. The fact is

apparent on every page. No one of her defenders is more resolute in the determination to see in Mary only an angel of light. Her absolute innocence of every charge that has been urged against her seems to his mind plain as day itself. Indeed, he represents all those opposed to her as such unblushing and acknowledged knaves, and allows to the most grave accusations such flimsy basis, that after putting down his volume the reader is puzzled to understand how her innocence could ever have been seriously brought in question. It is needless to say that this is not the way to arrive at truth. In his animadversions upon Mr. Froude he sets up an exalted standard of historical composition, but his sprightly chapters only confirm the truth of his own remark respecting the difficulty of attaining "that admirable equilibrium of judgment which secures perfect fairness of decision, and whose essential condition precedent is the thorough elimination of personal preference and party prejudice." A most admirable sentiment, of which Mr. Meline's book furnishes but a very imperfect illustration.

The work is made up, in part, of articles that appeared some time ago in the "Catholic World," and which as criticisms upon Mr. Froude attracted deserved attention. The modest appendage to the title gives the reader, in fact, a wholly inadequate conception of the contents of the volume, which is mainly devoted to a merciless examination of Mr. Froude's History. Of course the more conspicuous shortcomings of the eulogist of Henry and Elizabeth are not here laid bare for the first time. His lack of any fixed ethical standard, his persistent advocacy of one side of every question, his weakness for rhetorical and dramatic presentation, his singular habit of quotation, which the "Saturday Review" mildly described as a "failure to grasp fully the nature of inverted commas," have all been commented on by former critics. Mr. Meline omits none of these charges; indeed, he avails himself so freely of the researches of Hosack and others, that we are at a loss to estimate precisely the extent of his own contribution. But he has been an original investigator, and some of the most damaging assaults upon Mr. Froude's reputation are the results of his own inquiry. This is notably the case with reference to one charge, to which, when it was first made in the "Catholic World," Mr. Froude, as our readers perhaps remember, essayed a reply. Yet Mr. Meline has convicted him, beyond question, of having put into Mary Stuart's mouth words which she not only never used, but which convey a cruel aspersion upon her conduct. Mr. Meline gives many other instances in which the English historian has tampered in the most unwarrantable manner with his authorities. Thus, while professing to quote the substance of an

autograph letter from Mary to Elizabeth, written after the assassination of Rizzio, Mr. Froude introduces language which the original by no stretch of meaning can be made to justify; and so in a letter of Killigrew to Cecil, after the death of Darnley, he allows himself the same extraordinary liberty. Mr. Meline brings forward other instances not less remarkable. It is important to observe that most of these manipulations have such an important bearing upon the subject under discussion, that it seems impossible to attribute them to haste in composition. Thus where Throckmorton, in his account of the first interview at Loch Leven between Mary and the Earl of Murray, is made to say that the casket letters were referred to, Mr. Froude can be cleared of the charge of wilful misrepresentation only by supposing that he was blindly prepossessed with the conviction of Mary's guilt. Repeated cases of this sort leave little ground for confidence in Mr. Froude's capacity for interpreting fairly historical authorities. He is quite too much disposed to deal with the facts of history as with a pack of cards. Mr. Meline brings very grave charges against Mr. Froude, but they are well supported. His "Remarks" deserve to be carefully pondered by that large class who have found Mr. Froude's volumes as "fascinating as a novel." They are altogether the most damaging assault upon Mr. Froude's reputation as an historian that has yet appeared on either side the water.

Yet no one knows better than Mr. Meline himself that the demolition of Mr. Froude is by no means the same thing as the vindication of Mary Stuart. The dark transactions that tell with so much force against her reputation are entirely independent of Mr. Froude's insinuations and misquotations. They are not in the least relieved by his evident bias, or by his pitiless delineation of the last scene at Fotheringay. Mary may never have seen Chatelar "sighing at her feet," she may never have viewed Riccio as more than a "good and faithful servant," she may never have assented to the Craigmillar bond, she may never have suspected the dreadful fate prepared for Darnley even, and yet much that is dark and inexplicable still remains. In common with all Mary's advocates, Mr. Meline utterly rejects the famous casket letters. His discussion of the external history of these letters is acute and able, and is to our mind the most ingenious part of his book. The limits of this notice will not allow us to examine his arguments in detail. He certainly succeeds in showing that Mr. Froude was wholly unjustified in using the casket letters as historical authorities. Yet Mr. Meline does not succeed in solving the mystery; he only makes it, if possible, more perplexing. His sole explanation is the old one of utter and barefaced forgery, and of this he brings for-

ward not the slightest proof. He lays great stress upon what he terms recent and important discoveries, but he fails to show that such discoveries have thrown the least light upon the authorship of these famous epistles. His attempted explanation brings us face to face with the high improbability of a conspiracy that must have included, not only the leading statesmen of Scotland and England, but, by his own showing, Elizabeth herself. Granted that the men of that day were corrupt enough to enter into such an unheard-of plot to ruin the reputation of an innocent woman, does it seem likely that no evidence whatever of it could have survived? How much Mr. Meline approaches this difficult question as a mere advocate is shown in his neglect to note the important fact that in the Parliament which set forth the nature of these documents, and in which several of Mary's leading partisans were present, we have no hint that any suspicion of forgery was advanced; and in his omission of any reference to those incidental proofs that have since come to light tending to fix the authorship of the letters upon Mary. We refer to the explanations of the phrases "purpose of Heigate," and "had made her State." These are most important, but Mr. Meline makes no mention of them. We wish by no means to be understood as expressing our belief that Mary Stuart wrote these letters; we only mean to say that when Mr. Meline represents them as palpable and barefaced forgeries, he does not conceive the question in all its difficulties.

The part of the subject which Mr. Meline passes over most lightly is Mary's relation with Bothwell after the murder of Darnley. All along his heroine has been depicted as a marvel of virtue and spirit, but now, at once, she sinks into a forlorn and feeble-minded woman, meekly resigning her person to a man who had established no other claim upon her love and gratitude than that resulting from a most brutal outrage. Was Mary forced, either by her own sense of decorum, or by any public opinion, to accept Bothwell for her husband, and to shower new honors upon him, simply because he had ravished her? Certainly there was little in her career, either before or after her connection with Bothwell, that allows us to suppose that Mary Stuart was a woman to be driven into giving her hand to a man she loathed and hated. Bold and bad as Bothwell doubtless was, would even he have dared such a step without some encouragement? Was Mary's demeanor at Carberry, or after she came to England, the demeanor of one who had just been subjected to treatment that must have driven an innocent woman mad? The striking letter of Knollys to Elizabeth describes a woman full of pride and spirit, and still enamored of just those qualities which Bothwell, with all his faults, undoubtedly possessed.

But we set out to discuss Mr. Meline's book, not the broad question of Mary's guilt or innocence. We repeat that, with all his ingenuity, Mr. Meline fails to satisfy us. He makes the mistake of subjecting historical testimony to the precise rules of legal evidence. His undisguised partisanship has led him to miss an excellent opportunity of enriching our literature with a valuable monograph.

9.—*Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom.* By EDWARD B. TYLOR. Two vols. 8vo. London: John Murray. 1871.

FOR those who were so fortunate as to read Mr. Tylor's admirable essays on the "Early History of Mankind," published in 1865, the present work needs no introduction or recommendation from us. Those who have not read the earlier volume, and who know the author only by hearsay, or not at all, have yet before them an intellectual feast the like of which they will have seldom enjoyed. For the present is one of the few erudite treatises which are at once truly great and thoroughly entertaining. The learning displayed in it would do credit to a German specialist, both for extent and for minuteness, while the orderly arrangement of the arguments and the clearness and elegance of the style are such as we are accustomed to expect from French essay-writers. And what is still more admirable is the way in which the enthusiasm characteristic of a genial and original speculator is tempered by the patience and caution of a cool-headed critic. Patience and caution are nowhere more needed than in writers who deal with mythology and with primitive religious ideas; but these qualities are too seldom found in combination with the speculative boldness which is required when fresh theories are to be framed or new paths of investigation opened. The state of mind in which the explaining powers of a favorite theory are fondly contemplated is, to some extent, antagonistic to the state of mind in which facts are seen, with the eye of impartial criticism, in all their obstinate and uncompromising reality. To be able to preserve the balance between the two opposing tendencies is to give evidence of the most perfect scientific training. Among contemporary writers, Mr. Darwin affords, perhaps, the most striking example of this union of speculative boldness and critical sobriety; and we do not know how we can more aptly express our sense of the thoroughness of Mr. Tylor's scientific culture than by saying that he constantly reminds us of the illustrious author of the "Origin of Species."

If Mr. Tylor's book also perpetually reminds us of Mr. Cox's "Mythol-

ogy of the Aryan Nations," it is doubtless by the association of opposites, though with regard to the questions discussed there is some kinship between the books. It may, we fear, seem ill-natured in us to say so, but Mr. Cox's uncurbed enthusiasm in illustrating by every available example the physical theory of the origin of myths, has certainly the curious effect of weakening the reader's conviction of the soundness of the theory. For our own part, though by no means inclined to waver in adherence to a doctrine once adopted on good grounds, we never felt so much like rebelling against the mythologic supremacy of the Sun and the Dawn as when reading Mr. Cox's volumes. That Mr. Tylor, while defending the same fundamental theory, awakens no such rebellious feelings, is due to his clear perception and realization of the fact that it is impossible to generalize in a single formula such many-sided correspondences as those which primitive poetry and philosophy have discerned between the life of nature and the life of man. Whoso goes roaming up and down the elfland of popular fancies, with sole intent to resolve each episode of myth into some answering physical event, his only criterion being outward resemblance, cannot be trusted in his conclusions, since wherever he turns for evidence he is sure to find something that can be made to serve as such. As Mr. Tylor observes, no household legend or nursery-rhyme is safe from his hermeneutics. "Should he, for instance, demand as his property the nursery 'Song of Sixpence,' his claim would be easily established; obviously the four-and-twenty blackbirds are the four-and-twenty hours, and the pie that holds them is the underlying earth covered with the overarching sky; how true a touch of nature it is that when the pie is opened, that is, when day breaks, the birds begin to sing; the King is the Sun, and his counting out his money is pouring out the sunshine, the golden shower of Danaë; the Queen is the Moon, and her transparent honey the moonlight; the Maid is the 'rosy-fingered' Dawn, who rises before the Sun, her master, and hangs out the clouds, his clothes, across the sky; the particular blackbird, who so tragically ends the tale by snipping off her nose, is the hour of sunrise." In all this interpretation there is no *a priori* improbability, save, perhaps, in its unbroken symmetry and completeness. That some points, at least, of the story are thus derived from antique interpretations of physical events, is in harmony with all that we know concerning nursery rhymes. In short, "the time-honored rhyme really wants but one thing to prove it a sun-myth, that one thing being a proof by some argument more valid than analogy." The character of the argument which is lacking may be illustrated by a reference to the rhyme about Jack and Jill. These ill-fated children have been proved to be the spots on the moon; the proof consisting, not in

the analogy, which is in this case not especially obvious, but in the fact that in the Edda, and among ignorant Swedish peasants of the present day, the story of Jack and Jill is actually given as an explanation of the moon-spots. To the neglect of this distinction between what is plausible and what is supported by direct evidence is due much of the crude speculation which encumbers the study of myths.

The physical theory of myths is richly illustrated by legends and observances which Mr. Tylor has culled from every quarter of the barbaric world. But in Mr. Tylor's book — to say nothing of its interesting chapters on primitive language, on the art of counting, etc. — the study of mythology is merged in the wider inquiry into the characteristic features of the mode of thinking in which myths originated. It is in this inquiry that his originality and good sense are chiefly conspicuous. It is encouraging to find a writer who can treat of primitive religious ideas without losing his head over allegory and symbolism, and who duly realizes the fact that a savage is not a rabbinical commentator, or a cabalist, or a Rosicrucian, but a plain man who draws conclusions like ourselves, albeit with feeble intelligence and scanty knowledge. The leading conclusion established by the inquiry is that myths and customs and beliefs which, in an advanced stage of culture, seem meaningless, find their explanation in a reference to lower stages. Myths, like words, survive their primitive meanings; and hence it results that the higher culture may be a further development of the lower, while the lower culture cannot be a degradation from the higher. In the primitive stage the myth is part and parcel of the current mode of philosophizing; the explanation which it offers is, for the time, the natural one, the one which would most readily occur to any one thinking on the theme with which the myth is concerned. But by and by the mode of philosophizing changes; explanations which formerly seemed quite obvious no longer occur to any one, but the myth has acquired an independent substantive existence, and continues to be handed down from parents to children as something true, though no one can tell why it is true. Lastly, the myth itself gradually fades from remembrance, often leaving behind it some utterly unintelligible custom, or seemingly absurd superstitious notion. For example, it is still believed here and there by some old granny that it is wicked to kill robins; but he who should attribute the belief to the old granny's refined sympathy with all sentient existence, would be making the same blunder which is committed by all those who reason *a priori* about historical matters without following the historical method. At an earlier date the superstition existed in the shape of a belief that the killing of a robin portends some calamity;

in a still earlier form the calamity is specified as death; and again, still earlier, as death by lightning. Another step backward reveals that the dread sanctity of the robin is owing to the fact that he is the bird of Thor, the lightning god; and finally we reach that primitive stage of philosophizing in which the lightning is explained as a red bird dropping from its beak a worm which cleaveth the rocks. Again, the belief that some harm is sure to come to him who saves the life of a drowning man, is unintelligible until it is regarded as a case of survival in culture. In the older form of the superstition it is held that the rescuer will sooner or later be drowned himself; and thus we pass to the fetichistic interpretation of drowning as the seizing of the unfortunate person by the water-spirit, who is naturally angry at being deprived of his victim, and henceforth bears a special grudge against the bold mortal who has thus dared to frustrate him.

The interpretations of the lightning as a red bird, and of drowning as the murderous work of a smiling but treacherous friend, are parts of that primitive philosophy of nature in which all forces objectively existing are conceived as identical with the force subjectively known as volition. To this philosophy, currently known as fetichism, Mr. Tylor devotes two thirds of his work; but his treatment of it includes far more than that mere anthropomorphization of physical events which we call fetichism. Under the title of "Animism" Mr. Tylor deals with the whole theory of a spirit-world, as understood by uncivilized men, and shows, with great minuteness of detail, how the whole fabric is most logically built up out of such materials as the savage has at his command. The thorough study of savage customs and of the oldest Aryan literature has shown, as a matter of fact, that the uncivilized thinker does something more than merely to invest outward phenomena with a quasi-human personality. He not only regards the howling wind as a person, but he conceives it to be a particular person or group of persons, namely, some ancestor or ancestors of his tribe; whence the notion, which still survives in contemporary Europe, that in the night-wind are borne along the souls of the dead. According to Mr. Tylor, the doctrine of animism begins with the belief in the survival of dead ancestors and relatives, which is quite logically based upon the fact of their reappearance in dreams. This is established by a thorough survey of the whole philosophy of ghosts, wraiths, and doubles, trances and delirium, and of the relations of the soul to shadow, blood, and breath. On this primitive belief rests the almost universal custom of sacrificing the wives, servants, horses, and dogs of the departed chief of the tribe. After this beginning, the next step is to ascribe souls to plants and even to lifeless objects, such as the hatchet, or bow and ar-

rows, or food and drink, of the dead man. It is not only probable that uncivilized men would thus extend the doctrine of souls, since the same interpretation of shadows and of the things seen in dreams would apply to inanimate objects as to persons; but we have abundant evidence that the doctrine has been thus extended. Fijis and other contemporary savages, when questioned, expressly declare that the spear and the axe are as immortal as their owner; and thus we see the meaning of the offerings of food, ornaments, weapons, and money, which, in all countries, have been presented at the shrines of departed heroes. At a later stage, after surviving the phase of culture in which they originated, such offerings become mere memorials of affection or esteem for the dead man; but at the outset they were presented in the belief that their ghosts would be eaten or otherwise employed by the ghost of the dead man. Now when this theory of object-souls is expanded into a general doctrine of spirits, the philosophic scheme of animism is completed. Once habituated to the conception of souls of knives and tobacco-pipes passing to the land of ghosts, the savage cannot avoid carrying the interpretation still further, so that wind and water, fire and storm, are accredited with indwelling spirits akin by nature to the soul which inhabits the human frame.

Scanty justice can be done to Mr. Tylor's admirable discussion of animism in a brief sketch, from which we are obliged to omit all concrete illustration. It is in the skill and sagacity with which such illustrations are introduced that one principal charm of Mr. Tylor's book consists. The author asks us to admit nothing on *a priori* evidence, for which irrefragable inductive proof cannot also be cited; and at every step he halts to take his bearings, minutely scrutinizing the whole visible field. In tracking the wilderness of primeval speculation, he is a guide no less safe than delightful.

10.— *The Right One.* By Marie Sophie Schwartz. *Translated from the Swedish.* By Selma Borg and Marie A. Brown. Boston: Lee and Shepard. 1871.

There must be some sense in the cry for a "larger sphere for woman," when two ladies who can read and write two languages can find no better employment for their time and talents than translating a book like the present. It is hard to see on what principle foreign novels are selected for the English reader; certainly not usually for their merits, witness the so-called historical romances from the German

which have been so copiously turned out of late years. Their popularity being on the wane, the Swedish language has been resorted to. The result is no better in point of literary merit, but the novelty has not been without its effect. *Omne ignotum pro magnifico*, is the simple principle which gives these books currency among the reading public.

The book now under consideration is no better and no worse than a hundred other novels of the year. It has, in the first place, the unpardonable fault of being stupid; and there is nothing either in delineation of character or in beauty of style to weigh against this deficiency. To any one whose time was of no value, there would be a certain interest in deciphering the pedigree of the characters, who are all somehow related to each other, but how probably no one but a chancery lawyer could make out. Dr. Johnson thought that "Clarissa Harlowe" would be more complete with an index; so we would suggest that to future editions of "The Right One" there be prefixed a table of descents. Notwithstanding, or perhaps because of, these intricate ties of kinship, no two of the persons of the story can agree together, and their quarrels soon become monotonous. Particularly the husband and wife, who are the most prominent characters, enact a series of disagreeable scenes which have not even the excuse of powerful writing for their continual obtrusion. Considering the miscellaneous company to which we are introduced, however, perfect harmony is not to be expected. Whether it be the practice of the Swedish aristocracy to consort confidentially with opera-singers and mulatto servants (who, of course, turn out to be near relations), we cannot say; but some phase of life, if any there be in that country, more like our own, would have been a more natural and pleasing subject for translation into English.

The peculiar villain of the story is a clergyman, and this appears to be a good stroke of art; for if it were not that more is expected of his cloth, he would seem about as amiable as most of those with whom he deals.

In fine, the plot is badly developed, and the incidents dismal to the last degree; but, on the other hand, the book will take up as many hours, if read conscientiously, as any of the size and price, and is morally harmless; which last are qualities of some virtue in novels, though not often made objects in the writing of them.

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ART. I. — *Ma Mission en Prusse.* Par LE COMTE BENEDETTI. Paris. 1871.

COUNT BENEDETTI has done good service to contemporary history by the publication of the volume before us. Up to within a very short time there were several questions connected with the events which led to the recent war that had to be considered as unsettled. For example, it was not generally known whether France had been made aware of the negotiations pending between Prussia and Italy, in time to prevent the formation of their alliance against Austria. A doubt existed in regard to the nature of the transactions concerning the Rhenish frontier. It was, indeed, believed that France at one time had presented a claim for an extension of her boundary, but the precise terms of that demand no one professed to know. The *Projet de Traité*, published by Bismarck, seemed to place France clearly in the wrong; but the prompt counter-declaration of Benedetti appeared again to unsettle the whole question. The bandying of words and recriminations which followed was enough, at least, to raise the query, whether, after all, the French version might not be the true one; whether, for the sake of French support in her schemes of self-aggrandizement, Prussia had not been willing that Belgium should be seized by the French government. Then, too, there was the question whether the French government at the

commencement of the war had any adequate knowledge of the strength of the German armies. Were the negotiations concerning the Hohenzollern candidature carried on in that conciliatory spirit which tends to the preservation of peace, or was there prevalent on either side a disposition to provoke a war? We scarcely need to say that these questions are of somewhat more than ordinary importance. The Italian alliance, which a single word from France in the ear of Italy would have prevented, may be said to have had Sadowa and the primacy of Prussia in the affairs of Western Europe as its consequence. Of still greater importance, as showing the spirit of the two nations, was the Draft Treaty. Its very existence showed that an atrocious violation of international faith had been proposed by one side or the other. It was clear enough that the government which was willing to urge an armed alliance on the basis of the absorption of Southern Germany by Prussia, and the incorporation of Belgium into France, was deserving of universal indignation; for the treaty obligations which protect Belgium from the intriguing designs of ambitious neighbors are of the most binding character possible. Just such a combination was feared and provided against when the independent nationality of Belgium was established. The matter involved, therefore, not only the existence of some half a dozen independent states, but also the general peace of Europe; for if such treaties are to be broken with impunity by any nation, or any two nations, it is difficult to understand the value of any treaty obligations whatever. The mere proposal of such a violation of international contract is an effort to return from the reign of law to the reign of anarchy and physical force; it is therefore, in the instance before us, of vast consequence to know by which power such a proposition was urged and by which it was rejected.

On these and other questions of a kindred nature, the thick octavo before us, and the comments which it has provoked, throw a flood of light for which every student of this period will be grateful. We do not hesitate to call it the most valuable contribution to the history of the events just preceding the war that has yet appeared. Nor do we consider it strange that Count Benedetti should break over the ordinary usages of

diplomacy, and give his despatches to the world. He has been so vehemently accused, that he is entitled to a hearing in reply. His assailants, inspired by motives either patriotic or partisan, have attacked him from every conceivable quarter. Some of them have declared that he did not sufficiently advise his own government; others, that by his zealous officiousness he encouraged it on, and inspired it with a ruinous ambition. In the opinion of one class, he neglected to inform his imperial master of the military strength and purposes of Prussia; while, according to another, he was guilty of showing a criminal indifference in regard to the candidature of Prince Leopold. Worst of all, it would seem that, according to the opinion of all good Frenchmen, he misled the Emperor to believe that, in case of war, France would have the assistance of Southern Germany against Prussia, and that thus he, in a sense, provoked the contest by which the supremacy of France in European politics has been broken. Perhaps of all the men, from Napoleon to Trochu, whom the French people have endeavored to put to the purpose of a scapegoat for their sins, Benedetti has been the most unfortunate. The reason of this is in the double fact that he was most intimately connected with the events which brought on the war, and that his part in them was of such a nature as to be generally concealed from the public view. It was safe to accuse him of anything, because nobody could show that the accusation was false. Moreover, it seems to have been supposed that nobody was interested in showing that any of the accusations were unjust. But in their supposition the people were wrong. To await patiently the tardy justice of history is not always the part of human nature, especially of French human nature. It is doubtful whether one's country is ever subserved by the loss of one's honor. No word of censure, therefore, can properly be pronounced against Count Benedetti for publishing his despatches, even though by so doing he throws the blame of the war from himself upon his countrymen at large. Moreover, the same public which had so willing an ear for his accusers, are in duty bound to listen to his defence. That defence is now before the world. The witnesses through whose testimony he hopes to obtain judgment are the various despatches which he sent and received

when ambassador at the Prussian Court. These despatches, of course, constitute the great value of the evidence now brought to light.

Before proceeding to discuss the particular merits of Count Benedetti's work, it is necessary to clear the way by a single observation of a general nature. We take it for granted that the large number of diplomatic letters and despatches contained in the volume are exact copies of original papers that were actually sent as official documents, and which at the present time somewhere have an actual existence. It is asserted by the author that transcripts of the originals are held at the French Embassy, in Berlin, under the seal of the English Minister, and also that the originals themselves are to be found in the Bureau of Foreign Affairs in Paris. We are particular to mention this circumstance, inasmuch as more recent disclosures, which in due time we shall have occasion to consider, teach us that it is the part of prudence to inspect carefully our author's authorities. If there are any who, in the light of Bismarck's more recent disclosures, are inclined to think that Benedetti has forfeited all right to expect that his word will pass unchallenged, and that even his despatches, therefore, are not to be relied upon, we would remind them that when he deals in fiction and gives it out as fact, it is to be presumed that he does so after a careful estimate of the probabilities of detection. In view of the circumstance that to invent or to garble the despatches which his volume contains, would, in the face of such sure means of detection, be a hundred-fold worse than useless, we presume we are quite safe in regarding them all as genuine.

Near the beginning of his volume, Count Benedetti asserts that, in the course of his long diplomatic career, he has never, save in three instances, been charged by his government with the accomplishment of a definite and clearly defined mission. Those three definite missions were, the conclusion of the treaty by which Savoy and Nice were ceded to France, the consummation of an agreement between Prussia and Austria after the battle of Sadowa, and the procurement of the renunciation of the Hohenzollern candidature. His efforts on these three occasions he claims to have been completely successful; for

even in the affair at Ems, the renunciation which was sought was secured, and it was only when an additional demand was proffered by his government that the negotiations were terminated. At all other times, as he avers, his duties were merely of a general nature. He was charged with keeping his own government informed concerning the political affairs of Prussia, and with keeping Prussia informed of the wishes of France. His chief duties, indeed almost his only duties, appear to have been those of a purveyor of intelligence. But they were on this account none the less important. It was a time of constant changes in the relations of Prussia to the other German States. Benedetti's mission extended through the most important period of German history. During that time Prussia rose from a position of comparative weakness to be the strongest power in Europe; and this strength was attained, not so much by the power of Prussian arms, which defeated Austria, as by the skill of Prussian diplomacy, which manipulated the neighboring German States into alliance. This process of manipulation was going on in the very presence of Count Benedetti; and it is important to know whether he was so obtuse as not to perceive it, or whether he was so recreant to his duty as not to give information concerning it, or whether, indeed, his government was so infatuated as to give no weight to his reports. Then again, concerning the Italian alliance, there was at best nothing for the ambassador to do but to inform his government in regard to it, and then to carry out such directions as his government might see fit to give. The course pursued by France in 1866, in permitting the alliance of Italy and Prussia to take place, when a single word could have prevented it, was so utterly unnatural and unnecessary, that many have believed the French government could not have had even its suspicions aroused, until after the negotiations were completed and the whole affair was settled. Moreover, the importance of the alliance and the traditional policy of France would seem to justify such a conjecture. We are not for a moment allowed to suppose that the French government would have been indifferent to the aggrandizement of Prussia, if it had in any measure comprehended the prospect of such an aggrandizement by means of the alliance. If there were any doubt on this sub-

ject, it would be dispelled by the famous letter of Napoleon to La Valette, in which all the governments were given to understand that in case of any aggrandizement of either of the larger powers, France would expect a corresponding extension of her frontier. The great and the fatal mistake of France was in withholding her opposition to the course of Prussia when that opposition would have been effectual, and in thrusting it forward when Prussia had become so strong as to be able to disregard it with impunity. There is every reason to believe that Prussia would not have ventured upon the war of 1866 had it not been for the support of Italy. It is, moreover, quite certain that Italy would never have granted that support, if the French government, to which Victor Emmanuel was under so many obligations, had uttered so much as even a hint of a protest. The matter resolves itself then to this, that the war of 1866 would not have occurred, if Napoleon had protested against the alliance. Why did he not protest? It must have been either because his ambassadors gave him no information concerning the alliance until it was too late to prevent it, or because he had so inadequate an understanding of the strength of Prussia as to suppose that the alliance would be harmless. If the relations of Prussia and Austria, and the relations of Austria and Italy, at the time of the alliance, had been of a friendly nature, the supporters of Napoleon might not be reduced to the necessity of accepting the dilemma which the real state of affairs imposes. But both Prussia and Italy were in warlike mood toward Austria before the alliance was formed. Everybody knew that the alliance was formed for the purpose of war, and war alone. It is certain, therefore, that Napoleon either did not know of the alliance until it was too late to prevent it, or, that knowing of it, he chose to allow it, and by so doing, to encourage the war which, as he must have seen, was sure to follow. If the former supposition be correct, the blame, of course, is to be charged upon the ambassadors; if the latter it must rest with Napoleon, and we are forced to conclude that the Emperor looked with satisfaction upon the prospect of a war that would be likely to open the question of the boundary. As to which of these suppositions is correct, of course no one knows better than Count Benedetti, and in the volume before us he has settled the question beyond further doubt.

The first despatch concerning Italian affairs which Benedetti publishes is one which was written in 1866, on the 11th of January. It informed the government that Prussia had just extended a friendly greeting to Italy, in the form of the Collar of the Black Eagle, conferred upon Victor Emmanuel by King William. M. Benedetti declares that Bismarck had urged the king to this course some months before, but that the latter had resisted his importunities until there should seem to be some special occasion which would not awaken the suspicion of foreign powers. Such an occasion had just been furnished by the conclusion of a treaty between Italy and the Zollverein, and accordingly the king had conferred the distinction without further delay. On the 14th of February following, the French Ambassador sent a despatch to his government, giving a detailed account of an interview which he had just had with the Prussian Chancellor. Near the end of the despatch, which is given in full, he says of Bismarck: —

"Having come to the name of Italy, he interrupted his account to inform me that, according to word that M. d'Usedom had sent, the Cabinet of Florence was manifestly inclined to seek, in a reconciliation with that of Vienna, a solution of the Venetian question. I made the remark, that surely no one could blame them for that, at whatever pecuniary sacrifice such an arrangement might have to be made, be it even five hundred million of francs. 'War,' responded the president of the Council, 'would not cost them two hundred, and it would not leave pending those difficulties of the frontiers which peace is powerless to resolve between those two nations.'"

From this despatch it will be seen that even as early as the middle of February, 1866, Benedetti communicated to his government the fact that Bismarck did not hesitate to speak of the advantages of war between Italy and Austria. But what could be the significance of such a remark? It was folly to talk of a war in which Italy should undertake single-handed to rescue Venetia from Austria, and of course nothing of the kind was in the mind of the Prussian Minister. Such a result could only be accomplished by means of a foreign alliance. It is easy to believe that a similar remark may have been dropped in the presence of other ambassadors. That such was the case, and moreover that the remark

was generally interpreted as pointing to an alliance between Prussia and Italy, and consequently to a hostile movement against Austria, may be fairly inferred from what followed. On the 11th of March, only twenty-five days after the Chancellor's remark concerning the expense of recovering Venetia by force of arms, Benedetti sent home a letter showing that at various foreign courts there were most serious apprehensions of an outbreak between Prussia and Austria. This letter was apparently sent home for the purpose of informing the French government of the manner in which the principal courts of Europe would regard a rupture between the great German powers. In this letter Benedetti declared that Bismarck had just given him information of a report made by the Prussian Ambassador at London, and addressed directly to King William, in which it was stated that England would witness with extreme dissatisfaction any rupture of the friendly relations between Prussia and Austria. Still further, Bernstorff, according to the report of Bismarck, volunteered the advice to the king, in most pressing terms, that his Majesty should avoid a war in which Prussia would be liable to incur the displeasure of all the great powers, not excepting that of France, adding that such was the opinion of all the political men of London. Letters conceived in the same spirit, added Bismarck, had been received from the Count Redern, the Prussian Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg.

It might be of interest to speculate as to the cause of this excessive frankness on the part of the Prussian Chancellor. Whether it was for the purpose of blinding the French government by showing that Prussia was fully aware that all Europe would be against her, or whether it was for the purpose of giving France an opportunity to protest at an early day, if indeed she desired to protest, can only be a matter of conjecture. The facts of chief interest in this connection are, that France was clearly informed of the agitation concerning a possible Austrian war, that she received hints of a possible Italian alliance, and that when she was thus fairly invited to present her opposition, if opposition she had to offer, no word of disapprobation was uttered.

On the 14th of March, only three days later than the date of

the letter which reported the above conversation, Count Benedetti sent to Paris a despatch which shows that, whatever might be the condition of the French government, the French Ambassador was wide awake. He wrote: —

"It is announced that an Italian officer, General Govone, may soon be expected at Berlin, and that he comes charged with an important mission. This news, which is believed to have been divulged through the indiscretion of Marshal Wrangel, has caused some emotion. If it shall be confirmed, there will not be wanting those who believe that Prussia and Italy are negotiating a treaty, offensive and defensive, in view of an approaching war, and I need not say to you to what point this incident has already aroused the attention of the public, and that of my German colleagues."

Two days later than this, the ambassador announced to his government that General Govone had arrived, and that both Count Bismarck and the Italian Minister declared that he was charged with a military mission, having for its special object an investigation of Prussian military methods. Two days later still, that is, on the 18th of March, Benedetti despatched to his government the following letter: —

"In announcing the arrival of General Govone, I wrote to you that, according to Count Bismarck and the minister of Italy, this envoy of the Cabinet of Florence was solely charged with the study of the military condition of Prussia. Yesterday Count Bismarck, forgetting, without doubt, what he had previously said, informed me that General Govone was authorized to enter into arrangements with the Prussian government. The communication which the Italian official made to the president of the Council was, in substance, that Italy was not pressed to the necessity of an agreement; in other words, that she intended to reserve to herself liberty of action, but that she was ready, meanwhile, if such a movement should be in accordance with the disposition of the king of Prussia, to conclude a treaty, the object and the execution of which should be determined at a future date. To this, Bismarck responded that Prussia was not yet in a condition to negotiate on that double basis. The state of her relations with Austria were not sufficiently aggravated, and moreover the Prussian government was bound to show more completely the necessity of recurring to the employment of force, before it could contract an engagement to make war, and to declare it at a fixed date. Furthermore, the government was bound to confer in advance with the secondary States of Germany in

regard to their mutual interests,—a work with which the Chancellor is occupying himself at the present moment. But he will not be able to adopt definite action and pledge his word before he has provided for all possible contingencies; in other words, Prussia would be glad to bind herself with Italy, but in such a manner as to leave her action dependent upon circumstances. On both sides, meanwhile, they seem disposed to continue their parleys. At a second interview they considered the strength of the forces which each of the two nations would have at its disposal in the event of a crisis. . . . ."

One of the most important and valuable of the series of letters on this subject is that written as a *particulière* to M. Druyn de Lhuys, bearing date of the 27th of March. It shows, on the one hand, the great difficulties in the way of bringing the negotiations to a favorable issue, and on the other the ease with which France might have interfered and prevented the consummation of the treaty. After stating that Bismarck was in ill-nature that the affair made no progress, Benedetti proceeds: —

"I am in better condition to report to you, inasmuch as M. de Barral, the Italian Minister, has finally decided not to conceal from me entirely the movements and the advances of his government. You are acquainted with the first declarations which General Govone and Count Bismarck exchanged with each other. The Italian envoy proposed a treaty providing for war at a certain date, and indeed without delay; Count Bismarck responded, that he did not yet know whether Prussia could properly make war with Austria, still less at what moment war could be declared; he could therefore enter only into conditional engagements. The two plenipotentiaries have held themselves respectively on these grounds; in fact, they are defiant. It is feared at Florence that Prussia, finding herself in possession of an article which will place at her disposal all the forces of Italy, will make these engagements known at Vienna, and will influence the Austrian Cabinet, by intimidating it, to grant peacefully the concessions which she demands. At Berlin, on the other hand, it is feared that Italy, if the parties engage to negotiate on these terms, will, before final negotiations are concluded, give information to Austria, and will then attempt to obtain the abandonment of Venetia by means of a pecuniary consideration. It seems to me evident that these apprehensions have led the negotiators to hold themselves so well on their guard, that they have not succeeded, during these last days, in advancing a single step. M. Govone had come to observe a certain restraint which ill accommodated itself to the impatience of Bismarck. Finally the latter modified his

language, and proposed a treaty which provided, in substance, that Italy should engage to participate in a war, in case such should break out between Austria and Prussia within three months. This relatively short term appeared to General Govone to comport with the nature of his instructions, and accordingly to permit him to lend himself to the proposition of Bismarck as soon as he should have communicated by telegraph with his government. He then asked the president of the Council to draw up a plan of the project of a treaty, and present him with a copy, in order that he might transmit its provisions to his government before it should be published. M. Bismarck would have preferred, on his part, to proceed at once to a signature without further reference, fearing constantly that the Italians would submit it to the Court of Vienna before returning it to Berlin. Yesterday, accordingly, he had submitted nothing to General Govone. In explaining the affair to me, he expressed a regret that he had detained General Von Moltke,* although the presence of the latter, in view of the active part he had taken in the preparatory measures as commander-in-chief, would, on the eve of the mobilization of the army, be of great service at Berlin. The president was considering whether it would be better to arrest everything where it is, and despatch Von Moltke at once with the propositions of Prussia, or whether it would better subserve the cause to send another officer in his stead. Such, as it seems to me, was yesterday the state of the negotiations. The minister of Italy has meanwhile asked Count Bismarck for an interview, and I suppose they will have a meeting to-day."

This letter drew from the French Minister a response which is also of interest, inasmuch as it shows, perhaps more completely than anything before published, the attitude of the French government in regard to pending affairs. It also shows how the service of Benedetti was regarded at the French Cabinet. The letter is marked "*particulière et confidentielle*," and bears the date of the 31st of March. We translate it literally as follows: —

"I have read with great interest the special letters which you have addressed to me in the course of the present month. I tender to you for them my hearty thanks. If I have received them without respond-

* Von Moltke had been, some days before, on the point of setting out for Italy, perhaps on some mission similar to that of General Govone to Prussia. In view of the possibility of an immediate war, however, he had been detained. Benedetti had previously reported the affair to his government.

ing immediately, the reason is, that I have no modifications to make in the instructions which, from time to time, I have drawn up for your guidance. Our purposes are always the same. Fully recognizing the gravity of the new crisis which we are witnessing, we see nothing in the controversy as it presents itself to-day of sufficient importance to move us from our attitude of neutrality. We have explained our position at the Court of Prussia with all frankness. When we have been interrogated by the Cabinet of Vienna, we have declared freely that we wish to remain neutral, although that court has observed that our neutrality is much more favorable to Prussia than to Austria. We await, therefore, the conflict of arms, if such a conflict must take place, in the position where we are at the present moment. The march of events will enable us to decide in regard to the nature and the bearing of those interests which may become involved, and the extent to which the war is carried, as well as the questions which it raises will determine the nature of the understanding between Prussia and ourselves. As to the negotiations which the Cabinet at Berlin has opened with Italy, I can assure you there is no foundation for that which was reported to Count Bismarck, concerning an intervention on our part with the Court of Florence. Our position toward Italy is determined by two important considerations. In the first place, at the time of the Varsovie Conference, we, as you know, declared to the Italians, that if they should make themselves aggressors in Venetia, they would do it at their own risk and peril. We could not encourage them to listen to the overtures of Prussia, without incurring a very grave responsibility. In the second place, we have not designed, any further than we have been compelled, to place any obstacle in the way of the accomplishment of the destinies of Italy, by turning her from any combinations which, in the exercise of entire liberty of judgment, she may deem to be for her advantage. In this way I expressed myself to M. Nigra. This is the whole truth concerning our manner of looking at the question. I approve, moreover, completely of your attitude and your language, and I am much pleased that you have kept me so well informed in all the details of this crisis.

" *Veuillez*, etc.,

(Signed) " DROUYN DE LHUYS."

It is not necessary to multiply further our extracts from this interesting correspondence. Three days after the date of the letter just given the ambassador acknowledged it, and informed the government that it had arrived just in time to save him from some embarrassment. On the day before Count Bis-

marck had sent an urgent message, desiring an immediate interview. On reaching the Prussian Cabinet, Benedetti found that the Chancellor had just received a telegram from his envoy at Florence, announcing that Prince Napoleon, after having paid a brief visit to Victor Emmanuel at Turin, had arrived at Florence, and that, as a supposed consequence, the Italian ministers had been suddenly called to Turin for a Cabinet meeting with the king. The instantaneous inference of Bismarck from this intelligence was that the Prince had borne important counsel from the imperial government to that of Italy. The Prussian Minister himself declared that, as Napoleon had been made fully aware of the prospect of an alliance, it was in the power of the Emperor to throw obstacles in the way of the negotiations which would be of infinite injury to Prussia. If Italy, for example, should go to Austria and say that an alliance with Prussia was pending, and that, too, with the approval of France, it was easy to see that Austria would in all probability make terms more favorable to Italy than the latter could hope to secure as the result of a war. This fear of Count Bismarck, of course, it was easy for the French Ambassador to remove, after he had received the letter of Drouyn de Lhuys. It needs only to be said further, that from this time the negotiations were carried on without interruption or difficulty. On the 6th of April Benedetti wrote home that the Italian plenipotentiaries had received full authority to bring the treaty to a close, and to affix the signatures.

Now from this correspondence what inferences are to be drawn?

In the first place, we think it must be conceded that, as an informer, Count Benedetti played his part well. He had instructed his imperial master in advance in regard to the friendly disposition of Prussia toward Italy. He had announced the coming of General Govone, even before his arrival. He had succeeded in getting exact information concerning the negotiations, and had reported his information from day to day as the negotiations were pending. We think that Benedetti has shown his right to declare, as he does with evident satisfaction, that from the 18th of March, or three weeks before the conclusion of the treaty, he allowed the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to remain in ignorance of none of the circum-

stances connected with the negotiations. There is left no possibility of believing that the Emperor was deceived in regard to the fact of the alliance.

To the other conclusion, which Count Benedetti would have his readers draw from the correspondence, we are unable to agree. He would have us believe that the Prussian Chancellor was bound to infer from the course taken by the French government that Napoleon was at least opposed to the Italian alliance. Now, as it seems to us, the course of France was of a nature to produce the opposite impression. The circumstances were such that it might fairly be claimed that silence gave consent. From the first, Count Bismarck had laid the matter before the French government. Before the negotiations had advanced beyond their mere inception, the affair was a subject of frank conversation between the Chancellor and the ambassador. The results of these conferences were fully reported to the Cabinet at Paris. If there had been any desire to prevent the alliance, it would have been a matter of the most perfect ease. Italy was under every obligation to France; indeed to France Italy as a kingdom owed her existence. The relations of the two governments continued to be most friendly and most intimate. These facts leave no good reason for doubting that, if France had presented the slightest remonstrance to the Italian Cabinet, the negotiations would have come to an immediate termination. Moreover, in the early history of the relations which finally led to the treaty, the Prussian Minister constantly advanced as though such a protest might at any moment be made. From the first there was frankness, but at the same time there was great caution. It was evidently the purpose of Bismarck to give to France every opportunity to interpose her objections before negotiations had advanced so far as to make such an interposition in any way embarrassing. When, under these circumstances, it was apparent that no protest was to be offered, it was natural to infer that the alliance was regarded as in no sense objectionable. In a previous article we expressed the belief that Napoleon looked upon this treaty with favor, and in the correspondence before us we find much to confirm that opinion. The truth, doubtless, is that the Emperor was per-

suaded that, without the contemplated alliance, Prussia would be no match for Austria, and that she would either decline the contest, or be speedily overwhelmed with disaster. In either case there would be no fragments for France to gather up. But if, on the other hand, Italy should be thrown into the Prussian scale, the two sides would be so evenly balanced as to make any overwhelming defeat impossible. The situation, in consequence, would be favorable for intervention, and France might hope for a suitable reward for her friendly services. Indeed, such a policy was clearly hinted at in the letter of instructions addressed by Napoleon to La Valette.

Of Count Benedetti's part in the final negotiations before the war of 1866 it is not necessary to speak in detail. There was, of course, no longer any apprehension from any quarter that France would interfere, and therefore the ambassador's duties were confined to the matter of conveying intelligence, and speculating upon the future. And the author gives abundant evidence that he performed his duties with diligence and discrimination. It is plain that there was no reserve on the part of the Prussian Minister; it is equally plain that the ambassador faithfully transmitted to his master the information so freely given. As events culminated, despatches were sent to France almost hour by hour. These letters contained not only reports of events which were known to have taken place, but also the fullest expression of the writer's belief as to the course of events which might be anticipated. These letters the author calls special attention to, not only for the purpose of showing that he was a faithful reporter, but also to prove that his anticipations were in almost every instance realized. We are free to admit that the facts presented warrant the satisfaction of the author in presenting them. Not only are the details of the negotiations between Prussia and Austria reported with great fulness and clearness, but, what is of far more interest, the policy by which Bismarck was likely to accomplish his purposes was pointed out in advance with precision and with general correctness. He showed that there was a general discontent throughout Germany at the existing state of affairs. He declared that these discontents were fomented in the interest of Prussia. He advanced it as his opinion,

that the policy of Bismarck would be to make such demands of Austria, in the interests of common Germany, as Austria would feel compelled to reject. He prophesied that these demands would be interpreted by Austria as evidence of warlike intention, and that, in consequence, the Austrian army would be the first to put itself on a warlike footing. In this manner, he declared that Austria would be made to appear the aggressor. As early as the 3d of April he stated that the military purposes of Prussia, when the war broke out, would be to constrain the government of Austria to put all its military forces into the field, and then to bring the whole question to an issue in one great battle. He took especial delight in showing how Austria was exasperated into putting herself into the attitude of an aggressor; how that, in consequence of that exasperation, the diplomacy of Austria was most unfortunate; how the address of the Austrian government came to be "simply the address of the Emperor of Germany to the Marquis of Brandenburg"; finally, how all these negotiations were, to use the forcible expression of one of his colleagues, simply, "de l'eau au moulin de M. de Bismarck." *

In regard to the period just before the declaration of war, the volume of Count Benedetti gives us some other curious information. The author declares that Bismarck was in constant fear that King William would not stand firmly to his policy. When it seemed probable that the questions at issue would be submitted for adjustment to a conference of the larger powers, Benedetti wrote to his government that in any event Bismarck would not himself be present, for the reason that he would consider it unsafe to leave the king accessible to uncertain advisers. In the opinion of the ambassador, the president of the Cabinet was in perpetual apprehension lest some over-pious or

* In the *lettre particulière* which Count Benedetti addressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the 10th of April, 1866, he gives free expression to his opinion in regard to the attitude of the other European powers. What he said concerning the relations of Russia to Germany is, at the present moment, of unusual interest: "Puisque j'en suis à la Russie, laissez-moi noter que j'ai toujours remarqué, non sans surprise, l'indifférence avec laquelle le Cabinet de Saint-Petersbourg m'a paru, depuis l'origine, envisager les prétentions de la Prusse et l'éventualité d'un conflit entre les deux grandes puissances germanique; que je n'ai pas été moins frappé de la constante sécurité dans laquelle j'ai trouvé M. de Bismarck, sur l'attitude et les intentions de l'empire du Nord."

over-scrupulous person should get the ear of his Majesty and induce him to settle their difficulties without incurring the responsibility of war. It will be remembered that up to the 4th of June there was some prospect of an amicable settlement. While Austria was at least outwardly inclined to favor the reference of their difficulties to a conference, Bismarck was at heart thoroughly opposed to it. Benedetti points out the manner in which the Prussian Chancellor outwitted his antagonist, and made him serve the purposes of Prussia. By assenting with apparent heartiness to the very arbitration which he most of all dreaded, he succeeded in conveying to the Austrian government the impression that at the hands of the plenipotentiaries Prussia feared nothing, but instead, hoped for everything. The consequence was that Austria was filled with the gravest apprehension. She suspected that Prussia had some secret ground to hope for an extension of territory. The Cabinet of Vienna, therefore, fearing that it might be drawn into some unforeseen necessity, and never suspecting that the whole matter might yet miscarry, sent a despatch to St. Petersburg, declaring that, though the Austrian government still adhered to its former engagement to submit the questions in dispute to a conference, it could only do so on the condition that no territorial question should be discussed, and that the powers there represented should renounce in advance all claim to a territorial aggrandizement. The effect of this new demand was instantaneous. The several powers to which it had been addressed judged that the conditions imposed by Austria made the conference altogether impracticable. Such was accordingly the decision, and of course all further attempts at an amicable adjustment were impossible. Thus Prussia, though anxious at all hazards to avoid a conference, succeeded in throwing the responsibility of frustrating it upon her enemy, who was probably equally anxious to bring it about. Intelligence of this decision of the powers reached the Cabinet at Berlin on the 4th of June. On the same day Benedetti wrote to Drouyn de Lhuys that he happened to be with Count Bismarck when the despatch announcing the decision arrived, and that on reading it the Prussian Minister manifested his joy by crying out, "Vive le Roi."

Count Benedetti's part in the negotiations which followed the battle of Sadowa we shall not stop to consider. That period was already for the most part well understood; and as very little new light is thrown upon it by the volume before us, we pass at once to a subject of greater interest.

It will be remembered by everybody that, at the beginning of the late war, Count Bismarck took occasion to reinforce the German cause by the publication of what he declared to be certain propositions made by the French government in 1866, having in view the annexation of Belgium to France. This declaration of Bismarck was immediately followed by the assertion of Benedetti, that although the draft was indeed in his own handwriting, it had simply been written at the dictation of Bismarck. It was further affirmed that this project, the infamy of which the Prussian Minister had attempted to throw upon the French, was, from beginning to end, purely a Prussian affair. Up to the publication of Benedetti's volume, rather we should say up to the revelations called out by the volume, these contradictory statements have confronted each other with equal defiance. Nor is the question in dispute of insignificant importance. No one can properly sit in judgment on the causes of the late war, without having before him all the evidence he can gather to show the spirit of the two nations in their relations with each other. When, therefore, it is shown that there was advanced a proposition to incorporate Belgium into France, it is of supreme importance to know by which power so infamous a proposal was made, and by which it was rejected. Moreover, in the study of the same period, there is another question of almost equal importance. If it can be shown that the French made a vigorous diplomatic effort to gain the left bank of the Rhine, it is of importance to know whether the French government had any knowledge concerning the manner in which such a demand was likely to be received. On both of these questions there is now abundant light.

Immediately after it became certain that there would be war between Prussia and Austria, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed a special despatch to Count Benedetti, asking him to communicate fully and immediately his impressions concerning the mood of the German people and of the German

government toward France, and especially toward the French government. In response to this letter Benedetti sent a long communication, dated the 8th of June. In it he showed that of the two parties, the conservative and the radical, neither was disposed to be friendly toward the French government. The conservatives, or monarchists of the most rigid type, regarded Napoleon as the representative, and France as the cradle, of revolution. The journals of this party were partial and violent in their language. The liberal monarchists, on the other hand, had often rendered the French government justice, but always with a parsimonious hand. Persons of this class, together with the liberal democrats of all kinds, reproached the imperial government with being the most formidable enemy of parliamentary and constitutional reform. Thus conservatives and liberals, for reasons precisely opposite, manifested toward France a spirit of equal malevolence. However, it had to be admitted, Count Benedetti went on to say, that the bearing of France toward Germany during the war against Denmark had considerably modified the violence of German ill-will toward the French government. There were, indeed, symptoms of a more friendly disposition. But it would be a great mistake to suppose their prejudices and sympathies are conquered. Nothing was changed, except upon the surface. But the conclusion of the letter is so important that we translate it entire : —

"In fact we have contributed by our past actions to lessen somewhat the apprehensions which France inspires throughout Germany; but these apprehensions still exist, and they will show themselves unanimous and violent at the least indication which would allow them to suspect that we had an intention of pushing toward the Rhine. I know of no one, except perhaps Count Bismarck, who has entertained the thought that Prussia might have an interest in making to us a territorial concession, and even the Chancellor would consent to nothing more than to straighten the common frontiers of both countries. Nobody can foresee the necessities to which war might reduce the Prussian government; but from the king to the humblest of his subjects, no one at this time could be made to anticipate the possibility of such a sacrifice. The Prince Royal, though fully aware of the dangers of the policy of which he is a witness, declared but a short time ago with extreme earnestness to one of my colleagues, that he would prefer war to the abandonment even of the county of Glatz as the price at which the Duchies might be

annexed. In short, then, I perceive a considerable modification in the disposition of public opinion in Prussia; but if it has ceased to be openly hostile, it is not yet sufficiently favorable to justify us in neglecting to proceed with the utmost circumspection. Notwithstanding these facts and the general considerations which would lead them to seek our support, they do not forget that Prussia has no reason to dread the ambition of other powers, and that in France there is prevalent a desire to conquer the left bank of the Rhine. This conviction holds men on the alert, and keeps them from rendering to the Emperor without reserve the justice which is his due, and which the blindness of a narrow patriotism, no less than political passions and party prejudices, have up to the present moment refused to him."

It was only a few days later than the date of this despatch that there appeared in the *Moniteur* a letter written by Napoleon to his Foreign Minister, M. Drouyn de Lhuys. It was evidently intended as an expression of imperial policy. While the Emperor in substance declared that France would hold herself strictly neutral, he said that if the matter in dispute had been referred to a commission, the French government would not have thought of demanding a change of boundary, *except in case the settlement had been for the material advantage of one of the greater powers.* This clause was at least enough to show that Napoleon had the boundary question constantly in mind. Three days later, that is to say on the 15th of June, Benedetti sent to his government the following despatch, as expressing his opinion of the spirit in which the Emperor's letter had been received in Germany: —

"The document has produced at Berlin the most lively impression; it is at this moment the object of universal conversation. I should dissemble what I hear were I not to say to your Excellency that it has awakened in public opinion a general feeling of apprehension. No one here can fail to see that a war cannot leave the territorial state of Germany in its present condition; and in view of the fact that the war would be fruitless for Prussia if it could not result for her in some acquisition of territory, they conclude from the language of the Emperor that his Majesty, even at the present moment, is firmly resolved to demand a territorial compensation. No one seems inclined to suppose that our frontiers can be advanced at the expense of those neutral powers which take no part in the struggle; it will be German provinces, they add, which must be ceded to France, and the anticipation of

such an event raises, with the press and in the ranks of the opposition to the Prussian Cabinet, the most energetic recriminations. The friends of the government have flattered themselves — I do not say that it has encouraged them — that the benevolent and disinterested neutrality of France toward Prussia had in any event been permanently secured; and the manner in which the Emperor looks upon the situation which it might be best to impose upon the secondary states — a manner which it would be no less essential to preserve toward Austria — has all the more surprised them, inasmuch as this method of considering the situation is irreconcilable with the provisions of the plan of federal reform designed by the Prussian government. To one and all, therefore, the letter of the Emperor seems on the one hand to repel in advance all the benefits which they hope to gain from the war, and on the other to reserve for France the right to reap any advantage which may spring out of the contingencies of the struggle. I limit myself here, of course, to observing the sentiments which the letter calls up, and to describing them as exactly as possible. These should not, however, surprise your Excellency. As I indicated to you in a former report, public opinion in Prussia is not less dominant in its ambitious views than is the government itself; but it has no idea that the neighboring states dream of arraying themselves against a modification of the map of Germany. The doctrine which represents Germany as a single power, and one that is free to regulate itself at its own will, dazzles the eyes of the less prejudiced, and *they repel with indignation every idea of a transaction which might involve the loss of any portion of territory whatever.*"

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the great importance of these letters as showing to the French government the spirit of the German people. We should not have transcribed them at length, but for the fact that there is still lingering here and there a person who professes to believe that the French government before the war of 1866 had good reason to suppose that Prussia, in case of success, would generously reward the neutrality of France. To all such we commend the above letters. Meanwhile we will venture the query: if such was the spirit of the government and people of Prussia concerning a territorial recompense *before* the victory of Sadowa, what was their spirit likely to be *after* it?

In the light which M. Benedetti, for the benefit of the French government and of history, thus threw upon the spirit of the German people, we are the better able to understand the story

of the projected treaty. First of all, in approaching this question it is necessary to remark that the method which Count Benedetti has up to this point pursued here forsakes him. Hitherto, instead of telling his story in a manner that might be open to suspicion, he has simply allowed the story to relate itself, through the documents which were despatched to his government. In discussing the matter of the treaty, however, instead of fortifying his positions with documentary evidence, he has contented himself with repeating the assertions which he advanced in 1870, and with urging the inherent probabilities of their correctness. The reason which the author assigns for not publishing his letters is one which could hardly prove satisfactory to his blindest adherent. At the time when the negotiations referred to took place, the Foreign Office at Paris was vacant; the despatches of Count Benedetti, therefore, were sent directly to the Prime Minister, M. Rouher. The correspondence, in consequence, was not regarded as in the strictest sense official, and, as it had no proper place in the portfolio of the Prime Minister, when M. Rouher came to resign he neglected to turn over these letters with his other papers to his successor. If any one is inclined to ask why this circumstance should prevent Benedetti from publishing the needed letters, the answer is, that there is no possible method by which the reader could compare them with the originals, and that the author is so scrupulous that he will not introduce as authority a single document the correctness of which might not be verified.

After making this flimsy apology for the nature of his argument, the author advances to the argument itself. Put into the briefest language, his declaration is that France demanded Mayence, Prussia refused, and offered Belgium instead; France declined to annex Belgium, but asked for Luxemburg, and to this Prussia would not agree. In all this it will be seen that Benedetti gives the lie to Bismarck on every point connected with the negotiation.

Now if all this were true, what should be thought of the audacious effrontery of the Prussian Chancellor? According to such a supposition, Bismarck must not only have known that it was true, but also must have known that Benedetti

could not fail to have at his disposal the means of proving it true before the whole world. If the French version were the correct one, the matter would be reduced to this: Bismarck proposed that Belgium should be seized by France, and then, although France declined the offer, the Prussian Minister in 1870 had the audacity to assert that it was France that proposed, and Prussia that declined, and that, too, with full knowledge that Benedetti had the means of displaying his effrontery before the eyes of all men. This theory might find currency if there were anywhere to be found a considerable number of men who regard Bismarck as both a knave and an imbecile. But unfortunately for Count Benedetti's argument, though there are enough who think the Prussian president a rascal, there are surprisingly few who think him a fool.

From the time of the recriminations which followed the first publication of the proposed treaty up to the appearance of Benedetti's volume, no effort appears to have been made by the Germans to prove the falsity of the French claims concerning its origin. It now appears, however, that Prince Bismarck has had quietly resting in his office for more than a year a bundle of papers that one day were to come forth for the annihilation of his foe. It would be curious to know whether he so long held his fire simply that his enemy might come up into plainer view and more conspicuous destruction, or whether the motive of his reserve was that of the lion, which lay quietly and turned tail upon the drawn sword and eloquent threats of the Knight of La Mancha. But whatever may have been the cause of Bismarck's silence hitherto, it cannot be considered strange that the new and elaborate presentation of the case by Benedetti has called out a rejoinder. Scarcely had the volume of the French Ambassador appeared, when forth from the Prussian Bureau of Foreign Affairs came the very documents which Benedetti declares he would not publish as proof of his positions, for the reason that his transcripts could not be verified by reference to the originals. The very papers which Benedetti supposed to have been destroyed, or to be buried in the profoundest secrecy, Prince Bismarck takes from his drawer and publishes, for the purpose of showing that the story of Benedetti, from beginning to end, is a tissue of falsehoods. The

letters which passed between the French government and its ambassador at Berlin concerning the annexation of Belgium are now given to the world. Count Benedetti, as he did not find them at the proper office at Paris, supposed them to have been happily consigned to oblivion. It turns out, however, that, with a looseness so characteristic of the Empire, the papers had been left by Rouher at his private residence at Cerçay, and that in the course of the invasion they fell into the hands of the German army. So much of this correspondence as is necessary to show the history of the case is published by Bismarck, October 20th, 1871, in the *Reichs-Anzeiger*. In the light of these despatches we shall endeavor to present the facts as briefly as possible, though chiefly by quotations. The first letter published by Bismarck is one which was sent to the French government by Benedetti on the 5th of August, just after he had received instructions to demand for France the left bank of the Rhine. It is as follows: —

"M. LE MINISTRE: On my arrival in Berlin I found the telegram containing the text of the secret convention, which you have directed me to present to the Prussian government. Your Excellency may rest assured that I shall neglect no means of urging the acceptance of this convention, whatever may be the resistance I am sure to encounter. Deeply convinced of the moderation of the imperial government in stipulating for securities in the event of a future aggrandizement of Prussia, I shall not easily be brought to consent to modifications of any importance in your draft, even were it only for the purpose of submitting them to you. In this transaction I believe firmness to be the best, if not the only, argument to be employed. I shall therefore leave no doubt as to my determination to decline unacceptable proposals, taking good care, however, to prove that in refusing to us the guaranties we require, in case of Prussian aggrandizement, the Berlin Cabinet would be slighting the demands of justice and prudence, and also giving us an insight into the extent of its ingratitude. Considering what the temper of the Prussian Prime Minister is, and wishing to set to work as cautiously as possible, I thought it as well not to be present the moment when the certainty that we ask the Rhine, inclusive of Mayence, is distinctly realized by him. I have, therefore, sent him this morning a copy of your draft, accompanying it with a letter, of which I transmit a copy. I shall endeavor to see him to-morrow, and shall communicate in what mood I find him."

Prince Bismarck relates that this communication was succeeded by an interview, as the ambassador had anticipated. He declares that Count Benedetti warmly and resolutely pressed the French demands. When the Prussian Prime Minister observed that such a demand meant *war*, and that Count Benedetti had better go to Paris to prevent a rupture, the latter responded that he would, indeed, return home, but only to recommend the Emperor to maintain a proposition the abandonment of which might imperil the existence of his dynasty. The parting words of the Prussian Chancellor to Count Benedetti, before he set out for Paris, as nearly as the former could remember them, were these : —

"Please call his Majesty's attention to this. Should a war arise out of this complication, it might be a war attended with a revolutionary crisis. In such a case the German dynasties are likely to prove more solid than that of the Emperor Napoleon."

After this conversation Count Benedetti returned to Paris. On the 12th of August the Emperor's letter was published, in which matters were smoothed over. It was only after the Mayence question was thus disposed of, that the Belgian project was brought forward. This was done through the means of a letter dated the 16th of August, which M. Chauvy brought to Count Benedetti from Paris, and which contained an "accurate and precise abstract" of his instructions. This letter of instructions contains the gist of the whole matter, and settles the whole question in dispute. The instructions were as follows : —

"1. Negotiations are to preserve an amicable character.

"2. The negotiations must be strictly confidential." (Then follows a list of the persons to whom the confidence of the ambassador is to be confined.)

"3. In proportion to the chance of success, our demands will have to be graduated as follows: In the first place, you have to combine into one proposition the recovery of the frontiers of 1814 and the annexation of Belgium. You have, therefore, to ask for the extradition, by formal treaty, of Landau, Saarlouis, Saarbrück, and the Duchy of Luxemburg; and you have to aim at the annexation of Belgium by the conclusion of an offensive and defensive treaty, which is to be kept secret. Secondly, should this basis appear to promise no result, you

will resign Saarlouis, Saarbrück, and even Landau, which, after all, is but a dilapidated nest of a place, the occupation of which might excite German national feeling against us. In this eventuality, your public agreement will be confined to the Duchy of Luxemburg, and your secret treaty to the reunion of Belgium with France. Thirdly, in case a clear and unmistakable reference to the incorporation of Belgium should be found unpalatable, you are authorized to assent to a clause in which, to obviate the intervention of England, Antwerp is declared a free city. In no case, however, are you permitted to allow the reunion of Antwerp with Holland, or the incorporation of Maestricht with Prussia. Should Herr Von Bismarck put the question, what advantage would accrue to him from such a treaty? the simple reply would be, that he would thereby secure a powerful ally, that he would consolidate his recent acquisitions, that he was only desired to consent to the cession of what does not belong to him, and that he makes no sacrifice in any way to be compared with his gains. To sum up, *the minimum we require is an ostensible treaty which gives us Luxemburg, and a secret treaty which, stipulating for an offensive and defensive alliance, leaves us the opportunity of annexing Belgium at the right moment, Prussia engaging to assist us, if necessary, by force of arms, in carrying out this purpose.*"

These instructions, which bore the date of August 16th, were answered by Count Benedetti on the 23d of the same month. The reply is declared by Bismarck to be, "like so many other interesting documents of the same kind," in the handwriting of Benedetti. It is now in possession of the German Foreign Office. It contains a draft, also in Benedetti's hand, conceived in strict accordance with the above instructions. On the margin of this draft are sundry amendments, added in another hand at Paris. The revision agrees perfectly with the famous project published by Count Bismarck last year. In a letter accompanying the draft of August 23d Benedetti explained the reason of some modification which he had ventured to make. Landau and Saarbrück had been omitted. He assured the government that he had had occasion to convince himself that they would encounter insuperable difficulties were they to insist upon those places. He had accordingly kept himself to Luxemburg and Belgium. He also had deemed it best to have a single treaty instead of two.

To this letter of Benedetti's there is also in the hands of the

Germans a rough sketch of the reply. It is written on official paper, and shows that Benedetti's draft had made a favorable impression. It alludes to the necessity of indemnifying Holland for the loss of Luxemburg by means of Prussian territory. It considers the pecuniary sacrifices that might be necessary in carrying out the treaty. It asserts that the right to garrison the federal fortresses had become extinct, and that to maintain it in Southern Germany would be incompatible with the independence of the South German States. It renounces Landau and Saarbrück, but says that Prussia is expected to perform an act of courtesy by destroying their fortifications and divesting them of their threatening character. It repeats the declaration that the acquisition of Luxemburg is the immediate object of the convention, and the annexation of Belgium its ulterior aim. Then follows this passage: —

"It is obvious that the extension of the supremacy of Prussia across the Main will, as a matter of course, compel us to seize Belgium. But the same necessity may be brought on by other events, on which subject we must reserve to ourselves the exclusive right to judge. In this respect the clear and exact wording of the draft is of inestimable value. . . . . This combination reconciles all parties. By giving us an immediate satisfaction and setting people on the right track in regard to the disposal of Belgium, it quiets public opinion in France. It maintains secrecy concerning the alliance as well as the contemplated annexations. If you think that the annexation of Luxemburg had better be concealed until after we lay hands on Belgium, I should be obliged by your giving your reasons in detail. You will perceive that to suspend the beginning of operations for an indefinite time might result in bringing the Belgian question to a premature close."

To this communication from Paris Benedetti wrote a reply on the 29th of August. Now for the first time he expressed a doubt whether France could count upon the sincerity of Prussia. He thought that Bismarck suspected France of attempting to sow discord between England and Germany. He refers to the mission of General Manteuffel at St. Petersburg, and expresses the fear that Prussia has received assurances from another quarter, "which will enable her to dispense with the countenance of France." He states that Bismarck professes to have told the king that Prussia must have the assistance of one

great power. Should the co-operation of France be declined, it will be solely for the reason that the Berlin Cabinet is otherwise provided for, or hopes soon to be so. He concluded by declaring that, in this uncertain state of affairs, he had determined to go to Carlsbad, as he had been authorized to do in case he should deem it necessary.

It was during the absence of Benedetti here referred to that the Prussian Prime Minister left Berlin for his summer resort, to return only in the month of December. Secret negotiations were thus suspended. They were, however, resumed in the following summer; but as documentary evidence is not given by Prince Bismarck, it is to be presumed that the letters which were at that time exchanged between Paris and Berlin were not at Rouher's residence at the time of the invasion. Prince Bismarck closes his chapter of revelations in the following characteristic manner: —

"But we have no wish to indulge in disclosures beyond those imperatively required for defensive purposes. We accordingly confine ourselves to the correcting of statements which might occasion erroneous ideas in regard to German politics. Until forced to resume this task, we shall resist the temptation to make a more unreserved use of the copious materials at our disposal."

The defiance or rather the challenge with which Prince Bismarck thus closed his letter has not been accepted by Count Benedetti. The ambassador has not denied the genuineness of the documents. On the contrary, he is represented as expending his indignation upon his old friends, that they neglected to inform him of the captures of Cerçay.

It is scarcely necessary to dwell in detail upon the motives which prompted Count Benedetti to enter upon this course of misrepresentation. The first publication of the *Projet de Traité* in 1870 placed France in a trying position. The ambassador knew that some, at least, in France, would regard his word as of equal value with that of Bismarck. He knew, moreover, that the Prussian government had no means of proving the falseness of his allegations. He therefore determined to array his assertion against that of his enemy. Having once entered upon the path of misrepresentation, there was now left him the choice of either confessing his falsehood or

pushing forward, concealing and inventing as there might seem to be necessity. Supposing that M. Rouher had taken good care to destroy the documents which, in the interest of France, ought never to see the light, it was not difficult for him to decide upon his course. He wrote a narrative that is full of indignant virtue. He offered to the world a satisfactory account of all that happened in the matter. He carefully concealed all that could be arrayed against him. He omitted to publish his correspondence. Finally, with a grand climax of audacity, he assigns, as a reason for such omission, a virtuous unwillingness to bring forward a single witness which could not be cross-examined, when in fact he well knew that, if those witnesses were to be brought upon the stand, it would be for his instant destruction. We cannot but add that, even if ingenuous, the motive which he assigned for his reserve would pass for what Horace so well characterized as *pudens prave;* as the truth has been revealed, there seems to be more than "poetic justice" in the fact that by the very letters thus concealed he is finally overwhelmed.

The historic value of the papers published by Prince Bismarck is written upon their face. They show that, although, as we have seen, Benedetti faithfully warned his government that it could get nothing at the hands of the Germans, France began by demanding the powerful fortresses of Mayence and Landau, and ended by acquiescing in getting nothing. In the light of these facts the remarkable activity of the imperial government in reorganizing its army during 1867 – 68 has a new significance. The meaning of that great military activity can now be understood by everybody ; previously it was apprehended by the French and Prussian Cabinets alone.

Of Benedetti's account of his mission, fully one half is devoted to that portion of his career which follows what we have been considering. The value of this part of the volume, however, consists chiefly in the light which it throws upon two or three questions hitherto regarded as unsettled. Many of the friends of Napoleon have insisted that his government was not properly informed concerning the military strength of Prussia. Others have asserted that it was kept in entire ignorance of the relations of Prussia with the other powers of Europe.

Still others, actuated by kindred motives, have made it current that in the final negotiations at Ems, just before the late war, Count Benedetti bungled everything which he touched, and that at the last moment the French nation, in the person of its ambassador, was insulted beyond the proper bounds of endurance. On each of these questions the volume before us sheds abundant light.

When the preliminaries of peace were signed at Versailles, it first became publicly known that France had nothing to hope from Russia. The nation then learned that Prussia and the Northern Empire entertained most cordial relations with each other. It was learned with universal surprise. Recriminations ensued. The keenest shafts were discharged at Benedetti. The *Journal des Débats* declared that the treaty between the Czar and the Prussian king, which inflicted so much misery upon the French people, had been formed under the eyes of the French Ambassadors at Berlin and St. Petersburg, and that neither of them had conceived the least suspicion of it.

To these charges Count Benedetti's answer is distinct and conclusive. He shows, by frequent extracts from his despatches, that he had informed his government fully in regard to the whole progress of the negotiations. As early as the 9th of April, 1866, when the negotiations concerning the Italian Treaty were pending, he had given his chief a preliminary warning by remarking that he had always noted with surprise the indifference with which the Cabinet at St. Petersburg had looked upon the aggrandizement of Prussia, as well as the security which Bismarck had manifested in regard to the relations of Prussia and the Empire of the North. On the 8th of August, three days after France had presented her demand for Mayence, Benedetti telegraphed to Paris that General Manteuffel had just been called from his command at Frankfort, in order to go on a mission to St. Petersburg. On the 5th of January, 1868, in a letter which occupies twenty pages of his volume, M. Benedetti reviewed the relations of Prussia with the several powers of Europe. In our opinion, the letter shows an unusually clear comprehension of the various international relations of the different governments. In speaking of Russia, he calls attention to the fact that the moment it became cer-

tain France was to demand an extension of her frontiers, Prussia had despatched a most skilful agent to St. Petersburg. From the time of his arrival Alexander had not ceased to observe in his relations with Prussia an attitude that was manifestly benevolent. The ambassador furthermore relates, that the Russian envoy at Berlin, in evident alarm at the arming of Germany, had suddenly paid a visit to St. Petersburg, but that he had returned perfectly assured, and with no further apprehension. After narrating other circumstances which confirm his belief, Benedetti closes this portion of his letter by declaring that "these facts demonstrate that there exists a cordial understanding between St. Petersburg and Berlin." We need only add, that since the publication of this letter, it cannot be claimed that France was not duly instructed as to what she might anticipate from Russia in the event of a German war.

But the accusation which Count Benedetti repels with most energy is that in regard to his failure to inform his government concerning the military strength of the Germans. Before quoting from his letters, he refers to the annual statements made by his government to the Corps Legislatif. He calls attention to the fact that the Emperor appealed annually to the Chambers for such legislation as would warrant the government in putting the army on a footing equal to that of the army of Prussia. He declares that the government was perfectly informed, and that Napoleon vainly multiplied his endeavors to enlighten the country. He asserts that all these efforts were stubbornly resisted by the mass of the nation; and that when the people saw their country overrun by the enormous forces of the German armies, forgetting everything, they sought an outlet for their anger and their pride by attributing their misfortunes to the negligence or the incapacity of their diplomatic agents. Benedetti does not, however, stop to point out the dilemma to which his assertions bring the French government. What shall be thought, we cannot but ask, of the statesmanship of a ruler who knows the strength of his enemy to be considerably greater than his own, and who yet manages in such a manner as to encourage his subjects in drawing him into a mortal combat? But however damaging to the French government such a position may be, the author sustains his assertions with proofs that are conclusive.

On the 25th of August, 1866, he sends to his government a long letter, which he now prints in full, giving an elaborate account of all the branches of the German army. For still more minute details he refers to the accompanying report of his military *attaché*, and concludes by asserting that if the organization contemplated is completed, "the Cabinet of Berlin will have at its disposal more than a million of men." On the 18th of October following he informs his government that the organization proposed at Berlin had been adopted. One week later, and again on the 18th of December, the imperial government was assured that the organization recommended by the Prussian Minister of War was in full force, and that in the conquered territories the rules of the Prussian service were in process of rapid introduction. About a month later a letter was despatched containing such specific words as these: —

"Without recurring to what I have already had the honor to submit, I do not believe it superfluous to repeat that the Administration of War continues exercising the greatest activity. It is carrying out without relaxation the constitution of the new *Corps d'Armée*, and it is pressing the other states of the Confederation to take, without delay, the steps which the organization of the federal army requires. It is evident, and such, too, is the opinion of our military *attaché*, that they hold it as of the very highest importance to place themselves in a condition to confront any eventuality."

Nor was this all. Nearly a year later, January 5, 1868, the ambassador recurred to the same subject. In the first place he showed that, in the event of war, France would have nothing to hope from the hostility of foreign powers to Prussia. He then reverted to the condition of the German armies. The key-note of this portion of the despatch was in its opening words: —

"The more I observe the conduct of the Prussian government, the more I am persuaded that all its efforts tend to extend its power over the whole of Germany. I am each day more convinced that it is pursuing success in this direction, with the conviction that it cannot attain its end without making it impossible for France to place any obstacle in the way. How and by what means it seeks to obtain this twofold result is what I ask permission to explain to you to-day, by recalling and uniting in a general view the different items of information which I have already had the honor of transmitting."

On the subject of military strength, the writer then proceeded to show how the Prussian government had gained possession of the different resources of the country; how, after the last war, three new corps had been formed; how, at the same time, secret treaties had been formed with Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden; how still another engagement had been signed with Hesse and all the smaller states, by which their troops formed a part of the Prussian army; and finally, how by the law which voted the contingent for five years, the last requisite had been complied with for placing all the resources of Germany at the call and the pleasure of Prussia. Then, too, in regard to the purposes of Prussia his opinions are fully expressed. Perhaps this is the most valuable portion of his letter, for, while he warns France against the strength of Prussia, he informs her that Prussia has no spirit of aggression. He shows that, though the King had gathered in strength from every quarter, at home and abroad, until his resources were enormous, he had evidently no intention of using them save for the purpose of compelling other nations to respect the right of Germany to control her own political affairs. "Neither the king nor Count Bismarck," declares the writer, "has any thought, if I may judge from numerous indications, of invading our territory, or of forming for that end a coalition with other powers. At the same time I do not intend to say that they would abstain from it, in case of any event which would persuade them that it was a necessity." In summing up his argument he says: —

"The union of Germany will be speedily accomplished. Ought we to accept it? If so, let us not be backward in giving to her a friendly greeting. Let us strengthen Prussia. She will then separate herself from Russia, and the industrial and commercial state of Europe will be relieved. If we are not to accept it, let us prepare for war without respite. Let us study well in advance what agreement can be made with Austria. Let us determine upon our manner of settling both the Eastern Question and the Italian Question; for we shall not have, when all our troops are united, a larger force than is necessary to secure a victory on the Rhine. The campaigns of 1866 superabundantly demonstrated the dangers of a contest fought on both sides of the Alps."

It is needless to add, that if the wisdom of Count Benedetti's advice had prevailed at Paris, whatever might have become of the Emperor, France would have escaped the terrible punishment she has received. But France rejected both the courses recommended. She neither adopted a friendly policy, nor did she thoroughly prepare for war. The consequence was, that she brought down upon her own head the disasters of Gravelotte and Sedan.

After thus showing that a warning note was sounded in time to prevent disaster, if it had only been heeded, Benedetti proceeds to demonstrate that the same military diligence and the same pacific disposition continued to be maintained on the part of Prussia, up to the very outbreak of the late war. On this point the author's testimony is no less positive than on the others. On the 14th of January, 1870, he wrote: —

"The pacific views which animate the king and the Prime Minister do not in the least prevent them from bestowing the same care that has always been shown at Berlin on the development of the military forces of Prussia. They manifest an equal solicitude for the preservation of the good relations that have been established with the Court of St. Petersburg. As you were able to observe on a recent occasion, they neglect no opportunity to strengthen the friendship, already particularly intimate. The solidity of the Prussian army, and an eventual alliance with Russia, are looked upon at Berlin as the two guaranties necessary for the maintenance of the conquests made in Germany. During the present rule, at least, there will not be obtained from Prussia any concession of a nature to weaken her efficiency or her power. This was declared to me by Count Bismarck at our last interview, when he asked me if it were true that the Emperor's government was to reduce the military contingent by twenty-five thousand men, as had been announced in the journals."

Two weeks later the ambassador expressed his opinions at length on the policy of Bismarck, and in summing them up he used language of the most positive assurance. He referred to what he had already said in regard to the intentions of the Chancellor. He declared that everything confirmed him in the opinions which he had already advanced. He assured his government that unless complications arose which Bismarck had no thought of provoking, the Prussian government would not raise any issue in European politics to be regretted.

But one link more was necessary to complete this chain, and that Count Benedetti does not forget to supply. In the course of the negotiations which took place at Ems, just before the late war, he wrote concerning the military condition of Prussia in repeated and unqualified terms. He declared that the Germans, so far as he had been able to learn, were making no preparations which pointed to war. In short, the author fully confirms the opinion which has generally been entertained by those who were in Germany at the time, but which elsewhere has been somewhat reluctantly accepted, that at the moment when the war was thrust upon them by the French government, the Germans were in no better condition for an immediate campaign than they had been during the previous two and a half years.

It remains to consider briefly the act of Benedetti's diplomatic career which was played at Ems. The author gives in great detail an account of the proceedings in which he took so notorious a part. He publishes all the instructions which he received from his government, and all the despatches in which he gave, in return, an account of what he said and thought. And it is well that he has published the whole of his correspondence. By so doing he has disarmed his enemies. Every reader will thank him that he has omitted nothing, for he has made misunderstanding and misrepresentation impossible. With all the details before us, it is easy to form a positive opinion in regard to the nature and merits of his service.

The first letter which the ambassador wrote to his government on the Hohenzollern candidature bears a date as early as the 27th of March, 1869, — nearly a year and a half before the subject came before the public. In this letter he announced the arrival at Berlin of the Spanish diplomatist, Rancès, and called attention to the fact that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern had been mentioned as a possible candidate for the Spanish throne. A few days after this letter was written the ambassador was summoned to Paris and to an audience with the Emperor. Benedetti relates that his Majesty terminated the interview by summing up thus: —

"The candidature of the Duke of Montpensier is purely anti-dynastic. It injures no one but myself, and I can accept it. The candi-

dature of the Prince of Hohenzollern is essentially anti-national. The country will not allow it, it must be prevented."

Inspired by such instructions, Count Benedetti returned to Berlin. But a few days later he had an interview with Bismarck, and interrogated him in regard to the current report concerning the candidature of Leopold. The response of the Prussian Minister was deemed inconclusive, and therefore unsatisfactory. It was in substance that the Prussian government, as such, knew nothing of the candidature whatever. Bismarck declined to make a positive declaration in regard to the course the government would pursue in case it should be called upon to take positive action. He dwelt upon the difficulties which Leopold would have to contend with, and apparently desired to leave the impression that the Prince would not accept it, even if there should be no obstacle in the way. He declared that Prince Frederic Charles would have risked the venture, but that he was a Protestant, and although a gallant and distinguished officer, he had never shown any aptness in politics, and therefore the matter was out of the question. When pressed further on the same subject, he declined to inform his interlocutor whether the candidature of Prince Frederic Charles had been seriously considered.

Thus the interview by which Benedetti sought information failed to afford any positive enlightenment. But the affair for a time was here dropped. The king went to Ems, Bismarck to Wartzin, and Leopold to his home at Dusseldorf. From the time of the above letter (May 11, 1869), it was more than a year before the subject of the Hohenzollern candidature was again agitated. It will be seen, therefore, that this early correspondence is given by Benedetti merely for the purpose of showing that he was not guilty of that *aveugle negligence* of which he has been so loudly accused.* At one point, however,

* It is of interest to notice the effect of this interval of diplomatic inaction on the armament of France. On the 21st of March following the conversation here narrated Benedetti wrote home that the people of Berlin were "pretending" that the armaments of France were no longer purely defensive, and that in consequence there was considerable public agitation. He wrote further that Bismarck had assured him that the king had taken the trouble to write four letters on the preceding day, calling attention to information which he had received on the same subject.

his defence is quite imperfect. Although he shows that he was fully awake to the importance of the affair in its earliest history, it appears that he was quite ignorant of the negotiations which subsequently led to Leopold's acceptance. He is clearly of the opinion that the candidature was concerted between Madrid and Dusseldorf, when both the king and his minister were at their summer retreats. The conjecture is no doubt correct; but it is also true that Leopold solicited the consent of the king, and that the latter, acting as chief of the family, did not deem himself called upon to withhold it. Of this fact Benedetti seems to have been in entire ignorance up to the moment when he was ordered to Ems.

It was on the 7th of July, the day after the French Minister of War, Gramont, had set all France on fire by his speech in the Corps Legislatif, that Benedetti received a telegram ordering him to repair at once to Ems. Arriving on the following day, he received his instructions, which had been sent from Paris by special courier. His orders were definite, and had been summed up by Gramont himself in these words: "Efforcez-vous d'obtenir que sa Majesté conseille au Prince de Hohenzollern de revenir sur son acceptation." On the 9th Benedetti was admitted to an audience with the king. He immediately found that there was a difficulty, perhaps an insuperable difficulty, in the way of a literal fulfilment of his mission. The king declared that his consent to the candidature had been asked, and that he had granted it; he could not in honor therefore withdraw that consent, unless Leopold should again take the initiative and retract his acceptance. In case the Prince should think it best to withdraw from the candidature, the king was free to say that such a withdrawal would meet with his consent and approval. Under no circumstances, however, could he be persuaded to dictate or interfere in an affair for which Spain and the Prince were wholly responsible. And yet, as he had given his consent in the capacity of chief of the Hohenzollerns, and as France took exceptions to the candidature, he was willing, in the same capacity, to consult with the Prince and the father of the Prince in regard to a withdrawal. This course, however, was not quite acceptable to the French, inasmuch as it necessitated some delay. Leo

pold was in Switzerland, and they were in common possession of no cipher by means of which they could make use of the telegraph. When Benedetti urged the necessity of immediate decision, the king responded, that if the French government persisted in pushing matters to an extreme issue before he could hear from Sigmaringen, he should be compelled to regard it as evidence of a desire to provoke war.

On the whole Benedetti seems to have thought that the king was dealing in a reasonable and rational manner, especially as Prussia, so far as he was able to ascertain, was making no preparation whatever for war. But to the government at Paris the king's answer was wholly unsatisfactory. Gramont wrote there must be no delay. He declared that in case the answer was not immediate and satisfactory, they must be ready to enter upon the campaign within fifteen days. It seemed to be of far greater importance that Prussia should not get a day's start, than that peace should be preserved. Meanwhile public opinion at Paris, which at first had been chiefly excited by the speech of Gramont himself, was advancing at such a mad rate that it would soon be beyond control. Indeed, it was already beyond control. Already there came surging up to the throne that hoarse cry of the French people which has so often driven the government before it into measures as fatal as extravagant.

As everybody knows, the withdrawal of Leopold from the candidature was in due time announced. This withdrawal was first communicated to the French government from Madrid, even before it was known to the king of Prussia. It proved, however, unsatisfactory to the French people. Gramont wrote that, notwithstanding the renunciation which was now known, the public agitation was such that they feared they should not be able to control it. In fact, the cry "Au Rhin!" had become irresistible. Accordingly, the very same despatch which conveyed to Ems the first news of the renunciation, conveyed also the demand that the king should engage that if, at any future time, Prince Leopold should change his mind, the king would interfere to prevent the candidature.

For the purpose of communicating to the king the will of his government, Benedetti sought an immediate audience. As William had not yet heard of the renunciation, and as he had

engaged to inform the ambassador the instant he should receive word from Sigmaringen, his curiosity was somewhat moved by the urgency of Benedetti's request for an audience. Although, therefore, an audience had been appointed for the afternoon, the king, chancing in the morning to see Benedetti on a promenade, approached him at once, and there learned the desire of the French government. The king's answer was immediate and decisive. He positively refused to make the declaration demanded. After a protracted conference, he brought the interview to a close by declaring that in this, as in all such cases, he must reserve to himself the right to consult circumstances.

The next morning the king received the response of Prince Leopold. As there was no further occasion for an interview with the French Ambassador, he sent his message by an aide-de-camp. Its purport was that the candidature was withdrawn, and that the king approved of the withdrawal. On the following day the ambassador took formal leave of his Majesty at the railway station, as they were on the point of departing, the one for Paris, the other for Berlin. Benedetti declares that in all these negotiations the utmost courtesy had been maintained. The story of the "insult" he emphatically denies, and declares that it never originated either with himself or with his government. It was doubtless a mere war-cry, and is to be consigned to the limbo of the "fable" of Captain Jenkins's ears.

In surveying the diplomatic career of Count Benedetti, we cannot resist the conviction that he performed the parts which were, from time to time, assigned to him with considerably more than ordinary ability. In saying this, we do not forget that his declarations concerning the Belgian controversy suggest a facility in falsehood which it is by no means pleasant to contemplate. It is quite likely that against an enemy he would use lies with as little compunction as cannon-balls. But it must be remembered that "love your enemies" has not yet found a place in the accepted ethics of diplomacy. As a purveyor of intelligence to his own government, Benedetti was active and discriminating. In the most trying moments of his mission he carried out his instructions to the letter. He succeeded in securing the renunciation of the Hohenzollern candidature, and

it was only when additional and impossible conditions were imposed, that he was unsuccessful. That he failed to bring about a peaceful solution was no fault of his intelligence or his fidelity, but rather the fault of the nation which he served. We say the nation, and by it we mean both the government and the people, for they goaded each other on to common disaster. That the government was the first to raise the war-cry, we think is clearly shown by the Emperor's instructions to Benedetti, and by the infamous address of the Duke of Gramont. We doubt if there was any possible way of maintaining the peace from the hour when that address was circulated in the streets of Paris. From that moment there was to be either foreign war or revolution. The excitement was so intense that the dynasty was threatened, and Napoleon was obliged, at least, to seem to lead public opinion, when, in fact, he was swept along before it. After reading the despatches which were addressed to him by his ambassador at Berlin, it is impossible not to believe that he knew the risk he was running. But his crown was in peril, and his only hope of saving it was in throwing himself upon the mad current of popular opinion.

C. K. Adams.

Art. II. — *Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft.* Von Dr. H. Steinthal, etc. Erster Teil. *Die Sprache im Allgemeinen.* Also with separate title: *Einleitung in die Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft.* Von Dr. H. Steinthal, etc. Berlin. 1871. 8vo. pp. xxiii, 487.

Hajjim Steinthal, though little known to the general English-reading public, is one of the leading linguistic scholars of Germany. He represents, as professor extraordinary, the general science of language in the Berlin University. He is joint editor, with Professor Lazarus of Berne, of the *Zeitschrift für Völkerpsychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*, which is now in its seventh volume. His more important separate works have been his *Grammatik, Logik, und Psychologie* (1855), the *Charakteristik der hauptsächlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues* (1860),

the *Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern* (1863), and *Die Mande-Neger-Sprachen psychologisch und phonetisch betrachtet* (1867), of which the *Charakteristik*, especially, has necessarily lain upon the table of every deeper student of language. He was also the *rédacteur* of Heyse's *System der Sprachwissenschaft* (1856), and has put forth a considerable number of valuable lesser works and essays, the titles of which need not be given here. Nothing of his, so far as we know, has ever been translated into English. This is not, indeed, to be wondered at, since he habitually writes for a limited circle of readers, and not at all in a style calculated to be taking with the general public, either of England and America or of any other country. His point of view and method of treatment are distinctively and highly metaphysical, and what he produces is wont, therefore, to be hard reading, even for the practised linguistic scholar. He has been, in particular, the disciple, interpreter, and continuer of Wilhelm von Humboldt, a man whom it is nowadays the fashion to praise highly, without understanding or even reading him; Steinthal is *the* man in Germany, perhaps in the world, who penetrates the mysteries, unravels the inconsistencies, and expounds the dark sayings, of that ingenious and profound, but unclear and wholly unpractical, thinker.

The present work is intended by its author to be a new elaboration and digest of his former contributions to linguistics, the summary of his philosophy of language. Its first part, now published, is founded mainly on his *Grammatik, Logik, und Psychologie;* the parts to follow will be an expansion rather of the *Charakteristik*, treating of the ethnological peculiarities of the different families of language, our own in particular, and adding the history of languages, especially of the Greek, Latin, and Germanic; the whole forming three or four volumes. All students of language, we are sure, will thank us for bringing to their notice this comprehensive and systematic work of a writer who is worthy of careful attention.

It is not our intention to give here a comprehensive analysis and criticism of Steinthal's first volume, nor to set forth the general features of his scientific system. We prefer to take up but a single subject or chapter, namely, the Origin of Lan-

guage, and, by discussing that in detail, to get an impression of the author's way of working. No more central and telling subject, certainly, could be selected than this for attaining such a purpose; its exposition ought to bring to light the strength or the weakness that is in him, and enable us to see how fruitful of advantage to science his labors are likely to prove.

The Origin of Language is treated in the fifth and last chapter of the Introduction (pp. 72–90). The subjects of the previous chapters have been: 1. Scientific knowledge in general, the task of philosophy, and that of linguistic philosophy in particular; 2. Extent and division of the science of language; 3. Relation of this science to other sciences; 4. Speaking and thinking, grammar and logic. In entering upon this one, the author remarks that he comes at last to the more precise determination of the task which is to occupy him in the present work. "How could one hope," he asks, "to discover the principle of grammar, without having exactly analyzed and thoroughly investigated the essential character of language and its manifold relations to the mental activities, its function in the mental economy, its efficiency for the development of the mind? But these researches we have to begin with the investigation of the origin of language." It is characteristic of Steinthal's synthetic and *aprioristic* way of working, that he thinks it necessary to settle thus, at the very outset, the most recondite and difficult question in the whole science, one that most scholars would doubtless prefer to put off to the end of their work, as what might be settled by inference when everything else was established, and the way thus duly prepared for it. But, as we have hinted already, he is nothing if not metaphysical, and the metaphysical method requires that one get behind the facts he deals with, and evolve them by a necessity out of some predetermining principle. This is the opposite of the current scientific method, which is proud to acknowledge its dependence on facts, and prefers to proceed by cautious induction backward from the known and familiar to the obscure and unknown. Both methods ought to come to the same thing in the end, and will do so, provided the scientific be conducted with sufficient reach and insight, and the metaphysical with sufficient moderation and caution; we are used,

however, to seeing the metaphysical, when it comes to deal with concrete facts and their relations, fail by labored obscurity and feebleness or by forced and distorting treatment. The result alone can decide which is the better, as applied to language.

Men ask for a definition of language, we are now told; but very improperly, since things of such immense content are not to be defined; and moreover, a definition, like a picture, can represent only something at rest, or only a moment in an action; while language is manifold, and constantly growing and developing. If, then, we inquire how it is with language, the proper answer follows, "It is what it is becoming" (*sie ist, was sie wird*). Surely, it was hardly worth while to moot the point, only to come to so barren a result as this. Locomotives, likewise, are numerous and various, and their mode of construction is all the time changing; yet it is possible to give a plain man a reply to the question, "What is a locomotive?" When a definition of language is called for, men expect the answer, "It is audible thinking; it is the body of which thought is the soul; it is the spoken instrumentality of thought; it is a body of uttered signs for conceptions," or something of the kind, drawn out with more or less fulness, enough to show us, in a preliminary way, what the answerer's general idea of language is. The author might have left out the paragraphs he devotes to this little discussion, and nobody would have missed them; we only refer to the matter because it illustrates a vexatious way he sometimes has of startling and rebuffing a common-sense inquirer with a reply from a wholly different and unexpected point of view: as when you ask a physician, "Well, doctor, how does your patient promise this morning?" and he answers, with a wise look and an oracular shake of the head, "It is not given to humanity to look into futurity!" The effect is not destitute of the element of *bathos*.

Next we are called on to note that the way in which a problem is stated is of the highest consequence, often half involving the solution; and it is proposed to determine "what demand this present question contains, what significance it can alone have."

And, to lead the way to such a statement, our author gives

a sketch of the discussions respecting the origin of language, as they were carried on, in an especially lively manner, during the last century. Some maintained that language was invented by man, under the pressure of necessity and convenience, as a means of communicating with his fellows and securing their assistance. "He, the much-inventive man, has, among many other remarkable works, invented language also." And it was not at the outset so perfect a work that rude and uncultivated men should not have been equal to its production; having been improved and perfected later, somewhat as the means of navigation have been, from the first hollowed-out trunk of a tree to the modern ship of a hundred cannon. The opposing party referred to the languages of the negroes and of our Indians, as being so cunningly devised products as to imply a degree of reflection (*Nachdenken*) of which such savages were not capable. Moreover, the invention of language would require reason (*Vernunft*), and before the possession of language men could have had no reason. Therefore language must have been given by God; it is no human invention, but a divine communication.

According to Steinthal, those who defended the human invention of speech show a revolting triviality and rudeness of conception and view; while the upholders of the divine origin saw deeper. From his sketch of the argument, indeed, we should draw quite the contrary conclusion; but this may pass, as of small consequence. Of much more consequence is it to notice that he makes no reference of any kind, anywhere in his chapter, to a view of the nature and origin of language which is held by a whole school of linguistic students at the present day, and which is akin with the one first stated above, only modified to accord with the better knowledge and deeper insight of modern times. An adherent of that view would be likely to urge that it is an easy matter to cast reproach and ridicule upon the last-century form of it; but that to carry from the latter an inferential condemnation over to its present form is much more easy and convenient than fair and ingenuous; and he would be justified in adding that its present opponents are in the habit of combating it in that way, and in that alone. This also, however, only by the way; what concerns

us here is rather what our author does than what he leaves undone.

He declares, namely, that he cannot join the other party, who assume for language a divine origin, notwithstanding their deeper insight; and that, "for one general reason and two special reasons," which he proceeds to set forth. We give the general reason in his own words: —

"Of God, the philosophy of religion, founded on metaphysics, has to take account. It has to determine how far, in order to the understanding of every being and of every occurrence, in order to the full and true apprehension of all actuality, we are to add in our thoughts the idea of God. All other sciences are unauthorized to bring in God as a means of explanation. The philosophy of religion teaches *πάντα θεῖα*; the special sciences teach *φυσικά* or *ἀνθρώπινα πάντα*; and the two may not contradict one another."

We fail to appreciate the force or to see the appositeness of this objection. If to bring in the idea of God is the monopoly of religious philosophy, then, whenever that idea comes in, religious philosophy comes also; and the latter is called upon in this case to help solve a problem which science finds insoluble. Religious philosophy and the special sciences may be so distinct as not even to have in common the idea of a God; but, at least, the same person may be both special scientist and (even without knowing it) religious philosopher; and what he cannot do in the one character he may attempt to do in the other. If Steinthal chooses to say that it is not scientific to appeal to a divine author, that it only shows the weakness of the scientist, whose problem is really soluble without such appeal, then we shall understand what he means, and perhaps agree heartily with him; but to claim that God cannot have originated language because, in our classification of knowledge, we put the idea of God under another rubric than the linguistic, seems to us a mere verbal quibble.

In the "two special reasons," also, we find force and pertinence equally wanting. God, we are told, must either have created language in man, or taught it to him. But the latter is impossible; because, although much may be taught man by means of language, teaching is only possible by that means, and therefore language itself cannot be taught. This, we

remark, in spite of the fact that every child learns language without being previously possessed of language whereby to acquire it! To be sure, Steinthal does not, as we shall see hereafter, believe that children do learn language, in the ordinary sense of that term; yet, whatever the precise nature of the process, why should not God, in a confessedly supernatural or miraculous way, have been to the first human beings what they were, and what human parents have in general since been, to their children? This assumption, however, is in a manner involved and answered in our author's further reasoning, in refutation of the alternative theory, that God created language in men, — that is to say, made it a part of their nature or constitution. Language, he says, is evidently not created in us; it is certain and evident that the child "appropriates" (*sich aneignet*) the language of the community in which it grows up. And he goes on: —

"God, then, would have to be regarded as having created language in the first human pair alone, while the succeeding generations learned to speak, each from its own parents. But this assumption also is impossible. For what man can learn, that he can also bring forth as original out of himself, without instruction; for all learning is merely facilitated, supported, and for that very reason limited creation. But what one man should receive from God as an exceptional endowment, that no other man would be able to learn from him. If, therefore, language had been created in the first human beings, their children never could have appropriated it. If they were in fact able to do this, then the language of the first human beings could not have been an exceptional endowment of theirs, and their children must have been able also to create it independently for themselves. If, then, in order to man's possession of language, he absolutely must have had the power to create it, the first man in like manner with all his successors, why should it in only a single case have been created in him by God?"

We have given this in Steinthal's own words, because we feared not being able to do him justice in a paraphrase or summary. We think the inaptness of the reasoning, in spite of its obscure intricacy, will at once strike almost every one. The assumption is impossible, because — why should things have been so? We may retort, it is possible, because — why should n't they? What the Creator might or might not have thought it proper to do for the first human beings in order to

give the race a fair start in life, we would rather not claim to decide. And as to the impossibility of transmission claimed to be involved, it amounts simply to this, that a miracle contravenes the laws of nature. But that, we imagine, is involved in the very idea of a miracle. Our author might just as well assert that water could not be miraculously converted into wine, because there are certain chemical elements in wine which water does not contain; and because, if it had once been so converted, then all water would have to be so convertible, which every one knows not to be the case. The assumption of the divine origin of language does not, as we understand it, deny that each man, as a part of his human nature, possesses the capacity to learn and use and make language; it only implies that, whereas this capacity might be indefinitely or infinitely long in developing itself so as to produce languages like those we know, the first men were miraculously put by anticipation in possession of its perfected fruits. It is a part, and a natural part, of the view which supposes the first human beings to have been produced in the maturity of growth and in a condition of high culture, by a direct and anomalous fiat of the Almighty. We are ourselves just as far as Steinthal from accepting the theory that language was a miraculous gift to the first human beings; but our objections to it would be of a wholly different character from his. Here, it seems to us, he again shows the same remarkable incapacity already once noticed, of getting upon the same plane with the holders of an opinion which he opposes, and of so constructing his argument that it shall be understood and received by those against whom it is directed.

We are now led on by our author to a more serious attempt at breaking through the low and trivial assumed conditions of the problem as looked at by the controversialists of the last century. Our views of man, he says, have undergone a complete revolution since that time. As what a little, petty creature was he then regarded! born in the mire, ever crawling on the earth, a prey to want, from which he was all the time devising ways to extricate himself; driven by the pressure of necessity from one improvement of his at first rough work to another; nothing wise and great in his development; indeed, no inward

development at all! "Of the primeval powers of the human spirit, out of which the institutions of social life have grown, and from which they continually draw the juices of life, those people knew nothing; unknown was the creative force from which religious and moral ideas flow forth unsought, for the human being's own gratification."

Here, again, is seen Steinthal's complete antagonism with the inductive and scientific tendencies of the day. We should have said that the prevailing movement of modern thought was precisely the reverse of what is thus described; that only the philosophers of the eighteenth century and those who in the nineteenth inherit their spirit could regard the first human being as having walked the earth with lofty tread and gaze uplifted, letting grand ideas and noble institutions flow forth spontaneously from the deep springs of his soul, and enjoying their flow; comprehending by intuition the Creator and his works, and worshipping him with a pure adoration; meditating on problems of psychology, and giving birth to soulful expression as naturally and unconsciously as he walked or moved his arms. Modern science, on the contrary, claims to be proving, by the most careful and exhaustive study of man and his works, that our race began its existence on earth at the bottom of the scale, instead of at the top, and has been gradually working upward; that human powers have had a history of development; that all the elements of culture — as the arts of life, art, science, language, religion, philosophy — have been wrought out by slow and painful efforts, in the conflict between the soul and mind of man on the one hand, and external nature on the other, — a conflict in which man has, in favored races and under exceptional conditions of endowment and circumstance, been triumphantly the victor, and is still going on to new conquests. For ourselves, we heartily hold this latter view, deeming it to be established already on a firm basis, soon to be made impregnable; and we regard the other as the mere dream of a psychologist, who, in studying the growth of humanity, descends into the depths of his own being — a being developed in the midst of the highest culture produced by thousands of years of united efforts on the part of the whole race — instead of appealing to the facts of history. Why our author should feel

his conception of the dignity of humanity insulted by the belief that the first men were a prey to necessity, and rose by dint of earnest and persistent endeavor to escape its cruel yoke, we do not precisely see, inasmuch as the great majority of men are still bent beneath that yoke, and the number of those who realize his ideal is hardly more than infinitesimal. It would appear that he must hold the doctrine of a "fall" of the race, mental and moral, in its extremest form.

It is, then, only with a feeling of discouragement, of expectation devoid of hope, that we go on from this capital misapprehension to examine Professor Steinthal's further inquiries into the origin of language. We cannot but fear that here, again, he has mistaken the nature and bearings of the question he undertakes to discuss.

The succeeding paragraph warns us against being content with that half-view of language which would come from our merely regarding it, as well as poetry and the like, with wonder and admiration, as springing forth from the unfathomable depths of human nature, and which might lead us to explain it as the product of an "instinct"; some persons, in fact, having attributed the differences of Semitic and Indo-European speech, as of Semitic monotheism and Indo-European polytheism, to a difference in the linguistic and religious "instincts" of those races respectively; which is a mere play of words.

For, our author goes on, besides the "recognition of the creative power of man," we have in this century the advantage of a rational psychology, which strives to discover a mechanism in the movements of consciousness, laws in mental life, and so on; since all the creations of man will be found not less subject to the dominion of rational laws than are the productions of nature. Now we also, on our part, expect decided advantage to the study of language, as of every other human production, from an improved comprehension of the operations of the human mind, as of all the other determining conditions of a difficult problem. But whether the advance of psychology is or is not to bring about a revolution in the science of language, is a question depending on the manner and degree in which language is a "mental production" (*geistiges Erzeugniss*). It is very possible here to fall into the serious error of

looking upon words and phrases as an immediate emanation of the mind, and so of settling the laws of mental action, and out of them evolving the events of language-history. The soul of man and its powers and operations are, after all, the mystery of mysteries to us; the phenomena of language are one of its external manifestations, and comparatively a simple matter; the light which these shall cast upon the soul must probably be greater than that which they shall receive from our comprehension of the soul. If the linguistic student, in his devotion to psychology, shall invert this relation, he is very likely to add one more to the already numerous instances in which metaphysics has shown its inaptitude for dealing with facts of observation and induction. Only the result can decide, and that we will proceed to test.

In order, then, to exhibit the complete change of aspect of the question in this century, Professor Steinthal enters upon a detailed comparison between the "invention" of language and that of some product of mechanical ingenuity, as a watch, a steam-engine, gunpowder. And he first points out that men regard the original invention of a thing with much more interest than the succeeding manufacture of the thing invented; since invention is the grand difficulty, while imitation and reproduction are comparatively easy. So people have been talking about the invention of language by the first human beings; and that, even down to the present day; though now they change the name, and style it production instead of invention; the acquisition of speech by children they have regarded as a reproduction or later manufacture. They have, therefore, been curious to ascertain how and when this invention was made. They have wanted to know how Adam and Eve chatted together in Paradise, and, as they had no other way of getting at the desired knowledge, they dreamed it out.

We object *in toto* to this way of opening the inquiry. No one with any sense or learning has, within the memory of this generation, thought of regarding language as a thing invented or produced by anybody at any time. Whom is Steinthal arguing against? Whom does he wish to convince? Is it the shallow theorists of the last century, with here and there a last-century man, who has by some mischance failed to

get himself yet laid beneath the sod? Surely, there are involved in the origin of language a plenty of real living questions contended about by live men; it is hardly better than trifling to descend into the sepulchre for one's antagonists. Or can it be that he does not realize the measureless absurdity of the view he is opposing, that he thinks it calls for rectification rather than summary rejection? We shall see as we go on.

Our author confesses that first invention is more important than later reproduction; but he doubts whether the history of first manufacture is more attractive than that of later or present manufacture. What, at any rate, is more important and more attractive than either is to comprehend the laws of nature which underlie and determine the working of the thing invented, both at the outset and ever since. The latter is merely temporary and in part even accidental: the former are fundamental and eternal. Whoever knows that a certain monk named Schwarz, experimenting in his laboratory, perhaps in search of the philosopher's stone, invented powder, knows merely anecdotes: suppose another to be ignorant of this, but to understand the chemical composition and resolution of powder and the reason of the effects it produces, does not this one know what is better worth knowing? So as regards language: "it is more important and more attractive to investigate the laws according to which it both originally lived and subsisted, and at this very day subsists and lives; and to know the specific circumstances under which its first production may have taken place is a matter of less moment."

If, now, a comparison is to be enlightening and instructive, there needs to be at least a degree of analogy between the things compared; and such analogy we must confess ourselves unable here to discover. If there be any man living, or dead since the rise of linguistic science, who holds that language was invented, or produced, or created, or evolved, by an individual, as powder by Schwarz, or the watch by some one else, let him be brought forward that we may stare at him for a wonder, as we do at the *megalonyx* and the *ichthyosaurus;* but do not let us spend paper and ink in reasoning him down. And if we must perforce refute him, let us do it by pointing out the fundamental error of his understanding of language, not

by letting that pass unnoticed, and taking exceptions to a point of wholly subordinate consequence. But what, after all, does Steinthal's objection amount to? Simply to this: that it is a grander thing to be a chemist or physicist than to be a student of human culture as exhibited in the history of mechanical inventions. That may be so; it were useless to discuss the question of relative dignity; but, at any rate, the two are quite different, and there is room and occupation for both of them. The historical student does not fully comprehend his task without the help of the physicist to teach him the nature of the practical problems which human ingenuity has solved, one after another; yet he is an independent worker in a separate branch of inquiry, in which the physicist may be as little versed as he in physics. In like manner, it may be a far grander thing to be a psychologist than an historical student of language; yet the two are not engaged in the same work, and the eminent psychologist may show himself but a blunderer when he comes to deal with the facts and principles of linguistic history.

Indeed, although Professor Steinthal does not appear to understand the bearing of the comparison with which he is dealing, he yet goes on to set forth something like what we have just been stating. No single invention, he says, comes without due preparation, consisting in previous inventions and the capacity and insight arising from familiarity with them; and it falls fruitless and is forgotten unless it serves certain definite purposes, founded in the necessities and aspirations of the age in which it makes its appearance. In order to understand the invention of powder or of printing, we need to set the bare facts in relation with the whole history of the times of their production. Undoubtedly; nothing could be plainer than this. And what follows from it? Why, that we study the history of that department of human culture which includes the use of instruments and inventions, comprehensively and in detail, and through the medium of the facts themselves, though at the same time heeding carefully what mechanical science has to say in part explanation of the facts; we trace up invention after invention, inferring, as well as we may in the imperfection of the record, out of what preparation each one grew, and what new conditions it created to favor the production of its

successor. And at last, as it now appears, going back from the almost miraculous appliances of modern culture to simpler and simpler instruments, from iron to bronze, from bronze to stone, we find the beginnings of human effort in this direction to have been pebbles and flakes of flint-stone, and rods and clubs of wood; and one grand department of man's activity, of the utmost importance in its bearings on the progress, mental as well as physical, of the race, is laid before us, most interestingly and instructively, in at least the main outlines of its development. Such knowledge lies outside the sphere of the physicist, and is unattainable by his methods; one might study the laws of mechanical force and of chemical combination till doomsday, without advancing a step nearer to its possession. Thus is it, also, with language. A close and instructive analogy really exists between the two subjects, if rightly looked at; and in failing to discover this, and to put it in place of the other and false analogy, Steinthal has, as it seems to us, failed to draw any valuable result from the whole discussion. What in linguistics corresponds to the invention of a particular machine, or application of force, or useful combination of elements, is not the production of language in general; far from it; it is the production of an individual word or form. Every single item of existing speech had its own separate beginning, a time when it first came into men's use; it had its preparation, in the already subsisting material and usages of speech, and the degree of culture and knowledge in the community where it arose, and it obtained currency and maintained itself in existence because it answered a practical purpose, subserving a felt need of expression. The history of the development of language is nothing more than the sum and result of such single histories as this. The scientific student of language, therefore, sets himself at work to trace out the histories of words and forms, determining, so far as he is able, the chronological place and reason and source of each one, and deriving by induction from the facts thus gathered a comprehension, in no other way attainable, of the gradually advancing condition of mind and state of knowledge of the language-makers and language-users. And if he can determine what, or even of what sort, were the very first elements of language used by men, and why these

instead of other possible elements were used, he has solved the problem of the origin of language; and the history of this other, even grander and more important department of human productiveness, is also laid before us in its main features, though with infinite work yet remaining to be done upon it in detail. All the questions involved in it are primarily historical, to be investigated by studying and comparing the recorded facts of language. Psychology has just as much to do with it as theoretical mechanics and chemistry have to do with the study of human inventions; it is invaluable as critic and aid, but worthless as foundation and substitute. Which of all the innumerable events of linguistic history is accessible to us by the *a priori* method? What word or form in any language under the sun could we have prophesied, from the laws of action of the human mind and soul?

We are obliged, accordingly, to dissent utterly from Steinthal's conclusion, which is expressed in these words: "For us, then, the investigation of the origin of language is nothing else than this, to acquaint ourselves with the mental culture which immediately precedes the production of language, to comprehend a state of consciousness and certain relations of the same, as conditions under which language must break forth, and then to see what the mind gains by means of it, and how under the government of law it further develops itself." Our author, like others before him, here suffers the psychologist to overbear and replace in him the linguistic scholar; he ignores the essential character of the questions with which he deals, and substitutes subjective for objective methods of investigation. So far as we can see, he breaks not less decidedly with the inductive school of linguistics than he has broken before with the inductive school of anthropology. The origin and history of language is a mere matter of states of mind. Neither here nor anywhere else in the chapter do we find acknowledgment of the truth that speech is made up of a vast number of items, each one of which has its own time, occasion, and effect, nor anything to show that he does not regard it as an indivisible entity, produced or acquired once for all, so that when, under due favoring conditions, it has "broken forth," it *has* broken forth, and that is the end of the matter: than which,

certainly, a grosser error in the view of the historical student of language cannot possibly be committed. If such is to be the result of the full admission of psychology into linguistic investigation, then we can only say, may Heaven defend the science of language from psychology! and let us, too, aid the defence to the best of our ability.

We see pretty clearly, by this time, how much and how little we have to expect from Professor Steinthal toward the solution of the real question of the origin of language. It is important, however, that we continue to follow his reasonings and note to what result they actually come.

He next calls upon us to observe that, as regards the so-called invention of speech, natural laws and mental conditions are one and the same thing. "The mental condition and the relations of consciousness are here the actual forces themselves which produce language." But our observation refuses to show us any such thing. Speech is a body of vocal signs, successions of vibrations produced in the atmosphere by the organs of utterance, and apprehended by the organs of hearing. Are the lungs, the larynx, the tongue, the palate, the teeth, the lips, even the air about us, parts of the mind? If so, what is the body? and what are its acts, as distinguished from those of the mind? So far as we can see, the word "jump" is just as much and just as little an act of the mind as jumping over a fence is; each is an act of the body, executed under direction of the mind indeed, but by bodily organs, namely, the muscles. The mind's immediate products are conceptions, judgments, feelings, volitions, and the like; pyschology, surely, ought to teach that. An utterance is like nothing else in the world so much as a gesture or motion of the arms, hands, fingers. The latter is in like manner the effect of an act of will upon bodily organs that are obedient to the will; it differs only in being brought through another medium, the luminiferous ether, to the cognizance of another receptive organ, the eye. The hands can make an indefinite number of such motions, and combine them in every conceivable variety; and the mind, acting on and developing the hints afforded by what may be called the natural gestures, is capable of using these motions as instrumentalities for the ex-

pression of its thoughts; and it does so use them when circumstances limit it to this kind of instrumentality. In like manner, the voice can utter an indefinite number of articulate sounds, and can put them together into combinations practically infinite; and here, again, founding on the natural cries and on imitative sounds (perhaps also on other bases, the whole to an extent and in a manner not yet fully determined, and the determination of which would be the real and final solution of the remaining questions as to the origin of language), the human mind has been able to avail itself of this instrumentality in order to the expression of its acts; and it does so avail itself in every normally constituted human being. There is no more intimate connection between the mind and the articulating apparatus than between it and the fingering apparatus; words are just as extraneous to the mind — only lying within its convenient reach, and so capable of being put to use by it at pleasure — as are twistings of the fingers and brandishings of the arms or feet. These truths seem to us so plain, so self-evident, that we are at a loss to conceive how they can be opposed by any valid argument; we never have seen anything brought against them that could stand a moment's critical examination. That there is, therefore, any such wide and essential difference as our author would postulate between the material of speech and those purely physical and independently existing substances which the mechanically inventive mind turns to its purposes, does not appear. The difference is in reality great enough, and for that very reason does not require to be exaggerated. To contract it one way, and identify words outright with sticks and stones and metals, is at the very least no worse than to stretch it the other way, and to identify them with mental acts.

Steinthal's inferential assumption, then, from which we have necessarily to set forth in order to the further prosecution of our inquiries, is this: "that a certain condition of mental culture must be given, in which there lies a certain material, and which is governed by such laws that speech must necessarily come into being." We should state what of truth there seems to us to be in this in a very different manner, somewhat thus: A certain state of mind being given, consisting in the

apprehension of an idea that calls for expression, and in the desire to express it, and a certain material lying ready at hand, or being producible and habitually produced in indefinite quantity, the laws which govern human action in general in the adaptation of means to ends cause the production of an item of speech; and speech in general is made up of such items, so produced. I employ the words "locomotive" and "spectroscope" now simply by imitation, because some one else has employed them before me; the man who first employed them did so because his "mental culture," by reason of the invention of the one or the other instrument, had got into such a "condition" that he wanted a name to call them by; and he knew where to find it. Does Professor Steinthal believe that states of mental culture and laws of consciousness actually produced the two words in question? We hardly credit it; although it would seem a necessary inference from what he says. Perhaps he would not allow that these are parts of "language" at all, in the peculiar and psychological sense of that term. But we do not know where, in that case, he would stop, in excising and amputating the members of the body of speech. The queer new word *apperception*, which makes such a figure in his writings and in those of his school, would, for aught that we can see, have to go too. More probably, he has never brought his doctrine to the test of actual fact in recent times at all; and he would perhaps claim that productions of words in these modern degenerate days are of a very different character from those of earlier ages. That is to say, he would fly with his pet theory from the clear light of the present into the dimness of the past; and the further back into the dark he got, the more confident he would be of its truth and sufficiency. For our part, we think no explanation of the facts of language which does not account for the nearest present just as well as for the remote past has any good claim to acceptance. Of course, some of the important determining circumstances and conditions have been in constant change since the beginning, and this change requires to be fully allowed for; it is to be read in the antecedent forms of language, as we reconstruct them by taking away, one after another, the productions of the later time. And we need not absolutely deny the possibility that

other principles have been at work than those we now perceive working; only, they have to be inductively established before we shall accept them, and not simply "assumed" as part of a doctrine which appears not less inconsistent with the former than with the present phenomena of linguistic growth.

Our author proceeds: —

"This means, then, that language is not an invention, but an origination or creation in the mind, not a work to which the understanding has furnished the means, not an intentional application of a means sought after and found for the relief of a conscious necessity, nor even the happy turning to account of an accident for the enrichment of mental working (for this also presupposes reflection or consciousness as to the possible utilization of what had thus turned up), but language has come to be without being willed into existence. The laws which, while remaining unconscious, yet govern the elements of consciousness, operate, and execute the creation."

There are statements in this paragraph to which we can yield a partial assent. That men have willed language, as language, into existence, or, in its production, have labored consciously for the enrichment of their mental working, we do not believe, any more than Professor Steinthal does. But consciousness has its various spheres and degrees. The first man who, on being attacked by a wolf, seized a club or a stone and with it crushed his adversary's head, was not conscious that he was commencing a series of acts which would lead finally to rifles and engines, would make man the master (comparatively speaking) instead of the slave of nature, would call out and train some of his noblest powers, and be an essential element in his advancement to culture. He knew nothing either of the laws of association and the creative forces in his own mind that prompted the act, or of the laws of matter which made the weapon accomplish what his fist alone could not. The psychologist and the physicist, between them, can trace out now and state with exactness those laws and forces; can formulate the perceptions and apperceptions and reflex actions on the one hand; can put in terms of a and b and x and y the additional power conferred, on the other hand; and can even maintain, as we infer, that those laws and forces and formulas produced the man's act; while all that he himself knew was that he was

defending himself in a sudden emergency. We are not loath to admit that all the later advances in mechanics have been made in a similar way, each to meet some felt necessity, and to seize and realize an advantage which the possession of what had been done before him enabled the inventor to perceive as within his reach; and all the mental progress of the race (which is founded on physical well-being, since there could be no philosophers until there was spare fruit of other men's ruder labors to feed and support them), and all science and art, have depended in great part on those advances in mechanics, and have come as their unforeseen results. Professor Steinthal, as we have seen above, does not relish or accept this view, and thinks it a part of the philosophy of the last century. What man does not win directly, by the free play of his inherent creative forces, is to him only such a degradation of human nature as psychology spurns. While he remains in this frame of mind, we have no hope that he will accept our view of the history of origination and development of language, which is closely akin with what we have just laid down respecting that of mechanical invention. Men have not, in truth, produced language reflectively, or even with consciousness of what they were doing; they do not, in general, even so use it after it is produced. The great majority of the human race have no more idea that they are in the habit of "using language," than M. Jourdain had that he "spoke prose"; all they know is that they can and do talk. That is to say, language exists to them for the purpose of communication simply; of its value to the operations of their own minds, of its importance as an element in human culture, of its wonderful intricacy and regularity of structure, nay, even of the distinction of the parts of speech, they have not so much as a faint conception, and would stare in stupid astonishment if you set it forth to them. And we claim that all the other uses and values of language come as unforeseen consequences of its use as a means of communication. The desire of communication is a real living force, to the impelling action of which every human being, in every stage of culture, is accessible; and, so far as we can see, it is the only force that was equal to initiating the process of language-making, as it is also the one that has

kept up the process to the present time. It works both consciously and unconsciously: consciously, as regards the immediate end to be attained; unconsciously, as regards the further consequences of the act. When two men of different speech meet, they fall to trying simply to understand one another; so far as this goes, they know well enough what they are about; that they are thus making language they do not know: that is to say, they do not think of it in that light. The man who beckons to his friend across a crowded room, or coughs or *hems* to attract his attention, commits, consciously and yet unconsciously, a rude and rudimentary act of language-making,— one analogous doubtless with innumerable acts that preceded the successful initiation of the spoken speech which we have. No one consciously makes language, save he who uses it most reflectively, who has his mind always filled with its character and worth, — indeed, hardly even he; perhaps (to take an extreme case) the man who produced *apperception* itself only knew that he was finding a sign for a conception which he had formed, in order to use it as a factor, a kind of x, or π, or O_2, in his reasonings. And so men have gone on from the beginning, always finding a sign for the next idea, stereotyping the conception by a word, and working with it till the call for another came; and the result, at any stage of the process, is the language of that stage. Precisely here, then, is where comes in the operation of those "unconscious laws which gov ern consciousness," to the direct action of which our author would vainly ascribe the whole production; they shape into a regular and well-ordered whole the congeries of items thus miscellaneously and as it were accidentally produced; they create out of words a language; they give, in a perfectly unconscious way, that completeness, adaptedness, and proportion which make the instrumentality represent the nature and answer the higher uses of the minds from which it proceeds.

In the creative forces of the human soul, as by their free and spontaneous action the producers of spoken language, we have, then, no faith or belief whatever; indeed, to our unpsychological apprehension, there is something monstrous in the very suggestion or implication that a word is an act of the mind. Conceptions and judgments, these and their like are what the

mind forms; for them it finds, under the social impulse to communication, signs, in those acts of the body which experience shows to be best suited to its use; and the sum of these signs is language. Whether we shall call language-making invention, or production, or creation, or giving birth, is quite immaterial, provided we understand what the process really is, and how far it is faithfully represented by any or all of those terms. "Invention" is doubtless a name invested with too much false suggestiveness to be conveniently used; yet we are confident that many of those who have used it were much nearer the truth in their conception of what they thus denominated than is Professor Steinthal. "Growing organism," "unfolding germ," which he goes on in the immediate sequel to apply, — though also innocent enough, if employed with a full realization of how far they are figurative merely, — are far more dangerously misleading. That they mislead him into some strange ways and hard places, we shall have no difficulty in proving.

He next proceeds, namely, to abolish the distinction which he had before laid down so sharply between the first coming into being of language and its later acquisition by children. That, it appears, was a provisional concession to our weakness; a kind of scaffolding, by the aid of which we should rise a step in the argument he was constructing. Only, it must be confessed, the scaffolding is to our mind so much more substantial than the main structure, that we shall prefer to cleave to it, and stand or fall with it. Hear him: —

"Respecting language, it has been already observed that it no more admits of being taught and learned than seeing and hearing do. Who, I pray, has ever observed that children were taught to speak? Many a one, however, has perhaps already noticed how vain is the effort sometimes expended in teaching the child. But I assume with certainty that every one who has had occasion to watch a child from the second to the fourth year of life has often enough been astonished to see with what startling suddenness (*wie urplötzlich*) the child has used a word or a form. One seldom knows where the child got that. He has grasped it at some opportunity or other, and to grasp is to create" (*ergreifen heisst erzeugen*)!

Prodigious! Then, doubtless, the man we lately imagined, who "grasped" the stick or stone for purposes of self-defence,

really created it; and the said stick or stone was his mental act! If we can go on smoothing away differences and effecting identifications at this rate, we shall soon have all the elements of the discussion reduced to a condition of chaotic nebulosity out of which we may evolve just what suits our individual taste. Seriously, we should not have supposed any man, at this age of the world, capable of penning the sentences we have quoted. To deny that children learn their language from those about them is to abandon definitely and finally the ground of sound reason and common sense. What if you cannot sit down with spectacles on nose, and book and ferule in hand, and "teach" a child to speak? Is that the only way of teaching? Then we do not "learn" a tune, for example, which we have heard from the street-organs till our souls are weary of it; we are simply brought into such a condition of mental culture that our creative forces in their unconscious workings produce the tune. Would this statement be a whit less absurd than that which our author makes about language? It has even become with us an item of popular wisdom, as attested by a proverb, that example teaches better than precept. Children do, indeed, "grasp" just what they can, what they best understand and are prepared for, of the language which is current in their hearing, and we cannot follow the movements of their minds closely enough to tell beforehand what that will be; although we can act upon the hints their imperfect efforts give us, and help and correct till the step they are striving to take is taken. Does any one before whom some unforeseen new acquisition is blurted out by a child doubt that the child has heard it somewhere, at some time, and is simply reproducing it by imitation? If otherwise, why are not the current expressions of another language sometimes generated by the creative forces of the childish soul? Put the German child, along with its German-speaking parents and brothers and sisters, in an English-speaking community, so that it hears both languages every day, and almost every hour, and it acquires (or produces) both, apparently as well and as easily as it would have acquired (or produced) either alone under other circumstances. Is there nothing like learning there? Then how would Professor Steinthal explain

it? But he proceeds: "We have no right whatever, then, to speak of the learning of language on the part of children. For where there is no teaching, there there is no learning." Most true, indeed; there never yet was an effect where there was not a cause. But then we assert with equal confidence, that where there is learning, there there is also teaching; because, where the effect is, there we know there is a cause, if we can only find it; and the cause in this case is not hard to discover, if one will but open his eyes. Further: "What the gardener does with seeds out of which he wishes to rear plants, is all that we do with our children in order to bring them to speech: we bring them into the necessary conditions of mental growth, — namely, into human society. But as little as the gardener makes the seed grow, do we make or teach the child to speak: in accordance with the laws, in one case of nature, in the other of mind, does the flower spring up on the one hand, the language in the consciousness of the child on the other." We are heartily tired, we must say, of these comparisons that go limping along on one foot, or even on hardly the decent stump of a foot, deficient in the essentials of an instructive analogy, fit only to confuse and mislead. Let Professor Steinthal show us, if he can, a seed which in the forest would send up an oak, in the orchard an apple-tree, in the garden a tulip or an onion, according to the bed in which you planted it, or whose product, if planted in a bed of mingled tulips and onions, would be both a tulip and an onion at the same time; and then we will acknowledge that he has found something analogous with the child that grows up a user of language. What right, again, has he to assume that human society is the one necessary condition of mental growth? Mere physical growth, with the experience and observation it brings, brings also mental growth; but even our author, apparently, does not hold that it would bring language, or certainly not any given language. No; the one thing above all others that human society affords the young child, is the opportunity to acquire the form of human culture possessed by that society, of whatsoever kind or degree it may be; and because language is a part of culture, it, too, with all the incalculable advantages it brings, is acquired along with the rest.

Our author here quits for a moment his similitude of a seed,

to point out "how rude the view was which regarded the invention of language as that of a machine, and the learning to speak of the present day as a new fabrication of an invention previously made." No doubt; we got past that long ago; only we were less impressed by the rudeness of the view itself than by the inutility of quoting and opposing it, and the helplessness of the reasoning by which it was opposed. If we have got to put in place of it the view that language is a growing organism or a sprouting germ, we shall wish that we had our old adversary back again. Next, reverting to and adopting an idea which he had in an earlier paragraph expressly repudiated, as a mere "playing with words," he pronounces language an invention to which men were impelled by a mental "instinct," and which is continually reproduced by the same "instinctive" powers; and declares that if we know these latter, we know also the first invention. To this we demur: comprehending the forces in action is a very different thing from comprehending the history of their action, and knowing what were its first products. These same identical forces, in their present observable modes of action, produce some hundreds or thousands of wholly dissimilar linguistic "inventions." Which of all these was the first invention like, or how did it differ from them all? The question, in short, is one of fact, and our author would fain treat it as one of theory only. The infinite diversity of human speech ought alone to be a sufficient bar to the assertion that an understanding of the powers of the soul involves the explanation of speech. There are current in the world say a thousand different names for *mind*, or *love*, or *finger*, or *two*, and each of them is current, not among minds of a certain degree of culture everywhere, but within certain geographical limits among minds of every grade; which of them is the product of an instinctive action of mental forces, and which of them could have been determined *a priori* by a knowledge, however penetrating and intimate, of those forces?

Did pine forests, continues Professor Steinthal, have to wait for man to plant them? Did they not grow of old after the same laws as when we now plant them? Then the language of the first men grew out of a like germ, and by the same laws, with that of every child of the present generation. We have

already seen how "rude" this analogy is, and to how little valuable knowledge it conducts us. We pass it here, then, and go on to consider the further arguments by which it is followed up, and which are as extraordinary as anything in this extraordinary chapter.

We quote our author's own words: —

"But, it will be said, the conditions into which the germ fell were not the same, for the children of later generations come into the society of speakers, while the primitive man had to do at first with non-speakers. That is so. Still, from it follows only that the primitive man learned to speak under more unfavorable circumstances than our children now produce their speech; namely, there was wanting to the conditions in which the former lived a single circumstance, the language of the society in which he lived. But this circumstance is not essential.[!] It is human society alone that is indispensable to man. If he has this, he will either learn to speak along with it, in case it is not yet able to speak, or, if it already possesses speech, he will necessarily create his own speech entirely after the analogy of that which his society has."

Here, we acknowledge, Professor Steinthal occupies a position one step nearer the truth than that of those who maintain, or imply, that a solitary man would form a language for himself. But he occupies it only by the sacrifice of consistency. Where are those creative forces of the human soul which the present century has learned to recognize as doing such wonderful things? Shall we push the botanical parallel a little further, and say that the flowers which our "germ" produces are diœcious, or triœcious, or polyœcious, and cannot be expected to reproduce from a single individual? The additional strain thus put upon it would be, to our sense at least, hardly perceptible. The burden of proof obviously rests upon those who hold that, while the creative force, as regards language, of the soul A, and the soul B, and the soul C is each equal to nothing, that of $A + B + C$ is of such immense power that only the nineteenth century has been found able to estimate it. Perhaps if Steinthal would really look into the question otherwise than psychologically, he would find that the only thing which human society furnishes, and which nothing else can furnish, toward the production of language, is the impulse to communi-

cation; and that no other inducement than this has operated or can operate to draw out the powers of the human soul in the direction of language, and bring them to action and to consciousness. Where, again, resides the "necessity" which compels the creative soul of each new member of a community to produce a language precisely accordant with that of the community? Individuals of every variety of endowment are born in every community, in every class of the community; why does each one grow up to talk after the same fashion as those with whom he associates; speaking not only their speech, but their dialect, with their limitations, their least peculiarities of tone and phrase, even their mispronunciations and grammatical irregularities and blunders? Here, too, if our author would study the facts and learn what they teach him, instead of trying to get above and domineer them, he might soon convince himself that children really do, as he himself maintained in an earlier part of the chapter, "appropriate" their speech; that they *learn* it, as much as they do mathematics or philosophy, only by a different process.

We quote the remainder of the paragraph, the last which we shall find it necessary to treat thus: —

"With reference to what has been set forth, we can already say what will become yet plainer hereafter; man learns not so much to speak as to understand. Neither the primitive man nor the child of later generations makes or creates language, but it rises and grows in man; he gives it birth (*er gebiert sie*). When it is born, he has to take up his own child, and learn to understand it. The primitive man in the primitive society, like the child in later times, has to learn, not to speak, but to understand. The latter learns to understand the developed speech of later generations; the former, the language that is just breaking forth, just coming out into the air; and as the child has not created the language which he learns, so also the primitive man learns the primitive speech which he in like manner has not created; which is, rather, only born from the soul of the primitive society."

This may be called the climax of the chapter. We have now our solution of the question complete. Do you ask what was the origin of language? Why, there was once a primitive society, and (more fortunately endowed than "corporations" in our days) it had a primitive soul; and this soul possessed

primitive creative powers, which were not possessed by the souls of the individuals composing the community, although these too were creative; and these powers, not by creation, or invention, or making of any kind, but simply obstetrically, gave birth to primitive speech. But that is not the sole origin; the same obstetrical process repeats itself each day in the soul of every new member of the human race; language "originates" anew in every individual. Are you satisfied now?

Could there be more utter mockery than this? We ask for bread, and a stone is thrown us. What have these statements to do with the origin of language? Why all this long talk in order to arrive at a result so simple? We could have conceded at the outset that it is the powers with which man is endowed that produce language, and that they are on the whole the same powers in every individual of the race, and powers which, through the whole history of the race and of language, act on the whole in the same way. Yet their products, in different communities and in different ages of the same community, are exceedingly different. There are thousands of dialects to-day, the speakers of each of which are unintelligible to those of every other; and each is so unlike its own ancestor, from time to time back in the past, that no one would be intelligible to the speakers of any other. What is the reason of all this? and what was the still earlier and unrecorded condition out of which each, or all together, arose? Respecting each word of every language now existing, we know that it is used by the new individuals born into its community because it was used before, and the new-comer had only to imitate his predecessors, to do as they set him the example. Now what did the first speaking individuals do, who had no predecessors to set them an example? What, or of what kind, were the significant utterances they used, and how did these obtain their significance? To reply to these questions is to determine the origin of language; and Professor Steinthal does not so much as lift his finger toward answering them. He shows the same incapacity of appreciation respecting the main point as we had to notice in regard to one or two preliminary points at the commencement of the discussion. We have an historical inquiry before us, and he wants to force it into a metaphysical form.

He ignores all that has been accomplished in our day by the historical study of language; there is not a sentence in the chapter, so far as we have observed, which implies the existence of such a branch of knowledge as comparative philology. Whatever he may have learned and done in that direction, he keeps it out of sight here, and lets us behold only the psychologist. He ignores all that has been done by anthropology, in tracing out the history of other departments of human culture, and determining the general character of the process of development by which man has become what he is. We can hardly say that his theory is antagonistic to these sciences, or inconsistent with them, so much as that it has nothing in common with them. It belongs to the period before they came into being. Born in the latter half of the nineteenth century, it is nevertheless the child of the eighteenth, or of any earlier century you may choose. There was needed to produce it only an exalted idea of the creative forces of the human soul; and that, we venture to say, might have been found in at least a few exalted heads among the philosophers of any age. This may be, after all, the deeper reason why it seeks its antagonists among the linguistic theorizers of another century than ours. Views similar to those which we have been sustaining in opposition to it have been within not many years drawn out in a systematic and consistent form, based upon the established facts of linguistic and anthropological science, and extended by inductive methods over the whole ground of linguistic study, from the present time back to the beginning; and here, it might fairly be thought, Professor Steinthal would have found foes better worth contending with, and an opportunity to test the soundness of his views by seeing how effectively they could be made to confront the living and aggressive views of others; but he does not take the slightest notice of them, direct or implied. References, it is true, to other students of language, of any class, are very rare in the volume; the psychologic method is mainly independent of all aid, save from the soul of the investigator.

There remains, however, one more shift of ground for our author to make in the progress of his ratiocination. As he has successively set up the provisional assumptions that language is an invention and a product, and, after reasoning awhile

upon them, has got above and discarded them, so he now treats in the same way his last thesis, that language is a birth. Noting that speech does not exist in grammar and dictionary, but in the actual use and utterance of men, he pronounces it "no abiding existence, but a fleeting activity." It is "a mere possibility, which under due circumstances expresses itself, is exercised, and then becomes reality, but only for the moment. . . . . Language is not a something, like powder, but an occurrence, like the explosion; it is not an organ, like the eye and ear, but a capacity and activity, like seeing and hearing." All this, again, is in our opinion very verbiage, mere turbid talk, and mainly growing out of the fact that our author does not distinguish between language as a faculty, or the power to speak, and language as an actual concrete possession, or the set of audible signs which we first hear, then understand, then learn ourselves to make and use. The lack of this distinction underlies a considerable part of the false reasoning of the whole chapter, but it is especially fatal here and in what follows. The fault, it must be confessed, is in no small measure that of language itself. If the term *sprache* in German, and "speech" and "language" in English, did not apply indifferently to both things, if we were compelled to use one word where we meant the faculty, and another where we meant our current phraseology, the words and forms we make, half the mistaken views of language now in vogue would lose their foundation, and become even transparently absurd. The power to say "water" and to use it as the sign of a certain conception is a part of my human nature, shared by me with every normally constituted human being; it is a "capacity and activity," though in a sense so different from those of seeing and hearing that we can only marvel at Professor Steinthal's mentioning them together, and fear that there is unsoundness in his psychology as well as in his linguistic philosophy. Seeing and hearing are capacities with which the will has nothing directly to do; they are passive, receptive; only refrain from shutting our eyes and ears, and visible and audible things cannot but impress the sense, and impress it practically alike in all men; while, on the other hand, an act of the will is necessary to every sound we utter, as much as to every gesture we make. In short, we have here one more of

those unfortunate comparisons of which our author is so prolific in this chapter. But the word "water" is neither a capacity nor an activity; it is a *product*, not less so than is a machine, though in quite another way; it is capable of being first originated, or produced, or invented, at a given time, and thenceforward reproduced by learning and imitation; it is capable of being described, and depicted, and represented, and set down in dictionary, and its use regulated by grammar. Think of a grammar of capacity, a dictionary of activities! And of such products as "water" is all human speech, in the concrete sense of the term, composed. When, then, the paragraph goes on to say, "Such was and is language at all times. The primitive man saw not otherwise and spoke not otherwise than we at the moment when we speak," we answer that the statement is either a truism or a falsity, according as it is understood; and that, as the writer appears to suppose it has both senses, he is partly right and partly wrong; but that the truth is a worthless one, and all the point lies in the part that is false. That the primitive man had a mind like ours and used organs like ours, and that their joint working was after much the same fashion as in us, is so palpably true as to be almost impertinent; but that he said "water," as we do, and for the reason that he had heard some one else say it before him, is not true; and we crave to know whether he said anything when he had formed the conception of water (a conception which he was fully capable of forming without speech); and, if he did, what it was, and why.

That which follows is in the same strain. There is, we are told, absolutely no essential distinction between the original creation of language, the process of children's learning to speak, and the speaking which now goes on daily and hourly everywhere where human beings are to be found. There is no origin of language, otherwise than as it originates anew in every word we utter. And now all is finished. To adopt one of our author's favorite comparisons, the question of origin is not a substantial thing, like powder; it is a mere fleeting aspect, like the explosion; a little smouch, a momentary bad smell, and it is over; we are left with only the mortification of having concerned ourselves about a matter in which there was absolutely nothing.

Here, for the first time, Professor Steinthal is seized with a slight misgiving. May not his conclusions strike some persons as paradoxical? May it not appear that he arrives at this general identification of everything in language by ignoring essential distinctions? We seem to hear from his readers one universal cry of assent. But it does not reach his ears; and he proceeds to reason down his misgiving, after his peculiar fashion. Accepting, apparently, as impregnably established the general impression that there must be something deep and wonderful about the origin of language, he endeavors to remove any possible scruples on our part as to the identity of everything else with it, by proving that these everythings are also deep and wonderful, each in its way. In the first place, he assumes that any one of us who is profound enough will have already convinced himself that children's learning to speak is just as mysterious as the primitive man's creation of speech. We confess, however, that we are not profound enough for that; that the acquisition of language by children does not seem to us any mystery at all. We stand in an attitude of constant wonder and admiration before the human mind, with its wealth of endowments, its infinite acquirements, and the unlimited possibilities of its future; but that a child, after hearing a certain word used some scores or hundreds of times, comes to understand what it means, and then, a little later, to pronounce and use it, perhaps feebly and blunderingly at first, — this does not seem to us any more astonishing than the exercise of the same child's capacities in other directions; in acquiring, for instance, the command of a musical instrument, or mastering the intricacies of mathematics. Our admiration is called out in a much higher degree by considering what this simple instrumentality finally comes to be in the matured man, what power it gives him over himself and others, and the secrets of the world about him. And we wonder most of all when we consider the history of language, and see how its growth has gone hand in hand with the cultural development of the race, at once the result and the efficient aid of the latter. In fact, we think our appreciation of the wondrous character of language a vastly higher one than Professor Steinthal's; for, while he holds that any two or three human beings, putting

their heads together, in any age and under any circumstances, not only can, but of necessity must, produce it in all its essential features, we think it a possible result only of the accumulated labors of a series of generations, working on step by step, making every acquired item the means of new acquisitions. But let us see what he has to say in the way of setting forth the deep mystery of our daily speech, that we may be thereby led to regard ourselves as the true originators of language. "Only notice how, on the one hand, a person speaking in a strange tongue, *with which he is not very familiar*, gathers the words laboriously together in his memory and combines them with reflection; and how, on the other hand, when we use our mother-tongue, the words flow in upon us one after another in right order and in proper form." Well, we notice it, as directed; but we fail to see the mystery. On the contrary, we think our author has unwittingly solved the whole problem by the suggestion which we have italicized; the one language is familiar, the other is not. So the practised pianist sits down at his instrument with a sheet of dots and lines before him, which to another are devoid of all meaning, a mere intricate puzzle; and his fingers move over the white and black keys as if they went of themselves, without the direction of his will, and the puzzle is translated, at first sight, into ravishing music. But give him a new-fangled method of notation, "with which he is not familiar," and turn his key-board the other way, so that the tones go down in the scale from left to right, and behold, how changed! now he labors painfully from note to note, stumbling and tripping at every step. Or change the mathematician's whole system of signs and symbols, and see what a weight you have hung at his heels, until he shall have worn it out by sheer dint of dragging it over hard places. Let one pass, however, a series of years in complete divorcement from his mother-tongue, and in the enforced daily and hourly practice of another, and the balance of familiarity is shifted; the latter becomes the one which he wields with ease and adroitness, the former the one in whose use he stumbles, and has to labor and reflect. Is there anything in all this that is not fully explainable on the supposition that language is an acquired instrumentality? Is there, indeed, anything that is explain-

able on any other supposition? Here, once more, as it appears to us, our author has failed to see the point of his illustration, and draws from it an unwarranted conclusion. All our readiness to appreciate the wonders of language will not lead us to see anything marvellous in the fact that one manages a great and intricate instrument with which he is familiar better than one with which he is unfamiliar. Next we are called upon to observe that the difficulties and imperfections of some men's expression in their own mother-tongue show us how admirable is that gift of speech by which the word flows forth of itself. Very well; but what follows further? Simply that men's gifts are various. Just so one person can never learn to be more than a passable pianist, if even that; and there is an immense difference in the skill and effect with which two individuals will wield the resources of the higher mathematics. We by no means jump from this to the conclusion that music and mathematics did not have their weak beginnings and their slow development, and that the living musician or mathematician is in essentially the same position with every one of his craft from the beginning, and really produces or brings to birth all that they have recorded for him to learn.

And so our author goes on from item to item, where it would be tedious to follow him; everywhere missing the true analogy and suggesting in its place a false one, and therefore deducing from it an argument which is overthrown as soon as stated. We will pass over all of them excepting the last, where he points out that "many a one who at other times is but a stammerer, becomes eloquent when he falls under the influence of passion (*in Leidenschaft gerät*). Just in an excited condition of mind, then, when the clearness of his consciousness is diminished, when he is carried away, the fount of speech flows fullest; for [reverting suddenly to his favorite obstetrical parallel], the more painful the throes, the easier the birth." Disregarding the slightly paradoxical character of the last statement (as if the throes were not a part of the process of birth itself), as well as the characteristic weakness of the comparison in the essential point (for, to make it good, a violent headache, or severe wrenches of rheumatism, or a sound whipping, ought to make labor easy), we would urge in reply that excitement, up to

a certain point, has never been looked upon as dulling the powers of action, either mental or physical. The man who in the exaltation of passion would show a capacity of doing and daring, of exerting powers of attack and defence, of judging and deciding, which in his cooler moments he never dreamed himself to possess, need not feel that there is anything mysterious in his heightened power of expression under such circumstances. If he can wield the club or discourse upon the musical instrument the better for his passion, he may also better wield the word, without our needing to infer thence that the word is anything more than the instrument of the mind's acts. This, of course, without implying that there are not kinds and degrees of passion which may lame one's powers, either of speech or of action.

We must pronounce, then, Professor Steinthal's attempt to explain away the paradoxical character of his universal identification a complete failure, a mere continuation of the same sophistical reasonings by which he originally arrived at it.

After all this he declines to maintain "that, notwithstanding the essential likeness between the speaking of the primitive man and that of the child and the adult, there are not also, on the other hand, accompanying conditions which modify these three processes, and give to each a peculiar character. Only the differences cannot be understood except on the basis of the similarity." And so, it was necessary to lay down as a foundation that speech is always a creation, its origin the eternal and unchangeable origin of a power and activity in the consciousness of men; then to proceed to find the point of mental development at which speech necessarily breaks forth, and, to this end, to plunge into a psychological development of the processes of human thought. Accordingly, the title of the first succeeding part is "Psychical Mechanics," followed later by "History of Psychical Development."

That this is a direct reversal of the true process we are fully convinced. We repeat in summary the truths which we have endeavored above to establish: that language in the concrete sense, the sum of words and phrases by which any man expresses his thought, is an historical product, and must be studied, before all and above all, in an historical method. The

mental development which it accompanies, and of which it is at once the result and the aiding cause or instrument, is also an historical one, and involves among its elements the whole sum of human knowledge and variety of human institutions. The soul of man has grown from what it was once only potentially to what it is now actually, only by means of its own gradual accumulations of observation and reasoning, of experience and deduction. This historical growth is not to be read in the growth at the present day of an individual soul, surrounded from its birth by all the appliances of culture, with instructors on every hand, with the results of others' labors piled about it for it to grasp, in a profusion that defies its highest powers of acquisition. It is to be read only in the recorded and inferable facts of human history itself; these are to be first striven after and determined by every possible means; and from these we are to reason back to the states of mind that produced them. Doubtless a comprehension of the workings of the human soul under its present conditions will be an aid of high importance, but it will be only an aid. As well found the study of the history of astronomy on that of the laws of planetary perturbations as the study of the history of language on psychology. Psychology may be a valuable handmaid to linguistic science, but it must be a harmful mistress; it may follow alongside of historical investigation, guarding and checking every conclusion, but it has no right to claim to go on in advance and lead the way.

Or, if the case be not so, let it be shown to be otherwise; only do not ask us to accept the reasonings of this chapter, or anything like them, as in the least degree proving it otherwise. If this is the best that can be said in behalf of what we may call the psychologico-obstetrical theory of language, then that theory is an irretrievable failure. We have gone through our author's reasonings in detail, quoting in his own words all the principal passages, that there might be no chance of our misinterpreting his meaning, or of omitting what was essential to the right understanding of the rest; and it is seen with what result. We have not found telling expositions, arguments generally sound and cogent, with here and there a slip or a flaw; we have found nothing but mistaken facts and erroneous de-

ductions. The chapter is not entitled to be called able; even a false doctrine ought to admit of a better defence; we almost feel that we ought to apologize for occupying with its refutation so much of the time of our readers. But we know not where to find at present anything better on this side. Steinthal would, we imagine, be put forward by his party as their strongest man. It is, then, as the representative of a school and a tendency in linguistics that we have taken him up; to show how laming and disabling is the system and method in which he, with his coadjutors, works. Some will say, doubtless, that the fault lies with the metaphysical attitude of mind; that the metaphysician, in his efforts to get into the *a priori* position, to face and dominate his facts, really turns his back upon the foremost of them, as they surround him and drag him on in the opposite direction to that in which he fancies himself to be moving. We would not go so far as that; we are willing to allow, at least provisionally, that metaphysical inquiry carries one up into heights and down into depths that are not otherwise attainable, and that in its pursuit is the loftiest exertion and the keenest enjoyment of which man is capable; the metaphysicians say so, and surely they ought to know. We only demand that when they come down, or up, on to middle ground, when they take hold of matters that lie within the ken of common sense, their views and conclusions shall square with those of common sense; or, if it be not so, that they shall be able to show us why it is not, and to convince our common sense by their uncommon. The upholders of views akin with Steinthal's still constitute — as we hold, merely by force of tradition from the centuries of darkness — the largest and most influential body of writers on the theory of language, and they look down with contempt upon the opposing party as lost in the mazes of superficiality and philisterism. In our view, their profundity is merely subjective, and their whole system is destined to be swept away and succeeded by the scientific, the inductive. This alone is in unison with the best tendencies of modern thought; this alone can bring the science of language into harmonious alliance with the other branches of knowledge respecting man, his endowments and his history.

W. D. Whitney.

Art. III. — On the International Workingmen's Association; its Origin, Doctrines, and Ethics.

Nothing, says M. Renan in his work on St. Paul, misleads men of the world more frequently, or causes them to commit more grievous mistakes, than the superficial aversion they feel against ill-bred or ill-mannered people. Manners, after all, are but matters of form, and it happens sometimes that those who have none are in the right. Wrapped as he is in his own fastidiousness, the man of society walks often, without knowing it, by the side of the man who is the chosen hero or apostle of the future. They are not of the same world. And the error of the man of society consists in thinking that the world which he sees is the whole world.*

But it is not only the so-called man of the world who indulges in this gratifying belief. All tolerably prosperous persons who pass their lives in ease and comfort, all those, in other words, who belong to what we are wont to call the upper classes of society, are liable to the same illusion. Nor would the lower classes be exempt from it, if the world in which they live were attractive enough to induce forgetfulness of the "delectable mountains" that lie beyond its gloomy horizon. But even if the two strata of society were equally ignorant of each other, the power of ignoring the other seems to belong exclusively to the upper one, all stooping charity notwithstanding. This is not necessarily due to heartlessness or conscious pride. The French Court lady who suggested cake to the starving people as a substitute for bread, was probably quite sincere, and would have been ready to give away her own cakes, had she been asked to do so. But it cannot be denied that wealth and mundane happiness are, in themselves, demoralizing and blinding, if not stupefying, agencies, whose action is as certain and as permanent as that of any physical force, although their effects are often hidden and sometimes corrected or even neutralized by our own moral or intellectual reaction. Few people are conscious of this action, and many talk of wealth and prosperity as they would talk of the atmosphere whose pressure, but for

* Freely rendered, from page 224 of the original.

the barometer, they would deny, and which is called heavy only when it is light, and light only when it is heavy. "There is no heavier burden to bear," says Goethe, "than a long series of happy days," and of "him who never ate his bread in tears," the same poet says, "he knows you not, O heavenly powers!" Jesus speaks tenderly and hopefully of the poor. Theirs is the kingdom of heaven. But of the rich he speaks harshly; long pent up rancor and the memory of many wrongs could not find vent in harsher language.

This sentiment, which is founded on experience and on correct observation, is as old as the civilization of mankind, and is likely to endure so long as we have not discovered some means of effacing all mental, physical, and circumstantial inequalities among men, and so long as the various works and performances of men continue to have, or to be regarded as having, different degrees of dignity. The principal and primordial cause of the mischief was the institution or legal recognition of *castes*. A man's fate may be cruel, but it becomes revolting when rendered hereditary. The cobbler's work is of less dignity than the sculptor's or the statesman's, but there is nothing nowadays to prevent his becoming a sculptor or a statesman, and he knows that his children will not be predestined to bind shoes any more than he was himself.

In fact, the modern state has ceased to take legal cognizance of these distinctions and classifications. With the exception of royalty and the hereditary legislators in some countries of Europe, no castes are recognized in any modern state; and with the principle of caste or of hereditary misery, the institutions of slavery, domestic bondage, and feudal serfdom had to succumb and to vanish. Both Church and State, or to speak more accurately, the Protestant Church and the constitutional State, proclaim and uphold, each in its peculiar manner, the principles of equality and liberty, equality being the end and liberty the means. But these principles are purely theoretical. If equality is our goal, it is as such essentially ideal, and liberty can never be more than permissive. It is the open road, but not the vehicle, much less the locomotive power. Even the United States Declaration of Independence grants, not happiness itself, but the free "pursuit of happiness." "You may if you can,"

— that is the whole gospel of liberty. But you are what you are, for all that, and your powers are only what they happen to be. Practically, therefore, liberty re-enthrones inequality, and while it eliminates many fictitious and artificial kinds of inequality, it brings to light, more effectually than any other agency, all natural and real inequalities. And the equality proclaimed by Church and State — the equality before God and before the law — means practically nothing but the "fair start" before the race; the prizes of life belong to those who can fetch them, — to the quickest, the strongest, the cleverest, the healthiest, in all cases to the best.

The offspring of political liberty and initial equality are the laws and practices of free competition, known to the modern world under the name of *Political Economy*. Like Justice, Economy has her scales, but instead of weighing right against wrong, she weighs "supply" against "demand," and her decisions are irrevocable. She knows nothing of equality, much less of love or mercy, but she says to all impartially, "Take what you can get, within the limits allowed by the decalogue of the Church and by the laws of the state."

This sounds humiliating. Can it be that poets ever sang inspired songs of freedom, that heroes ever fought or died for liberty, if this is the result, the logical, inevitable result, of all their songs and deeds? As long as liberty is militant and iconoclastic, it cannot fail to inspire us, because we mistake its means for its ends; but when all thrones have been upset, and all escutcheons broken, when every silly trace of feudal inequality has been effaced or swept away, we discover, instead of the promised blessings of equality, nothing but a new contrivance for generating inequalities. Free competition must lead to the accumulation of wealth and power; and the competing forces being always unequal, the distribution of wealth and power must also be unequal. New oligarchies and class distinctions, far more essential and tangible (because more rational) than those to be met with in old societies, are thus created and perpetuated in the name of that same liberty which promised to lead us to equality and to destroy the barriers of society. What, then, have we gained by the change? Whatever the reign of liberty may have accomplished, it has failed to rid society of class

distinctions; and as long as there are rich men and poor men, capitalists and working classes, the selfishness of the former will continue to provoke the egotism of the latter, and with the self-complacency of the wealthy the self-assertion of the poor will continue to threaten the stability of even the freest commonwealth.

Granted, then, that the principle of equality is an axiomatic truth proclaimed by Christianity, and affirmed by the moral consciousness of educated mankind; granted that "the right of the stronger," which we abhorred when it belonged to muscle, but which still belongs to health and wealth and intellect, is the principal cause of human sufferings; and granted, therefore, that it is, and ever must be, the duty of society so to organize itself, that human suffering should cease to be proportionate to the physical and mental abilities of the individual, and should become, as far as possible, proportionate to his moral merits, reaching its minimum when the moral elevation of society reaches its maximum; — we are bound to confess that the present organization of society as exhibited in the modern state has, thus far, proved unequal to its presumptive task, and that it can never become equal to it as long as it remains founded on nothing but the purely permissive principle of political liberty. And if, equality or the equalization of human joys and sufferings being the postulate, pure liberty fails and proves unable to lead to it or even towards it, then liberty requires either a substitute or an addition or a corrective. We know that it is too precious a thing to be replaced by aught we can devise. But the necessity of a corrective our syllogism forces us to admit. And to furnish such an addition or such a corrective to political liberty is the conscious or unconscious, avowed or implied, intended or involuntary, aim and tendency of modern socialism, whatever forms and names it may assume.

From what we have said before, and from the genetic definition of socialism, it follows that all socialistic movements are essentially extra-political and extra-national, their scope lying outside the sphere of the state. They may fit into this or that state, and may be antagonistic to this or that other state. But they are essentially international, humanitarian, and, as such, non-political. They are always and essentially antagonistic to

the principle of personal liberty, and especially to that liberty whose absolute validity is asserted by Political Economy, and affirmed by the rules and practices of free competition. That socialism is a professed adversary of the Church is a matter of fact, and as such undeniable. But any impartial outsider can see, at a glance, that this antagonism is partly imaginary, and, in so far as it is real, unnecessary. If Christianity were what it purports to be, and if the broadly socialistic doctrines once preached by Jesus, long held by all who gloried in the name of Ebionim, and faintly recognizable even in the clumsy usages of conventional life, were faithfully held up to the church-going children of the world as the true essence of all religion, not to be hidden or eclipsed by the rank growth of dogmatics and ritualism, all self-styled systems of socialism would be in logic bound to acknowledge the identity of their aims with those of practical Christianity, or, if they dislike the name, of practical religion. And how willing they would be to do this is clearly shown by the readiness with which modern socialists become converts to the religion of M. Comte, who helped them to get over their rationalistic scruples by giving them a nameless and undogmatic religion, and by substituting the more philosophic term "altruism" for "love and charity," these latter terms being too pathetic for a world in which the laws of Political Economy are the highest laws.

The position of modern socialism in the intellectual world may thus be briefly defined: Socialism *must* react against Political Economy, it *acts* outside the state, and it *might*, if it chose, co-operate with the Church. It opposes the absolute freedom of competition as being cruel in its consequences; it ignores the narrow limits of nationality upheld by the state, but it might, if it thought fit, assume the tone and methods of a religious propaganda. In other words, socialism is anti-economic, super-national, and religious *malgré lui*.

Socialistic movements are obviously legitimate, their aims and objects being not only irreproachable, but praiseworthy and desirable. Whether the same can be said of the means and methods adopted by socialistic leaders, is a different question, which cannot be discussed in general terms. As a matter of fact, we know that socialism always begins by using legitimate

means, and that it openly disclaims and deprecates the use of any other. For, notwithstanding its hostile attitude toward the acknowledged law of social economy, and notwithstanding its indifference for the prizes fought for in the political arena, it cannot help availing itself of the weapons which either of these spheres furnishes ready made as the only lawful weapons. These are the weapons of fair play, the various forms of liberty, — in the economic world, the freedom of producing and consuming, of selling and buying; in the political world, the freedom of speech and the freedom of association. With these the socialists strike their first blows, and can do so without becoming amenable to law or obnoxious to fair criticism. Even when they go further and push these permissive principles to their extreme consequences, they only do what President Grant says ought to be done with all bad laws, in order to show their hidden badness and imperfection. There is, however, a practical limit, if not a theoretical one, beyond which the political state cannot rely on the practicability of its own laws. *Salus publica suprema lex est.* The public welfare, or, as it is seen from a political point of view, the integrity of the state, overrules all other laws, and when the state considers itself threatened, were it only through a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*, by its own institutions, then opinions may begin to differ concerning the moral legality of such inexorable agencies, and we have a right, nay, the obligation, to consider whether the professed aims of these agencies (granted and proved to be good) are good enough to justify the destruction of the existing order of things with which they are incompatible; and if they are, whether these agencies are strong enough to secure the prospect of a speedy success.

It is not easy to decide such questions, and most of those who eagerly discuss them are utterly unfit to pronounce judgment. All those, for instance, whom duty, taste, or calling impels to descend into the political arena, and to take an active part in the perennial struggles for power, must sooner or later become party men, and as such specious pleaders. They own allegiance, not to truth, but to an alternative, and are bound to ignore all that lies between the two horns of their dilemma. If we add to these all men of strong convictions, of strong

hopes or fears, who have made up their minds on any given subject or phenomenon the moment it heaves in sight, we shall probably obtain a majority of mankind, comprising all men of action and of feeling, the real soldiers, in fact, in the battle of life, to whom our thanks are due, but who need not be our leaders, and who cannot be our teachers. They lose themselves a great intellectual pleasure, — that pleasure which Lucretius felt when he withdrew to his tower of speculation to watch the strugglers in the battle-field or on the stormy sea. There he could say, *suave est*, adding, however, as a man of proper feeling, that this intellectual self-congratulation implied no selfishness or want of sympathy for his struggling brethren. And he was right. For if a battle is to be described and judged, it must be done by those who stand outside the battle-field, on the nearest, if not the highest, hill.

Long before socialism was known under its present name, it existed as a powerful ferment in European society. But it existed only theoretically; its aspirations were felt by the masses, but proclaimed only by a few independent thinkers, who propounded new social doctrines and excogitated various systems of wondrous neatness and theoretical perfection. The soil of France seemed to be the one best suited for the growth of such seedlings, the average Frenchman being remarkable for his intellectual initiative, and for having what few persons have in other countries, "the courage of his opinions." Rousseau not only believed in his *contrat social*, but acted on its principles. Who but a Frenchman would have sent his legitimate children to the Foundling House? The French Revolution, by adding the term *fraternité* to the Republican motto, acknowledged the claims of socialism, without being aware of the contradiction or of the philosophic mystery contained in the triune formula. A little later we find Charles Fourrier, who believed in the "division of labor," adding, however, as a corrective to his panacea, the *attraction passionnée*, a livelier and more fertile sentiment than that of fraternity. St. Simon and his unconscious imitator, Auguste Comte, seem to have felt the incompatibilities between the social and the political state, and taking a higher view than Plato, who could not even see their difference, they found the ulti-

mate reconciliation and final coincidence of the two states in a *tertium aliquid*, the social hierarchy.

Proudhon's communism, the discovery of the *droit au travail*, and the opening and closing of the *ateliers nationaux* in 1848, were the last important events in the history of French socialism. But it is to be regretted that no evolutionary phases can be recognized in the succession of these phenomena, the latest being as crude as the earliest, and each apostle identifying his doctrine with his own personal apostolate or priesthood, taught it without the slightest reference to those of his predecessor. No tangible or lasting results could come from such spasmodic and sporadic efforts. We know them through literature only, and French socialists have never furnished us with any proof of the practical value of their doctrines. Fourrier's phalansteries never existed except on paper. Enfantin's Simonistic papacy was destroyed by two of its own high-priests, and, like the Comtean papacy, remained a papacy without popes. The national "ateliers" were opened, it is true, in 1848, but after a four months' trial they had to be closed; and it is important to remember that they were closed by those who had planned them, nay, that there was no man in Paris more anxious to close them than their own founders and protectors.

It would be rash, however, to infer from this dearth of results that the doctrines themselves were utterly worthless and faulty. All we have a right to infer is, that France, the mother of socialism, was (like many French mothers) not the proper nurse for her child. To find social doctrines translated into real life and matter of fact, to find the proper tests for their practicability and usefulness, to find, in fact, the only rational, the only intelligible, and therefore the only interesting form or forms of socialism, we must indulge in a paradox, and go to the country where "ideas" are scorned, where speculation is ridiculed, and where no theory can live without being clothed at once in the coarse garment of reality: we must go to England. The English know nothing about communism and phalansteries, and often pride themselves on their ignorance. Perhaps the only genuine *doctrinaire* that England has produced was Malthus, who, feeling convinced that there was no

room on earth for the poor, begged that they would not start into existence at all. Robert Owen, who called himself a communist, was certainly a dreamer, but must have been something more than a dreamer, for he began his socialistic career by trying his doctrines at Lanark Mills, and was his own disciple long before he became his own apostle and missionary. He failed, it is true, in the United States. His colony of New Harmony was anything but a success. But it was an experiment, to say the least, as interesting as the more celebrated experiments of Brook Farm, where the principle of rotation was tried as a substitute for division of labor. And, scientifically, a failure is as valuable as a success, just as in mathematics negative quantities are as valuable as positive ones. It is only the absence of all trial and application which makes social doctrines uninteresting and valueless. And France has neither a Lanark nor a New Harmony, nor even a Brook Farm, to boast of.

The most important practical contribution to socialism which England has furnished does not consist in a doctrine invented by a thinker, or in a school founded by a master, but was something anonymous and altogether impersonal, which must have sprung from the common wants of many. The British *trades-unions* may be considered as the primitive *nuclei* round which all latent or nascent elements of socialism could gather. There was nothing abstract in these institutions. They were concrete, substantial things, without beauty or pathos; inattractive, yet attracting by their very solidity and bulk, and destined to become the prototypes and models of that wider union whose units are unions of workingmen, and which is known to us as the great *International Association*. It would be preposterous to suppose that the English trades-unions were conscious of having any historic mission, or of having anything to do with what was called socialism on the Continent. They would have scorned the imputation. Nevertheless, such an imputation seems to have been made at once by public opinion, and trades-unions were held to be illegal, the Magna Charta notwithstanding, until 1825, and long continued to be obnoxious to the surveillance of the authorities, as we may infer from the riots of 1834. These trades-unions of

modern England have no resemblance with the Anglo-Saxon guilds. Nor can they be compared with the German *Zünfte*, or with the Italian *maestranze*, or with the *collegia opificum* of the Roman Republic. All these societies were what the trades-unions have vainly endeavored to become, legally recognized, chartered, moral entities, and they included all the representatives of each trade, — the master, the workmen, and the apprentices; while the trades-unions are associations of independent workmen, without, or if needs be against, the master or employer. As such, the unions were tolerated by the state, but legally ignored; that is to say, their property being collective, was no man's property in the eyes of the law, and a trades-union could not prosecute a thief or swindler, as it could not become a party to any lawsuit. It is only since 1869 that the unions have enjoyed the privileges of a legal status in the United Kingdom.

The well-known objects of these societies are to secure assistance to the affiliated workmen in all cases of distress and forfeiture of wages, and to command the labor market so far, at least, as it lies within the range of their legitimate influence. It seems impossible to say anything against this. Whatever could be urged against such workmen's unions, might, with the same right, be urged against insurance companies and joint-stock associations, nay, against every kind of financial operation. But the strange persistency with which the trades-unions have for many years been attacked in newspapers, pamphlets, and even in didactic novels written *ad hoc*, can only be explained by the sentimental view which the last generation was accustomed to take of the relations between master and workman, whose union being a "moral union," * they wished to remain undisturbed by the vicissitudes of the market, and undefiled by mercenary or ambitious considerations. But the market took no heed of these idyllic unions, and its dominion was felt in the palace and in the cottage alike. Why, then, should the workman abstain from doing occasionally what his employer did every day of his life, — from selling in the dearest market? And to make the market dear, they began,

* Mr. Newman, in his "Lectures on Political Economy," calls even the relation between the tradesman and his customer a "moral union."

like him, by withdrawing their own supply from it. Moreover, labor is a ware *sui generis*, an eating capital. Like perishable goods and live stock, it cannot afford waiting for the propitious moment. Only associated or collective labor can do so within certain limits. And this being so, a body of united workmen has obviously the same right *not to work* as the corn-dealer has not to sell his corn. A strike is legally and economically as legitimate as any commercial operation, and as to its moral justification, it is, to say the least, greater than that of the corn-dealer speculating on famine prices. The really objectionable feature of these unions was, and still is, their tyrannical constitution. They enforce allegiance and tolerate no outsider. Whoever is not with us is against us, they say; and the peace-loving, faint-hearted fellow-workman who, for his family's sake, would prefer low wages to no wages, is intimidated by threats and punished by *rattening*. All this is very wrong, of course. Let the law of the land protect the right of every free citizen. At the same time it is obvious that the trades-unions had either to enforce allegiance or to cease to exist; the subordination of individual interests under the class interests being necessary for their tactics and essential to their doctrines, as it forms the essence of all socialistic doctrines.

In England, the practice of strikes dates from the beginning of the century. In 1810 it began to assume gigantic proportions. But the contest was still unequal, and generally ended in defeat. The workmen had to resume work at reduced instead of increased wages, and even the increase obtained sometimes never outweighed the enormous loss inevitably incurred through the suspension of work. The workmen, of course, knew this only too well. But with them it was not a question of immediate gain, but of principle or prospective gain; nor was it with the master a question of economy always, but rather a question of self-love and pride. Their pugnacity being challenged, they liked to show the superiority of, at least, their powers of resistance, in other words, the superiority of cash over muscle, of capital over labor. When the two contending parties came at last to an agreement, it was generally from sheer exhaustion or impatience or dire necessity. Mutual concessions were made only when they had ceased to be conces-

sions, and to refer their quarrels to arbitration seems never to have occurred to these pugnacious antagonists. Yet the French had their *chambres consultatives* a hundred years ago, and later their *conseils des prud'hommes*, or special courts of equity, which worked admirably, and enjoyed the confidence and respect of both contending classes. And even in antiquity, when the Plebeians of Rome had "struck work" *en masse* and gone to sulk on the *mons sacer*, the Patricians did not "lock them out," but sent a kind-hearted and mellifluous ambassador to explain to them how indispensable both parties were to each other, and that, if the limbs had to work for the stomach, the stomach had also to work for the limbs.

But there was no Menenius Agrippa among the British mill-owners and manufacturers. They preferred showing their strength, and they did this in the only two ways that were legally open to them, — by "locking out" the exacting workmen, or by sending for cheaper ones elsewhere. If the masters had been animated by the same *esprit de corps* which animated the workmen, they would have found in the "lock-out" a far more efficient weapon than in the mutual competition of the latter. A lock-out proclaimed by a coalition of masters (such as was quite recently planned at Blackburn in Lancashire, where not less than fifty thousand operatives would have been thrown upon their own resources with one stroke) is the most crushing repartee to a strike, and at the same time a preventive of further strikes; and if this practice had been adopted forty or fifty years ago, the workingmen would have been forced to resort to emigration rather than to strikes. But here we see the essential difference between the rich master and the poor workman. A manufacturer not actually suffering from a strike is rarely inclined to make his neighbor's cause his own; he will outbid him in the labor market as he would undersell him in the goods market. And thus the lock-out, if not general, soon loses its sting. Very naturally, then, the importation of cheaper labor became the principal expedient of the masters. And as long as the trades-unions of the different districts were not bound together by a common compact, their readiness to undersell each other could generally be relied on. The men on strike knew as well as their employer that from the neighboring

county, or at all events from Ireland, a batch of starving laborers could always be had at a moment's notice, and later, when that source began to fail, the Continent, and especially Belgium, was ready to furnish the required number of hands, willing enough to receive shillings instead of francs. Why should a Belgian workman not go to fill the English workman's place? What is an Englishman to a Belgian? What interests have they in common? If the Englishman chooses to starve in obedience to his "union," so much the worse for him and his family. The Belgian, who has to obey no orders, and to fear no rattening, may claim the advantages accruing from this difference. And was it not certain that if the Belgian did not come, somebody else would come, from France perhaps, or Germany, or Spain? There was misery and modesty enough all over the Continent, and the workmen were not shackled yet by those chains of "solidarity" which have since then become to them what the heavenly cross became to Constantine, — an emblem and an instrument of victory.

To strike work under such circumstances was obviously a very bad speculation for English workmen. In most cases it proved a mere waste of time and money; and with the rapidly increasing facilities for travelling, the prospects of the strike system became more and more uncertain and gloomy. In fact, since 1836 the number of successful strikes has remained comparatively small; and had this state of things continued, the trades-unions would have lost the principal pretext for their existence. If the Chinese immigration of the United States were to extend over the manufacturing districts, the American workman would find himself in a position almost as precarious as that of the English workman before 1860. His "striking" power would rapidly diminish, and he would soon have to consider the alternative of ousting his rival or of gaining him over as an ally.

Both methods have been tried in England, where foreign workmen have often been mobbed and successfully expelled. But it is a brutal method, not likely to succeed in the long run, and its failures would necessarily lead to a most unpleasant state of things in the invaded country. The only thing to be done, therefore, was to make common cause with the foreign

nouveauté de Paris of great originality, and it had the additional advantage of being, though French and though philosophy, quite free from any revolutionary taint. In the Preface to his "Positive Religion" Comte says: "We come forward to deliver the Western world from an *anarchical democracy* and from a retrograde aristocracy. . . . . In fact we sociocrats * are as little democratical as we are aristocratical. . . . . Our official conservatives are behindhand, it is true, and yet the mere revolutionist seems to me still more alien to the true spirit of the time."

It is clear that if Comte's doctrine was socialistic, it was socialism in the garb of conservative respectability. *Pour détruire, il faut remplacer.* Doomed aristocracy was at once to be replaced, society at once to be indemnified for the loss by a new hierarchy, closely resembling that of the Roman Church, which was to maintain *order* in the world. Comte dreaded anarchy more than anything else. Both liberty and equality were to be sacrificed to the principle of order, and fraternity, under the new name of "altruism," was to take their place.

That a certain positivism pre-existed in England is undeniable, as it existed even in Germany where Comte's name is but little known and where his doctrine would hardly be called philosophy. Men like J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer are positivists, without professing to be Comtists. But M. Laugel (in an article published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of February 15, 1864) seems to have no difficulty in tracing the influence of Comte even in the writings of Mr. Mill, and especially in those of Mr. Buckle. Professor Huxley, too, admits (in an article quoted in the "Beehive" of November 4, 1871) "that he is indebted to Comte for the conviction which I shall always be thankful to him for awakening in me, that the organization of society upon a new and purely scientific basis is not only practicable, but is the only political object much worth fighting for." Again, Professor Beesley, one of the most active and eloquent leaders of the socialistic movement, in a lecture delivered in May, 1868, to a meeting of trades-union men, attacked productive co-operation on the ground that it was

* We are not responsible for the hybrid word.

based on the joint-stock principle, and recommended unionism as the only means of "keeping the capitalist up to his duty, until a *religious* influence shall have been organized which will produce the same result." This "religious influence" is to eradicate "jealousy and personal rivalry," and to induce "forgetfulness of self and readiness to obey rather than eagerness to command." Moses, the finest "theocratic type," was ready (the Professor continues) to be blotted out of God's book, so that the humblest and lowest of his people might enter the promised land. And Danton, when reminded of his "reputation," asked, "What is that? Blighted be my name, but let France be free." We quote these passages as good instances of Comtean phraseology. Professor Beesley's lecture was published in the "Fortnightly Review," whose editor is a Comtist, and headed with the following quotation from Comte: "The working class is not, properly speaking, a class at all, but constitutes the body of society. From it proceed the various special classes which we may regard as organs necessary to that body." Two other lectures were delivered to the workmen of the unions in the spring of the same year, 1868, one by Mr. Congreve, the translator of Comte's "Catechism of Positivism," and author of the "System of Positive Philosophy" and of the "System of Positive Politics"; the other by Mr. Frederick Harrison, the well-known apologist of the Paris Commune, and an able contributor to the "Fortnightly Review," mentioned above.

Further proofs are hardly required to show that the doctrines of the French philosopher were spreading fast among the literary men of England; that they were persistently preached by these to the workingmen of the trades-unions; that Comtism, subordinating everything, even liberty and patriotism, to the paramount claims of humanity, furnished the most appropriate framework for any scheme of international alliance, but more particularly among those who are now arrayed against each other as working rivals in times of peace, as fighting enemies in times of war; and that the intimate connection which exists between the spread of Comtism in England and the origin and growth of the International Association is more than an historical concidence, — a logical collegation.

How, then, did this doctrine originate, since it did not originate in England? The Continental workmen lived in strictly national spheres of thought like their English brethren, and were inferior to them in public spirit and political freedom. They had no unions, no clubs, much less a programme or a platform. Only when railways had begun to widen their horizon and their aspirations, when those who could not prosper at home could go in search of better spheres for their industry and skill, when the "wandering apprentice," till then a specific type of Germany, could without difficulty extend his migrations as far as Paris and London, Naples and Messina, when there was no large town in Western Europe without its colony of foreign, and principally German, workmen, the spirit of association began to develop itself among these more or less homesick emigrants, who eagerly clubbed together, were it only for the sake of social enjoyment and mutual instruction. Thus an "Arbeiter Bildungs Verein" (or workmen's culture club) was formed in London, and even Rome could boast of a small club of German workingmen who seem to have contented themselves with chatting, singing, and smoking together. Many similar societies sprang up in France, Switzerland, and Belgium, most of which were, however, German, since French-speaking workmen do not go abroad, if they can help it.

Now these German emigrations became the substratum of a curious propaganda. We say substratum, because the emigrants themselves had nothing to propagate. They brought no doctrine with them. But they carried along with them a certain philosophic receptivity peculiar to their race, and which causes Germans to be ever ready, though never eager, recipients of new and especially of foreign ideas. The social and political condition of Germany was, indeed, not calculated to develop this faculty in half-educated men belonging to the working classes. But under the fertilizing influence of association and of democratic liberty, such at least as France and Belgium afforded in those days, it soon manifested itself in a general tendency to socialism, and in a strong partiality for the hard problems of social science. The socialism resulting from this was neither French nor German, but may be considered as a German modification of French socialism; all the more

formidable in its political bearings for being sober and inobtrusive, and for being founded exclusively on the principle of self-help, while French socialists expect government to be maid-of-all-work in their phalansteries.

Thus, while the unreasoning but withal rational struggle between workmen and employers was carried on in England in a dull and stubborn manner, a parallel yet very dissimilar movement was going on, not only on the Continent, but in the very heart of London, where the "Arbeiter Bildungs Verein," having put itself in communication with the Continental societies, became, as it were, the advanced post of Continental socialism. To call this a movement may be saying too much. It was nothing but an unpremeditated spreading of certain sentiments and aspirations. Yet these foreigners had precisely what the English workmen had not, the generalizing and cosmopolitan spirit; and the English workmen had what the foreigners had not, the experience, traditions, and practical methods of unionism. Their wants and aspirations being naturally the same, or similar at least, it appears strange that these two elements were so loath to coalesce and to co-operate. Mr. Ernest Jones and a few other English Chartists had gone so far as to join the German Verein. But these Chartists were, after all, politicians only, and seem to have had no great influence with the working classes of their country.

The first attempt at denationalizing the various socialistic elements coexisting in London was made not long before the outbreak of the Revolution of 1848, when a new society was instituted in London under the name of "Society of the Fraternal Democrats," which was to comprise as many nationalities as possible. But it seems to have been a failure, and we soon lose sight of it.

Far more important and more successful was a Communist Conference held in London in November, 1847, where two Germans, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, were the principal speakers. Disowning all crudely communistic doctrines of France, they advocated a broader interpretation of the term "communism," which should embrace, they urged, all truths and aspirations which being "common" to all men are above, and independent of, nationality. In accordance with the pre-

vailing spirit of the time, they began with a plea for political liberty, but significantly added, that their "immediate * aim" was the "overthrow of the rule of the capitalists, through the acquisition of political power."

The Internationals of 1871 say no more than that. Their entire programme is contained in this manifesto of 1847. Like the Internationals of 1871, the German communists of 1847 pronounced in favor of the abolition of private property in land, and like the modern Peace and Liberty League, they advocated gratuitous education and the centralization of all means of transport in the hands of the state. Unfortunately they wanted, in addition to all this, what modern socialists have long ceased to want, the establishment of "national workshops." This was the vulnerable heel of an otherwise invulnerable body. The idea of national workshops is thoroughly French, as everybody can see at a glance. Of all socialistic schemes it is unquestionably the weakest, but it was popular in France, and the Parisian socialists, with their usual perversity of instinct, singled it out for the honors of a trial. We know that whatever may have been in store for the French Republic of 1848, its doom was hastened by the *ateliers nationaux* and by the daily increasing crowd of disappointed workmen who had been taught to believe in this *droit au travail*, that is to say, in the duty of the state to give them tools and wages, and in the duty of all other mortals to buy their work, whether they wanted it or not.

There can be no doubt that a very brisk exchange of ideas had been established between the French socialists in Paris and the German communists in London. With the downfall of the French Republic, both vanish from sight together. Yet the "saviour of society" could not annihilate these spectres. All he could do was to banish French socialists, thereby swelling the number of cosmopolitan malcontents who were encamped on the free and neutral soil of England. Very naturally, England became and long remained the head-quarters of all that was hostile to the new order of things on the Continent. With the exception of two or three small states, which, too, were often bullied into political intolerance by their mighty

* Evidently intended to express the reverse of immediate, or "ultimate."

neighbors, freedom had vanished from the Continent of Europe, and liberty, which had often taken wing to carry its blessings across the Channel, came back once more to its British home, "wounded and in despair." Can we wonder that to the exiled victims of the Revolution thus brought together on the banks of the Thames, their international differences began to appear small, indeed, when viewed from such a moral distance?

It was about that time, or during the ten or twelve years preceding the opening of the International Exhibition of 1862, that the moral and intellectual foundations for the great International League were laid. The various groups of foreign workmen residing in London began to associate more freely, not only with each other, but also with the political exiles. Thus Mazzini, Louis Blanc, Felix Pyat, became their teachers and oracles. But it was, above all, Mazzini's stirring influence on one side, and the sobering influences of English life on the other, which cleared the horizon and elevated the tone of the working classes. The intellectual phase upon which the Italian patriot had just then entered is clearly recognizable in his little treatise "On the Duties of Man." Its very title was a protest against the growing habit of reducing all political life to a continuous assertion of *rights*. The *droit au travail* of the Parisian patriots, and the endless disquisitions of the Frankfort Parliament on the "fundamental rights of man," seem to have disgusted Mazzini with the word as well as with its meaning; and he whose liberalism no man could call in question came boldly forward now to deny the assumed priority of human or civic rights, reducing them to mere prizes obtainable by certain tests, or to commodities purchasable by certain performances, and subordinating them to duty, whose claims alone were absolute, unconditional, and above discussion.

What a lasting impression this Mazzinian deontology has produced among the working classes was shown quite recently by a theoretical quarrel between the "Ligurian Workmen's Society" of Genoa, whose creed is Mazzinian, and the "Italian Section" of the International Association, which held a conference at Rome in October last. This quarrel soon became a quarrel between Mazzini and Garibaldi, or between Mazzinians and Garibaldians as such. But the antithesis of these two

names coincides pretty well with the antithesis of duty and right, the leading organ of one party being called *Il Dovere*, that of the other (its oldest organ at least) being called *Il Diritto*. Mazzini is not only *not* a member of the International Association, but is its most formidable opponent. Nevertheless, he is a socialist himself, having strong ideas of his own on socialistic matters. He recommended a *sliding scale* for workmen's wages as a thoroughgoing remedy for workmen's wrongs. The scheme never found favor with the men of the International Society, and no allusion to it can be found in any edition of its often-amended programme. In fact, it was at once eclipsed and superseded by the new doctrine of co-operation. But considering that co-operation, in its turn, has been found wanting, and is now all but thrown overboard by the new leaders of the league, this theoretical controversy is insufficient to explain the remarkable antagonism still existing between the Republican leader and the International Association. It is well known, however, that Mazzini's open hostility was provoked, not by any economic heresy, but by the obtrusive atheism of some of the International leaders, who are fond of saying their *credo* or *non credo* before they begin a speech on strikes or workmen's wages. The more irrelevant and inconsistent these philosophic digressions are, the more we must regret that they have been the cause of Mazzini's estrangement, and that, through them, the International Association has lost the services of one of the noblest minds and finest characters of European democracy.

But we must return to the time when Mazzini was writing his book on the duties of man. Whatever the influence of the political refugees may have been at that time, it is certain that there were two other agencies at work in England which tended to prepare the working classes for what we beg leave to call *Internationalism*. One was an æsthetic, the other a purely intellectual one. Both emanated from France.

Thanks to Napoleon's friendly attitude and to his Anglo-French alliance, a general revulsion of feeling had taken place in England. France became the fashion of the day, — not the political France, of course, but the France of Paris. Not unnaturally, the sudden change became first perceptible in the

minutiæ of every-day life. Englishmen ceased to shave their chins. No ornament, no pattern or design, was deemed *comme il faut*, unless imported from France, and the revolution of taste was so general and so rapid that England seemed almost ashamed of the proverbial solidity of her manufactures. Every trade had to revise and modify its methods, but, above all, its patterns and designs. There was a real mania for new designs. The South Kensington Museum was founded, and with it a School of Design, which was, indeed, a novelty in England. The mission of this school was to add elegance to comfort, grace to solidity, beauty to usefulness. Workmen had to be sent to Paris and other Continental towns to study and to copy whatever they could find of new forms and shapes and colors. Prizes for table ornaments were offered and awarded by the South Kensington Museum, and nothing was left undone or untried that seemed likely to revolutionize the old habits and standards of English taste. Of course, the thing was overdone. Whether the demand or the supply, the buying classes or the working classes, were responsible for this, we cannot decide. But a considerable part of the responsibility belongs, unquestionably, to the South Kensington Museum, which became a regular *entrepôt* for foreign patterns and classical designs. The consequence was that old England, the land of comfort and of common sense, became overstocked with knick-knack, *bric-à-brac*, and all kinds of impossible utensils. Not all decanters pour well that are of Etruscan shape, and if a milk-jug cannot be emptied or cleaned, its nautilus beauty affords but a poor consolation for its defects. The genius of South Kensington, in opening a new era of English art and industry, seems to have shaken the old belief in fitness and solidity, and to have treated it as though it were a clumsy superstition.

But whatever the merits or disadvantages of this æsthetic revolution may have been, the many new desires engendered by it added greatly to the importance of the International Exhibition which took place in 1862, and this, in its turn, enhanced the denationalization of the English taste, by tempting it with foreign ware and suggesting new channels of commerce. Nevertheless it is difficult for us now to understand the marked

eagerness with which the deputation of French workmen sent over by the workshops of Paris was received in London by a special "French Workmen Reception Committee," or the immense importance attached by the French workmen not only to this visit and to the reception they met with, but to the very existence of a workingmen's delegation, freely elected by the workmen of Imperial Paris.

The historians of the International Society are in the habit of considering this French visit to London as the true origin of the association. Yet we know that the plan of an international league was not even alluded to during that visit, that the speeches delivered on the occasion contained nothing but an exchange of compliments and friendly assurances, and, what is more characteristic still, that the trades-unions themselves had nothing to do with the reception of the French guests and were not even represented in the Reception Committee. This looks as if these international courtesies had been due to the initiative of some outsiders or amateurs not belonging to the trades-unions; and who knows how long the latter would have continued to stand aloof and to ignore or to resist the new sentiment of international brotherhood, had not the revolution of taste been accompanied by another movement whose influence could reach the workingmen only through those who were willing to become their leaders and capable of imparting to them what they lacked most, the power of initiative?

The agency producing this intellectual movement in England was Auguste Comte's so-called Positive Philosophy; a philosophy which applies the strictly scientific methods hitherto followed in the exact sciences to all other intellectual pursuits, — to history, politics, and social science. Comte maintained that the scientific method could have no limitations. But he took not only the method, but also its results for granted, thereby making the method superfluous, and instead of seeking, and making others seek, the truth, he became at once the high-priest of a dogma. One must be a born Frenchman to worship Comte's new deity, Humanity. The goddess Reason of the first Revolution was far more godlike and adorable than her Comtean hypostasis, which even in France never obtained the honors of public worship, — the "Synthetical Festival" prescribed by

Comte in his system of social worship, having (as far as we know) never been celebrated on any *jour de l'an*. The religious sentiment being very strong in Comte, his atheism was a reticent non-affirmation rather than a negation, and differed from the antitheism of other atheists. His doctrine of humanity, too, when stripped of the ritualistic nonsense that hangs around it, will be found a very rational one. Humanity, though never perfect, is ever perfectible, and this perfectibility can well be raised to the rank of something superhuman or divine. When it becomes man's highest aim and is pointed out as implying all our duties, we not only obtain a perfect code of morality, but may obtain, what Christianity has not given us, a scientific system of ethics. We should then have found a common ground for all men, on which all intellects might exert their powers, and all hearts gratify their cravings. Comtism thus freed from its dogmatics would become, like Freemasonry, acceptable to all, even to disbelievers, and repelling none but the wicked. A social philosophy proclaiming "Love as the Principle, Order as the Basis, and Progress as the End," cannot be attacked and need not be defended.

But it may be asked, what has all this to do with the International Workingmen's Association? At first sight, very little. Yet all the principal leaders of the working classes in England are avowed Comtists, and their pleadings for the workman's cause are not only founded on arguments supposed to be peculiar to Positivism, but often expressed in terms borrowed from Comte's phraseology. Such a coalition of French philosophy and English socialism cannot have been the result of chance. And if the essential features of the two doctrines have been blended so easily, it is more than probable that the non-essential features of the former will, in their turn, exercise a more or less deranging influence on the latter. Comtism always had a strange fascination for the English mind. Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, which was translated into English by Miss Martineau, had a remarkable success in England, and soon enjoyed what we would call a secret popularity. The author being an unbeliever, and yet intensely religious, neither Churchmen nor sceptics had much to say against him. Moreover, Comtism had the recommendation of being French, a

nouveauté de Paris of great originality, and it had the additional advantage of being, though French and though philosophy, quite free from any revolutionary taint. In the Preface to his "Positive Religion" Comte says: "We come forward to deliver the Western world from an *anarchical democracy* and from a retrograde aristocracy. . . . . In fact we sociocrats * are as little democratical as we are aristocratical. . . . . Our official conservatives are behindhand, it is true, and yet the mere revolutionist seems to me still more alien to the true spirit of the time."

It is clear that if Comte's doctrine was socialistic, it was socialism in the garb of conservative respectability. *Pour détruire, il faut remplacer.* Doomed aristocracy was at once to be replaced, society at once to be indemnified for the loss by a new hierarchy, closely resembling that of the Roman Church, which was to maintain *order* in the world. Comte dreaded anarchy more than anything else. Both liberty and equality were to be sacrificed to the principle of order, and fraternity, under the new name of "altruism," was to take their place.

That a certain positivism pre-existed in England is undeniable, as it existed even in Germany where Comte's name is but little known and where his doctrine would hardly be called philosophy. Men like J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer are positivists, without professing to be Comtists. But M. Laugel (in an article published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of February 15, 1864) seems to have no difficulty in tracing the influence of Comte even in the writings of Mr. Mill, and especially in those of Mr. Buckle. Professor Huxley, too, admits (in an article quoted in the "Beehive" of November 4, 1871) "that he is indebted to Comte for the conviction which I shall always be thankful to him for awakening in me, that the organization of society upon a new and purely scientific basis is not only practicable, but is the only political object much worth fighting for." Again, Professor Beesley, one of the most active and eloquent leaders of the socialistic movement, in a lecture delivered in May, 1868, to a meeting of trades-union men, attacked productive co-operation on the ground that it was

* We are not responsible for the hybrid word.

based on the joint-stock principle, and recommended unionism as the only means of "keeping the capitalist up to his duty, until a *religious* influence shall have been organized which will produce the same result." This "religious influence" is to eradicate "jealousy and personal rivalry," and to induce "forgetfulness of self and readiness to obey rather than eagerness to command." Moses, the finest "theocratic type," was ready (the Professor continues) to be blotted out of God's book, so that the humblest and lowest of his people might enter the promised land. And Danton, when reminded of his "reputation," asked, "What is that? Blighted be my name, but let France be free." We quote these passages as good instances of Comtean phraseology. Professor Beesley's lecture was published in the "Fortnightly Review," whose editor is a Comtist, and headed with the following quotation from Comte: "The working class is not, properly speaking, a class at all, but constitutes the body of society. From it proceed the various special classes which we may regard as organs necessary to that body." Two other lectures were delivered to the workmen of the unions in the spring of the same year, 1868, one by Mr. Congreve, the translator of Comte's "Catechism of Positivism," and author of the "System of Positive Philosophy" and of the "System of Positive Politics"; the other by Mr. Frederick Harrison, the well-known apologist of the Paris Commune, and an able contributor to the "Fortnightly Review," mentioned above.

Further proofs are hardly required to show that the doctrines of the French philosopher were spreading fast among the literary men of England; that they were persistently preached by these to the workingmen of the trades-unions; that Comtism, subordinating everything, even liberty and patriotism, to the paramount claims of humanity, furnished the most appropriate framework for any scheme of international alliance, but more particularly among those who are now arrayed against each other as working rivals in times of peace, as fighting enemies in times of war; and that the intimate connection which exists between the spread of Comtism in England and the origin and growth of the International Association is more than an historical concidence, — a logical collegation.

Many learned and literary men, and many others who had nothing but wealth and leisure to devote to the cause of Positivism, had volunteered to become the protectors of the workingmen. Not that the latter had ever solicited anybody's protection, but they sadly wanted both leaders and instructors. Their initiative had never gone beyond the narrow sphere of the trades-union, and their knowledge and range of ideas seemed subject to the same limitations. The minute division of labor which English manufacturers had long carried to an excess had cramped and lamed the workman's faculties. What can we expect of a man who is doomed to make pins' heads and nothing but pins' heads all his life, or of his companion who sharpens the points from morning till night? Such men become slaves, not only of their employer, but of each other, since they cannot get on alone in life. Five or six of them make a man, one might say. How can we wonder that in their acquired onesidedness they have trained themselves to feel but one want, higher wages, and to wield but one weapon, the strike!

They knew, however, the shortcomings of that weapon. They knew that it sometimes cuts the cutter. For, had not the great builders' strike of 1859 been a failure, notwithstanding its magnitude and long duration? They felt the want of a safer and more powerful weapon. But unable to invent one themselves, they became ready listeners to those who had volunteered to enlighten and to instruct them, and in whose benevolence and superior knowledge they had good reason to believe. Their fashionable and accomplished protectors displayed an extraordinary activity. Hardly a week passed without some meeting, lecture, or conference being held. Even cabmen's clubs and reading-rooms were founded. Pamphlets were written and distributed by the thousand, as if they were religious tracts. Occasionally the magazines and some of the daily papers were pressed into service, but very soon special papers were founded for the exclusive advocacy of the workingman's cause. Of these we will mention only the "Beehive," of London, appearing twice a week, the "Co-operator," a weekly paper, of Manchester, and the "Social Economist," also a co-operative review, which, stanch to its principles, transferred its

funds and all its hands to a newly formed North of England Printing Society, to avoid journalistic rivalry as something "hurtful to co-operative reputation." Mr. Bradlaugh's "National Reformer" (a free-thought journal) and some respectable old papers like the Birmingham "Western Post" and the London "Eastern Post" willingly opened their columns to the advocates of the new cause; and, among the quarterly magazines, the "Westminster Review" (chiefly inspired, if not edited, by Mr. Mill) became the most dignified, though not the most popular, champion of the new movement.

The workingmen have reason to regret that as soon as the labor question was raised and publicly discussed, two other questions cropped up quite suddenly, — the question of political reform and the religious dilemma of "free thought or ritualism," which distracted and divided the attention of the public, and overtaxed the energies of the socialistic leaders, who were ambitious men, and could not see a fire without having an iron in it. Although the political and the socialist movements were closely connected, the franchise being in this case a political means for a socialistic end, the multiplicity of "questions" may well have retarded the work of the international propaganda, which ought to have led more rapidly to tangible results. All the elements necessary for the great international phenomenon were ready, — the solid organization of the trades-unions, the denationalization of English taste, the cosmopolitan spirit of the new philosophy, and the socialistic proclivities of the German emigrants. Nothing, it would seem, was wanting but the quickening flash of opportunity, that might impel these germs to burst forth into one new existence.

There is something humorous, nay, almost ludicrous, in the fact that that opportunity was furnished by the Polish insurrection of 1863. The International Association and the labor question have as much to do with the Polish insurrection as the Franco-German war of 1870 had to do with the Hohenzollern candidature to the Spanish throne. Yet the incidental connection cannot be denied. Our intellectual atmosphere is, like the physical atmosphere, loaded with the ingredients for clouds: they float about, invisible and isolated, until they can gather round some eminence of personality, or impinge upon

some stubborn fact. Then they become visible. The cloud itself becomes a fact and starts on its career, to spend itself, as the case may be, in fertilizing showers or in devastating hail-storms.

The Parisian Democrats, knowing that their sympathies for Poland would have less weight with the Emperor than the supposed anti-Polish counsels of the British government, wanted to induce the English Democrats to exercise the necessary pressure on Lord Palmerston. And for this purpose they availed themselves of those channels of intercourse which had quite recently been opened between the working classes of the two countries. The Parisian workshops were invited by the Democrats to send a deputation of workmen to London for the special purpose of inducing the London workmen to convene public meetings in favor of Poland. How these men carried out their mission is not known, their movements being masked by the far more conspicuous movements of the Polish emigrants, who, being better linguists, and having to advocate their own cause, occupied a more prominent position in society as well as on the platform. When, however, on the 22d July, 1863, a public meeting in favor of Poland was held in St. James's Hall, the French deputation unexpectedly stepped on the platform, and having announced the object of their mission, were enthusiastically cheered. They were invited to meet the chairman and his friends next day at the Bell Inn, Old Bailey, and it was then and there that the establishment of an international league of workingmen was, for the first time, seriously taken into consideration.

Mr. George Odger, a shoemaker, who had been long before the public, and who was known to have been the founder and chairman of a "Trades-Unionist, Manhood Suffrage, and Vote by Ballot Association," in 1860, very ably explained that if labor was to be effectually protected against the encroachments of capital, this could only be done through an international compact, which would make it impossible for capitalists and employers to apply to foreign labor markets in case of a strike. His French friends admitted that, but urged the necessity of confining their efforts, for the moment, to the liberation of Poland. The two things had nothing to do with

each other. But Mr. Odger was not the man to be daunted by such trifling difficulties. The opportunity was far too precious to be lost. He wanted the co-operation of the French workmen, and something of it he was determined to secure on the spot. Like a clever, single-minded, yet not narrow-minded man, he at once made room on his platform for anything his French friends desired to put upon it. And it is owing to this circumstance that we see the figure of Poland on it, remaining for more than a year by the side of the British workman, — an awkward juxtaposition rather than a group.

The practical result of the Bell Inn meeting was that a committee of five was appointed, and that Mr. Odger, being one of the five, was charged with the drawing up of an address to the workingmen of France.

Mr. Odger deserves credit for the able manner in which he acquitted himself of this task. There is something Ciceronian in the arrangement of his arguments. To fix the attention of his French readers, he begins with Poland; but instead of dwelling on the best means for its liberation, he deduces from its subjection the necessity of an international alliance, not, indeed, of governments, but of peoples.

"Let there be a gathering together of representatives from France, Italy, Germany, Poland, England. . . . . Let us have our congresses, let us discuss the questions on which the peace of nations depends. . . . . This would clear the way for honorable men with comprehensive minds to come forth to legislate for the rights of the many, and not for the privileges of the few. . . . . A fraternity of peoples," he goes on to say, "is highly necessary for the cause of labor; for we find that whenever we attempt to better our social condition by reducing the hours of toil or by raising the price of our labor, our employers threaten us with bringing over Frenchmen, Germans, Belgians, and others, to do our work at a reduced rate of wages; and . . . . this has been done, not from any desire to injure us, but from a want of systematic communication between the industrious classes of all countries. . . . . We hope to bring up the wage of the ill-paid to as near a level as possible with that of those who are better remunerated, and not to allow our employers to play us off one against the other, and so drag us down to the lowest possible condition."

Rather more than a year elapsed before the arrival of the French reply, the delay being due to the difficulty the Paris

workmen seem to have had in scraping together the necessary funds for the outfit of a new embassy to London. Like the English address, the French reply began with Poland. But the insurrection having in the mean time been stifled, the writer, being under the depressing yet calming influence of an accomplished fact, seems to have felt unable to dwell on the subject, and turned abruptly to the labor question, whose urgency could no longer be denied. The signers of the document declare war "against the financial and industrial aristocracy, against division of labor, and against free-trade when unrestricted by the solidarity of laborers." They point out to their fellow-workmen the danger of allowing their small savings to accumulate in the hands of the future aristocracy. "Moved by a charitable feeling and by a desire to protect us, whether we wish it or not, they have a thousand ingenious ways of taking from the workman his small capital, instead of exciting his initiative for his own benefit. The division of labor tends to make of each workman a piece of mechanism in the hands of the great lords of industry. . . . . Through the want of professional education, science has become the privilege of capital; . . . . and free-trade, without the solidarity of laborers, will engender industrial serfdom more implacable and more fatal to humanity than that which our fathers overthrew in the days of our Revolution."

While this document was being prepared, the London committee, feeling sure of their success in Paris, made strenuous efforts to secure the adhesion of the leading workmen and socialists of other countries. Easy though this was, it entailed a great loss of time, and more than a twelvemonth had passed before a new meeting, and this time a truly international meeting, could be appointed. It was on the 28th September, 1864, that the London committee met to receive their foreign guests in St. Martin's Hall. Professor Beesley presided, and everything was done to impart a certain solemnity to the meeting. The assembly, though small, was in a certain sense an international workingmen's parliament. Yet, with the exception of the French deputation, it was not a representative assembly. Its members were self-appointed missionaries. Even the English committee had no mandate from the trades-unions. Only

the French guests, having come to London at the expense of the workmen of Paris, could boast of being both their representatives and their ambassadors. At all events, the meeting had the dignity of a constituent assembly, and its date, the 28th September, 1864, is not unjustly considered as the real birthday of the International Association.

The first step was the appointment of a *Central Committee*, consisting of workingmen of the different countries represented, which was to draw up a provisional code of regulations and a declaration of principles, both to be submitted to an international congress which, it was hoped, would be held next year at Brussels. The Central Committee, which was bound to reside permanently in London, installed itself at No. 18 Greek Street, Soho, where it held its first sitting on Wednesday, the 5th October, 1864. It consisted of twenty-seven English, two French, one Swiss, two German members, two members for Italy, and one for Poland. Fifteen new members being added in the course of the week, the committee became a body of fifty. Mr. Odger was elected President, Mr. Wheeler, Treasurer, and Mr. Cremer, General Secretary. It was agreed that these three offices should remain in the hands of English workingmen, but that there should be one Corresponding Secretary for every nationality represented in the committee. Le Lubez, being a good linguist, was elected Secretary for France, Dr. Marx for Germany, Hermann Jung for Switzerland, Major Wolff for Italy, and Holthorp for Poland. Of the other members of the Central Committee we need mention only Facey, Goddard, Howell, Lucraft, Weston, Eccarius, and Bosquet, as those whose names occur most frequently in the annals of the International Society. Tolain, an equally celebrated leader, did not belong to the Central Committee of 1864.

Considering the difficulties which this motley and polyglot assembly must have had to contend with in their deliberations, we cannot but admire the political tact they showed at the very outset. They began by declaring themselves incompetent to deal with all questions involving a consideration of local or national politics. Aiming at universality, and wishing their principles to take root in the old monarchies of Europe as well as in the republics of the New World, they deprecated all polit-

ical conspiracy and renounced all schemes which could be carried out only by secret societies.

The English members of the committee had a special difficulty to deal with. They stood outside the trades-unions, and, therefore, outside the great bulk of the working classes of England. How could they come forward to advocate the cause of the working classes, or to speak in their name? Might not the trades-unions have denounced them as officious and obtrusive amateurs? Moreover, the growth of the International Association depended mainly on centralization of power, and therefore either on the spontaneous co-operation of the independent trades-unions, or on their formal resignation of autonomy. And the trades-unions being notoriously proud of their autonomies, the new association seemed as impossible with the trades-unions as it was impossible without them. The Central Committee, however, was prudent enough to avoid even the appearance of rivalry or opposition, assuring these powerful bodies that the English branch of the International Association would never aspire to be more than a federation of all the existing unions and trade societies, whose special institutions would, under all circumstances, be respected and left intact.

With regard to the rules of the society and the declaration of principles, there was some dissension in the sub-committee, which had to discuss these matters. After having rejected two papers as being either too long or too "theoretical," they agreed on adopting a third, which its principal author, Dr. Marx, had submitted to the Central Committee on the 1st of November. From its long preamble we can quote only the most characteristic expressions. It points out the difference between "the political economy of the middle classes" founded on the "blind rule of supply and demand," and "the political economy of the working classes" founded on "social production," controlled by "social foresight." It speaks in high terms of admiration of the co-operative movement, not so much of the co-operation for consumption as of that for production, the co-operative factories affording a proof that production *on a large scale* is possible without the existence of a class of masters, and it expresses a conviction that "all *hired labor*, like slave and serf labor, is but a transitory form destined to disappear before

associated labor." In order to shorten the present period of transition, it exhorts the working classes to exercise a strong pressure on their political rulers, and, wherever that is impracticable, to watch their diplomacy and to denounce their intrigues as "immoral and mischievous."

The Declaration of Principles runs as follows: —

"Considering that the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves; that the struggle for the emancipation of the working classes means, not a struggle for class privileges, but for equal rights and duties and the abolition of all class rule; that the economical subjection of the man of labor to the monopolizer of the means of labor, — that is, the sources of life, — lies at the bottom of servitude in all its forms, of all social misery, mental degradation, and political dependence; that the economical emancipation of the working classes is, therefore, *the great end, to which every political movement ought to be subordinate as a means;* that all efforts aiming at that great end have hitherto failed from the want of solidarity between the manifold divisions of labor in each country, and from the absence of a fraternal bond of union between the working classes of different countries; that the emancipation of labor is neither a local nor a national, but a social problem, embracing all countries in which modern society exists, and depending for its solution on the concurrence, practical and theoretical, of the most advanced countries; that the present revival of the working classes in the most industrious countries of Europe, while it raises a new hope, gives solemn warning against a relapse into the old errors, and calls for the immediate combination of the still disconnected movements; — for these reasons the undersigned members of the committee holding its powers by resolution of the public meeting held on September 28, 1864, at St. Martin's Hall, London, have taken the steps necessary for founding the International Workingmen's Association. They declare that the International Association, and all societies and individuals adhering to it, will acknowledge truth, justice, and morality as the basis of their conduct towards each other and towards all men, without regard to color, creed, or nationality. They hold it the duty of a man to claim the rights of a man and a citizen, not only for himself, but for every man who does his duty. *No rights without duties, no duties without rights.* And in this spirit they have drawn up the following provisional rules of the International Association. . . . ."

These rules need not be quoted *in extenso*. The principal paragraphs enacted, that a general *Congress* should meet once

a year; that the executive power should be vested in a *Central Council* yearly appointed by the Congress, but having power to add new members to its board; that the Central Council should form an internal agency between the different associations, so that the workingmen in one country may be constantly informed of the movements of their class in every other country; that questions of general interest mooted in one society should be ventilated in all, and, when immediate practical steps are needed, as, for instance, in case of international quarrels, the action of the associated societies should be simultaneous and uniform; that until the meeting of the first Congress the Central Committee should act as *Provisional Central Council;* that any member of the International Association, on removing his domicile from one country to another, should receive the fraternal support of the associated workingmen, and that the workingmen's societies joining the International Association should preserve their institutions intact.

After having unanimously adopted this constitution, the International Assembly closed its session towards the end of the year 1864.

Like apostles of a new creed these men went forth into the world, each returning to his own country, to his own workshop, to spread the good tidings and to scatter the new seed. Their success, however, was less rapid than might have been expected. The French delegates hastened, on their arrival in Paris, to inform the Emperor of the results of their meeting at St. Martin's Hall, and urged M. Rouher to furnish them with the necessary means for the establishment of an International Branch Society in Paris. It is believed that the request was granted, and that the Imperial government continued, for some time, to subsidize this society. The incident is highly characteristic of the giver as well as of the petitioners. The first thing a Frenchman thinks of is an appeal to his government, as though he could do nothing without its help. And yet, though subsidized by government, the Paris association was, of all the workmen's societies of Europe, the only one that failed to pay, for nearly two years, its contribution to the International exchequer of London. Whether Napoleon took a purely philosophical interest in the new phenomenon, or whether

he courted popularity with the working classes by becoming their patron, as he had courted popularity with the rural population by becoming the protector of the Pope, we do not care to decide. At any rate, he treated the matter with his habitual unsteadiness. And thinking perhaps, with Goethe, that it was easier to confound and to bewilder people than to satisfy them, he stroked the animal before striking it. For, immediately after the great bronze-moulders' strike of Paris (by organizing which, the International Association was erroneously supposed to have tested the working order of its own organization), the friendly attitude of the Imperial government changed suddenly into open hostility. The Paris section was no longer permitted to publish manifestoes or pamphlets, or to receive those published abroad. Its foreign correspondence, and, among other things, eight hundred packets containing copies of the Rules of the International Association, were seized by the Imperial police,* and the society was so closely watched that it was forced to become, in a measure at least, a secret society.

Difficulties of a very different kind retarded the progress of the new movement in England. The Italian society residing in London, and the German "Arbeiter Bildungs Verein," had joined the International without a moment's hesitation. But the English trades-unions were anything but eager to do so, and many other societies, when invited by special deputations to adhere to the new compact, replied evasively, or asked for "time to consider." It should also be remembered that the year 1865, being fraught with the germs of the political events of 1866, was no favorable time for the furtherance of schemes founded on international fraternity. Denmark, Prussia, and Austria were debating over the Holstein question, the old Bund was threatened with collapse, Italy was coveting Venetia and building ironclads, and the peace of France was nothing better than a *pax Romana;* while England, the only comfortable head-quarters of the International army, was all astir with the Reform agitation, which was the more prejudicial to the socialistic movement, as, in the opinion of many, the extension of the political franchise to the workingmen embraced and

* These papers were restored a year later, in consequence of the intercession of Lord Cowley, the English Ambassador at Paris.

implied everything the International Society could reasonably desire. Not fewer than fourteen members of the Central Committee were also members of the Council of the Reform League; and although the men of the Reform League were serving, unconsciously, the workman's cause, even without belonging to any workmen's association, the interests of the newly organized and not yet consolidated society suffered indirectly from this state of things, and the slightest appearance of neglect or indifference on the part of the committee-men was apt to produce an unfavorable impression on many foreign members who knew and cared but little about English politics and English Reform.

Nor was this all. The Italian members of the Council, who, it would seem, could not live long in London without feeling the powerful influence of Mazzini, began suddenly to look upon the whole movement from a new point of view. And their conversion was so rapid and so complete, that they withdrew from the committee altogether.

Le Lubez, too, resigned his post, though his reasons were personal only, not doctrinal. He had appointed Lefort, a good penman, to defend the cause of the society in the French papers. But the workmen of Paris repudiated the patronage of a man whom they considered as a "*bourgeois* republican," and, what was worse, they denied the right of the London Council to interfere with what they called their own affairs. The Council, respecting their autonomy, decided against Le Lubez, and the latter, resenting the disavowal, withdrew.

More untoward, however, than all this was the passing of an Alien Act in Belgium, which prevented the meeting of a workingmen's congress in Brussels. In lieu of the intended congress, a conference was held in London in September, 1865, where, however, no very important business could be transacted, the Continent being represented by only ten delegates. Here the spectre of Poland appears once more on the platform. But it was for the last time. The French delegates, coming from a paradise of forbidden fruits, begged to be excused from all political discussions, and yielded only to Mr. Odger's arguments, who maintained that in consideration of the historical connection between the cause of Poland and the origin of their

society, the conference was in honor bound neither to abandon nor to ignore it. It was agreed that the first International Congress should meet at Geneva in September, 1866, and it was decided, though only after a long and animated discussion, that the right of voting and of speaking at the Congress should not be granted to "individual members" or to persons not belonging to any trade society, but only to delegates elected by affiliated societies, and therefore only to persons owning a twofold responsibility and a twofold allegiance to the working class.

The Congress of Geneva was opened on the 5th of September, 1866. Although a good many trades-unions had joined the International Association in the course of the year, only seven delegates from England were present. The French societies had sent seventeen, and thirty-six were Swiss. Among the London delegates was one Frenchman, Eugène Dupont, who represented the French workmen residing in London; the other six were Carter, Cremer, Eccarius, Jung, Lawrence, and Odger, five of whom were really no delegates at all, having been appointed by the council at the request of various societies which could either not spare a deputy from their own ranks, or could not find among them a man of sufficient capacity for such a task.

The principal questions discussed at Geneva were, *the statistics of wages*, *the reduction of the hours of labor*, and *co-operation*. The tone and manner in which they were discussed are by no means discreditable to this first parliament of workingmen; and if any one were to doubt the usefulness of such assemblies, we would advise him to read, for instance, the debate on the eight-hours movement, published, like all the Geneva debates, in the "London International Courier" of 1866. It is interesting to compare the English, the French, and the Swiss arguments on this subject, and to observe how easily ignorance and confusion can be cleared away by a frank exchange of ideas. The Swiss, in objecting to a reduction of working hours on economical grounds, were perfectly right, and so were the French in objecting to it on the ground of individual freedom. But such, of course, were not the proper grounds to stand upon at a socialistic congress, or in a society

whose very essence it is to recognize a higher principle than either economy or liberty.

With regard to co-operation, which had been so highly recommended in the Declaration of Principles, and which had given rise to unreasonable expectations on the part of consumers and producers alike, the opinions of the workingmen assembled at Geneva had evidently undergone a considerable change. They acknowledged the principle, but expressed their conviction that no good whatever could come from co-operation, unless it were applied universally or on a gigantic scale, and significantly added, that "to transform capitalist society and to convert social production into *one* large system of free co-operative labor, general social changes are required which cannot be realized except by the *transfer* of the organized forces of society, that is to say, of the *state power from capitalists and landlords to the producers* themselves."

Among many other resolutions, one was passed in favor of *direct taxation*, and a gentle admonition was administered to the English trades-unions, many of which seemed to persist in their sullen passivity and apparent indifference for international interests.

During the four years following the Congress of Geneva, the history of the International Association runs, so to speak, in three different channels. We have the history of its ideas, the history of its propaganda, and the history of its strikes. The growth of its ideas and the elasticity of its principles will be best understood from its parliamentary history, or from the successive debates of its congresses and conferences. The history of its propaganda shows us the intellectual phases and degrees of receptivity among the working classes of the different countries, and the history of its strikes, which apparently forms the whole of its outward history, will give us an idea both of its power and of its ethics, and at the same time of the power and ethics of the masters and of the political rulers. It would be well if the historians of the International Association would arrange their materials in this manner. We cannot, however, follow this plan here, and must content ourselves with a general outline and a cursory review of the progress made by the society in the principal industrial countries of Europe and America.

In a certain sense the history of this period may, indeed, be regarded as being a history of strikes, for many of which the International Association is morally responsible. But it is a mistake to believe that strikes are directly ordered by the Council of the society. Many masters and many governments have fallen into this error, and have been haunted by visions of International emissaries, as if the workingmen could have no grievance of their own. It is not the *mot d'ordre* which the workmen receive from the International Council, but the general method of concerted action, the means for concerting it, and sometimes the means for sustaining it. In case of a lock-out, for instance, the workmen have only to telegraph to the central office in London, which immediately sends a warning to all European workmen concerned in the matter, not to accept any offers from the challenging employer or from his agents, and even societies not affiliated to the International League can avail themselves of this protection, which is never refused.

To order and to subsidize strikes would have been utterly impossible for the society, certainly during the first year of its existence, which nevertheless was a year of strikes. Its financial distress was so great in 1867, that the Reports of the Geneva Congress, containing the ratified Constitution of the League, could neither be translated nor printed (except in a newspaper whose editor volunteered to do it gratuitously), the society having only twenty-three francs in its exchequer. It is difficult to understand why the question of funds had been allowed to remain in abeyance so long, and why no common tariff of admission fees and yearly contributions had been agreed upon even before the London Conference of 1865. At Geneva the yearly contribution was fixed at thirty centimes, which had subsequently to be reduced to five centimes; but the rates varied, it seems, in different countries, as we hear, for instance, of a tax of ten centimes per annum levied by the Paris section on its members. The English trade societies, on joining the League in a body, paid an entrance fee of five shillings, after which it was left to their generosity to assist the General Council by voluntary contributions.

This state of things, however, does not seem to have lasted

long. The distress so bitterly complained of in the Reports of the Congress of Lausanne (held in September, 1867) no longer occupied the attention of the next congress, held at Brussels in September, 1868, and we have many other reasons to infer that, by that time, the society had entered upon a new era of prosperity and power. Like an avalanche, it grew slowly and imperceptibly in the beginning of its career, but as soon as it began visibly to gain in size and strength, even the rate of its increase increased from day to day, while the obstacles it had to overcome either remained stationary or increased only sufficiently to stimulate its growth and to enhance its importance.

In France, twenty-six societies had adhered to the International League by the end of 1867, and formed *sections* of it. Since the war between Prussia and Austria, the International, and, therefore, anti-Chauvinistic spirit of these societies had excited more than ever the jealousy and ill-will of the Imperial government. All workmen's meetings were prohibited or otherwise rendered impossible, and a little later, when the International Bureau of Paris had joined the London Council in a protest (*ultra crepidam*, it seems) against the execution of some Fenian prisoners, Napoleon, being anxious to oblige the British government, ordered the offices of the Bureau de Paris to be searched by the police under the pretext that they had become the head-quarters of Fenianism. As no incriminating papers could be found, the members of the bureau were indicted for being the heads of a "non-authorized society of more than twenty persons," and on this plea the bureau was closed, its papers confiscated, and its nine members sent to prison. At the Congress of Brussels a letter was read, dated "S^te. Pélagie," in which they explained their involuntary absence.

It need hardly be mentioned that these proceedings of the Imperial government, though apparently successful, were in reality failures. The good-will of the working classes, which was obviously more essential than the gratitude of England to the stability of a throne founded on plebiscitary right, was irretrievably lost to the Imperial government. The Plebiscite of 1870, which went against the Emperor in all the large towns and in the manufacturing districts, was a remote consequence and an unequivocal proof of this estrangement.

But the workmen had to suffer more from their own masters than from their political ruler. It is well known that many manufacturers disapproved of the Emperor's free-trade policy, and were smarting under the commercial treaty with England. The cotton-spinners of the Département de la Somme were right in considering the question whether it was possible to undersell their English rivals. The rate of wages being lower in France than in England, competition was possible, provided the quality of the French goods could be made equal or superior to that of the English goods, and the masters were ready to suffer a slight reduction of profits. They met at Amiens to discuss the matter, but came to the conclusion that by reducing the workmen's wages instead of their own profits, they would obtain the desired end in a manner far more agreeable to themselves. Nobody can say anything against their logic or their arithmetic. But they went a little further, and argued that the wages of their unfortunate workmen might be reduced to such a level as would enable the masters to beat the English not only in France, but in England itself. And such a commercial invasion of England would not only be profitable to the ingenuous invaders, but also flattering to the workmen, who (they thought) would be French enough and patriotic enough to swallow the bitter pill of low wages when silvered with such prospects of glory.

The result of this brilliant scheme was the strike of Sotteville-lez-Rouen, one of the classical strikes of France. The workmen struck work in December, 1868, and it was only after having exhausted all their means of resistance that the workmen's committee of Rouen applied to the International Council of London for aid. Subsidies were promised, but owing to the distress just then prevailing in the manufacturing districts of England, the necessary funds could not be raised at once, and when, at last, they were forthcoming, the workmen of Rouen, unable to hold out any longer, had given in. Two things follow from this: first, that the strike of Sotteville had not been ordered by the International Council; and secondly, that at the end of 1868, the International Society had no funds for subsidizing a large strike. For, if such funds had existed, their employment on this occasion would have served the double

purpose of supporting the claims of the French workmen, and of securing the English workmen against the more practicable and less Quixotic part of the Rouen programme. When the Normandy workmen had become aware that they could not yet rely on the International Council for aid, in sudden emergencies, they organized, without delay, trades-unions among themselves, and, what they had not done before, formally joined the International Association.

In the same manner, the strikes of Lyons, an account of which may be found in the Report of the General Council, read on September 7, 1869, at the Congress of Bale, show that it was not the International Society which led the workmen to strike work, but that it was the strike which led them to join the International Society.

In the strike of St. Etienne, which began on the 11th June, 1869, we have a typical specimen of the bloody strike. Here the intervention of the soldiery led to what the workingmen like to call the *massacre de la Ricamerie*, in which twelve workmen, two women, and one child were killed, and many others wounded. When miners on strike find the mine guarded by soldiers, they have, strictly speaking, no right to complain, the mine not being theirs. Moreover, the Report of the General Council says that there were sixty miners "desirous to converse with those who were in the pit"; and as it does not tell us who the persons in the pit were, we must suppose that they were resistent workmen, unwilling to join the strikers, and, for that reason placed, like the mines themselves, under military protection. This protection, which is legally right and politically necessary, looks illegitimate from a socialistic point of view. It certainly is dangerous among French-speaking and French-tempered people. French soldiers are prone to use their arms, where English policemen would not even lift their maces. Their protection led to bloodshed, and the bloodshed to a very long and careful judicial inquiry, which proved many things, but which failed to prove what it was partly intended to prove, the strongly suspected complicity of the International Society.

In Belgium the society was remarkably successful in the beginning. But the political intrigues of a powerful and sin-

gularly restless clerical party, which is the bane of the little kingdom, and whose activity puts its free institutions to the severest test, soon brought discord and apostasy into the ranks of the workingmen. It was easy enough for conservative or clerical ministers to retard and to obstruct the propagation of International doctrines, but they could not prevent their importation. They firmly believed that all Belgian strikes were caused by these imported doctrines, and their inability to shut out the cause made them doubly anxious to suppress the supposed effect. The Belgian government has shown greater zeal than any other government in repressing strikes, or in otherwise meddling with them, and we cannot wonder that almost all the great Belgian strikes have ended in bloodshed. After the strike of the Charleroi miners in 1868, the International Association had to support the widows of the many victims killed by the soldiers, as it had also to appoint and to pay lawyers for the defence of the accused workmen. In 1869, the puddlers of Seraing and the miners of the Borinage district struck work simultaneously, which led to a succession of bloody affrays during four consecutive nights. This double strike was so ill-advised (for reasons into which we need not enter here), and the miners had committed such an obvious mistake in following the puddlers' example, that the Belgian authorities thought the advice must have come from a distant friend, while the International Council inferred that the advice had come from an insidious enemy on the spot. And so sure were they of this, that they despatched an agent from London with instructions *to dissuade* the Borinage miners from continuing the strike, and to counsel moderation to the puddlers of Seraing. Here, then, the complicity of the International Society was neither provable nor probable, and shortly after the strike the General Council published a rather strongly worded manifesto, in which they remind the public that the International Association is not a secret society, and that it is averse to all underhand dealings. That it is, so to speak, morally responsible for a great number of Belgian strikes, it would be impossible to deny; the influence of its doctrines, even in parts where no member of the association had ever penetrated, being so universally felt that the workmen, to quote the Bale Report of 1869, "ne parlent que d'Elle, n'ont espérance qu'en Elle."

Switzerland took kindly to its International guests, but only slowly to their doctrines. The institutions of the country being free, and public opinion somewhat backward, both these circumstances can be accounted for. The relations between master and workmen were of a patriarchal character. The masters were good, the wages low, the workmen contented. But the masters' goodness was more a matter of good-nature than of justice, of temper than of principle. It was the cheap and profitable goodness of the slaveholder. The masters were proud of the contentedness of their men, and were convinced that the men were content *because* the wages were low, and would remain content only so long as the wages remained low. Any doctrine tending to make the workingmen more independent was necessarily hateful to the masters, and they were determined to resist its consequences if they could not prevent its spread. Their position was a strong one. They were not only the employers of their workmen, but in many cases their landlords, so that the personal dependence of the workmen was shared by their families. How could the men strike work without exposing their families to the danger of immediate eviction? Yet their new leaders taught them to face the enemy. They learned to strike, and the masters were not slow in using reprisals. At Bale it was the masters who began the quarrel. They wished to rescind the customary half-holiday on Michaelmas-day, and threatened to dismiss any workman not returning to the factory in the afternoon. The men accepted the challenge; and the consequence was a lock-out which lasted several months. At the same time hundreds of families were driven from their dwellings, and to make this wholesale eviction as cruel as possible, the masters took care to warn all tradesmen not to give credit to the homeless families. The printers' strike of Geneva, which took place in March, 1869, threatened to lead to bloodshed, many citizens having taken up arms against the workmen, whose strike they considered to be the work of the dreaded International League. But on the whole, Swiss strikes are spiteful and obstinate rather than fierce, and an orderly, school-going, and home-loving people is not likely ever to acquire a taste for similar tactics. The International movement remained long confined to the western and northern can-

tons. Only in 1868 it began to extend over the eastern and southern parts, and seems to have been particularly successful in the Romand districts. In January, 1869, a Romand congress could be held at Geneva, and a paper called *l'Egalité* was founded as an organ of the "Romand section" of the International Association. As far as we can judge from the debates of the three International congresses held in Switzerland, the Swiss delegates represent the conservative (certainly the phlegmatic) element in the International movement. Some of them went so far as to object to the discussion of all social questions not immediately affecting the relations between master and workman, and when at Bale the abolition of the right of inheritance and of property in land was brought under discussion, the Geneva Committee sent a solemn warning to the Bale Assembly, urging them not to go beyond the range of the workmen's immediate interests.

In Austria, too, public opinion was remarkably hostile to the new movement. A congress of Austrian workmen, which was to be held at Vienna in 1868, was prohibited by the government, to the great delight and apparent relief of the public. This, of course, only hastened the adhesion to the International of many who might have contented themselves with any other centre of communication, had they been allowed to establish one in Vienna. Since then, the International Society has gained a firmer footing in Austria, but its progress, it must be admitted, has hitherto been slow.

A very different spirit prevailed in Prussia and throughout the newly created North German Confederation. Those countries had neither to be invaded nor to be gained over by the Internationals, since the German workmen came, so to speak, half-way to meet them. Long before the International Society had been organized, a large number of trade societies existed all over the North of Germany. Each society enjoyed perfect freedom within its sphere. But they could not coalesce into larger groups or centralize their forces, without becoming obnoxious to the jealousy or suspicion of their political rulers, who could not have tolerated such a "state within the state," as long as Germany remained in that purely provisional and unsettled, nay, impossible condition, which had resulted from

the war of 1866. There was no reason, however, why the German workmen should not, by common accord, look upon London or Geneva or Bale as their common head-quarters, and as soon as the International Society was sufficiently consolidated to hold its first congress at Geneva, upwards of thirty North German workmen's societies were ready to join it without a moment's delay. It is a curious circumstance, that there was a law in Prussia making it illegal for any Prussian societies or corporations, as such, to affiliate themselves to any foreign league or order, while each individual member of a society could do so without asking anybody's permission. In this law, the old spirit of Protestantism seems to have asserted itself, once more, against the cosmopolitan spirit, and against what Benjamin Constant has called *la papauté industrielle*. But it respected individual freedom, and the law became practically nugatory. When in 1868 the workmen of North Germany held a congress at Hamburg, they formally declared that each member of the assembly had become a member of the International Association, and that their societies, unable to join it as such, were ready to pursue a path strictly parallel to that of the great League. Similar declarations were made at another congress held at Nürnberg in the same year, and at the Congress of Eisenach in 1869, when nearly one hundred thousand German workmen were registered as "individual members" of the International Society.

Italy can boast of an immense number of trade societies, but these societies have hitherto been but feebly — indeed, remarkably feebly — represented in the councils, committees, and assemblies of the International Association. In 1867, the Italian delegate at Lausanne estimated the number of Italian trade societies at about six hundred. The largest and best organized are those of Naples, Milan, and Genoa, which were then the only ones that had opened a correspondence with the General Council of London to settle the terms of their affiliation. The Italian is fond of club life, and once associated, is a staunch and faithful member. But his public spirit is not always strong enough to expand beyond the range of his clan interests. Almost all the workmen's clubs are mutual-aid societies, which do a great deal of good, each within its own

sphere, but they do not assist each other in case of a strike. Many of them have means to constitute themselves as people's banks or workmen's credit institutions, and to issue fractional paper currency; but they repudiate each other's paper money, and do many other things which belie the existence of a common bond, notwithstanding occasional outbursts of fraternal affection. Until 1864 Mazzini was their acknowledged patron and head-centre. They had their annual congresses, where their delegates vainly endeavored to come to an understanding on the terms of a common constitution. But when, at last, they seemed to have succeeded in this task, the fraternal bond turned out to be further than ever from being realized. The Congress of Naples was the last general meeting of Italian delegates. Its results were union and disunion, but the union was formal and imaginary, the discord essential and real. Into the causes of this discord we cannot enter here. At one of the sittings held by the International Council of London in November last, the split was ascribed to Mazzini's "religious preachings," the Italian workmen being "tired of being reminded that the great object of their lives was the performance of duties, while he never spoke of their rights." This may be true, but it is not the whole truth. We must remember that, under Mazzini's leadership, all political topics were rigorously excluded from the debates of the mutual-aid societies. How long was it possible for Italians to respect such a taboo? Politics, in the eyes of Italian workmen, meant Garibaldi and Mazzini, whether he likes it or not. They could not meet without proposing either of the absent heroes as their president, or sending a salutation to him. And, of course, the wording of the despatch and its direction (was it London or Caprera) gave rise to animated and angry discussions of a political and personal character. The breach was unavoidable. The Mazzinians established a "Permanent (Ligurian) Commission" as their central authority, while the other societies either remained independent and isolated, or, feeling the want of a common centre, and being unable to establish such a centre among themselves, went over to the International camp. There having been no Italian workingmen's congress since 1864, Mazzini and the Permanent Commission of Genoa convoked a new

one in October, 1871, to meet in Rome, the new capital of Italy. But the invitation was not accepted by many societies. The congress was not a success. An open personal breach between Mazzini and Garibaldi was its principal result; and it is probable that as long as these two figures continue to fill up the horizon of the Italian artisan, the work of international affiliation will go on but slowly in the Italian peninsula. With regard to Italian strikes, we have only to add, that they are frequent enough, but always short and remarkably mild, which is easily explained by the want of means and of mutual assistance, by the love of "quick returns" and immediate gain, but above all by the easy-going, accommodating spirit of the people, which is as strong among the masters as among the working classes of Italy.

Immediately after the Congress of Geneva, in 1866, the Council of the International Association took steps to secure the adhesion of the workingmen of the United States of America. During the first year these efforts remained fruitless; partly because the European leaders did not address themselves to the proper quarters, partly because the United States had a labor movement of their own, with all its paraphernalia of trade societies, trade congresses, and strikes. In Mr. Wendell Phillips the workingmen had, if not a leader, a zealous advocate, and several papers, such as "The Voice," of Boston, and "The Workingman's Advocate," of Chicago, were exclusively devoted to the discussion of the labor question. Under these circumstances, the International Association of Europe could rely on the hearty co-operation of the various American societies, but hardly on their formal adhesion. There are other reasons which render such an adhesion difficult, and which are likely to retard the work of affiliation. The sentiments and doctrines underlying the American movement differ considerably from those which have given rise to the European movement. They are more tame and less revolutionary. Springing from different wants, they need not have the same aims. The higher rate of American wages, the shortness of the legal working day, the greater facility of converting labor into capital, of producing and multiplying wealth, and the total absence of well-founded class grievances,

must necessarily be so many obstacles to a mutual understanding between the working "classes" of Europe, and the workingmen, constituting no class at all, of America. What is the "ten-hours movement" of Austria and Switzerland, or the "nine-hours movement" of England, to the American workman, whose working hours have been reduced to eight, if not in all, in many States. And why should he formally pledge himself never to do what he never has done and never can feel tempted to do, — to undersell his European brother-workman, who, in his turn, is not likely to cross the Atlantic for the purpose of frustrating an American strike. He may have to provide, one day, against Chinese competition in the labor market, but from the competition of European workmen he has nothing to fear, and consequently can gain nothing by an alliance with them. Moreover, when he hears European workmen declare war against the capitalists, he must have some difficulty in understanding the theoretical antagonism between labor and capital, which has never been brought home to him in the tangible shape of *stereotyped* class distinctions, of hereditary wealth and hereditary misery.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, two American sections of the International Association were established in 1867, and the London General Council succeeded in putting itself on good terms with the United States "National Labor Union," and the "International Iron-moulders' Union." No American delegates were sent to the Congress of Lausanne, but on the 19th August, 1867, the American societies held a congress of their own at Chicago. Since then the International Association boasts of having met with considerable success in America. In October, 1871, altogether twenty sections could be counted, the best organized being those of New York, Boston, Springfield, St. Louis, New Orleans, and San Francisco. But whether there is no self-deception in all this, and whether the bond between the workingmen of the Old and the New World can ever consist, or need consist, in anything more than mutual goodwill and intellectual sympathy, the future alone can decide.

In England, the quadrennial epoch ending with the International Congress of Bale in September, 1869, was a time of extraordinary political and intellectual activity. The death or

retirement of the old-school politicians had marked the beginning of a new era, and the English nation seemed all of a sudden engaged in revising its opinions on every subject of social or political importance, on the Church-and-State question, on colonial autonomy, on the tenure of land, on education, on co-operation, on representative government. Not only were these questions freely broached and ventilated in meetings and in the press, but many special societies were formed for the purpose of influencing public opinion, and of preparing it for the necessary political agitation. Of these societies we will mention only the Reform League, the Labor Representation League, the National Education League, the Personal Representation League, the Peace and Liberty League, the Liberation Society (for the disestablishment of the national church), the Radical Association, the Land and Labor League, the Land Tenure Reform League, the Political and Social Reform League. The Church itself was agitated by questions of sacerdotal millinery and the frivolous claims of ritualism on one side, and by the rationalism of Colenso and of the Five Essayists on the other. And even the Irish difficulty, though it disappointed and imbittered the new rulers of England, who had hoped to show off the efficacy of "middle-class" liberalism against such evils, could not fail to act as a powerful stimulant on the new life of the nation. It was a most propitious time for the Comtists and Positivists, for the authors of social statics and social dynamics, and for the social science men and women who held a congress once a year. Philosophy herself, in the person of John Stuart Mill, had gained a seat in Parliament, and many opportunities of showing that she took as much interest in the affairs of this world, and possessed as much knowledge of them, as any squire or commoner of England.

Now it is clear that such a period of political, religious, and socialistic reflection in a country like England must lead to more lasting results, or at least to more rational aspirations, than any of those fits of socialism to which the Parisians are liable from time to time. And the working classes were not slow in feeling these influences. They eagerly accepted any bold and brilliant scheme the new thinkers of London might elaborate

for their benefit, and never hesitated to push their doctrines to the last consequences implied in them, as is shown by the discussions of Bale, where the purely theoretical evolutions of International socialism seem, thus far, to have reached their acme.

As to the practical success of the International Association in England, we have no better measure for it than the number of trades-unions gradually accepting the International compact. True to its original programme, the International Society has constituted itself in such a manner, that its English section is nothing more (or little more) than a slowly increasing group of pre-existing trades-unions, only some members of the Council being outsiders not affiliated to any union, or socialistic amateurs not belonging to the working classes at all.

At the end of 1867, twenty-nine trade societies had joined the International League, or thirty-two, if we count the German, French, and Polish workmen's societies of London. This number remained all but stationary during 1868, the attention of the leaders being absorbed by politics, the attention of the workmen by their own distress, which made them selfish and indifferent to cosmopolitan ideas. But that distress also led to a most terrible strike, provoked by the owner of a Welsh mine, who had a bad reputation among the miners, but who, disregarding his own unpopularity and the prevailing distress, announced a reduction of wages. The men struck work, all the miners of the district joining in the strike. But, unfortunately, they also joined them in mobbing the owner of the mine, who had to invoke the protection of the police. Some men were arrested, but one of them having been rescued by the mob, a military escort was necessary for the others. And when the workmen began to pelt the soldiers with stones, a conflict arose, in which five persons were killed. The French call this *le massacre de Mold.* But when the matter was urged in the House of Commons, the English Minister (having evidently a better conscience than the Imperial government of France had on similar occasions) refused to make any amends, and talked of *le massacre de Mold* very much as an American might have talked last autumn of *le massacre de New York.* This the trades-unions resented bitterly.

They knew they could indulge in a strike at any time with perfect impunity, and what more could they desire? To smash a man's windows, to attack policemen, and to pelt soldiers with stones, is not legal in any country, and whoever tries these things must abide by the consequences. Now it seems that these consequences had, somehow, shaken the workmen's belief in their own power. And as self-sufficiency had been their principal defect, the result was a good one. They began to look out for new sources of strength, and the nearest source at hand was their affiliation to the great league of unions. Three months after the Welsh strike, the trades-unions met in congress at Birmingham, and on the 30th August passed a resolution inviting all trade societies of the United Kingdom to join the International Association. Many have followed the advice, but not all. The trades-unions continued to be deferentially treated by the International Society, and even those affiliated to the latter seem to occupy an exceptional position in it, as we may infer from article 4 of the 5th chapter of the lately revised "Administrative Regulations," of which we shall have to give some extracts further on.

Having thus hastily sketched the International propaganda, its methods, its instruments of action, and its vicissitudes in the principal countries of Europe and America, we think it right to add a few outlines of theoretical history, setting forth the growth and development of the International idea, and of those adventitious doctrines which make up the theoretical substance of the debates of the four congresses held successively at Geneva (1866), Lausanne (1867), Brussels (1868), and Bale (1869). All we have to say on this subject may be condensed into the following philosophical sketch, representing the successive phases of the socialistic idea, as well as their logical connection.

The data on which socialism builds its structures are the existing inequalities ordained by nature, enhanced by liberty. Human capacities are unequal. So are human wants. The wants increase and decrease with the capacities within certain limits. But they cannot be reduced below a certain minimum, where wants become physical necessities and legal claims. Near this level their gratification ought no longer to depend on

skill (and its success), which being a gift of nature is uncertain. Yet liberty says even here: Let capacities compete; you are entitled to the result of their competition; your wants as such imply no claim. Socialism retorts: If nature is unjust, let us be just. Anywhere near the line of minimum happiness, in the social strata composed of workmen and laborers, let us ignore all natural inequalities. Let one man's skill be all men's advantage. The *solidarity* of labor's interests being taken for granted, equality of labor's wages must be enforced.

This is the primitive trades-union stand-point; it excludes freedom of competition, and restricts individual liberty. And the International Association, being in its first stage nothing but an enlarged trades-union, borrows from the trades-union its methods and its instrument of action, — the *strike*.

At the same time, being international, it has higher aims and wider views. It practises the strike, but soon discovers, first, that the strike is theoretically wrong, being itself an application of the "blind rule of demand and supply"; and secondly, that it is inefficient. It raises the wages here and there, and for a time, but cannot better the condition of the working class permanently, or reduce the power of the capitalists. These were the views taken in 1867 at the Congress of Lausanne. They led to the following conclusions: —

The strike, being theoretically wrong, cannot be accepted in principle, but must be allowed provisionally as an instrument of war, during the *militant* stage of the League's existence. In the mean time we must look out for some substitute capable of doing what the strike never can do, — of disarming the capitalist or the master. Let workmen begin by ignoring the existence of masters. They can do this by *co-operation*, which replaces the master, and, associated labor being itself potential capital, this *capital ouvrier* replaces the master's capital. Wages then become dividends.

Where co-operation is not practicable, or where wages labor cannot be dispensed with, the *mean rate of wages* has to be determined, — a problem which might be solved by statistics or (though roughly only) by a *system* of strikes. This is "the culminating point of social economy," as M. Aubry said at Lausanne. Through it we can ascertain the real *value* of the

products of labor, the knowledge of which is essential for the emancipation of the working classes. The shortest way to this knowledge would be the introduction of an unchangeable standard of value, not liable itself to fluctuations. The value of money differs at different times, in different places. Why should work be compared with money? The true measure of the value of a thing is the *time* employed on its production; and workingmen and co-operative societies should use this standard in their mutual transactions, which would become barter instead of mercenary bargains.

But co-operation has been tried and found wanting. It has all the drawbacks and dangers of ordinary joint-stock undertakings. The dividends being either spent or reinvested, the workmen become so many shareholders, and unequal shareholders too. They are capitalists, in fact, and hiring wages labor, in their turn, become strangers to the working classes. The methods of socialism, instead of reducing the sources of capital, seem to multiply them. Yet, capital being the cause of the workman's misery, must be attacked. And if one method has failed, new ones must be tried.

Capital can be attacked in two ways. We can *prevent* its being made or accumulated, or, when made or accumulated, we can *unmake* or disperse it. The principal causes producing wealth are *commerce* and *landed property*. The principal cause of its accumulation is the right of *inheritance*. How are we to deal with these institutions? Consumptive co-operation might replace the middle-man, or shopkeeper, and reduce commerce to a system of distribution. But what shall we do with land-owners and rich heirs? It was at Bale, in 1869, that these questions were raised, discussed, and answered. With regard to land, it was urged that it was a thing *sui generis*, that it could be no man's property, that it is a trust in the cultivator's keeping. Technically, therefore, land might be considered either as *collective property*, that is to say, as the common property of all, or as the property of the state, — the state being the landlord, the cultivators its tenants. In either case agriculture should be carried on by co-operation on a large scale, or by state-aided co-operation, which could never be liable to the many drawbacks of private or restricted co-opera-

tion. The assembly of Bale decided in favor of *collectivism*, by fifty-three votes against eight; four being absent, and ten having abstained from voting.

But since all this would be insufficient to prevent the occasional accumulation of wealth, in some hands, at least, some further corrective is necessary. These residual accumulations must be tolerated during the owner's lifetime; but they must not be perpetuated. In each successive generation the anomaly must be corrected. The *right of inheritance is abolished.* The state is heir universal. Thus (approximately at least) initial equality is restored at each succession. A fair start in life is secured to all alike. All must begin by being workingmen, though nobody is prevented from dying as a capitalist. The vote was carried by a majority of thirty-two against twenty-three; seven being absent, and thirty having abstained.

Notwithstanding these numbers, and notwithstanding the protests of some of the Swiss delegates, the International Association stands formally committed to the doctrines implied in these two resolutions, and is bound to adhere to them.

It was useless, however, to advance any further on the path of theory. The socialistic pioneers had distanced considerably the world of realities. They had to stop now and to wait for a new contact with it. Their doctrines were logical and consistent. If they could only be tried for once! But who was likely to allow such doctrines to be tried? They did not apply to a small phalanstery, but to society at large, — to the state. And to try them in the political state, their champions must have *political power*. Who would blame Prometheus if he longs to try his fire?

And just when the thirst for political power was greatest among the International socialists, a series of unexpected events took place on the Continent, ending in the startling phenomenon of the *Commune* of Paris, which like a mirage seems to have tempted the thirsty pioneers of society to change their direction.

The connection between the International Society and the Commune, which has the appearance of a criminal one, was theoretically quite unnecessary; but it was intelligible, the International Society being obviously interested in the political

success of the Commune. The idea of the Commune was borrowed from the first French Revolution. Not the International Society, but the new rulers of France, should be held responsible for its reappearance in 1870. Paris was then severed from France, thanks to its fortifications. Paris remembered the last *plébiscite*, remembered that it had voted against the Empire, that is to say, against the cause of the national disaster, but it also remembered that its own vote (like the vote of other large towns) had been swamped by the vote of the rural population. And were the new rulers of France not the representatives of that rural population? What good could come from Bordeaux or Versailles? The hot-headed patriots of Paris, looking at the outer world only through the distorting and magnifying *lunettes* of their fortifications, could see nothing but treason all around, and the National Guard deemed it prudent to get hold of some pledge for good behavior. They seized as many guns as they could, and then assumed an expectant yet defiant attitude on the heights of Montmartre. Even before the municipal *plébiscite* of Paris, the plan of proclaiming the Commune had been contemplated. But when the Versailles government, instead of disarming the not unfounded suspicions felt against them in Paris, did everything (unwittingly, of course) to aggravate them; when they appointed Valentin, the ex-gendarme, *Préfet de Police*, and sent Vinoy the *Décembriseur* as commander-in-chief of the military forces of Paris, the breach could no longer be averted. This was the moment for the emissaries of the International Society to slip into power. They found materials enough to work with. There never is any lack of socialists in Paris at any time. Socialistic elements abounded especially in the National Guard, which now became the army of Paris, the pretorians of the Commune. The opportunity was tempting, irresistible. Moreover, Assi, the organizer of the great strikes of Creuzot, happened to be in Paris, and at once became a leading member of the new government. Thus the International League was both enthroned and well supported in Paris. But it was enthroned by the side of many other powers, anonymous and ill definable. The Commune became a mixture of republican and socialistic crudities, and amid the bombastic jargon of '89, we hear the gentler

passwords, the more modern phraseology of the International Association. The new rulers were all in good earnest. One ordered the remission of overdue rents, another pulled down the Vendôme Column, a third killed hostages. We mention only these deeds as being the three typical deeds of the Commune, whose authors represent the communistic, the international, and the blood-red element respectively. These men sat at the same board and are technically responsible for each other's deeds. But if we care to go beyond this technical point of view, we cannot help seeing that the three actions belong, indeed, to very different moral categories. The remission of rents and other debts was a silly, yet probably well-meant and pardonable abuse of newly gotten power. The murder of the hostages was a ruffianly crime. And the destruction of the Vendôme Column we venture to qualify as a practical joke, which no man of proper feeling would perpetrate himself, but which is not altogether unenjoyable when perpetrated by another person. At all events, if the column had any artistic value, that value was its only value.

Now there is no reason to suppose that Assi would have killed hostages, that Ferré would have destroyed the Vendome Column, or that Courbet would have remitted the rents. And consequently there was no necessity for the International Society to identify itself with all that has been done in the name of the Commune of Paris. The Commune had given it a "lift," which was eagerly accepted. A short coalition was deemed expedient. But why not drop it again when it had ceased to be so?

But the International Association remained stanch, — viciously and wantonly stanch. It may have been angry with its unsuccessful ally, but it was also angry with itself, and apparently angry with the whole world. It was in the position of a man who had espoused, warmly espoused, some unsound cause, and who is loath to confess his error, or to disown even an unworthy friend. And in its unwillingness or inability to recant, the great workman's league hurled an angry anathema at modern society, solemnly proclaiming that the established order of society was doomed to perish. "It must fall, and it will fall."

We have little to add to the history of the International Association. Soon after the downfall of the Commune, an apologetic pamphlet, "On the Civil War in France," was "printed and published for the Council" of the Association, — a pamphlet which is not likely to increase the good fame of its anonymous but well-known author. It is a significant fact, however, that as soon as the pamphlet was published, Mr. Odger withdrew from the General Council, of which he had been a member for six years.

Anybody desirous of following the daily history of the international labor movement will find the necessary information in the various newspapers devoted to its cause. We mention only the "Eastern Post" and the "Beehive" of London, *L'Internationale* of Brussels, *L'Egalité* of Geneva, *Die Tagwacht* of Zürich, and *Der Volksstaat* of Leipzig.

Owing to the war, no Congress was held in 1870. Why none took place in September, 1871, we do not pretend to know. In lieu of a Congress, however, a conference was held at London from the 17th to the 23d September, at which many resolutions were passed, of which we give only the following more important ones: —

"The Conference invites the General Council and the Federal Councils or Committees to prepare, for the next Congress, reports on the means of securing the adhesion of the agricultural producers to the movement of the industrial proletariate.

"Meanwhile, the Federal Councils or Committees are invited to send agitators to the rural districts, there to organize public meetings, to propagate the principles of the International, and to found rural branches."

"The Conference recalls to the members of the *International*: —

"That in the militant state of the working class, its economical movement and its political action are indissolubly united."

"In those countries where the regular organization of the *International* may for the moment have become impracticable in consequence of government interference, the Association, and its local groups, may be reformed under various other names, but all secret societies properly so called are and remain formally excluded."

"The Conference invites the General Council to call upon the English branches in London to form a Federal Committee for London; which, after its recognition by the provincial branches and affiliated

societies, shall be recognized, by the General Council, as the *Federal Council for England.*"

"The Conference approves of the adjunction of the members of the Paris Commune whom the General Council has added to its number.

"The General Council shall immediately publish a declaration to the effect that the International Workingmen's Association is utterly foreign to the so-called conspiracy of Netschayeff, who has fraudulently usurped its name."

Several alterations were made at the same time in the original statutes of the Association. Its revised and amended constitution may be considered as its last important act. But it has been printed so often and divulged in so many different ways, that we will not add to the length of this article by giving the entire document. The preamble being the same as that of 1864, quoted above, the following extracts will suffice for our present purpose. They contain all that can be interesting to the general reader: —

I.

Administrative Regulations.

1. Every member of the International Workingmen's Association has the right to vote at elections for, and is eligible as, a delegate to the General Congress.

2. Every branch, whatever the number of its members, may send a delegate to the Congress.

3. Each delegate has but one vote in the Congress.

4. The expenses of the delegates are to be defrayed by the branches and groups which appoint them.

5. If a branch be unable to send a delegate, it may unite with other neighboring branches for the appointment of one.

6. Every branch or group consisting of more than 500 members may send an additional delegate for every additional 500 members.

7. Only the delegates of such societies, sections, or groups as form parts of the International, and shall have paid their contributions to the General Council, will in future be allowed to take their seats and to vote at Congresses. Nevertheless, for such countries where the regular establishment of the International may have been prevented by law, delegates of trades-unions and workingmen's co-operative societies will be allowed to participate in Congress debates on questions of principle, but not to discuss or to vote on administrative matters.

8. The sittings of the Congress will be twofold, — administrative

sittings, which will be private; and public sittings, reserved for the discussion of, and the vote upon, the general questions of the Congress programme.

11. The Congress will appoint as many committees as there shall be questions submitted to it. Each delegate shall designate the committee upon which he may prefer to sit. Each committee shall read the memorials presented by the different sections and groups on the special question referred to it. It shall elaborate them into one single report, which alone is to be read at the public sittings. It shall, moreover, decide which of the above memorials shall be annexed to the official report of the Congress transactions.

13. All resolutions on questions of principle shall be voted upon by division (*appel nominal*).

14. Two months at latest before the meeting of the annual Congress, every branch, or federation of branches, shall transmit to the General Council a detailed report of its proceedings and development during the current year. The General Council shall elaborate these elements into one single report, which alone is to be read before Congress.

II.

The General Council.

1. The designation of General Council is reserved for the Central Council of the International Workingmen's Association. The Central Councils of the various countries, where the International is regularly organized, shall designate themselves as Federal Councils, or Federal Committees, with the names of the respective countries attached.

2. The General Council is bound to execute the Congress resolutions.

3. As often as its means may permit, the General Council shall publish a bulletin or report, embracing everything which may be of interest to the International Workingmen's Association.

6. The General Council has also the right of suspending, till the meeting of next Congress, any branch of the International.

7. In case of differences arising between societies or branches of the same national group, or between groups of different nationalities, the General Council shall have the right of deciding such differences, subject to appeal to the next Congress, whose decision shall be final.

8. All delegates appointed by the General Council to distinct missions, shall have the right to attend and be heard at all meetings of Federal Councils or Committees, district and local committees, and local branches, without, however, being entitled to vote thereat.

III.

Contributions to be paid to the General Council.

1. An annual contribution of one penny per member shall be levied from all branches and affiliated societies for the use of the General Council. This contribution is intended to defray the expenses of the General Council, such as the remuneration of its General Secretary, costs of correspondence, publications, preparatory work for Congress, etc., etc.

2. The General Council shall cause to be printed uniform adhesive stamps, representing the value of one penny each, to be annually supplied, in the numbers wanted, to the Federal Councils or Committees.

4. On the 1st of March of each year, the Federal Councils or Committees of the different countries shall forward to the General Council the amounts of the stamps disposed of, and return the unsold stamps remaining on hand.

5. These stamps, representing the value of the individual contributions, shall bear the date of the current year.

IV.

Federal Councils or Committees.

1. The expenses of the Federal Councils or Committees shall be defrayed by their respective branches.

2. The Federal Councils or Committees shall send one report at least every month to the General Council.

V.

Local Societies, Branches, and Groups.

1. Every branch is at liberty to make rules and by-laws for its local administration, adapted to local circumstances and the laws of its country. But these rules and by-laws must not contain anything contrary to the general rules and regulations.

2. All local branches, groups, and their committees, are henceforth to designate and constitute themselves simply and exclusively as branches, groups, and committees of the International Workingmen's Association, with the names of their respective localities attached.

3. Consequently, no branches or groups will henceforth be allowed to designate themselves by sectarian names, such as Positivists, Mutualists, Collectivists, Communists, etc., or to form separatist bodies under the name of *sections of propaganda*, etc., pretending to accomplish official missions distinct from the common purposes of the Association.

4. Art. 2 of this division does not apply to affiliated trades-unions.

5. All sections, branches, and workingmen's societies affiliated to the International are invited to abolish the office of president of their respective branch or society.

6. The formation of female branches amongst the working class is recommended. It is, however, understood that this resolution does not at all intend to interfere with the existence or formation of branches composed of both sexes.

VI.

General Statistics of Labor.

5. The resolutions of the Geneva Congress, 1866, alluded to in Art. 1 of this division, are the following: —

One great International combination of efforts will be a statistical inquiry into the situation of the working classes of all civilized countries, to be instituted by the working classes themselves. To act with any success, the material to be acted upon must be known. By initiating so great a work, the workingmen will prove their ability to take their own fate into their own hands. The Congress, therefore, proposes that in each locality where branches of our Association exist, the work be immediately commenced and evidence collected on the different points specified in the subjoined scheme of inquiry; the Congress invites the workingmen of Europe and the United States of America to co-operate in gathering the elements of the statistics of the working class, reports and evidence to be forwarded to the General Council. The General Council shall elaborate them into a report, adding the evidence as an appendix. This report, together with its appendix, shall be laid before the next annual Congress, and after having received its sanction, be printed at the expense of the Association.

General scheme of inquiry, which may of course be modified by each locality: 1. Industry, name of; 2. Age and sex of the employed; 3. Number of the employed; 4. Salaries and wages; (a) Apprentices; (b) Wages by the day or piece work; scale paid by middle men, weekly, yearly average; 5. (a) Hours of work in factories; (b) The hours of work with small employers and in home work, if the business be carried on in those different modes; (c) Night and day work; 6. Meal times and treatment; 7. Sort of work-shop and work; overcrowding, defective ventilation, want of sunlight, use of gas-light, cleanliness, etc.; 8. Effect of employment on the physical condition; 9. Moral condition, education; 10. State of trade; whether season trade or more or less uniformly distributed over the year; whether greatly fluctuating; whether exposed to foreign competition; whether destined principally for home or foreign consumption, etc.

The tone assumed by the leaders of the International Society, since the fall of the Commune, seems to have alarmed society. No sooner was the challenge given, than the rulers of several European countries thought it necessary to consider the expediency of taking defensive or preventive measures. Some prohibitory laws were passed by the Spanish Cortes, and even the Italian government swerved, for a moment, from its habitual conduct, in prohibiting some workmen's meetings. In France, a diplomatic congress was contemplated. The Emperors of Germany and of Austria put their heads together at Gastein; and the English government called upon its diplomatic and consular agents to collect all facts and data concerning the dreaded League, and to report to the Foreign Office. Each country, it will be seen, acted and behaved in its own characteristic manner, not altogether unlike the three savants of the anecdote who had to study the natural history of the camel.

But the question arises: Was there ever any ground for alarm? And is it proper to feel intimidated by an aphoristic threat uttered in a moment of spite and bitter disappointment? Why "*must*" the established order of society "fall"? We very much doubt whether it *can* fall, considering that it is not a thing like Troy or Carthage, nor a local institution, like royalty. The present order of society is the sum total of history, and, as such, the irrevocable effect of an irrevocable cause. But though irrevocable, it is not final. The effect becomes cause in its turn, and we willingly admit that the present order of things would be worth nothing if it pretended to be more than a modest link in the chain of evolutions. Revolution thinks it can break this chain, but deceives itself. Being short-sighted, it mistakes the local flaw for a universal breach of continuity. What falls is never more than a barricade, a citadel, at most a throne; but society goes on, as before, eating and drinking, buying and selling, inheriting and bequeathing. Only the formula of the deed is altered. Even Christianity produced no sudden changes in the order of society; and the doctrines of modern socialism, however just and excellent they may be, are not likely to produce more striking effects. Mankind moves in a resistent medium, and there are checks and

limitations in human nature itself which frustrate and vitiate even our noblest designs.

In default of all trustworthy statistics concerning the numerical strength of the International Society, we will accept Mr. B. Cochrane's estimate of seventeen millions (of which 1,000,000 belong to France, and only 186,000 to England, while the aggregate strength of the trades-unions is supposed to be 800,000). But even if we go further, and consider the number of all possible future members of the workmen's league, that is to say, the total numerical strength of the working classes, we obtain only nine per cent of the total population of all civilized countries. And if we remember that, notwithstanding the undoubted skill of their leaders, the associated workmen represent (no fault of theirs) the least educated portion of mankind, the intellectual strength represented by their numbers cannot, we apprehend, be sufficiently imposing to overawe the ninety-one per cent made up of avowedly better educated human beings. The International Society thus carries its own ballast, its own brake. Its power will grow, no doubt, together with its numerical strength and geographical extension; but when it has reached a certain limit of redundance, any further addition to its size can do nothing but weaken its power.

We have purposely dwelt in this article on the extreme slowness with which the International idea developed itself, and on the difficulty with which it was understood and accepted by the different nations of Europe. If the cement of a political union is community of interests, or the *idem velle et idem nolle* of all the parts united, the socialistic union presupposes not only a community of interests, but also a community of rights and duties. Its stability must depend on the strength of that cement. Will it stick, and how many pieces will it hold together? The Sicilian cobbler, the Geneva watchmaker, and the Yorkshire miner are three very discordant types of working humanity. Unless they can be taught to understand the identity of their rights, duties, and interests, the International will be powerless to hold them together, or they will adhere to it from lower motives.

The poor man takes it for granted that he is an unimportant personage, and that nobody cares for him except himself. He

has no vote, no position, no wealth, no knowledge, and, if he has no cares, he has no hopes or prospects either. To such a man the trades-union opens a new world; by associating himself to it, he becomes at once a voter, a legislator, and a co-possessor of wealth. How, then, could he resist the temptation of becoming a member of that vast International League which strikes terror into kings and masters, and opens to the humblest of its members endless vistas of power, wealth, and education? "I, too, am something," he may say to himself, "a citizen of a new state, where there are neither kings nor armies, neither disowned nor disinherited." His personal vanity is flattered, his self-respect gratified, by such prospects. And many workmen (more especially those of Southern countries) have joined the International Society from no higher motive than this, and without having asked themselves whether they accept the entire programme or whether they comprehend its bearings.

The principal elements of weakness inherent to the International Workmen's League are: —

1. Its size, and consequent lack of administrative cohesion.
2. The comprehensiveness of its programme.
3. Its contamination with party politics.
4. The national incompatibilities (of temper, interests, and principles) within its own ranks.

Its real prospects, however, must ultimately depend on the theoretical soundness of its doctrines and on the justness of its grievances. What are these grievances? They may be summed up in the fact that *labor is tyrannized by capital*, and it is not for those who happen not to suffer from this tyranny to deny its reality. English statistics show that, in the course of the last fifty years, English capital has increased 350 per cent; that there are 13,720,000 producers in England with an aggregate income of £ 814,000,000 per annum; that one half of this sum is divided among 1,250,000 persons; that there are 2,688,000 persons with an average income of £ 189, and, according to Professor Leone Levi, eleven million persons whose annual income does not exceed £ 29 per annum. It is obvious, then, that the many must be dependent on the few, and must remain so, until the economical condition of English society is thor-

oughly altered. And in so far as dependence invites tyranny, the complaint of the working classes is well founded and just.

But, strictly speaking, both labor and capital are tyrannized by the man who hires both, by the contractor, the builder, the commercial speculator. He pays wages to the workmen and interest to the investing capitalist. Now, the latter receives occasional dividends in addition to his interest. And to place the workman in a fairly analogous position, the employer would have to treat him, too, as a co-interested partner, and either to allow him the benefit of a "sliding scale" of wages, or, assuming his labor to be the equivalent of a certain amount of invested capital, to award him dividends according to this estimate. But it is clear that this estimate of the *capital ouvrier* would always have to be a low one, considering that the workman cannot, like the capitalist partner, become liable for his employer's debts in case of bankruptcy. The extension of this liability to the workman would lead to slavery and physical bondage. And this being out of the question, the whole scheme of the capitalization of labor falls to the ground. This proves, better than anything else, the essential heterogeneity of capital and labor.

Nor are the advantages all on the side of capital, which is to labor precisely as high interest is to security. As responsibility finds its reward in honor, risk and anxiety in high gain, so low wages find their compensation in steadiness and security. To make wages unsteady and shifting would be to confer a very questionable benefit on the workingman. But labor and wealth, though essentially heterogeneous, need not be antagonistic, provided they agree to remain what they are, *convertible correlatives*. Like mechanical work and caloric, each is the product of the other. The so-called mechanical theory of heat teaches us (and proves it, too) that there is no motion, throughout the universe, from the vibrations of a tuning-fork to the rotation of our planet, which does not generate caloric; that there is no heat which does not translate itself into mechanical performance; and that the quantity of heat and the quantity of work are mutually determined and measurable by each other. Yet the physical forces which perform the work in obedience to, and at the expense of, caloric are no more tyrannized by

caloric than caloric is tyrannized by the *vis viva* of matter. They are mutually dependent, commensurate, and convertible things, and must forever remain such.

In like manner all human labor is convertible into wealth or into its conventional symbol, money; and all wealth, money, enjoyment, or leisure induce labor in their turn. Nay, it is the very accumulation of money, as it is the accumulation of heat in a boiler, which produces the most practical results, the most useful performances. Capital, therefore, which is accumulated money, can hardly be objected to on principle, not even by those who are in its service and in its pay.

There are, indeed, accumulations of wealth which might be called explosive, just as there can be explosive accumulations of heat. If the abolition of individual property in land and of the right of inheritance can prevent such dangerous accumulations, public opinion ought to be gained over to these projects of reform. But even within the short span of one man's life relative accumulations of wealth may take place quite sufficient to perpetuate the various forms of what has justly been called "white slavery." It requires but little wealth to import a batch of Italian organ-grinders into England, whose utter destitution would keep them hopelessly enslaved to their master. In such and in all similar cases, the strike is a righteous and indispensable weapon of defence, and to make strikes possible, the sufferers must unite. In so far, therefore, as the International Workingmen's Association acts as a radical reformer of society, we say to it, *You may try.* In so far as it is a militant champion of suffering and enslaved humanity, we say to it, *You must succeed.* And within these limitations, every unprejudiced man may give it and ought to give it his sympathy, his approbation, and, if needs be, his co-operation.

Wealth tyrannizes labor, because wealth is the end and labor the means. The end always tyrannizes the means. But wealth is power, and as such it is itself a means serving ulterior ends. When viewed in this light, the antithesis of capital and labor appears to us only as one of those many contradictions which constitute the enigma of human life, and at the same time its very essence. We must learn to understand the antagonism of the two, but also to believe in this correlation and compos-

sibility. The crude dilemma must disappear, the alternative be changed into alternation. And it is our duty to hasten this process, not to retard or to destroy it. The more quickly labor is converted into wealth and wealth reconverted into labor, the lighter will become the aggregate burden of human toil and the more nourishing will be the fruits of human leisure and refinement. We must, for the sake of truth and justice, seek the true "wealth equivalent" of human labor. But to attempt the final extinction of either alternative, or to despair of the eternal fitness of their alternation, would be presumptuous and unwise. We want neither the aimless toils of Sisyphus nor the lifeless rest of chaos, neither Hades nor Nirvana. We want Paradise. And the Paradise of rational men lies in their unceasing endeavors to regain it.

E. Gryzanovski.

Art. IV. — The Law of Maritime Warfare, as it affects the Belligerents.

The recent Franco-Prussian war brought out into great and practical prominence two questions of international law, — the one concerning the proper methods of conducting maritime warfare by the belligerents, the other concerning the duties of neutral states. Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, in the summer of 1870, the king of Prussia issued a proclamation, declaring that no ships nor cargoes belonging to French subjects, except contraband, should be molested by his own cruisers, even though the French government should not reciprocate by a similar concession. France did not reciprocate. In the course of the contest, British subjects were engaged in an active commerce with the French in arms, ammunition, and other articles confessedly contraband, and in coals for the French navy, which no treaties and no modern writers have ever pronounced to be contraband. A correspondence thereupon took place between the British and Prussian Cabinets, somewhat acrimonious on the part of the latter. King William's Minister for Foreign Affairs announced and maintained the

novel doctrine that a neutral nation or its government is to be held responsible to one belligerent for the acts of its citizens and subjects in carrying on a contraband commerce with the other belligerent, and is justly liable to reclamations in favor of the former for this breach of international duty, and for the injuries caused by it. In other words, that the penalties for a commerce in contraband are to be visited upon a neutral state as well as upon its private citizens who engage in the traffic and assume its risks. These positions of the Berlin Cabinet received a considerable support in Europe from two classes of publicists, — from the *sentimentalists* and from the *absolutists*, or those whose opinions and writings tend to uphold absolutism in its most extreme form. They also met with much favor in the United States, and even obtained the extraordinary approval of Mr. Secretary Fish in an official communication to the Prussian Minister. The ordinary newspaper support which these propositions have received in this country, exhibiting as it did an utter ignorance of the principles and of the rules of international law, seems to have been suggested by a sentiment of blind antagonism to Great Britain and of equally blind admiration for the wonderful military organization and power of Prussia.

I purpose to investigate these proposed dogmas, and to subject them to a somewhat careful analysis. I shall show that they are opposed to the very sentiments of humanity which many of their advocates invoke in their support, and that, tending inevitably to uphold the strong against the weak, they are entirely in the interests of absolute power. In pursuing this design, I shall observe the following general order, and give, —

I. A very brief statement of the rules and methods of maritime warfare both as respects the belligerents and as respects neutrals, which are now accepted and acted upon by all the civilized nations of the world ;

II. An historical sketch of the origin and progress of the two doctrines under review, and particularly of the first and most important of them ;

III. A discussion of these doctrines.

I. I give, really as an introduction, a very brief statement

of the rules and methods of maritime warfare both as respects the belligerent parties themselves and as respects neutrals.

Any general discussion of the nature of international law in the abstract, any examination of the fundamental question whether it is in a true sense of the term *law*, or is only a collection of principles and formulas voluntarily assumed and complied with, having no true human sanction, will not now be attempted. It is enough for me to say at present that the practical rules for the conduct of maritime warfare in form, in precision, in certainty, and in compulsive force, approach more nearly than any other portions of the international system the commands of a purely municipal legislation; they have, more than any others, the character and effect of true and positive law enforced by human sanctions, judicially applied. The reason of this is obvious. The operations of maritime warfare, both as respects belligerents and neutrals, consist chiefly in the capture of ships and cargoes. These mere acts of manual taking do not work a change of property in the ship or cargo seized. By the universal consent and practice of civilized nations, the lawfulness and efficiency of the capture must be judicially determined. This is done by a judgment of a prize court in a proceeding *in rem* instituted by the captors, all the world having an opportunity of coming in and contesting. The decree of such a tribunal, and a public sale of the prize by virtue thereof, transfer the property in the article to the purchaser, and this property is recognized as valid all the world over, even in a neutral nation of which the original owner was a citizen. In fact, there is no higher and more complete title than that derived from a condemnation by a prize court and a sale in pursuance thereof. It is true that the prize court is always a tribunal of the belligerent making the capture; but this fact, though it has often given rise to theoretical discussions, has never in the slightest degree weakened the title derived from the proceedings. These prize courts are therefore the international tribunals, the only regular judicial tribunals which have any semblance of an international character. They proceed judicially; and they have announced and promulgated the rules which govern maritime warfare in the same manner and form in which the strictly national courts have announced and pro-

mulgated the rules which govern the internal affairs of a particular state. It has so happened that among the great maritime powers these prize courts have generally been composed of jurists and statesmen of the highest ability and character. In Great Britain the Court of Admiralty is always clothed with the prize jurisdiction in time of war, with an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In the United States the Supreme Court is the prize tribunal of the last resort. In many and perhaps most of the European countries, prize courts are created by special commission at the outbreak of hostilities. The reason is obvious, then, why the rules of the international law relating to the conduct of maritime warfare, in a marked and special manner resemble, both in form and character, the rules of the municipal law; they are the results of judicial decision, and not of diplomatic negotiation, and they have to do with the destruction and the creation of private rights of property in things transportable and constantly transported over the whole world, which rights are everywhere acknowledged and protected.

I come now to a concise statement of these rules: and *first*, as they affect neutrals; and *second*, as they affect the belligerents.

First, as they affect neutrals.

These should be separated into two entirely distinct classes. Much confusion exists in the popular mind — which shows itself in the popular literature, in the newspapers and the magazines, and even in our American popular diplomatic writings, emanating from men who have been trained by no previous study or experience for diplomacy — from a failure to keep these two classes separate, from a tendency to combine them and to confound the rights and duties which belong to or flow from them respectively. These two classes of rules are, firstly, those which affect and have relation to a neutral nation in its organic capacity, and which are imposed upon and bind, so far as any international rules can bind, its government. It is plain that this class lies entirely outside of any judicial cognizance. The precepts themselves which it contains have only a moral sanction; they are to be obeyed voluntarily, are to be made effective by negotiation, or are to be enforced by war. And,

secondly, those which affect and have relation to the citizens and subjects of neutral nations, in their rights of persons and property.

Firstly, a neutral nation in its organic capacity, and as represented by its government, may not aid either of the belligerents. This, of course, forbids all direct acts of the government in furnishing warlike materials, troops, subsidies, and the like. But it goes much further, and requires that the neutral government should use all reasonable diligence to suppress and prevent any aid by its subjects, or by agents of a belligerent, within its jurisdiction, when such *aid assumes the form and character of a military array.*

I have endeavored here to generalize this important principle into a short and comprehensive formula, and to express, in the language I have used, at once the reasons and the limitations of the positive rule. I think I have done so when I affirm the neutral state's duty to be to use all reasonable diligence to suppress and prevent aid to one belligerent, where such aid assumes the form and character of a military array. This, evidently, includes the fitting out and setting forth of organized expeditions from neutral soil against one belligerent in aid of the other; it also embraces the enlistment of soldiers or sailors within the neutral territory by agents of a belligerent, even though the persons enlisted should depart singly and unarmed, because by such a proceeding the belligerent potentially extends its military organization or array within the neutral jurisdiction; it also prohibits the fitting out or despatching of armed vessels for the purpose of cruising against one of the combatants, in the service of the other; because such a man-of-war is as much a military array as is an army. I need not illustrate further. But, on the other hand, this doctrine does not make the neutral nation or government responsible for the unorganized and voluntary departure of its subjects to join the forces of a belligerent, nor for the commercial enterprises of its citizens in selling or transporting contraband articles to a belligerent government or its subjects, or in evading a blockade, or even in fitting out and despatching under the neutral flag an armed vessel, all ready for war, if the object be to transport the vessel to a belligerent port, and there to sell her as a business venture.

The recent British Neutrality Act, so far as it forbids the queen's subjects from joining the forces of a belligerent as stated above, and from selling an armed vessel as last described, goes beyond the requirements of the international law. The United States Neutrality Act contains no such provisions.

Secondly, rules which affect and have relation to neutral subjects and citizens.

Neutral subjects may freely and without any risk carry their own goods in their own vessels to all the ports of a belligerent which are open, — that is, not blockaded by the other party, — provided that the goods are not contraband ; subject to the liability of the vessel's being searched on the high seas by the cruisers of the other party to ascertain if there are contraband goods on board, and subject also to the risk and penalty incident to contraband commerce.

It is generally said that commerce in contraband is illegal. This is, as it seems to me, a very inaccurate way of stating the doctrine ; and the use of the word " illegal " has done much to create the confusion of ideas which so generally exists in reference to this subject. It is more accurate to say, that if a neutral transports to a belligerent articles contraband of war, he does so under the risk and penalty of having the ship seized, the voyage broken up, and the prohibited goods condemned by decree of a prize court. Perhaps the whole cargo might, under some circumstances, be confiscated ; but it is not now the practice to condemn the vessel if her destination be to an open port. If the neutral adventurer evades the hostile cruisers, and gets his contraband to its intended purchaser, all risk and liability are ended. He is in no way responsible for that act, even though he should be overhauled on the return or another voyage ; and this simple fact shows, conclusively, that his proceeding is not, in any true sense of the term, *illegal*.

When an effective blockade of a port has been established, it is commonly said that all neutral trade with the place is illegal. The same criticism is to be made here as in the last case. It is more accurate to say that a neutral voyage to a blockaded port is under this very serious risk, — the vessel and cargo may be captured by the cruisers of the blockading party, and will be entirely confiscated by decree of a prize court, ship and

lading, without reference to the nature of the goods. This risk lasts from the beginning of the outward voyage to the end of the return voyage, because coming out of the blockaded port is as much prohibited as going into it. But if the return voyage be completed in safety, all liability for the adventure is ended, even though the ship should afterwards be taken.

A long controversy was settled — or is supposed to have been settled — by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, between all the great powers of Europe. A declaration of principles annexed to this treaty contains four rules of maritime warfare, of which the second and third are as follows: "The neutral flag covers enemy goods, except contraband of war. Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not seizable under the enemy flag." To this declaration almost all civilized nations have given their formal adherence. The result is, that a neutral vessel may transport goods owned by enemy subjects from all parts of the world to open ports of the same enemy, and to all parts of the world from open ports of that enemy, and between all ports not enemy, without molestation, unless the goods are contraband, in which case they would be liable to confiscation. And conversely, an enemy ship may transport neutral goods from and to the same places, and the goods would not be subject to confiscation, unless they were contraband, although the ship would be, as we shall see under the next head. These rules do not of course in any way affect or interfere with the hostile rights of blockades.

Second, the rules as they affect the belligerents, including citizens and subjects thereof.

Of course armed ships of war are liable to be captured, and thus to become the property of the victor nation. I put out of view the subject of privateering, because this method of conducting maritime warfare has happily been very generally if not universally abandoned. The ships of commerce of private citizens or subjects of one belligerent, together with the cargoes therein belonging to citizens or subjects of the same state, may be captured anywhere on the high seas, no matter where bound, by the cruisers of the enemy, and may be condemned by its prize courts. Under the rules established in 1856, the goods of a belligerent citizen not contraband, on board a

neutral vessel not running a blockade, and the goods of a neutral not contraband on board the vessel of a belligerent not running a blockade, are free from capture.

It is proposed to change two of the foregoing rules, and to make belligerent commerce, except in contraband, absolutely free, and to impose upon neutral nations the active duty of restraining the contraband commerce of their private citizens and subjects. This brings me to the second general head, namely, an historical sketch of the origin and progress of these new doctrines, which are proposed for acceptance to the family of nations.

II. The Abbé Mably was the first publicist who announced and advocated the dogma that private commerce by enemy subjects, except in contraband, should not be interrupted by the war. He does not discuss the proposition at any length, but in a chapter treating of commerce as a source of national wealth and power he says: —

"Why should two nations, when war is declared between them, at once interdict all reciprocal commerce? This usage is a relic of our ancient barbarism."

He adds some other remarks of the same import, but confounds the reform he suggests with the further proposal to abolish privateering, so that it is difficult to make out clearly whether he would have private enemy commerce free altogether or free only from capture by corsairs.*

In 1782 Galiani, a Neapolitan ecclesiastic and publicist, followed the Abbé Mably in his criticisms upon the existing international law. In his treatise, *De' Doveri de' Principi Neutrali*, there is a chapter upon privateering. Amidst a violent onslaught upon the custom of nations to use privateering, he says: —

"Then, when the war shall advance towards its close, we shall see on the one side a conquering general make his triumphal entry into a conquered place, amidst the acclamations of the inhabitants whose persons and privileges he has spared, whose magistrates he has maintained in the exercise of their functions, and whose goods, merchandise, and warehouses he has protected; while at the same moment other goods

* Le Droit Public de l'Europe fondé sur les Traités, 3e ed. 1764, Tom. II. p. 468 *et seq.*

of the same nature, depending upon the same commerce, deposited a little time before in the same warehouses, but embarked during the war upon ships to become the object of an inoffensive and loyal traffic, shall be declared good prize and condemned as booty of war to the captors. O atrocious and mournful contrast!"

After this parenthetical picture he immediately returns to his attack upon privateering.* I think we are to infer from the context that Galiani does not object to the capture of private property by men-of-war, but only to its capture by corsairs. M. Cauchy, one of the ablest modern French advocates of the new doctrine, recognizes this fact, but gives it an ingenious and hardly honest turn by declaring that the abolition of privateering and the absolute freedom of belligerent commerce are so intimately bound up with each other, that the one necessarily implies the other, and that the writers referred to, while urging the abolition of corsairs, were in reality advocating its corollary, the absolute freedom of commerce.†

Thus far we have only the speculations of theoretical writers. But in 1785 the doctrine was incorporated into a treaty made by two persons who are not ordinarily looked upon as sentimentalists, although they may have been philosophers, — Frederick the Great and Franklin. The first treaty between Prussia and the United States, concluded in that year, contained the following stipulation: —

"Article XXIII. If war should arise between the contracting parties, all women and children, scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufacturers, fishermen, unarmed inhabitants of unfortified towns, villages, or places, and in general all others whose occupations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed to continue their respective employments, and shall not be molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or goods be burned or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the armed force of the enemy into whose power by the events of the war they may happen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be taken from them for the use of such armed force, the same shall be paid for at a reasonable price. And all merchant and trading vessels employed in exchanging the products of different places, and thereby rendering the necessary comforts and

* Le Droit Maritime International, par Eugène Cauchy, Tom. II. p. 285, where the whole passage from Galiani is quoted.

† Droit Maritime International, Tom. II. p. 474.

conveniences of human life more easy to be obtained and more general, shall be allowed to pass free and unmolested; and neither of the contracting parties shall grant or issue any commission to any private armed vessels empowering them to take or destroy such trading vessels or interrupt such commerce."

From the time of this treaty the theory I am examining has generally, though of course improperly, been called the "American doctrine." One most important and significant fact should be carefully noticed in this connection. Franklin and his colleagues were charged by the United States with the duty of entering into treaties with several other European powers besides Prussia. He took part in negotiating the treaty of 1778 with France; he concluded that of 1783 with Sweden; John Adams alone signed that of 1782 with the Low Countries. Not one of these contains any stipulation similar to the twenty-third article of the treaty with Prussia; not one makes the least allusion, however distant, to the doctrine which is said to be distinctively American.

"There is nothing in the diplomatic correspondence of the period which makes it appear that it was ever made a question of imposing on, or of demanding from, any other nation than Prussia respect for the private property of enemy subjects. The notion is only found incorporated in a convention between the United States and Prussia, between an exclusively maritime state of North America and an exclusively continental power of the North of Europe whose marine was at the time almost nothing; that is to say, between two peoples who were in the quasi-impossibility of making war upon the land, and who could by no possibility encounter each other on the sea." *

This treaty expired by its own limitation in 1796. Negotiations for a new convention were opened in 1798. John Quincy Adams, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States, in his first communication to the Prussian Cabinet suggesting changes to be made in the old treaty, wrote: —

"It is proposed to omit the last clauses of the twenty-third article, which declare that, in case of war between the high contracting parties, the merchant and trading vessels shall not be subject to capture. This stipulation being of little importance to the high contracting parties,

* Hautefeuille, Questions de Droit Maritime International, 1868, p. 71.

between whom no probability of war, no opposing interests which might lead to it, appear to exist, it is therefore in regard to other nations, who may require similar conditions when they might import very different consequences, that this engagement is desired to be omitted." *

The Prussian plenipotentiaries replied: —

"The twenty-third article, which protected merchant vessels from all capture, was dictated without doubt by the purest considerations of humanity and benevolence, and it is not without regret that we efface it; but this pleasant (*douce*) theory being so difficult to carry into practice, it only remains to renounce it at once, especially since the political interests of the United States may possibly be affected by it." †

Thus, at the request of an American minister and in accordance with the public interest of the United States, this so-called American doctrine was politely but somewhat contemptuously dismissed from the Prussian Treaty.

In 1792 the French Legislative Assembly decreed the abolition, first, of the capture of private property on the sea; and, second, of privateering. It invited the executive power to enter into a negotiation with all the maritime states of the world in order to induce them to recognize this double precept. The city of Hamburg alone replied favorably to the philosophic appeal. ‡ The philosophy was, however, very short lived, for during the wars which soon arose the French Republic openly violated all rules of international law, and outraged the rights of neutrals in a manner which no other civilized state has ever imitated.

At the commencement of the war with Spain, in 1823, a despatch of M. Chateaubriand announced that the French government would not issue any letter of marque, and would even order the royal navy to capture only the Spanish ships of war, and not to seize any vessel of commerce, Spanish or neutral, unless such vessel was endeavoring to force an effective blockade. § This was, however, a mere paper manifesto; Spanish prizes were taken as usual. Although the philanthropic state paper of the French philosopher-statesman produced no

* J. Q. Adams to the Prussian Ministers, July 11, 1798, Am. St. Pap. For. Rel., fol. ed. Vol. II. p. 353.

† Prussian Ministers to J. Q. Adams, September 25, 1798, Ib. p. 254.

‡ Hautefeuille, *ubi supra*, p. 64.

§ Cauchy, *ubi supra*, Vol. II. p. 374.

direct and practical effect on the war, it kindled a responsive glow in the placid bosom of President Monroe. In his Annual Message to Congress, December 2, 1823, the President, speaking of this French declaration, said: —

"This declaration, concurring with principles proclaimed and cherished by the United States from the first establishment of their independence, suggested the hope that the time had arrived when the proposal for adopting it as a permanent and invariable rule in all future maritime wars might meet the favorable consideration of the great European powers. Instructions have accordingly been given to our ministers with France, Russia, and Great Britain to make those proposals to their respective governments; and when the friends of humanity reflect on the essential amelioration to the condition of the human race which would result from the abolition of private war on the sea, an earnest hope is indulged that these overtures will meet with an attention animated by the spirit in which they were made, and that they will ultimately be successful."

In his next message, December 7, 1824, he returned to the subject, saying: —

"Propositions having this object in view have been made to the governments of Great Britain, France, and Russia, and of other powers, which have been received in a friendly manner by all, but as yet no treaty has been formed with either for its accomplishment. The policy will, it is presumed, be persevered in, and in the hope that it may be successful."

In pursuance with this policy the American ministers brought the matter before the French, British, and Russian Cabinets, and a polite correspondence followed. The American Minister at St. Petersburg, December 5, 1823, presented to the Russian government the *projet* of a convention, the fourth article of which was identical in terms with the twenty-third article of the Prussian Treaty of 1785. He addressed an explanatory note of the same date to Count Nesselrode, from which I take the substance of a few sentences which give the gist of his argument: —

"The motive which impels the government of the United States to offer this proposition to the civilized world is that the same principles of justice, of charity, and of peace, under the influence of which Christian nations have with common accord exempted private property on land from the destruction and spoliation of war, equally demand protection for private property on the high seas."

In answer to an assumed objection, that, if this doctrine should be established, neutrals would lose great commercial advantages which they now possess in war between maritime states, he says that the United States is the most important neutral power having an extensive commerce, and that its government is willing to surrender all such advantages, because the experience of the recent European wars had taught it that they do not exist. He concluded his note as follows: —

"The system which the United States now proposes is not new in their politics. It took its birth in the first years of their independence. The first treaty with Prussia is a proof of this."

Count Nesselrode replied February 1, 1824, acknowledging the kindly disposition of his court in favor of an act which he said "would be a crown of glory for modern diplomacy," but he was of opinion that "the proposed measures could only produce the effects which had been attributed to them by an agreement of all the other maritime powers." So Mr. Monroe's project came to nothing.

In 1856, at the close of the Crimean War, the great powers of Europe signed the Treaty of Paris, and annexed a declaration, the second and third clauses of which have already been quoted. The first and fourth were, "Privateering is abolished; and blockades to be obligatory should be effective." All the other nations of the world were invited to unite in this convention. The United States declined, unless a further provision were added, to the effect that "private property of the subjects or citizens of one belligerent power upon the high seas should not be seized by the armed vessels of the other power, unless it were contraband." It is generally assumed that this single suggestion exhausted the amendments desired by the United States government, whereas the despatch of Mr. Marcy went much further, and proposed the removal of all restriction upon contraband, the surrender of the right of visit and search, and the complete liberty of neutral commerce excepting with blockaded places.* This attitude of the United States received a partial response from a few European states and peoples. A large assembly of merchants at Bremen, held December 2, 1859,

* Cauchy, Vol. II. pp. 376–380.

† Despatch of Secretary Marcy to the French government, July 28, 1856.

adopted the following statement of principles, which, as it is illustrative of the arguments generally put forth in favor of the new doctrine, I quote entire: —

"Considering that respect for persons and for property is the only basis upon which the moral and intellectual relations of the people can prosper; that without it morality and well-being cannot develop freely and without restraint; that this sacred principle ought to be respected even in war by the nations which hold the honorable position of marching at the head of civilization: considering that, contrary to this principle, belligerents are still authorized, in maritime wars, to confiscate the goods of persons peaceably exercising their trade, to seize and destroy merchant ships and their cargoes, and to make the crews prisoners: considering, moreover, that public opinion universally pronounces against this iniquitous mode of procedure; that the declaration of the Congress of Paris, of April 16, 1856, has opened the way to a new progress, and has been approved by the greater part of the nations; that this declaration protects, not only the interests of those domiciled in neutral states, but guards also the goods of those domiciled in the belligerent states, when these goods are found on board a neutral ship; that many states, and among others the United States of America, have formally expressed the desire that the inviolability of private property should be established: considering, also, that it belongs to the Congress of the great European powers, soon to reassemble, to finish the work of its predecessors by extirpating from the maritime law the arbitrary principles of the past, and by raising in this manner an imperishable monument in the annals of civilization: considering, finally, that it is a duty of all the friends of progress and of the development of humanity to elevate their voices in the counsels of their nation, and to make their governments the interpreters of the unanimous wishes of the civilized world, — this assembly decrees: 1. Public opinion imperiously demands that the inviolability of persons and of property should be extended, during maritime war, to those domiciled in the belligerent states.

"2. The senate of the free city of Bremen is prayed to make itself the representative of this principle, and to take, as well with the states of Germany as with the powers united in Congress, the necessary measures to procure the universal acknowledgment thereof.

"3. The members of this assembly, who have at heart the progress of right and of civilization, engage to use all their efforts with their respective governments to procure the universal acceptance of this principle.

"4. A committee shall be named to communicate these decisions to the senate of the city of Bremen, to the Chamber of Commerce, and to foreign consuls resident at Bremen." *

This production, which shows that the noble art of blatherskite is not confined to the United States, M. Bluntschli says, "formulates the true modern principle." In the same month a deputation of merchants presented a communication to the senate of Hamburg, and demanded the adoption of the following extraordinary propositions: —

"1. The freedom of private property on the seas from the attacks both of privateers and of men-of-war; 2. The restriction of blockade to fortified places, and that even there it should prevent only the introduction of contraband articles."

The latter rule would, in effect, be the abolition of blockade. The New York Chamber of Commerce of course could not refrain from giving to the world its utterance upon this subject; it formally requested President Buchanan to renew the proposition made through Mr. Secretary Marcy. The President replied by a letter, in which he left other innovators far in the background, for he advocated the abolition of all right of blockade in maritime warfare. This body of citizens, which represents commerce in name, has during the past year, under the leadership of that eminent publicist, George Opdyke, discussed and perhaps passed resolutions favoring the humanitarian reform.

In the war of 1866 Prussia and Austria renounced their right of capturing merchant ships. As neither nation was largely maritime, this action had little practical value.

Among the publicists of the present day Pinheiro-Ferreira, an annotator of Martens, and Pradier-Fodéré, the most recent editor of Grotius and of Vattel, are violent advocates of the new doctrine. One of the most exhaustive modern treatises upon maritime law is *Le Droit Commercial dans ses Rapports avec le Droit des Gens et le Droit Civil*, in four volumes, 1861, by M. G. Massé, Vice-President of the Tribunal de la Seine. M. Massé discusses this subject with much ability.† I shall have

* Bluntschli, Droit Int. Codifié, p. 339, note.

† See Vol. I. p. 104, n. 121 *et seq.*

occasion to refer to his argument in the sequel, because it presents the case in a calm and logical manner, and without the almost inevitable declamation in which other writers of the same school indulge. Another work to which I have already referred, *Le Droit Maritime International*, of Eugène Cauchy, 1862, two volumes, seems to have been written with express purpose of defending the proposed change in the law of war. The author closes his elaborate treatise with a formal argument and a reply to objections which he puts into the mouth of his opponents. As is often the case, however, in such controversies, he utterly fails to present the objections which have any force, and of course omits to answer them. M. Bluntschli, in his *Droit International Codifié*, article 665, states the rule in a manner which sufficiently indicates his personal opinions as well as his lack of candor and, I may even say, veracity: "Although maritime war should be directed against the state and not against individuals, and although by the natural law private property should be respected on the sea as well as on land, yet many maritime powers still recognize in maritime war the right of seizing ships which are the property of persons within the jurisdiction of the enemy country, and of confiscating the goods found on board such ships."

I shall make no reference to the standard writers upon international law, the great public jurists, from Grotius down to Wheaton and Phillimore and Twiss, because they all recognize and uphold the doctrine and practice which the modern theories would overthrow. But it is worthy of notice that Hautefeuille, the great champion of neutral rights and of free neutral commerce, and certainly one of the ablest publicists of the present day, is an ardent supporter of the old and established principle. His master work, *Droits et Devoirs des Nations Neutres*, sufficiently expresses his views; they are repeated at greater length in his *Histoire des Origines, des Progrès, et des Variations du Droit Maritime International.* Finally, in his latest work, *Questions de Droit Maritime International*, 1868, he devotes an essay to the examination of this question. From this essay I have drawn a few facts. The argumentative position is strong and convincing; but, for the patriotic and loyal American, its force would doubtless be somewhat impaired by

the spirit of hostility to the United States which it plainly exhibits, and by the imputation of ulterior and ambitious designs of conquest to the American people which it contains.

III. An examination and discussion of these doctrines.

It is evident from the citations which have been made, that the argument in support of the principal doctrine under review is entirely based upon two assumptions: first, private property upon the land is respected, and it is inconsistent that a different rule should prevail in respect to similar property on the sea; and, second, the present practice is forbidden by natural law, and its abolition is demanded by the interests of humanity, and the sentiments of an advancing civilization. I shall direct my analysis and discussion to these two assumptions, and if they are both found to be false, the whole superstructure of the argument crumbles away.

First, Is private property on land respected in continental wars? Is there any rule of international law, or any practice of civilized states, by virtue of which it is free from capture or destruction? It must be conceded at once that the answer to this question involves only an historical fact, and not a principle of natural law or morality. If it appears that private property on the land is not respected, the inconsistency which is so generally imputed to nations in the conduct of their wars is certainly removed; but we shall not have necessarily proved the abstract right or expediency of the common practice.

Modern theoretical writers upon public law generally assert the doctrine as conceded and the rule as established that private property on land is respected during continental wars. I will not multiply citations: it will suffice to quote from two very recent authors. During our civil war, Dr. Francis Lieber, at the request of Mr. Secretary Stanton, prepared a code of "Instructions for the Armies of the United States while in the Field," which was approved by President Lincoln. The thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth articles are as follows: —

"The United States recognizes and protects private property in enemies' territory. . . . . Private property, unless confiscated for the crimes or delicts of the owner, can only be seized for the needs or use of the army or of the United States. If the owner is not in flight, the commanding officer will deliver to him a receipt which will enable him to obtain an indemnity."

Two publicists of the sentimental school thus speak of this work. M. Laboulaye says: —

"These instructions are in fact a little *chef-d'œuvre*. It is not a small thing thus to have installed right in the empire of force by bringing under the yoke of law the usages and even the excesses of war."

M. Bluntschli declares that it "constitutes one of the most important movements in advance of modern international law," and was inspired by it to compile the whole body of that law in a codified form. In this work * we find the following articles: —

"The conqueror is bound to respect private property, and can only seize or destroy it when military operations demand such a course." (§ 652.) "The laws of war especially do not authorize requisitions purely pecuniary." (§ 654.) "Persons who form part of an army have not the right to seize objects belonging to private individuals or to injure such objects voluntarily. But in case of absolute necessity provisions or clothing may be appropriated; the public treasury (*le fisc*) will nevertheless be bound to reimburse the value of the articles taken, unless the inhabitants were under an obligation to furnish them gratuitously." (§ 656.) "The international law absolutely interdicts the acquisition of booty in time of war." (§ 657.)

It is easy in the quiet of one's chamber to construct in this manner a theory which the Prussian Minister appropriately called *douce;* but the theory has no practical value. That certainly cannot be called a rule of the international law which, applying to peoples and governments in the very agony of an armed contest, while each combatant is putting forth its mightiest efforts, and the feelings and passions of individual citizens are aroused to the highest pitch, can only be enforced by an overwhelming hostile power; that cannot be called a rule of the international law for the violation of which no nation was ever called to an account; that cannot be called a rule of the international law which no nation ever feels bound to observe, which no nation ever does observe, except from mere motives of policy, which every nation discards and throws to the winds in practice, whatever may have been the prior professions of its publicists, its statesmen, or its actual rulers. There is in fact no such rule, no such principle, no such doctrine, no such

* Le Droit International Codifié.

practice, that the private property of enemy citizens or subjects on land is to be respected or is respected during continental wars. The very exception which the writers of this school universally make — namely, the exigencies, the necessities of the military movements and operations — utterly destroys the possibility of any rule similar to the one assumed by them; for the sole judge of these exigencies, of these necessities, must either be the commander in the field, or the government whose agent he is, and from the decision of either there can be no appeal, no review. Where all is left to the discretion of a man with an army at his back, and that discretion arbitrary because uncontrolled and uncontrollable except by a more powerful opposing army, it would seem that the rule which the university professors have so neatly constructed can exist only on paper.

Undoubtedly private property is not so systematically taken and confiscated on land as on the sea. For this there are two reasons, — the first found in considerations of policy, and the second in the nature of the element itself. The cruisers of a belligerent freely sail over the sea, meeting no obstacle, except an occasional hostile man-of-war; their course is open; they are invading no enemy soil. In continental wars of the present day an invasion which penetrates the enemy territory to any considerable distance is unusual; the contest generally rages upon the boundaries. The two notable exceptions — the invasion of Georgia and the Carolinas by Sherman, and of France by the Prussians — were in every way remarkable. Of course private property on land is not exposed unless territory is invaded, and is therefore less frequently captured or destroyed than similar property on the sea. But during an invasion private property always has been and is now regarded and treated as completely subject to the victors' will. Whether taken or left, whether destroyed or preserved, depends upon no rule, upon no principle, but simply upon motives of policy. In this connection and upon this point Hautefeuille is very emphatic; and that his position and reasoning may have their full force, it should be remembered that Hautefeuille, more than any other publicist, bases the whole international law upon the law of nature, which he defines to be the precepts and prin-

ciples of God's moral law applicable to the conduct of peoples organized into societies. Mere practice, however universal, mere custom, however hoary with age, has no authority with him, if it be opposed to the immutable principles of right and justice. I cannot, however, quote his argument in even a condensed form. He denies that private property is ever respected by an invading enemy on account of any duty, but only from considerations of expediency, of policy. Lands cannot, of course, be carried away, but houses are occupied, used, destroyed, as the convenience of the army requires. Movables are always at the mercy of the invader, and he generally levies a contribution upon the districts which he traverses, appropriating food of all kinds, clothing, beasts of burden, and often money. When a Bremen deputation waited upon Lord Palmerston to advocate the freedom of belligerent commerce, and made the common assumption that different rules prevailed upon the sea and upon the land, Lord Palmerston, with that strong common sense and regard for fact which made him so hateful to mere theorists, simply replied, that they were mistaken in their premises; that in continental wars private persons were always injured in their property by the lodgement of troops, by contributions, by devastations, and the like, for which they never received any indemnity.

These general statements I will illustrate by two examples which have a peculiar fitness and a dramatic intensity of interest, because the nations implicated were the first to formulate the doctrine of free belligerent commerce in a treaty, and have frequently since that time published it with the assurance of those who believed and practised it, — Prussia and the United States.

In the war of 1866 with Austria, and in that of 1870 with France, Prussia renounced or rather waived the right to capture private enemy property on the sea. If the principle is good on the sea, it certainly ought to be good on the land. We are now told that Prussia leads the civilization of Europe, — we did not know it before, — but her marvellous military power and success sufficiently demonstrated the fact for current American belief. Prussian education is the most perfect system extant; the Prussian army, one would have thought, was an army of

professors and philosophers. Here was certainly an opportunity, full of glorious possibilities, for the sentiments of humanity to express themselves, for the progress of civilization to make itself felt. The free commercial cities which joined the Austrian cause soon discovered from the enormous pecuniary requisitions levied upon them, — the French people, swept through and over by invading hosts, gazing upon sacked villages and slaughtered peasantry, contributing of every species of property which could be demanded and forced from them, and finally crushed down under the burden of an indemnity imposed as a condition of peace, — these Frankforters and Frenchmen discovered that although the sentiments of humanity might have free sweep over the sea, where the Prussians had little commerce and no navy, they had no place on land which could be marched over by victorious Prussian armies.

The United States first reduced the speculative dogma of a free belligerent commerce into a practical form; its first diplomatist procured it to be incorporated into a treaty; President Monroe endeavored to induce the great powers to adopt it; President Pierce demanded it as a condition of uniting in the Declaration of 1856; all these official acts and state papers assert that freedom of property on the sea is but a corollary of the admitted freedom of property on land. If there is one nation in the world which above all others, when engaged in a war, should adhere to its so-called principles of progress and of humanity, that nation is the United States. Our professions have been tested. I pass over all the minor occurrences of the civil war; two events stamp their character upon the whole conflict. General Sherman, with a copy of Dr. Lieber's amiable "Instructions" undoubtedly in his pocket, moved from Atlanta on his march to the sea. Spreading his forces over as wide an extent of territory as possible, he swept down through the richest portions of Georgia, and left behind him a broad track of desolation within which there was nothing but the land, the houses, and the forests; all else was taken or destroyed. Growing crops, the gathered grain and fruits of the soil, the implements of agriculture, the cattle, horses, and other stock, — everything which constituted private movable property vanished in the presence

of his advancing host. On his march from Savannah northward through South Carolina, another and more terrible element of destruction was added. His course was marked by the smoke and flames of burning mansions, until at last the conflagration of beautiful Columbia told with emphasis how the United States government adheres to its time-honored principles, and respects the private property of enemy citizens. With most of these acts I find no fault; I believe that all of them, except the burnings, were actually done in the interests of humanity: but I can't help feeling that Mr. Secretary Stanton snubbed his friend Dr. Lieber, for the history of the times does not tell us that General Sherman gave a single "receipt" which would enable the fortunate possessor "to obtain an indemnity." But all this is trivial: another act of the government deepens its inconsistency into hypocrisy. In former wars property has generally been taken or destroyed by commanders in the field for military purposes, for support of armies, or some similar immediate and pressing need. The United States has done and still does what no other civilized nation in this generation has dared to do: it has confiscated private property in cold blood, without any pretence of military necessity, after all opposition was ended, in pursuance of statutes passed by Congress and approved by the President. The confiscation measures of 1861 and 1862 are still in force. Under them private property of enormous value — amounting, I believe, to hundreds of millions — belonging to enemy subjects or citizens has been taken and its proceeds appropriated to the use of the government, — "*covered* into the treasury," is the official slang. I need only refer, as an illustration, to the seizure of cotton, after all resistance was ended, when Savannah and other places fell into our hands. In fact, whenever a Southern district was occupied by our forces, it was immediately swept of its cotton by a horde of treasury agents, who swarmed like jackals in the trail of our armies. The validity of these statutes has been disputed, but has been sustained by the Supreme Court in several decisions. The latest is the case of Miller *vs.* The United States, 11 Wallace's R. 248 (1870), which expressly holds that these legislative acts would be utterly void as statutes imposing penalties or punishments for crimes, but are

valid, and valid only, as measures of actual warfare. The opinion is given by Mr. Justice Strong, who may be regarded as representing in a peculiar manner the notions of abstract right and the sentiments of humanity held by the managing portion of the dominant party, and by the present administration. This judgment is so clear, and states the doctrine so boldly, without limitation or exception, that I quote the passage in full. After showing that these measures are not the exercise of the municipal power of the government, are not statutes against crimes, but were passed in virtue of the war powers of Congress, he proceeds at page 305: —

"It is argued that though there are no express constitutional restrictions upon the power of Congress to declare and prosecute war or to make rules respecting captures on land or water, there are restrictions implied in the nature of the powers themselves. Hence, it is said, the power to prosecute war is only a power to prosecute it according to the law of nations, and the power to make rules respecting captures is a power to make such rules only as are within the law of nations. Whether this is so or not we do not care to inquire, for it is not necessary to the present case. It is sufficient that the right to confiscate the property of all public enemies is a conceded right. Now what is that right, and why is it allowed? It may be remarked that it has no reference whatever to the personal guilt of the owner of confiscated property, and the act of confiscation is not a proceeding against him. The confiscation is not because of crime, but because of the relation of the property to the opposing belligerent, a relation in [into] which it has been brought in consequence of its ownership. It is immaterial to it whether the owner be an alien or friend, or even a citizen or subject of the power that attempts to appropriate the property. In either case the property may be liable to confiscation under the rules of war. It is certainly enough to warrant the exercise of this belligerent right, that the owner be a resident of the enemies' country, no matter what his nationality. The whole doctrine of confiscation is built upon the foundation that it is an instrument of coercion, which, by depriving an enemy of property within reach of his power, whether within his territory or without it, impairs his ability to resist the confiscating government, while at the same time it furnishes to that government means for carrying on the war. Hence, any property which the enemy can use, either by actual appropriation or by the exercise of control over its owner, or which the adherents of the enemy have the power of diverting to the enemy's use, is a proper subject of confiscation."

With this record of recent action, with these existing statutes, with these final judgments, the United States government still prates about freedom from capture on the sea as a doctrine to which the nation is pledged, and in the triumph of which it takes a lively interest. Mr. Secretary Fish congratulates the Prussian Minister upon the act of his royal master at the commencement of the French war, and reminds him of the early day when Prussia and America, first of all states, committed themselves to this philanthropic measure. This spectacle provokes at once derision and disgust, — contempt for the thin, make-believe character of the transaction, disgust for its glaring hypocrisy. Our public acts belie our public professions, while our professions cast a slur upon our acts.

I need pursue this branch of the subject no further. It is plain that there is no rule of international law, no practice of civilized states, which exempts private enemy property from capture or destruction on land.

Second, are these new doctrines in the interest of humanity and of civilization?

The argument generally advanced by their advocates consists of bald assumptions and frothy declamation. The assumption is of the very foundation upon which the proposed reform must rest, namely, that it *is* in the interest of humanity, that interference with private property in war is contrary to natural law; that is, contrary to the precepts of God's moral law applicable to organized bodies politic. Most of the writers to whom I have referred in this essay content themselves with asserting the proposition, without any attempt to demonstrate its truth, or any apparent consciousness that a demonstration is necessary. I have, however, already mentioned one exception, M. Massé, and will quote his argument in full, because it is clear, condensed, and in form logical. He says: —

"War ought to be just in its consequences; that is to say, it ought to be conducted in conformity with the eternal laws of humanity and of justice, and ought not to be the means of obtaining more than is due, nor of obtaining anything different from what is due, either as the cause of the war or the title to reparation. *Inter arma silent leges*, says Grotius; but only those civil and juridical laws which have place solely in time of peace, and not these perpetual laws which are for all times.

Now, since the laws of humanity and of justice are laws for all times, whose voice war cannot stifle, it follows that if the very nature of war itself, and the condition of reciprocal violence into which the belligerents are thrown, authorize them to do to the *enemy* as much evil as is necessary to force him to be just, or to obtain the reparation which is due from him, they do not authorize anything beyond this ; they authorize evil to be done solely to the *enemy* because it is the enemy, and the *enemy alone*, which the belligerent has any interest in forcing to be just. And as the right of war is based upon a necessity imposed upon one people to do violence to another people, both taken and regarded *collectively*, it results that war is a relation of *state* to *state*, and not of *individuals* to *individuals*, a relation of things and not of persons ; in such a sense and manner that between two or more belligerent nations, the particular individuals of which these nations are composed are not *enemies*, whether we consider them as men or as citizens, and they become enemies only when they act in the name of and as representatives of the state or nation ; that is to say, when they are soldiers, or when they personally engage in acts of hostility. It follows from this principle, that belligerents have no right either to inflict injury upon citizens of the state with which the war exists, unless these citizens have taken arms and have individually put on the character of enemies, or to obtain satisfaction, or to reclaim what is due either as the cause of or as reparation for the war, from such citizens, or to disturb the pacific and commercial relations which have no connection with the condition of war, which, by introducing enmity between two or more states, has not introduced enmity between the men who compose them." *

I am now prepared to examine this fundamental position which the advocates of the proposed change assume, and I deny its correctness. I deny that the principles and precepts of natural law, of that divine moral code which has been invoked, forbid the taking or destruction of private property in war. I affirm that the doctrine which so many modern publicists seek to establish is opposed to the interests of humanity, that its adoption would be a step in the retrograde, and that its necessary and intended effect would be to uphold mere physical force, to sustain absolutism.

It will not of course be denied that the destruction of a nation's foreign commerce would greatly cripple the nation itself, would weaken all its energies, would cut off many of its re-

* Massé, Le Droit Commercial, Tom. I. pp. 104, 105, §§ 120, 121.

sources, would largely diminish its power of resistance and of attack. This result is especially true in time of war, because a great body of producers are then withdrawn from the acts and processes of production, and the want created by this withdrawal must be supplied from abroad, or cannot be supplied at all. I need not dwell upon this preliminary proposition. All must admit that if the foreign commerce of one belligerent has been destroyed, much has been accomplished tending to a successful termination of the conflict. Now it should be carefully observed, in this connection, that in destroying the entire foreign commerce, it would not be necessary actually to seize and confiscate all of the merchant ships and cargoes of the enemy citizens; in fact, a very few, compared with the whole number, would be taken. The process is as follows: A war breaks out between two states, both maritime. A few weeks or months will decide which has the mastery on the sea. During this short interval, a number of the trading ships and cargoes — but in fact a small number — belonging to the subjects of the other belligerent will be seized, and then, learning their country's weakness, these trading citizens will simply suspend their further traffic; they will sell to neutrals what vessels and cargoes they have afloat, and will await the return of peace. Destruction of commerce, therefore, does not imply much destruction of actual property; it rather implies a forced suspension of trade, a cessation of the pleasant process of making profits, a loss of future expectations rather than of present possessions. All this, which is so true, so self-evident, is overlooked in the writings of the school whose teachings I oppose. This very cessation of commerce works all the injury to the state which the exigencies of successful war demand, without very much loss to individuals of property on hand. The experience of our civil war furnishes a very striking illustration. The few Rebel cruisers, by driving our trade from the ocean, inflicted a blow upon the country more staggering than that given by the defeat of many armies; and how few ships were actually captured! For every one taken I presume twenty-five or perhaps more were transferred to foreign owners.

There is still another preliminary fact which it is important to notice. Destruction of private property inflicts no *perma-*

nent injury; and what is true of the countless forms of wealth on land is *a fortiori* true of the instruments and objects of commerce on the sea. Even if all the accumulated results of labor were swept out of existence, and only the fertile land and the able-bodied inhabitants were left, the short time within which the nation would recuperate is something simply marvellous. Destroying men destroys producers and lessens the power of producing. Destroying private property is but the removing a small part of the surplus products, and the energies of a vigorous people will soon supply the waste.

War is in some aspects a dreadful evil, but it is necessary and will continue to be necessary as long as states are independent and have no common earthly authority to which they may appeal and whose decision they must respect. It cannot then be a wrong *absolutely*. The order of things as established by the Creator involves the existence of wars. We cannot apply to nations at any time, and especially in time of war, the same principles and precepts of personal morality which regulate the conduct of the individual men who compose those nations; because if we do so attempt to apply them, we must begin by interdicting all wars. The state in its organic capacity — although I conceive and affirm that it has a moral character, moral relations, rights, and duties — cannot be governed by the same rules and motives of action as those which compel individuals. The state is a trustee for its own citizens; its primary duty is towards them, to promote their security and well-being. Its duties to other states and the citizens thereof are subordinate to its duties to its own subjects. It may therefore well be that these two classes of duties should clash; and when so, it is plain which must yield. These general principles, which cannot be denied, throw light upon the absolute morality of state action towards foreign states or citizens which are for the time enemies.

The object of war is to produce a peace in the shortest possible time. In every scientific discussion we must throw out of view all motives of revenge or of doing injury for injury's sake. Each belligerent state has some ultimate end, the attainment of which requires and is assumed to justify a resort to arms. The object of the war is to reach as soon as possible

consistent with and in connection with the attainment of this end the normal condition of the parties, to restore the peaceful relations which have been interrupted. M. Hautefeuille bases his whole argument in favor of the existing practices of nations in reference to private property upon the fact that destruction of material wealth tends to hasten the close of hostilities, and thus to accomplish their very design as well as the killing and wounding human beings. The argument is fair and forcible, but I think there are others much stronger.

It is in accordance with the principles and precepts of natural law, with the sentiments of humanity, and with the interests of Christian civilization, to produce a peace not only as soon as possible, but with as little destruction of human life, with as little injury to human bodies, as possible. For this reason the improvements in weapons of offensive warfare — the rifled guns, the enormous shells, the dreaded torpedoes — are humane inventions, because they make wars on the whole less bloody. If science should so far perfect the instruments of slaughter that every member of each opposing army would with absolute certainty be killed at a blow, then wars would cease. If this be true, the conclusion is inevitable, that it is more in accordance with the instincts of humanity to inflict injury upon an enemy state, and thus to force a peace, by capturing or destroying property, than to reach the same result by killing and maiming men. *A fortiori* must this be true if the capture or destruction is not of articles necessary to the immediate subsistence and preservation of the enemy inhabitants, but is rather of superfluities, of things which are at most comforts and conveniences, and finally if the loss be one from which the nation will in a short time recover. The ideal of a war carried on according to mere motives of humanity, of a war in which sentiments of humanity have absolute control, would be one where no injury was done to human beings, no life taken, no wound inflicted, and all the force was exerted against material objects.

The new doctrines are evidently the exact opposite of this ideal; they exalt wealth above humanity; they make loss of products a greater evil than loss of producers; they demand that all the forces of war should be directed exclusively against

men, against life, bodies, and limbs. It is true they would confine the use of these hostile forces to one class of men, to combatants or soldiers. We can now see how false are the assumptions, how hollow the pretences, of the sentimental school of publicists. They regard soldiers or combatants as mere machines, ignoring their humanity, and placing them in importance below the material wealth of citizens who stay at home and trade. When we are about to test the rules and practices of war by the instincts and sentiments of humanity merely, we should remember that the professional soldier is as much a human being as the merchant, that his life is as valuable as that of the artisan, and that when we compare him with ships and cargoes there is no common measure which can be applied to them. What is true when we think of professional soldiers, of combatants who are as a class separated from all other classes, is most overwhelmingly true of modern wars where the armies are drawn from the great body of the citizens, where all ranks and classes, producers of every kind, are marched into the field and become the combatants, while behind them stands the rest of the nation awaiting its turn to join in the conflict.

If the doctrines I am examining should be universally adopted, the consequence would be immediate and inevitable; all wars would be made more protracted, and, what is far worse, more bloody. This proposition can be well illustrated by assuming the accomplishment of the proposed change, the realization of the ideal which the reformers have conceived; that is, contest between combatants alone, while all else in the state goes on as usual. A war is declared between two powerful maritime nations. It produces no direct change in the peaceful avocations of life; agriculture, manufactures, commerce, flourish as before. The people are not hindered in their productions and exchanges, and are thus enabled to respond to the demands of the government, and to furnish all the material supplies necessary to sustain the struggle. It is true that producers are withdrawn from time to time from the orderly activities of life, and are converted into military non-producers. But the vacancy thus made is not felt, because the articles which were before produced at home are now brought from abroad by means of the

free commerce which is thus quickened into extraordinary activity. Under these circumstances the war is reduced to a mere duel between hostile armies. The nation has only to furnish men, and the contest will be continued until one country has been swept of its able-bodied citizens. That nation will certainly be victorious which can bring forward and sacrifice the greatest number of soldiers. This is not an imaginary picture. The essential fact was shown to be true in the history of the Confederacy. Levy after levy was made, army after army took the field; but as soon as Sherman ravaged the sources of supply in Georgia and Carolina, the whole hostile array collapsed.

Finally, all this, when accomplished, would evidently be in the interests of absolutism. Under the influence and effect of these doctrines, nations to be great, and powerful, and successful in war, must maintain enormous standing armies, or must rather, as Prussia has done, convert the entire mass of citizens into an army ready to be summoned into active service. The picture of a war waged between combatants alone, which I have just drawn, shows that success requires vast numbers and constant training; and this means vast professional armies or universal military organization of citizens; and this in turn means, *is, absolutism*, is utterly incompatible with constitutional government. The insane admiration for the Prussian system as something good in itself, as well as something wonderful in its power, which was felt and outspoken all through the United States during the Franco-Prussian war, indicated a demoralization alarming to every thoughtful citizen, — a forgetting of the very principles of a free government and of civil liberty.

Furthermore, these dominating nations would be continental; maritime power and supremacy would be gone. Navies would be useless, except to attack and defend coast towns and fortifications. The peoples most favorably situated for maintaining the mastery of the sea would be obliged to become strong on land or sink into the rank of inferior powers. The two nations of all others which would thus be deprived of their natural advantages and maritime supremacy are the United States and Great Britain.

That I am not mistaken in these positions is plain from the unconcealed partisanship of the Second as well as of the First

Empire, exhibited by the French writers whose names I have given. M. Cauchy repeatedly refers to Napoleon I. as an authority, and quotes a declaration made by him, in 1809, to Mr. Armstrong, Minister of the United States, as follows: —

"The seas belong to no nation; they are the common good of the peoples, and the domain of all. Enemy ships of commerce, belonging to private individuals, ought to be respected. In all her conquests, France has respected private property. . . . . Such are the principles of the Emperor upon the usages and the rights of maritime warfares. When France shall have acquired a navy proportioned to the extent of her coasts and of her population, the Emperor will reduce these maxims to practice, and will use all his efforts to render their adoption general." *

Napoleon's design in this is as plain as his lying was audacious. The man who openly violated and derided all rules of international law, whose principle of actual war was to support his army from off the enemy, who respected neither the persons nor property of enemy citizens, wished to destroy the power of Great Britain by rendering navies useless, and armies the sole instrument of warfare.

There is a further consideration of policy which applies with peculiar force to the United States. Notwithstanding the episode of our civil war, we are and must ever be the great neutral nation of the world. Down to the year 1861 it was our traditional policy to uphold and maintain neutral rights; all the world looked to us as the champion of these rights. Erelong, when the government falls once more into the hands of statesmen, this policy will be revived. The Treaty of Paris of 1856 was a triumph of the neutral cause; it fixed what had been contended for through generations, — the doctrine that free ships make free goods; or, in other words, that neutral vessels may carry enemy goods free from capture. With these rules of 1856 in existence, the next great European war and all succeeding ones will throw into our hands the carrying trade of the world, the commerce of both continents. But if this commerce be made free for the belligerents themselves, all these advantages are lost, sacrificed to a mere sentiment. The advocacy of free belligerent commerce by Americans is therefore simply suicidal.

* Droit Maritime International, p. 561.

My time and space do not allow me to speak at length of the other proposed change in the laws of war. It is in the same interest and designed to promote the same objects as the one I have discussed. If the time shall ever arrive when all mastery on the sea is ended, when a few great continental powers dominate in the family of nations by their enormous armies and organized military citizens, and when no aid can be given in arms, ammunition, and other warlike material to a weak and struggling people, there will be a triumph indeed, but not of civilization, not of humanity.

JOHN NORTON POMEROY.

Art. V. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — *Universal Pronouncing Dictionary of Biography and Mythology.* By J. Thomas, M. D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. Two vols. Royal 8vo. 1871.

The want of a good modern biographical dictionary in English has long been felt, — a work adapted to popular use in schools, libraries, reading-rooms, and private houses, not too extended, and so too costly, nor on the other hand too limited in its range, and too meagre in its statements, — something between the two monumental works of Michaud and Hoefer, and the handy English volume not long ago revised and edited by Mr. William A. Wheeler. But such a work is one of the hardest to prepare. A dictionary of words or of places, or even of the arts and sciences, seems to us an easier task, for while these works require as much labor and learning as the compendium of biography, the latter involves a decision of many questions of fame and fortune, a perpetual dealing with prejudices and rivalries, an incessant effort to ascertain and exhibit the world's estimate of all sorts of characters, from Adam to the last celebrity.

The author who allows himself some freedom in the discussion of certain lives, and yet restricts himself to the limit of one or two volumes in the aggregate, assumes a bold, delicate, and ill-paid undertaking. From the very nature of the case, he cannot satisfy conflicting schools in theology, politics, history, and science. Let him be ever so guarded he cannot expect to avoid censure. It is doubtful whether he can even satisfy himself in his own varying moods. The highest reward he can expect, beyond the consciousness of fidelity and industry, is the verdict of historical scholars, bibliographers, and antiquaries, who can appreciate the enormous difficulties under which he has toiled, that the work is well done and worthy the confidence and acceptance of the public.

Such praise we are sure will be heartily accorded to Dr. Thomas, for the Dictionary of Biography and Mythology, on which he has expended many years of expert and untiring diligence. He is already favorably known to scholars by the "Pronouncing Gazetteer," which is commonly quoted as "Lippincott's," and by his Pronouncing Tables of Proper Names, appended to the latest revision of the Webster Dictionary. We might easily adduce other evidence of his fitness for this new task, but we are sure that he himself will prefer to have attention directed to the work itself, with a candid scrutiny of its quality.

The real character of such works as this is not at once apparent. The essential merits and defects are both to be discovered by long familiarity, by reference to the pages in different moods and for different purposes, and especially by observing the service which the volumes render to the average reader when he consults them. It may be taken for granted that the specialist in any branch of learning will sometimes be disappointed in the treatment of authorities whom he regards as of the first rank, or in the degree of prominence bestowed on men whose influence has been strong in very restricted paths. It must also be expected in a work so comprehensive as a Biographical Dictionary, that some statements will be given as facts from which scholars will dissent, and that some errors of dates and names will creep in, and some important incidents or occurrences will escape the compiler's notice. It is not fair to bring in hypercriticism here. Knowing that the author is competent, conscientious, and painstaking, we are much more interested in ascertaining the peculiar characteristics of his work, and the degree of success which has generally attended the execution of his plan.

We begin with the aspect of the volumes. The page is a large-sized royal octavo, almost a quarto, printed in two columns, with good margins, and clear, open typography, the name at the head of every article having a broad, black-faced letter, which makes reference easy. The bibliographical notes are given in fine type at the close of the articles. The ink, paper, stitching, and other mechanical qualities are excellent. Copies may be obtained, bound in one volume or in two, at the buyer's choice. Scarcely any abbreviations are employed, — not even for words of constant recurrence, like born, died, son, father, etc., — but the style of each notice is clear and readable, free from amplification, as a general rule, and yet not curt or abrupt. Frequently toward the close of a sketch an apposite quotation is made from a writer of literary distinction, but the author of the volume rarely allows himself any rhetorical freedom. It would, perhaps, have been better if the epithets "distinguished," "celebrated," "eminent," "learned," and the like, which so often succeed the name, had been uniformly omitted.

Among the distinctive features of these volumes the author would doubtless give special prominence to the pronunciation. On this he has expended a vast amount of inquiry and study. As a remarkable instance of his zeal, it deserves to be mentioned that, in view of the difficulties connected with the English transliteration and utterance of Oriental names, Dr. Thomas went abroad and spent nearly two years in the East studying the rudiments of several Asiatic tongues, including Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, and Hindoostanee. The results of this

"pronouncing voyage," unique, we presume, in literary annals, are seen on almost every page.

There are only three courses, he remarks, which can be pursued in speaking foreign names, — to blunder over them haphazard like a school-boy, to pronounce them according to the rules of English orthoepy, or to give as nearly as possible the pronunciation adopted by well-educated people in the land to which the name belongs. It is the last method which he follows, in accordance with good sense and good usage both in this country and abroad. But likewise, in accordance with good sense and good usage, he makes some important exceptions. Celebrated names like Confucius, Kosciusko, Cortez, Cervantes, Luther, Petrarch, and so on, which have acquired an established English pronunciation, he would leave undisturbed in their English utterance.

The principles which govern the sounds of the more important European and Asiatic languages are elaborately stated in the Introduction to the first volume, and then each proper name, as it is introduced in its alphabetical place, has affixed to it an indication of the appropriate sounds, expressed with accents, marks of quantity, peculiar type, and modified spelling. By these four helps the author has been very successful, as it seems to us, in exhibiting his conception of the pronunciation of almost every name.

The next point to which we refer is the comprehensiveness of these volumes. Mythological names are included, and in addition to those of Greece and Rome, special attention has been given to those of Norse and Hindoo origin, — a feature which will be generally acceptable. The biographical sketches refer to persons of all countries and callings, living as well as dead. English and American names, of the second or third rank in importance, are much more commonly given than those of like consequence in other countries. Chinese, Hindoo, and Arabic names receive fair attention, proportioned to the supposed requirements of an ordinary English reader. Most of the historic names of American Indians are given, though there are some noteworthy omissions. Men of literary renown, as a class, are perhaps better represented than statesmen and generals. The greatest deficiencies which we have noted are among the scholars in natural science. Some of the most distinguished are very slightly spoken of (Darwin, for example, whose name is on every one's lips), or are wholly omitted.

After running through the work, having in hand various lists of persons no longer living, selected not for their fame, but for their worth in different departments of human activity, we have been surprised, on the whole, to see how rarely any name for which we thus looked is omitted. Among living men of distinction we should include many

whom the author does not, and *vice versa*, but in this there can be no positive standard.

The great comprehensiveness of this work is accomplished by giving, in most instances, very brief sketches. We open at random to pages 428, 429, Brand — Bray, where we find in the four columns sixty-eight different black-letter headings (a few of them cross-references), and the longest one of the sketches is but seventeen lines. This selection is not an average, we admit, neither is it extreme. But the dry, annalistic monotony which would result from such condensation, if it were not relieved, is compensated by the elaborate sketches which are frequently interspersed. To men of world-wide influence ample space is given, and some of these character sketches are noteworthy examples of condensed, spirited, biographical narrative. For example, between six and seven columns are devoted to Julius Cæsar, fourteen columns to Napoleon Bonaparte, four columns to Alexander the Great, seven and a half to Washington, five to Wellington, and so on; but Charlemagne, on the contrary, who is certainly to be regarded as a great man raised up for a great emergency, the representative of the transition from the Roman Empire to the modern European state, is restricted to two thirds of a column. Special prominence is given to the leaders of religious opinion, Confucius, Gautama Boodha, and Mohammed being elaborately treated. The article Brahma and Brahmanism is also very ample; Zoroaster is rapidly passed over. Luther, Calvin, George Fox, Wesley, Swedenborg, receive just appreciation; but some of the great leaders of the Latin Church in the Middle Ages are too briefly mentioned, — such men, for example, as Gregory the Great, Gregory the Seventh or Hildebrand, Innocent the Third, and others, by whose power the ecclesiastical system of Rome was so firmly built up. Indeed, with our estimate of the influences by which modern civilization in Europe was brought out of the ruins of the ancient Empire, we should have expected to find fuller articles upon many of the mediæval worthies, Charlemagne, Alfred, Louis of France, Barbarossa, and the rest. Among the articles on literary men those on Goethe and Voltaire are quite noteworthy. That on Dante falls far short of the importance of the man; and that on Shakespeare seems to us ill-balanced by the preponderance given to the new theory of Miss Bacon and Mr. Holmes. Homer and Virgil are not elaborately treated; Plato, and especially Cicero, receive just honor. Most of the longer articles are not only prepared with great care as to the facts which they state, but are written in a clear and easy style, sometimes with great ability, and often with the introduction of fit selections from the writings of other biographers and critics.

Presuming that the Dictionary of Dr. Thomas is to assume a standard place as a book of reference in American libraries and schools, we have no doubt that the plates will from time to time be revised, and that a select appendix will by and by be necessary. We have detected some needless defects in the notices of distinguished Americans, many of which would be obviated by a careful collation of the Dictionary with the triennials of Harvard and Yale, the West Point Register of General Cullum, the official registers of the United States army and navy, and other like manuals. For example, the career of General A. A. Humphreys, chief of engineers in the United States army, is very inadequately stated, and no mention is made of his great work on the Mississippi River, one of the most valuable of American contributions to science; Professor Bache's work might, within the same space, be much better delineated; General Halleck's work on International Law ought not to be omitted from his record; Professor Weir's career as a painter is made more noteworthy by the fact that he has been so long a professor at West Point. All this would be obvious by referring to Cullum's admirable volumes. The triennials of American colleges, when published, are edited with great care, and at least obviate in most cases the necessity of using the word "about" in mentioning the dates of graduation and of death. It seems remarkable that Dr. Lieber's removal to New York, Professor Botta's residence in this country, Dr. Palfrey's third volume of New England History, the full summary of Mr. Peabody's benefactions, the memoir of General Nathaniel Lyon, the appointment of Professor Peirce to the head of the United States Coast Survey, the time when Admiral Foote entered the navy, and some other well-known facts, should have escaped Dr. Thomas's attention; but these are trifling slips, hardly worth mentioning, and quite pardonable in one who has done so much good work in the study.

On the whole, after many hours of examination, and in different moods, we have formed a favorable opinion of the labors of Dr. Thomas. The blemishes to which we have just referred are only such as are natural when a single man covers so wide a field; indeed, they could not be wholly avoided by an association of scholars or a corps of collaborators. They are not serious enough to affect our general estimate of the work. On the contrary, its excellence is more and more apparent as we prolong our scrutiny. For fulness of names, judiciousness of treatment, accuracy of statement, and freedom from the bias of this or that school, it rivals any work of the kind in English. As a combination of compactness and completeness it is especially commendable. For the thoroughness with which the work is carried to the end,

when so many compilers "give out" in the early letters of the alphabet, the author deserves especial praise. His volumes will merit a constant place by the side of the dictionary and the gazetteer in every reference library. It would be especially desirable that an edition on a little thinner paper, at least at a somewhat lower price, could be offered for the use of schools. Such volumes as these are invaluable in every class in history, and would doubtless be widely introduced.

2.—*The Life of Charles Dickens.* By John Forster. Vol. I. 1812–1842. London: Chapman and Hall. 1872. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.

There is no better reading for an idle hour than a volume of memoirs or a good biography, and we presume that by this time everybody who could buy, borrow, or take out the book has read through the first volume of the "Life of Dickens," by his friend, John Forster, who has made biography in some sort his line in literature. It is safe to say everybody, because no author of his generation so attracted all classes of readers as Dickens. The characters he sent out into the world between 1837 and his visit to America in 1842 were so new, vivid, and amusing, that they became actual existences to thousands. And although the fate common to all has overtaken many of them, and Kenwigses, Bumbles, Smikes, and the rest of that kind have vanished or are perceptibly vanishing into the covers of the books they sprang from, most of us remember the spell they laid upon us, and many are under it still.

There were few external incidents in Dickens's life, apart from his wonderful literary successes, and those recorded in this volume were known already, except the episode of the blacking warehouse. But some extracts from letters written to Forster during Dickens's first visit to this country are new and entertaining. He had let the world see in his "Notes" that the progress in the United States which began with effusive affection on the part of the nation and the "nation's guest" ended in something like disgust, — what with his ill-timed copyright speeches and the irritation produced in him by American habits, manners, and intrusiveness. Our national trait of looking upon a distinguished man as in some sort public property, as we do upon a public house or a public conveyance, which we have a right to make use of when it suits our pleasure, was never more strongly exemplified than in his case. In these letters he pours out his feelings fresh and warm from the heart. His language is strong, but he means every word he

writes: how he was mobbed at all hours, and hand-shaken and stared at and spit upon; how he was wearied to death by literary ladies, the L. L.'s, as he calls them; how he hates our "eternal prosy conversation about dollars and politics, the only two subjects they ever converse upon or can converse upon"; and how he "would not live here on any consideration": better fifty years of London than a cycle of Broadway. It is amusing to read how entirely he agreed with Mr. Carlyle in his estimate of our talent for social intercourse: "I am quite serious when I say that I do not believe there are on the whole earth besides so many intensified bores as in these United States. No one can form an adequate idea of the real meaning of the word without coming here." Another melancholy instance of a foreigner who did not understand our institutions!

On the whole, Mr. Forster has done his work fairly well, apart from some faults of taste and of style; but we have laid down the book with a certain sense of disappointment. We are shown Dickens at school, in the reporters' gallery, and, later, working at his stories with an industry as intense as his imagination. We are told he was "the cheerfullest man of the age"; that "light and motion flashed from every part of his face"; that he was the life of society by his quaint fancies, his unwearying animal spirits, and his love of jollity and fun; that a man "of more beautiful and noble nature and more truly generous never lived." We hear of walks, rides, journeyings, and dinners public and private; but somehow we do not get a clear, distinct idea of the man. We see his features dimly through a haze. We feel that we do not fully know his character or even his habits. Mr. Forster has not the knack of catching a likeness, at least in this volume he has not shown the masterly hand that with a few skilful touches places the man before us, standing "revealed" for once and always.

Mr. Forster's style seems to us to lack directness and simplicity. There is an affectation in his manner that reminds us of some ambitious writers nearer home, who, as his former hero, Goldsmith, says, "hunt after lofty expressions to deliver ordinary ideas, and are forever gaping when they have only a whisper to bring out." Many of his sentences are as involved in their construction as if they were translated from the Latin; they seem to be turned upside down, and it requires a second perusal to understand them. Here is one, for example, and there are plenty of others like it, that jars upon the nerves of a judicious reader: "To the account therein given of himself when he went to the school, as advanced enough, so safely had his memory retained its poor fragments of early schooling, to be put into Virgil, as getting sundry prizes, and as attaining to the eminent position of its first boy, one of

his two schoolfellows with whom I have held communication, makes objection" (page 75). It is strange that with such living models as Mill, Huxley, Helps, or Maurice, whose vigorous classical English is as clear as the best French, any man in Great Britain who has anything to say cannot say it simply and naturally.

That to write a man's life generally makes the biographer in love with his subject is notorious; and Mr. Forster had, over and above this influence, the affection of three-and-twenty years' intimate friendship to warp his judgment. Even this twofold cause of aberration does not excuse the profuse unvarying praise he bestows upon his hero and all his works. Mr. Forster takes Dickens at his own valuation and gives us pretty much his ideal of himself. Heine says the original weakness of man is to appear what he is not. Dickens did not escape this taint of the old Adam. His emotions were so strong and his imagination so vivid, that his joys and sorrows, his wishes and hopes, seemed to him much more intense than they really were. A genius in whom "Gedanke und Ausdruck," thought and the expression of it, sprang up together, he was never at a loss for strong, highly colored, eloquent words. An actor by nature, "the best amateur that ever wielded a hare's foot or a blunt sword," he instinctively personified the character he dreamed of, and with his great power of language and his knack of making every point tell, he deceived many of his friends and very likely himself.

A good example of this peculiarity of Dickens's character, and of Mr. Forster's apparent inability to detect it, is the story of the blacking warehouse. If in the case of books patents were applied for instead of copyrights, Mr. Forster would claim this incident as his especial discovery, — a discovery he made accidentally "one day in the March or April of 1847," Dickens being then thirty-five years of age. These are the unvarnished facts of the case: —

Dickens the father was in the Marshalsea Prison for debt; the rest of the family, nearly destitute, after "camping in two rooms" for a while, took up their lodgings in the prison. A relative engaged in the manufacture of an imitation of Warren's Blacking, knowing their circumstances, and seeing Charles, then about ten years old, neglected and idle, took him into his employ at a salary of six or seven shillings a week, with the hearty thanks of his parents. The boy remained in it until his father was released from prison; he was then taken away, against his mother's wishes, and sent to school.

Dickens, alluding to this period of his life, says: "I have no idea how long it lasted, whether for a year or much more or less." Probably for less. His memory was as retentive as his faculty of observa-

tion was minute. It is not likely that a child who could describe things he saw before he was two years of age could forget the time he had passed in this "acute misery," — a time, Mr. Forster writes, "of which he could never lose the remembrance while he remembered anything, and the recollection of which at intervals haunted him and made him miserable even to that hour." His business was to tie the corks of the blacking-bottles and to paste on the labels, — an occupation not uncongenial to youthful tastes; and "on Saturday night it was a grand thing to walk home with six shillings in his pocket, and to look in at the shop windows and think what it would buy." In the beginning he was placed by himself on an upper floor, but he soon found his way down to Bob Fagin and Paul Green, two boys who were busy at the same work below stairs. Although youngsters of ten or eleven are not generally over-particular about their playmates, if they are not bullied by them, Dickens's recollection was, that "no words can express the secret agony of my soul as I sunk into this companionship, the shame I felt in my position." Harshness and physical ill-treatment do certainly leave a scar on the character of a child, but there are no complaints of anything of the kind. On the contrary, his cousin arranged to teach him during the dinner hour. He was treated as upon a different footing from the rest. The boys and men employed always spoke of him as the young gentleman. He remembered that "though perfectly familiar with them, my conduct and manners were different enough from theirs to place a space between us." Nothing very terrible about this, we should say, for a boy who had been "a poor little drudge ever since we came to London," and whose shiftless parents were in a jail. From this place he went at once to a school. Two of his schoolfellows have described him to Mr. Forster as he appeared to them then and there, — a healthy-looking, handsome, curly-headed lad, full of animation and animal spirits, fond of telling stories, of getting up plays, and connected with every mischievous prank in the school. It is evident that the iron had not entered very deeply into the soul of the boy.

But Dickens, the man, chose to consider the blacking warehouse the skeleton of his closet, although he took care to work every bone of it into his books. It grew larger and more ghastly in his imagination, until he felt a bitter sense of injury against fate and the parents who had sacrificed him. It was "wonderful to him that he could have been so easily cast away, that no one had compassion on him." He gradually identified himself with Oliver and Copperfield, just as when a child he "sustained his idea of Roderick Random for a month at a stretch." It became an awful secret that he carried locked up in his

heart, and when at last he confided it to Mr. Forster he exhausted his remarkable melodramatic power of language to express his feelings. His version of the story reads like an article in a London "Penny Dreadful." "How much I suffered it is utterly beyond my power to tell, no man's imagination can overstep the reality." "I know that, but for the mercy of God, I might easily have been, for any care that was taken of me, a little robber or a little vagabond." "My whole nature was so penetrated with the grief and humiliation of such considerations, that even now, famous and caressed and happy, I often forget in my dreams that I have a dear wife and child, even that I am a man, and wander desolately back to that time of my life." "Until old Hungerford Market was pulled down, until old Hungerford stairs were destroyed and the very nature of the ground changed, I never had the courage to go back to the place where my servitude began. I never saw it. I could not endure to go near it. For many years, when I came near to Warren's in the Strand, I crossed over to the opposite side of the way, to avoid a certain smell of the cement they put upon the blacking corks which reminded me of what I was once!" "I have never, until I now impart it to this paper, in any burst of confidence with any one, my own wife not excepted, raised the curtain I then dropped, thank God!"

Mr. Forster tells us that he was "startled" when Dickens told him the story. Even now, after an interval of twenty-five years, he seems to accept this catalogue of emotions, and adds a few sympathetic touches of his own about "the poor little lad" who was turned at the age of ten into "a laboring hind," and who "mingled his tears with the water" in which he rinsed and washed out bottles.

If the dispassionate reader applies the moral spectroscope to this story, the lines of exaggeration become strongly visible, — an exaggeration curious and characteristic of the man. It is likely that the lad of ten knew nothing of this agony and humiliation, and enjoyed his independence, his companions, and his six shillings; but there is no doubt that Dickens, famous, flattered, with dinner invitations innumerable from the highest quarters, the intimate associate of all the best men in letters and in art, did feel humiliated when he recollected that he had "worked from morning to night with common men and boys, a shabby child," and in a blacking shop at that! May not there have been the rub? Was not the stigma of having belonged to the workingmen class, the root of the horrors inexpressible, unutterable, except to his dearest friend? The dislike of a low origin, or any lapse from what is called respectability, is probably stronger in an Englishman than in any other man. Be he ever so clever or so radical, he can hardly

escape it. Dickens considered himself the son of a gentleman; he was aristocratic in his feelings, and had great personal pride. It may be that blacking had the same effect upon his nerves as bodkin upon those of Sir Piercie Shafton. Most people will think that in this matter Dickens was unnecessarily severe upon his parents. His father was at his wits' end, in prison, and nothing "turned up." If the poor man did little for his son, he at least bequeathed him Micawber, who will live the longest of his creations.

Mr. Forster's criticism of Dickens's works is the least satisfactory part of the book. It would have done no harm to the fame of his friend if the steady flow of undiscriminating praise had been rippled here and there by a difficulty or a doubt. He might at least have hinted that there were critics, wrong-minded and without taste of course, whose opinion of Dickens's works is not always so favorable as his own. Mistaken persons who think that Dickens, with all his genius, saw things on the surface and rarely got beneath it; and in the reforms he had at heart, was so much more influenced by his feelings than by his reason, that he narrowly escaped, if indeed he did escape, belonging to the *classe dangereuse* of sentimentalists who attack abuses with the least possible knowledge of the root of the evil, and curse when they come to bless. We have even heard of captious fault-finders who say that Dickens's villains are always villains, and his angels always angelic, without the mixture of good and evil we find in human beings; that there is no development of character in his stories, his personages springing full-grown and fully equipped from his brain with a speech in their mouths to suit the part; often mere caricatures who reappear when they are wanted, with the same features and the same superscription. And some indeed have gone wrong so far as to maintain that his humor is often overstrained, the *jeu d'esprit* becoming perceptibly an *effort d'esprit*, as a Frenchman once expressed it; that his pathos often wanders dangerously near to the edge of the abyss of falseness, not to say maudlin; and that his gushing benevolence, which makes all the virtuous poor happy, especially about Christmas-time, has a flavor of plum-pudding and mince-pie about it, and seems to result rather from a jolly good dinner and abundant port than from any fixed principle of charity. All these idle remarks he might have noticed to confute them. His method has been to exhaust praise and to make use of an additional padding of commonplaces, we might call them platitudes, of the Goody Two Shoes school of philosophy. It is appalling to learn that "we cannot too often be told, that as the pride and grandeur of external circumstance is the falsest of earthly things, so the truth of virtue in the heart is the most lovely and lasting, and

from the pages of 'Oliver Twist' this teaching is once again to be taken by all who will look for it there" (page 161). It was not as a writer of tracts or of moral essays that Mr. Dickens won his great reputation; and of the thousands who have read "Oliver Twist," probably no one has ever remarked before that "it is the book's pre-eminent merit that vice is nowhere made attractive in it." In the same vein Mr. Barnum criticised the moral dramas formerly played in his Museum, and made daily use of his criticism in the form of an advertisement; they were warranted not to bring a blush to the cheek of the purest-minded female. Mr. Forster may not have heard that soon after Dickens's death there was much discussion in this country among earnest-minded advocates of temperance as to whether an author so fond of the "wicked jingle of glass," and who so often and so enthusiastically chanted the praises of half-and-half, mulled wine, hot punch, and brandy cold without, was a moral writer or even a Christian.

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3. — *Livy, Books I. – X. With Introduction, Historical Examination, and Notes.* By J. R. Seeley, M. A., Professor of Modern History, Cambridge. Book I. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press. 1871. 8vo. pp. 198.

There is certainly room for a good edition of Livy with English notes; for there exists none at present, except of certain portions, selected for the use of classes. There is, to be sure, Weissenborn's cheap and excellent edition, for those who can read German, — and the student of philology who cannot read German lacks one of the tools of his trade; but its crowded pages and painful minuteness of annotation weary both the mind and the eye of the English student. And even Weissenborn does not give us all that we want. His chief interest is with the grammar and language of Livy; and although he devotes a fair amount of space to explaining the facts told by his author, yet he can hardly be called an independent student in this field. He generally adopts intelligently, and not slavishly, the views of the prevailing school of antiquarians; what we may call the school of Niebuhr, represented especially by Schwegler and Becker. But these views are in a fair way to be superseded by the later doctrines advanced by Mommsen, which may be said to have fairly revolutionized a great part of our theories upon the early institutions of Rome.

Mr. Seeley has therefore undertaken a very useful enterprise; and even if he gives us no more than the first decade, we shall be grateful for that, and hope that some one else equally competent will continue

his work. At any rate the first decade by itself will have a certain completeness, and it is here that the doubtful points in Roman antiquities are chiefly to be found. And since we have criticised Weissenborn as giving too little historical commentary, and that incomplete, in view of Mommsen's recent theories, we are glad that Mr. Seeley gives his chief attention to this department of the field, and that he is an unequivocal follower of Mommsen in almost every point. "It is difficult," he says, "to be equally thorough in three departments so distinct, and each so large, as Roman antiquities, Latin philology and grammar, and textual criticism. My chief attention has been given to the first, but I shall be disappointed if this edition is not judged to deal conscientiously and thoroughly with the difficulties of idiom and construction which Livy presents. In textual criticism all I have done is to exert an independent judgment upon the materials furnished by Weissenborn, Hertz, Alschefski, Madvig, etc." (p. 9). These words describe very exactly the character of the edition, and claim no more merit for its execution than the editor fairly deserves.

It is a clear advantage for the student that the historical commentary is chiefly given in the form of a preliminary essay, instead of being scattered through the book. Notes to each passage must necessarily be partial, and at the same time can hardly avoid repeating each other more or less, and nothing is more important than a clear and connected notice of the subject as a whole. In this Historical Examination the most striking characteristic is the clearness and compactness with which the "case" is stated, and the reader put in possession of the facts from which his judgment must be formed. After the volumes of conjecture and argument that have been bestowed upon these obscure subjects, one is really surprised to see to how small a bulk the whole can be reduced by a man who possesses at once erudition and common sense. To be sure several important and puzzling topics are reserved for the commentaries upon the following books; but leaving these aside, we believe we are speaking within bounds when we say that there is not in existence so accurate and comprehensible and at the same time comprehensive a discussion of the early Roman constitution as this, or so good an introduction to the study of the subject. One is especially impressed with the clear-sightedness with which the really essential points are singled out, and the multitudinous minutiæ which only serve to confuse and obscure are passed over. In spite of the moderate bounds within which the whole is brought, one very rarely misses a point or a citation that would add very much to the argument.

A special merit of this introductory essay is the good illustrations it gives of the right way of approaching a subject; for upon this de-

pends half the cogency of an argument. Mr. Seeley makes it a practice to introduce every topic with one of two things, — either a plain and clear statement of what is known as a certainty, by well-attested evidence, in regard to the early times; or a similar statement of the well-ascertained usage in the later ages of the Republic. In the first case, the reader starts on his inquiries with his mind disembarrassed of the confusing speculations of modern writers, and is able to pass readily from the meagre facts which are known to the most probable inference from them. The second method is even more fruitful. Nothing is more surprising, when one considers the subject, than the degree in which these incoherent traditions in regard to institutions which very soon passed out of use have overshadowed in our minds the institutions which actually existed when Rome was a powerful Republic. We spend pages in debating whether Livy was right in giving 194 centuries in the time of the kings, or Dionysius in giving 193; and are hardly aware of the fact that neither of these figures is of any importance for historical times, and that we are utterly ignorant how many centuries there were at the time when the Centuriat Comitia were the most important legislative body in the world.

When the real facts known are thus put together and placed before the reader, this is in itself a better refutation of the credibility of the early history than a long argument. And yet Professor Seeley's reply to Dr. Dyer in regard to this is so excellent that we cannot avoid citing a part of it (p. 50): —

"If we had good testimony that there existed a large mass of contemporary testimony from which our historians might have drawn their history of the kings, it would certainly be superfluous to imagine any other way in which they may have constructed it. Our confidence in most modern historians rests no doubt upon our knowledge that they had access to the truth, and had therefore no inducement to invent. But on the most favorable view, on Dr. Dyer's own view, of the sources of the early history, it cannot be said that we know Livy and Dionysius to have had access to any copious contemporary account of the regal period. The utmost Dr. Dyer ought to consider himself to have proved is, that there were certainly some contemporary documents, that probably they were not nearly so few as has been supposed, that conceivably they were positively numerous and minute. On the other hand, it is possible, even granting all that he has urged, that the more unfavorable view is correct. I myself feel that the very best evidence we have about early documents is not such as ought to produce certainty. . . . . Dr. Dyer would perhaps answer this by an argument which he uses more than once, namely, that the evidence, if

slight, 'is the best evidence that can reasonably be expected in a matter of such high antiquity.' The truth is, he differs from his opponents more on the principles of logic itself than on the facts to which they are applied. He believes that historical evidence gains in demonstrative power in proportion as it diminishes in quality, and that it does so expressly in order to prevent the inconveniences that might otherwise arise. He believes that in a recent period we are right to require a good deal of evidence, because we can get it, but that in a remote period less is necessary, because less can be had."

If Professor Seeley exposes very thoroughly the fallacy of the argument for the credibility of the early history, he is equally conclusive — and in just the same way, by a naked statement of ascertained facts — in refuting many of the theories that have been brought forward to take the place of the old traditions. We believe that in every question that comes up, where Mommsen differs from Schwegler and Becker, and other scholars of the school of Niebuhr, he accepts Mommsen's conclusions, — conclusions, it should be observed, which in almost every case return nearer to the old traditions. He shows that the curiate comitia were not exclusively patrician in the time of the Republic, — one of the chief points in which Niebuhr rejected Livy's authority. As a corollary of this, he appears to accept the plebeians as members of the *sex suffragia*, although his expressions in regard to this point are less perspicuous than is usual with him, and the note to chapter forty-three rather implies that he thinks them exclusively patrician. And at any rate, he does not go so far as Mommsen and Rubino in ranking the *sex suffragia* under the twelve *centuriæ equitum*. Again, he shows that the *patrum auctoritas* cannot be identical with the *lex curiata de imperio* (a favorite theory of Niebuhr), and thus is led to adopt Mommsen's view that, while the entire Senate was a purely advisory body, the patrician members of it possessed certain special powers as an independent body.

Nevertheless, even Professor Seeley sometimes shows marks of being widely influenced by the prevailing theories and the traditions in regard to prehistoric times. The *sex suffragia* are a case in point, although of too trifling importance to spend much time upon. We think that no person who reads Rubino's or Mommsen's argument, and keeps his mind clear from previous theories, can fail to be convinced that *in the last century of the Republic* the *sex suffragia* were lower in rank than the *centuriæ equitum*. Even Livy (i. 43) gives more support to this view than to the other; and his expression (xliii. 16), "cum ex duodecim centuriis equitum octo censorem condemnassent," is, in its connection, quite conclusive. It is supported, moreover, by

Cicero (Rep. ii. 22), "equitum centuriæ cum sex suffragiis," words which seem to mark the latter as an appendage to the former. Taken in connection with Festus, p. 334, who describes the *sex suffragia* as later in origin, we have every reason to conclude, with Mommsen, that the *sex suffragia* were not merely open to plebeians, but were actually lower in rank than the other centuries of knights.

In another point Professor Seeley appears to us not to have followed out the argument as fully as would have been desirable; or rather, perhaps, he made a mistake in deferring the consideration of the clients and the plebs until the next book. For although, as he says, the chief importance of the plebs falls in the times of the Republic, yet a knowledge of its nature is essential to an understanding of the monarchy; and at any rate the clients are an essential element of the earliest community. The section upon "The Patricians and the Senate" is therefore the most unsatisfactory of the whole, not so much for what it contains as because it fails to cover the whole ground of discussion. Our author satisfactorily vindicates, against Rubino, Niebuhr's theory that the patricians were the body of the citizens at the foundation of the state; but, after all, Rubino, in many respects the most acute and logical mind which has been employed upon the field of Roman antiquities ("how many things Huschke divined, which Rubino has proved!" says Mommsen), — after all, we say, Rubino, in his suggestion of an earlier nobility, from whom the patricians were taken, seems to have caught a glimpse of an important truth. There was one body of the plebs — the rural plebs, the citizens of conquered towns of Latium — the consideration of which properly belongs to the second book. There was another body — the city rabble, emancipated slaves, hucksters, and poor mechanics, floating to Rome from every quarter — whose importance belongs to a much later time. But there was a plebs as far back as Roman tradition goes, or rather a body which afterwards became a part of the plebs, — the clients. These must have been Romans, as well as the patricians, but they were not citizens; they were attached to the patrician *gentes*, but not members of them. Their origin lies far beyond the reach of historical records, but perhaps we shall not be far out of the way if we compare them to the similar class in England, — the *ceorls*, who were obliged to "commend" themselves to powerful thanes. "Commendation" is of the nature of clientage, and, as Mommsen has shown, clientage was a relation essentially the same as *hospitium*, — a relation that we can more easily conceive to have arisen from a gradual loss of freedom, such as we know took place in England, than from the conquest and enslavement of a free people.

Or take the analogy of Athens, where the *Eupatridæ* were an aristocracy within an artistocracy, precisely such as Rubino conjectures the patricians to have been. There were in early times in Athens three grades: first, the Eupatridæ, or patricians, who were in exclusive possession of political rights. But there were by their side the *geomori* and *demiurgi*, equally Athenians, equally members of the tribes, *gentes* and *phratriæ*, but excluded from political power until the time of Solon. And there were still others outside of the tribal organization, and therefore not even Athenians in the highest sense of the word, who were first admitted to political rights by the reforms of Clisthenes. Now Rubino's theory of the origin of the patriciate cannot stand a moment; still we believe that the patricians, the clients, and the later plebs corresponded respectively to these three classes. But the second class in Athens was recognized as belonging to the old tribal organization, while in Rome it was in a completely dependent position, but still — we must think — belonging in a sense to the respective *gentes*, upon which its members were individually dependent. And this relation is more likely to have come up gradually than to have been established suddenly; considering how all-important was the state, and how rigorous was the principle of authority in Rome, nothing is more natural than that a process of degradation which was begun in Athens should here be carried to its fullest extent.

What, then, is meant by the words in the speech of Decius (Liv. x. 8), "vos solos gentem habere," — "that you [patricians] alone have the gentile organization"? In a broad sense this was not true; as Professor Seeley says, "the institution of the 'gens' was not peculiar to Rome, but was widely spread through all the nations of antiquity"; the Latins, Sabines, and Samnites had it as well as the Romans; the plebeians must have had it as well as the patricians, that is, the rural plebeians, the citizens of conquered cities. Certainly it is a legitimate inference from this and other passages, that the plebeian gentes were not "gentes" in the strict *legal* sense of the word, that is, as an organized Roman institution. But essentially and *historically* they were as good as the patrician. We can understand the distinction better by quoting the rest of the words of Decius: "Semper ista audita sunt eadem, penes vos auspicia esse, vos solos gentem habere." Now what is true of the "gens" is true of the auspices. These, too, were a primitive Italian institution, and the plebeians used auspices as well as the patricians. But they were not the same auspices. The patricians, who alone were citizens of the early community, developed their own gentile organization, of which the clients must have been dependent members, and this became the state; any other "gentes" were outside the state.

In like manner their peculiar form of taking auspices was established as the legal form, and it was solely in their hands and understood by them alone. All other auspices were private or foreign. So far as the plebeiate was made up of clients, who were subject to the gentes, or of a floating population, who were outside of all organizations, it is true that they had neither "gens" nor auspices. But the genuine plebeians, members of the country tribes, those who fought out the great contest for equality of rights, — the ancestors of the Licinii, Sempronii, Lutatii, and Mucii of the later Republic, — must have had a gentile organization and auspices of their own, perhaps equally ancient, but unrecognized, and thus of no public validity. It is worthy of notice that in Cicero's definition of the gentile relation (Top. 6) nothing is said of its being peculiarly patrician.

The annotations show the same admirable clearness and sagacity in presenting what is essential and passing over useless matter, that we have found in the Historical Examination. Especially the editor takes frequent pains to point out the inconsistencies in Livy's account, and his utter lack of historical judgment; thus completely disposing of Dr. Dyer's assumption that, however low we may rate Dionysius and Diodorus, Livy is good authority. For example, the note on "descendentibus inter duos lucos," ch. 8: "This is an instance of Livy's way of slurring difficulties. He says that 'on descending' you find the enclosed space called 'inter duos lucos.' On descending what? As we have been told that Romulus's city was on the Palatine, we naturally assume that this is the hill meant. Livy, however, does not say so, and as a matter of fact it was on the Capitoline. Not knowing how to explain this, he suppresses it."

We are surprised that so careful a student of Mommsen should seem to be unaware of his change of opinion upon so important a point as the origin of the worship of Hercules (p. 30). It is true that in his earlier editions, Mommsen held that he was a native deity, whose name was connected etymologically with the old Italian verb *hercere*, and that he was mistakenly identified with the Greek Herakles. But in his last edition he has returned to the common view that Hercules was a Latinized form of Herakles, and that the early prevalence of his worship is one among the many indications of an early and powerful Greek influence. See Vol. I. p. 240, Am. ed.

We will close with the citation of a passage which is a good illustration of Professor Seeley's clear perception of historical relations: "On the whole the senate answers in its original character very exactly to the council of Areopagus. In its history it differs entirely, owing to the fact which makes the capital distinction between the constitutional

history of Rome and of Athens, namely, that the popular assemblies at Rome were not debating assemblies, while at Athens they were. Hence at Athens the Areopagus was gradually pushed into the background, while the Roman Senate continued always the great arena of political discussion." (p. 69.)

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4. — *Letters and other Writings of the late Edward Denison, M. P. for Newark.* Edited by Sir Baldwyn Leighton, Bart. London: Richard Bentley and Son. 1872.

It would be a hard task to define the laws which govern the issue of privately printed matter. The heavy quartos which appear from time to time, containing genealogical details and untrustworthy pedigrees, may be supposed to be due in some respect to family vanity (not that we have anything to say against them, destined as they are to become the delight of the bibliomaniac); a love for the dead sometimes shows itself in the collection of literary fragments scraped from the most heterogeneous of sources, perhaps purposely confined to oblivion by the author, who would be the first to protest against any value being attached to them. Thus it is that the verses written at school and the hasty sketches of unfinished tales are ushered into the world, while the personal affection and interest the writers inspired among their contemporaries are expected to extend to these crude productions. Whatever may be the motive which is at work, whenever we see a privately printed volume, we feel convinced that only a short interval of time is likely to elapse before its publication. The private issue of a book seems often a tentative mode of testing the interest of the public; if it is limited to a few copies, the work becomes a literary curiosity, and in proportion to the difficulty in obtaining it is the interest excited by it. If the subject be a record of family life or private details, every one wishes to read it: so little by little it advances towards publicity. A series of favorable reviews makes its progress easier; for how can hostile criticism be directed against a book which can only be read with, much less be reviewed without, the sanction of the editor? These reviews regret, as a matter of course, that the appreciation of a volume which possesses such intrinsic merits should necessarily be so limited, and urge upon the editor the judiciousness of publishing it for the benefit of the public. The editor, like all other editors, is naturally distrustful of his own powers, but at last succumbs, and, deprecating criticism, launches his labors upon the world. We gather from the volume before us that it has gone through some such similar antecedents,

though we are far from classifying it amongst those the publication of which is to be regretted. It contains two Prefaces by Sir Baldwyn Leighton: the first gives a short account of the life of Edward Denison, the author of the following letters and papers, and is reprinted from the privately printed edition which appeared in January, 1871; the second is a "Preface on Publication," and states that the public issue of the volume has been determined upon, not on "the mere representation of personal friends or of dilettante readers, but of practical workers, who found their own thoughts re-echoed and their own hands strengthened in reading these pages." As our fault-finding will be confined to this portion of the book, we shall get it over as quickly as possible. We understand that there is but one addition to the information given by the first Preface in its original state, which is the important fact that, had Edward Denison visited these shores in 1869, his travelling companion on that occasion would have been Sir Michael Beach, a gentleman whom we assume to be a baronet. Unfortunately, though so particular a circumstance as this has been thought worthy of insertion, it is clear that no correction has been made of the mistakes in grammar and construction which disfigured this memoir, and which critics might perhaps be inclined to pass over, as long as they corrupted a limited audience only. But an attention to both these points may fairly be required as one of the distinctions which ought to mark the issue of publicly and privately printed matter. When we read that "the following short summary may serve to explain his writings by the circumstance"; that "Edward Denison had an interview with Victor Hugo, with whose wild communistic theories and impracticable views he was much astonished," and that "the alternatives of a winter at Cannes or a voyage in a sailing-ship to the Antipodes were offered to him," we are inclined to regret that this Preface ever emerged from the comparative seclusion it enjoyed during 1871. The second Preface is more free from faults, but is open to the charge of want of simplicity, a danger especially to be guarded against in publications of this nature. It announces that "the omission of all reference to newspapers was advised by some of Mr. Denison's intimate friends for fear of hostile criticism"; and the point of the long apodosis which follows apparently is to the effect that this advice was not complied with; yet the "Pall-Mall Gazette" and "Saturday Review," when adversely commented on at pages 34 and 62, become respectively the P—— and the S——, though when they are spoken of favorably their names are printed at length, — a somewhat illogical proceeding. With regard to the letters themselves, we think it would have been an improvement, if the names of the correspondents to whom they were addressed had been in some instances given.

What is only playful and pleasant when written to a very intimate friend or near relation, seems often priggish or dictatorial when addressed to an acquaintance. Nevertheless, in spite of these drawbacks, the book is an interesting one; and if we do not altogether congratulate Sir Baldwyn Leighton on his editorship, we are at least grateful to him for the collection he has made and the publication which has ensued.

Edward Denison, the son of the late Bishop of Salisbury, was born in 1840. He was educated at Eaton, where he seems to have injured his health by over-exertion in training for a boat-race, and laid the foundations of the illness which was destined to prove fatal to him. He subsequently went to Oxford, where in the year 1862 he took a second class in law and history. After spending the next few years in travel and the study of the law, showing that he possessed a refined taste and a considerable appreciation of literature, and taking a keen interest in all that was going on around him, both in religion and politics, he turned to what constituted for him the chief occupation of the subsequent portion of his life. The extremes of luxury and misery which exist side by side in London may well engage the attention of the economist and philanthropist; but the amelioration of these evils is a problem rarely dreamt of by young Englishmen of good social position, who possess the means as well as the capacity for enjoyment. The pursuit of pleasure or of notoriety rarely leads its votaries to the consideration of such subjects, which require the closest attention from the reformer who undertakes their consideration or their amendment. "Il est mille fois plus aisé de faire le bien, que de le bien faire," is an axiom of Montesquieu which ought to be specially inculcated upon the minds of the philanthropists of the nineteenth century. It was as visitor for the Society for Relief of Distress that Edward Denison began his connection with the East End of London, a division which to the ears of most Englishmen is synonymous with chronic want, disease, and starvation. Here is no exaggerated picture of one of its parishes, written by a man well able to form a competent opinion:—

"The external state of the district is only equalled by its internal. Although the houses for the most part consist of two floors and a cellar and garret, there are compressed within them four or five whole families, sometimes including sons-in-law and daughters-in-law, who share between them one common yard, the size of a rabbit hutch. It is a most unusual thing to find a single family occupying more than one room, and this has to serve the various purposes of bedroom, sitting-room, workshop, kitchen, larder, and coal-cellar. During the daytime the little ones, even before they can stand, are turned loose into the streets, shoeless and ragged, since there is no room for them in the house, save at meal or bedtime. Hence morality is destroyed,

filth engendered, malignant fevers, virulent epidemics abound, and death is rife, sweeping off in particular the young children."

In the autumn of 1867, Edward Denison left the West End of London altogether, established himself at Stepney, and for eight months lived at lodgings in Philpot Street, in order to be in the centre of the work that was going on, and take a more direct and personal share in that work. His first letter from the East End is dated the 7th of August, and his description of the district differs but little from that which we have just quoted. He lost no time in entering upon the duties which he had assigned to himself, and by the middle of the month he had organized a meeting of dock laborers in the evening twice a week, to whom he gave a course of lectures. The political treatment of the question equally occupied his attention; on the 28th he writes: —

"Good laws, energetically enforced, with compulsory education, supplemented by gratuitous individual exertion, will certainly succeed in giving the mass of the people so much light as will generally guide them into so much of industry and morality as is clearly conducive to their bodily ease and advancement in life."

On the 20th of December he says: —

"You see the real truth is, sensation writing and reckless alms are fast doing away the great work of the new poor-law in bringing up the people to providence and self-restraint. You will find all the men who really give themselves most trouble about the poor are the most alive to the terrible evils of the so-called charity which pours money into the haunts of misery and vice every winter."

And on the 24th: —

"Build school-houses, pay teachers, give prizes, frame workmen's clubs, help them to help themselves, lend them your brains; but give them no money, except what you sink in such undertakings as above."

In the January of the following year Mr. Evelyn Denison, the late speaker of the House of Commons, proposed to his nephew that he should stand for Newark at the ensuing election. The letter which refers to this proposal is a curious commentary upon that of the previous 28th of August. In it the writer says: —

"I am sensible it might be a worthier course to throw up the more attractive game for the sake of interests undoubtedly higher than those of politics or society; but my weakness is made weaker by the belief I cannot shake off, that to ordinary people the right road is usually the one which lies straight before them, in the absence of any inward call so strong as to leave no substantial doubt upon the mind."

It is, however, just this departure from the ordinary rules which

govern the actions of ordinary men that constitutes the merit of Edward Denison's conduct, and consequently the value of this book. Had he adhered to the views he here expresses, he would hardly have been led to consider himself "a thief and a murderer" in withholding the time at his disposal from the paupers of the East End. For the next three months he remained in Philpot Street, busy in his work, now instituting a children's hospital, or penny readings, now putting up a ragged-school, or setting on foot a workingmen's club. A visit to Paris in the spring, in order to investigate the French system of dealing with destitution, and to Edinburgh in the summer to obtain information of a similar character with regard to that town, varied his labors, and were followed by his appeal to the Newark constituency in July. Some extracts of a speech made during his canvass are given, which, though not eloquent, are earnest and full of common sense. At the general election in November he was returned to Parliament; in February of the following year, 1869, he wrote two excellent letters on the subject of pauperism to the editor of the "East London Observer," and on the 10th of May he spoke in the House of Commons upon the same question. On the 18th of the same month we find him in Germany, a pleasant description of which is given in the letters he wrote thence, free from mannerism, and more natural than usual. In the autumn his health broke down, and in October he left England for Melbourne, in the hope of receiving some benefit from the voyage. That hope, unhappily, was not realized (we quote from the first Preface): —

"The alternation of weather and the diet of a sailing-ship were unfavorable to his state of health. Instead of improving he became gradually worse, and during the last weeks of this fatal voyage he was nearly confined to his cabin. On January 26, 1870, within a fortnight of the time he landed, Edward Denison died at Melbourne."

The last letter in this collection is dated from Plymouth, on the 1st of November, but an appendix is added containing several papers on the poor-laws and cognate subjects. Some of the suggestions put forward in them have already been adopted, others again the English legislature is slowly promoting. The truth of Dr. Johnson's saying, that "it is an unhappy circumstance that you might give away five hundred pounds in a year to those that importune in the streets and not do any good," has only been recognized during the last few years, and it is only step by step that the old habits of thought are losing ground. The strict application of the workhouse test, renewed checks upon the administration of outdoor relief, the exercise of the preventive check upon the increase of the population, compulsory education, facility in the transfer of land, and co-operation in industrial pur-

suits, are the remedies which Mr. Fawcett proposes in his recent work upon English pauperism. Most of these, and especially the two first, are insisted upon by Edward Denison throughout this volume.

"The remedy," he writes, "is to bring the poor-law back to the spirit of its institution; organize a sufficiently elastic labor test, without which no outdoor relief to be given. Make the few alterations which altered times demand, and impose every possible discouragement on private benevolence. Universal administration of poor-law on these principles for one generation would almost extirpate pauperism."

The question is of such magnitude and importance to Englishmen, that the principles which underlie it cannot be too often stated or too well known. In spite of increased knowledge, the most absurd cries are heard at intervals, such as that if labor be offered at two prices, the higher should be accepted; that charity is preferable to political economy; that wages must be protected; or that a trade for which there is no demand should be artificially stimulated. It is true that at the beginning of this year the distress in London was probably less than it had been since the year 1866; yet the number of persons in receipt of relief was 122,674, in comparison with 103,078 paupers at the commencement of 1866. If their condition cannot be improved, the extinction or diminution of pauperism will depend largely upon the diffusion of a higher standard of knowledge among the rising generation. That can alone be obtained by a general system of education, and the participation by all classes of the community in its benefits. The Education Act of 1870 will probably be amended in the course of this year, and the compulsory clauses extended so as to embrace the whole of the population. Many years, however, must elapse before such an influence as this can be expected to make itself felt in England. To return from this digression to the volume before us, it will be seen that the views expressed in it, even if they do not add any new information to the knowledge at present possessed by those who are engaged in an endeavor to solve the problem of pauperism, promote and contribute to its correct appreciation, while the example of the writer is one his contemporaries may fitly dwell on. Individual activity, it is true, cannot hope to achieve any great result, but the presence of a man like Edward Denison among the poor is an unqualified good, and "his remedial influence upon the local authorities inestimable."

The occasional descriptions of scenery which occur in these letters make us regret that there are not more. The following account of Berne is graphic and striking: —

"Berne is a glorious old place. Fancy an oblong hill with steep, and in places precipitous sides; cover it with the most fantastic confusion of towers,

turrets, and gables; cut terraces along the sides and shade them with fine trees; take a river as big as the Tweed at Kelso, but of bright blue color, and wind it round the town, leaving only a narrow neck to join it to the mainland; cover its high banks on the other side with villas and gardens and great walnut-trees, and planes with brilliant green turf under them; and beyond all, look upon the white peaks of the Oberland fringing the whole southern horizon from east to west, and then you have some idea of the capital of this little republic."

Sir Baldwyn Leighton has speculated in his first Preface upon the political position which Edward Denison might one day have occupied, and has given a summary of the views he held. These letters hardly bear him out in his remarks. They are full of generous impulses, of hasty generalizations, and are characterized by a strong love of truth and contempt of cant; but the mind of the writer is in no settled state, and his opinions often share the fate of those expressed at the age of twenty-seven or twenty-eight. At one time, in the middle of his canvass, he thinks that political life is not, and believes that abstract political speculation is, his *métier*. At another he dreams of a farm in Tasmania, and a settlement of English laborers around him. One thing, however, is certain, whatever might have been his public career, he would have brought to the consideration and elucidation of social questions all the advantages which accrue from intercourse with the poor, a knowledge of, and sympathy with, their requirements, a clear insight into the laws which affect them, a gentle manner, and a high sense of duty. His friends, we are told, have erected a window to his memory in the Cathedral of Christ Church at Oxford; but the best memorial will always be found in these letters, — the earnest expressions of a man to whom the nineteenth century, in spite of its improvements, seemed incomplete, and whose short life was spent in an endeavor to reconcile its contradictions.

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5. — *Brief on Behalf of Authors and Publishers in Favor of International Copyright, before Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.* DILLAWAY AND ANDREWS, of Counsel. Washington. 1872.

ONE of the best measures of the civilization of a people is afforded by their willingness to recognize the equal rights of their fellow-men, irrespective of race or nationality. Commencing with the savage, for whom none but his companions have any rights whatever, we may trace a regular gradation to a state hardly yet reached by any nation, in which the law shall make no distinction of residence or nationality

in respect of protection to person or property, and of liberty to exchange services. Immaterial rights are the last to be recognized, but they must also be included. It is therefore not to our credit that we still confine to citizens and residents that right of an author to his works, the validity of which is universally recognized by enlightened nations. An effort is now being made to remedy this defect in our system, and we propose to say something of the plans suggested. The committee of Congress on the Library has now no less than four bills before it for this purpose.

The authors' bill simply grants to foreign authors the same rights now granted to native authors, without any restriction whatever. It is conceded that, at the present time, this bill stands no chance of becoming a law, because it will greatly interfere with the extensive and lucrative business of appropriating the works of foreign authors, and reissuing them in an American dress. To the average Pennsylvania Congressman it looks like a gross piece of injustice to strike so heavy a blow at this branch of "home industry." We will suggest a single reflection on this point. Suppose the British public should absolutely prevent the exportation of a single copy of the writings of any of their authors, so that our printers and publishers could not find out what they wrote. We could still print and publish as many books as we pleased, but could put nothing in them from abroad. The blow to our book-making interests would be more severe than that inflicted by the most stringent international copyright. That the simple erection of such a fence around the British literary garden should operate so disastrously upon us proves that our book-makers are sustained by something valuable from abroad, and suggests some analogies to their arguments against being injured in business. It would be interesting to note, in such a case, at what price incoming passengers who had read the latest productions of Reade or Tyndal, and were gifted with perfect memory, could sell their information.

At the other extreme stands Mr. Appleton's bill. It proposes to grant copyright to foreign authors under several restrictions, for some of which we see no reason. The book must be wholly the product of the mechanical industry of the United States, and this American edition must be ready for sale within three months of the date of publication abroad. If, from any cause whatever, the American publisher fails to bring the book out within the required time, or to keep it on sale, the author loses all his rights. The foreign edition is completely excluded from the American market.

Neither this proposal to punish the author for any possible delinquency of an agent on the other side of the ocean, nor the absolute

exclusion of foreign editions, has met with favor at Washington, and they may be considered as disposed of by the compromise bill of Mr. Andrews. This has, we believe, been accepted both by the foreign authors, through their representatives, and by such of our publishers as are willing to accede foreign copyright on any terms whatever, including Mr. Appleton himself. It grants the foreign author his rights on the condition that he shall manufacture and publish his work in the United States. A delay to do this does not operate as a direct forfeiture of his copyright, but only subjects him to the peril of having his work appropriated without redress, by any American publisher who may think it worth seizing.

This bill has at least one point of strength, great brevity. It is a curious fact, and one we wish some expert would explain, that a law on any subject, on its passage through Congress, meets with obstructions which are directly proportional to the care with which it has been elaborated to meet every possible case that may arise under it. In Congress brevity seems to be considered the soul of legal wisdom rather than of wit.

The question of the importation of foreign editions is one to be settled between the author and his American publisher. We may reasonably expect that the former will generally sell to the latter the exclusive privilege of sale in the United States, so that the foreign edition cannot be introduced, or, at any rate, sold, without special arrangements for reciprocity between the publishers of the two countries. There is, however, no occasion for making the investment of such right in the American publisher compulsory, as in Mr. Appleton's bill. The effect would be that the franchise which the author had to sell would be a little more valuable, but as he can fix his own price, he can charge more for it in the same proportion. To the author, it is a matter of comparative indifference where the copies of his book sold are manufactured. We therefore wish, for the sake of our public and other libraries, that a provision might be added to the bill recognizing the right of any party in America to import for its own use, and not for sale, one copy of any authorized foreign edition of a copyrighted work.

To an American who cares for the intellectual reputation of his country, it is humiliating to have it proclaimed abroad that it has not yet passed the "protection to home industry" stage of economical civilization. But it is impossible at the present time to secure an international copyright law without this proclamation, and we consider it better to secure the measure of justice so loudly called for with the home-manufacture proviso, than not to obtain it at all. A strong rea-

son in favor of this concession is, that it will be easier, at any future time, to have the objectionable proviso stricken out than to pass a copyright bill. It must also be remembered that even without the proviso it would generally be to the advantage of the authors of widely circulated books both to employ an American house to introduce the book to the American market, and to manufacture the editions designed for this market in America. The adoption or rejection of the proviso is not, therefore, a matter of so much importance to our publishing interests as might at first sight appear. The parties most affected by it are new and comparatively unknown authors, who may find difficulty in securing an American publisher until the success of their works has been proved, when they may be reprinted without their consent, and writers of works the policy of reprinting which may be doubtful, owing either to their expense or their limited circulation. Among the works of this class we may include standard philosophical and scientific treatises. A work of this class might, in the judgment of some publisher, be worth stealing, while the author was vainly seeking a publisher who would pay him. In fact, if the author, from any cause whatever, fails to secure an American manufacturer and publisher who will bring his work out simultaneously with its appearance in his own country, he will be in the position of one trying to sell an article which any one is at liberty to steal from him. All these defects can, however, ultimately be cured, and we would much rather see almost any reasonable law on the subject enacted than have things left in their present condition.

6.— *The Theory of Political Economy.* By W. Stanley Jevons, M. A., Professor of Logic and Political Economy in Owens College, Manchester. London and New York. 1871. 8vo. pp. xvi, 627.

There are two very different standards by which we may judge such a work as this. The one is its relation to the most advanced thought and the most careful investigations relating to the subject which have been given to the world; the other is the position it occupies with respect to the average thought of the educated public. If we compare Professor Jevons's work with that of Cournot on the same subject, published more than thirty years ago, we cannot but admit that in fertility of method and elegance of treatment it falls far below it. But the latter can be understood only by an expert mathematician, and the number of those who are at the same time mathematicians and economists is too small even to perpetuate the knowledge of such a

work, so that even in this age Cournot has met the fate of the Atlantides. Hoping that he will be exhumed and his investigations continued by some future generation, let us examine the work before us by the light of the generally known political economy of the present.

Just now, when the claims of political economy to a place among the sciences are hotly disputed, when few, even of its professed cultivators, dare to claim it as an exact science, and when society is ready to brand as a doctrinaire every one who talks about applying its principles to the affairs of men, it requires no little courage to come before the world expressing its truths by mathematical formulæ. Holding that this mode of expression is now what political economy stands most in need of, we welcome every attempt to introduce it, and commend the work as showing that there certainly are truths of this science which admit of exact mathematical expression and reasoning. Still, it is only after repeated efforts, followed by careful criticism of each, that we can hope for success, and the work before us is well worthy of a critical examination.

The basis of the work is a theory of utility which may well supersede the old distinction of value in use and value in exchange. The utility of every article which we possess, or, rather, the utility of an increased supply of that article, diminishes with the quantity we have on hand, and vanishes when we have all we want to use. Take bread, for instance. One loaf a day is of very great utility to an individual; if he has nothing else to eat, it preserves him from starvation. A second loaf per day, if he can eat it, will also be useful, but far less so than the first one. If the two loaves satisfy his hunger, the addition of a third loaf will be of no utility whatever. Utility thus depending on the supply, it is possible to express the relation between the two by an algebraic equation, if we have the necessary data for forming this equation. These are the quantities of each kind of goods sold, and the price at which the sales are effected under various circumstances. From such data the equation is to be formed by induction.

Given this law of utility, a fundamental law of exchange follows at once. Whenever an exchange between two parties can be so effected that the utility of the commodities received shall, in the case of each party, be greater than the utility of the commodities given for them, an exchange will take place, and will continue until these utilities balance each other in the case of each party. This condition determines the quantities of both commodities exchanged, and hence the quantity of the one which will be given for a unit of the other which corresponds to price, or "ratio of exchange." From the same principle we can fix the laws of exchange of any number of commodities among any num-

ber of individuals. An interesting application of the law would be to find the quantity of each article which an individual with given wants and a given income would purchase. The necessary data being given the manner in which each dollar of his income would be spent, always supposing him to spend with perfect intelligence, would be a matter of mathematical deduction.

The theory of utility and exchange here described we regard as entirely correct in its results, so far as it can be applied to the actual circumstances of trade. But unless some modification be made in its form, it is of very limited application. In fact, the author himself cites one exception, which is so sweeping as to include nearly every case of domestic purchase. It is that in which the vendor has so small a desire for consuming his own commodity, that the very last minute portion of it has a less degree of utility to him than has the commodity he receives in exchange, so that he is quite ready to sell out his entire stock at the market rates. Now, this is just what nearly every trader is always ready to do; nay, he will offer a small premium to a purchaser who will buy all he has. When a stock of goods is kept on hand for sale, the utility of an individual unit to the holders cannot be properly regarded as depending on the amount they have on hand. It is true that, if the stock is small, it will sell at a higher price per unit, and thus the indirect utility to the holder will be greater; but this indirect utility does not enter among the data; on the contrary, it is the very thing which is to be determined by the equations.

This naturally leads to another inquiry: whether the data required will not in many cases, perhaps in all cases, be more difficult to obtain than will the results. The utility of the commodity to the producer or holder is among the data. We may hope to learn the law of utility of wheat to the farmer, and of a house to the carpenter. But how shall we learn the utility of ships to an importer or ship-carpenter, of bank stock to a capitalist, of horse-shoes to a farrier, or of railways to an engineer? Apart from this, is it not rather unsatisfactory to found a science upon a set of equations which shall hold true or fail according as the producer of a commodity does or does not keep an infinitesimal amount of it for his own use? The fact is, that our author has laid a foundation for us, but has not built upon it himself, nor shown us how to do so. His theory of utility is very valuable as enabling us to understand what we see in the commercial world, but it does not furnish sufficient means of investigating it. We cannot get at the law of utility *a priori;* we must proceed by induction. The law of utility is in fact nothing more than a law of prices, and we can learn it only by observation. Although the equations of exchange

are true in the few cases to which they apply, they are seldom those which should actually be used for the purpose of deduction. When we come to apply them to any concrete case, we apprehend that the utility of the commodity to the seller or producer will disappear from the equations altogether, and the relation will appear as one between the conditions of production on the one side, and the utility of the commodity to the purchaser on the other. Since the latter can be determined only by induction, we shall finally have nothing left but relations between quantities, prices, and conditions of production and consumption.

That this is really the proper way of considering the subject seems to be shown by the chapter on Labor. We there find the amount of labor expressed by an equation between its disagreeableness and the utility of its product to the laborer. But, when the attempt is made to compare the price or "ratio of exchange" with the cost of production, the common middle term expressing the utility of the product to the producer, which enters the equations both of labor and exchange, disappears entirely from the result. The latter is true even in the large class of cases where the term in question has no existence, and we therefore think it should be omitted entirely.

Mr. Jevons's idea seems to have been to found a calculus of pleasure and pain, — an idea which we cannot conceive to have any sound philosophical basis. He encourages himself by the inquiry, "Previous to the time of Pascal, who would have thought of measuring doubt and belief?" We might retort by inquiring, Who thinks of doing so now? Certainly not the philosophical mathematician. He does submit to calculation certain conditions on which belief depends, or ought logically to depend, but not the belief itself. A calculus like that proposed must be subject to the same limitation. We may make the acts of man undertaken with a view of gaining pleasure and avoiding pain the subject of a calculus, but this can hardly be considered as measuring pleasure and pain themselves.

In laying the foundations for his science, our author frequently finds himself at variance with the opinions of economists in general. In nearly every such instance the views he combats seem to us stronger than those he substitutes. It is in his ideas of capital that he is most radically at variance with others, and to this we may devote some consideration. The accumulated wealth of a people is commonly considered as divisible into two parts, of which one is capital and the other is not. Mr. Jevons seems to recognize a distinction, but his classification leads to a result that is directly the opposite of that commonly admitted. He defines capital as "the aggregate of those com-

modities which are required for sustaining laborers of any kind or class engaged in work"; and again, "the current means of sustenance constitute capital in its free or uninvested form." Since nearly all men are laborers of some kind, either with mind or body, and since the few who are not laborers require about the same articles for their sustenance with those who are, we do not see why the human race might not be substituted for laborers in the above definition. "Sustenance" is commonly supposed to mean food only, but this would make capital cover a very limited field. We learn, however, from the context, that houses, clothing, utensils, and furniture are included. This shows that a liberal extension is given to the meaning of the word "requisite"; indeed, economists have long since given up the attempt to draw the line between things requisite and things which are not. We take it, therefore, that our author means by capital any article fitted to supply any human want; and since mankind labor only to supply their wants, capital includes all the products of labor. If there is any exception to this sweeping construction, it is that mills, railways, and other things commonly considered capital are excluded; the railway is not capital, "but capital is fixed in the railway." We are, indeed, somewhat in doubt whether we have correctly apprehended the author's meaning, but we have given the best conclusions we can draw from what he says. Such a view of capital is tantamount to abolishing the distinction between it and other wealth, — a distinction which we regard as among the most important in political economy. With so high an authority as our author, ignoring, or at least not correctly apprehending, so important a question, we may be excused for entering into some elementary considerations on the subject.

Let us imagine a large community living in a state of isolation, and unable to supply itself with any kind of machinery. Its members are, in consequence, obliged to make their cloth by the hand-loom. Thus burdened, they are able only to supply their current wants, and so never increase in wealth, or gain any better means of producing cloth. At length some member of this community comes into possession of a fortune. To meet Mr. Jevons's ideas in the best way, we may suppose that he receives this fortune in the form of food and clothing in sufficient quantity to supply a number of men for a year; in fact, that he is now able to command the services of his fellows to an important extent. There are two distinct channels into which he may direct these services. In the first place, he may employ them in building him a fine house, and supplying him with carpets, furniture, pictures, and wines. Thus his own means of enjoyment will be materially increased. But his neighbors will be none the better off for his fortune, since the full

equivalent of all he gives them he takes from them in the shape of labor. In the next place, he may employ his men in building a factory, by the aid of which a cheaper and more abundant supply of clothing will be furnished the whole community, while at the same time the mill will yield him an annual profit from the sale of its products.

That there is an essential difference between these two modes of employing wealth, in respect of their influence on the future welfare of the community, is an obvious truth, and one which all the economists of note have seen; but when they have sought to generalize the difference by a definition, they have always failed in doing it in a way which would not in special cases lead to some real or seeming parodox. One of these is noticed by Mr. Jevons. Where two people live in their own houses, these are not, according to present opinion, capital; if they find it convenient to exchange houses and pay rent each to the other, the houses are capital. But we conceive that all difficulties may be avoided by a slight modification of the definitions of Adam Smith himself. We have simply to consider the capital of a country as that portion of its wealth which is employed for the purpose of gaining an increased product with the same amount of labor, this increased product constituting the profit. In the case just supposed, the excess of cloth produced by the factory over that produced by the spinning-wheel, with the same amount of labor, constitutes the profit. If there is no such excess, the factory can pay no dividends. Coming down to individuals, the capital of an individual consists of all that portion of his wealth from the present enjoyment of which he is abstaining for the sake of a future profit. This introduces the paradox that the national capital is far less than the sum of the capitals of individuals. To avoid it, we have only to introduce the mathematical idea of negative capital, comprising that wealth for the enjoyment of which one is paying interest to the owner. Then, when the people exchange houses, the latter become positive capital to their owners, and negative capital to their occupants, thus balancing each other in any sum total which includes both.

While we find much to dissent from in Mr. Jevons's work, we conceive that the distinguished author can render no more important service to social science than that which will result from the continuance of his researches. We should, therefore, be pleased to see his method developed and applied with greater fulness and perspicuity, and to find the results obtained by his predecessors incorporated with his own.

S. N.

7. — *Shakespeare-Studien.* Von Otto Ludwig. Aus dem Nachlasse des Dichters herausgegeben von Moritz Heydrich. Leipzig. 1872. pp. cxv, 540.

Although in Germany the name of Otto Ludwig is well known, and he has a certain reputation as a dramatic poet, there are few, we fancy, in this country, who have ever heard of him. Nor is this strange. Even in his own land his fame was greater for what he had tried to do than for what he had done. His plays, though full of poetry, hardly kept the stage; and it was this failure that inspired the book that we have before us, which, we have no hesitation in saying, will establish his reputation on a surer basis than his poetical power could have done. For it is more especially as a critic that he shines. In this book he frankly confesses his failure as a dramatic writer, and sits down to trace his faults to their origin, to strive to find better ways by the comparison of his own work with the universally acknowledged standards of merit, and by deducing from them the laws that should govern that sort of composition in which he is anxious to excel. He approaches the task with all the adaptability for theory of a critic and the practical knowledge of a poet, — a combination not too often met with. Not that the application to his own works is ever thrust upon the reader; the lessons drawn are only applicable to him in so far as they contain what is universally true, and it is this quality that makes the merit of the book. In its form it is singular. The editor, Mr. Moritz Heydrich, has done his task with real German thoroughness. The material that awaited him consisted of an enormous mass of short, disconnected notes, only joined together by the fact that they were in the same manuscript volume which Ludwig had used till it was full. Hence we have many unnecessary repetitions, indeed all the faults of conversation; but in spite of these rhetorical faults, the book will be found to be excellent reading. Shakespeare literature in English is apt to take the form of either indiscriminate adulation, or the expression of some author's fantastic whimseys either about the real writer of the plays commonly ascribed to him, or the profession of Shakespeare himself, proving him a sailor, a farmer, a lawyer, a doctor, — who can say what? — and meanwhile forgetting that he was a poet.

Ludwig, with the hearty admiration that all Germans feel for Shakespeare, while he is more especially anxious to ascertain the true laws of dramatic composition, takes Shakespeare as the most useful example, but he by no means neglects either the Greek tragedians or Goethe and Schiller. His own contemporaries, too, he has studied with interest. As a critic he shows that he has destructive as well as construc-

tive powers. This book is arranged only chronologically, but thereby, in spite of its fragmentary state, we can catch very well the growth of the author's mind. His faithful study brought him good results, and none of the intermediate work is without its merits. Of more particular interest to us will be his criticism of Shakespeare and of the German classics, of which we offer a few examples. Writing on "the development of the situation," he says:—

"Shakespeare always avoids the appearance of anything skeleton-like or hurried. Here is an example. Hamlet, led by the Ghost, appears in a more remote part of the platform. He asks, 'Where wilt thou lead me? Speak. I 'll go no farther.' The Ghost does not at once begin to tell him. He says first, 'Mark me.' Hamlet replies, 'I will.' And still the Ghost does not begin; he still deepens the impression of his words.

'My hour is almost come,
When I to sulphurous and tormenting flames
Must render up myself.'

Hamlet says, 'Alas, poor Ghost.' Still the Ghost does not begin, nor does Hamlet continue to urge him; he says:—

'Pity me not, but lend thy serious hearing
To what I shall unfold.'

Hamlet answers again as before,

'Speak, I am bound to hear.'

The Ghost goes on,

'So art thou to revenge, when thou shalt hear.'

"Now Hamlet asks, 'What?'

"But still the Ghost does not say; he simply tells him who he is, for which there is really no necessity. He continues to heighten the solemnity of the moment, by describing the pains of Purgatory all the more vividly by telling us what impression the description, that he cannot give, would make upon Hamlet. At the same time this gives him an opportunity for poetical description. After a long sentence his, 'List, Hamlet, O list,' makes a wonderful impression. What must that be that he has to tell? Still the narration does not come. It is as if the Ghost was himself anxious to postpone it, and so our expectation grows greater. But first comes,

'If thou didst ever thy dear father love.'

Hamlet breaks in with, 'O heaven.' How can the Ghost ask in this way? and now? How can Hamlet express his love for his father, now that he is moved by sympathy and fired by a longing to revenge him. He has to revenge his father, but he knows not on whom. First the Ghost says for what,

'Revenge his foul and most unnatural murder.'

Hamlet bursts out, 'Murder!' Then the murder is described 'foul and most unnatural.' Hamlet,

'Haste me to know it; that I with wings as swift
As meditation, or the thoughts of love,
May sweep to my revenge.'

"It is to be noticed here how the 'By whom, that I may kill him,' is artistically worked out. The urgent impulse is not expressed by hasty, swiftly spoken words. The swiftness is described; he says he will be quick, but he is not quick. . . . . And so the idea of Hamlet's character and of the whole piece is expressed. The Ghost had just said,

'I find thee apt;
And duller shouldst thou be,' etc.

And Hamlet shows himself actually so dull. . . . . After this long preparation, the words of the Ghost's story make their most complete impression. The delay of both arouses the same feeling in the spectator, the same awe of what is to be told. The ingenuity of Shakespeare in these preparations is wonderful, so that almost every scene, if dissected in this way, shows that they are almost all constructed in this fashion."

Again, he speaks in a more general way of Shakespeare and Schiller, *apropos* to the discussion of the difference between the realist and the idealist in their mode of handling their subjects: —

"The realist develops the fate of his hero by his guilt, and his guilt by his character and situation, his character by his rank, nature, habits, time, occupation, historical ground, etc. That is to say, his *rôles* are representative, typical beings, realistic, conditioned ideals; the idealists are unconditioned ideals; creatures of the fancy free from the conditions of reality. Whatever characterization they may have is not the condition of their nature, but is simply fastened upon them from the outside. Since he ascribes qualities which are not the outgrowth of their real nature, they appear at the same time more empirical, accidental, and nearer reality. What they say is of more importance to him than what they are, i. e. he lays the most weight upon their speeches and not upon their presentation. The realist judges his characters, sees for himself how and what they are, estimates them according to the laws by which we estimate human beings in real life. Romeo and Juliet are found beautiful from both points of view, they make an impression of poetic ideality and also of being real human beings. Schiller says, 'To die for freedom, to kill one's self for love, is great and noble, it is the fate of the beautiful,' etc. Shakespeare says, 'That that is the lot of guilt on the earth, suicide is a crime, but the person who commits may be deserving of our sympathy.' That was Shakespeare's humanity, to judge of the guilt, to pity the man; his piety lay in his belief in a righteous order of the world. God, great and righteous, man weak and so deserving pity in his guilt; not man great and noble in his guilt, and the order of the world a mischievous natural power, which hates what is noble and causes the beautiful to perish because it is beautiful. . . . . The tragical necessity can only lie in the hero, i. e. the hero cannot merely stand in a so-called tragical situation; the situation can only be tragic by the fact that the hero, who stands in it, is a tragical character. That this

Macbeth, as he stands before us in our immediate presence, must perish is certain. A man with so strong a conscience and such wicked passions. The best arranged external necessity does not make a piece tragical, if the hero is not a tragical nature. . . . . Human beings must always interest us more than the abstract working of the machinery of the play. That is of use merely to set such and such characters in motion and to make them appear lifelike."

This extract, with its crudities of expression and its repetitions, may well represent a great deal of the book, which, notwithstanding, is one of the most valuable manuals of criticisms that we have seen for a long time. We trace the author from thought to thought as if he were talking to us: that is at once the merit and the defect of the book, though vastly more the former.

We close in recommending it heartily to the student of literature. At some day we hope that a well-selected translation may be made of the work.

8.— *Their Wedding Journey.* By W. D. Howells. Boston: J. R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

An interesting question presents itself to the cautious critic who reads this little book, and who does not care to commit himself and his reputation for sound judgment irretrievably to the strength of such a gossamer-like web: it is whether the book will live. Why should it not live? If extreme and almost photographic truth to nature, and remarkable delicacy and lightness of touch, can give permanent life to a story, why should this one not be read with curiosity and enjoyment a hundred or two hundred years hence? Our descendants will find nowhere so faithful and so pleasing a picture of our American existence, and no writer is likely to rival Mr. Howells in this idealization of the commonplace. The vein which Mr. Howells has struck is hardly a deep one. His dexterity in following it, and in drawing out its slightest resources, seems at times almost marvellous, a perpetual succession of feats of sleight-of-hand, all the more remarkable because the critical reader alone will understand how difficult such feats are, and how much tact and wit is needed to escape a mortifying failure. Mr. Howells has a delicacy of touch which does not belong to man. One can scarcely resist the impression that he has had feminine aid and counsel, and that the traitor to her sex has taken delight in revealing the secret of her own attractions, so far at least as she knows it; for Mr. Howells, like the rest of mankind, after all his care and study, can only acknowledge his masculine incompetence to comprehend the female character. The book is essentially a lovers' book. It deserves

to be among the first of the gifts which follow or precede the marriage offer. It has, we believe, had a marked success in this way, as a sort of lovers' Murray or Appleton; and if it can throw over the average bridal couple some reflection of its own refinement and taste, it will prove itself a valuable assistant to American civilization.

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9. — *Mountaineering in the Sierra Nevada.* By Clarence King. Boston: James R. Osgood & Co. 1872.

Mr. King is a kind of young hero of the American type. We do not mean to base this opinion of him upon this book, which, though agreeable reading enough, is but a trifle, and shows only the superficial qualities of a lively *raconteur*. To be appreciated it should be read in company with the five huge volumes now appearing, in which Mr. King, the dignified chief of the great national survey of the fortieth parallel, publishes the results of his long and indefatigable labors. As a matter of dignity, this book of sketches will rather injure than benefit Mr. King, who, like all persons in employ of government, must run the gauntlet of congressional criticism; and it would be interesting to know in point of fact whether the publication of these sketches in any way affected the opinions recently expressed in Congress of Mr. King's Report, — opinions in which even General Garfield, who should know better, allowed himself to angle for a little cheap popularity by denouncing what, next to the Coast Survey, is probably the most valuable and the best conducted undertaking our government has now in hand.

Of Mr. King, the man of science, we shall have occasion to speak at greater length when his Report is complete. The undertaking with which he is identified is unique in geological science. Its results must greatly affect geological theories, and may not improbably settle forever more than one difficult geological problem. But these results are not as yet published, and Mr. King's own deductions from the facts he has observed make no part of his mountaineering sketches. These are of the nature of monthly magazines, slight. They are written to amuse, or, if any instruction is intended, it is carefully concealed; and in fact they are amusing, although it must be agreed that mountain-climbers are apt to be monotonous on paper, and that, to enjoy their adventures, the reader should always have a series of exact stereoscopic views representing the adventurer in the act of performing all his most break-neck feats. Every impartial reader must wish to judge for himself in regard to the amount of danger at any special moment, and the photograph alone is to be trusted for the facts.

Artistically speaking, Mr. King's book errs perhaps in carrying sensationalism too far for effect. The truth is, that in work like that of Mr. King, the wonder always is that a day passes without accident. If he is not dragging or riding a mule up or down a perpendicular precipice, he is shooting at bears, getting struck by lightning, or catching rattlesnakes by the tail. There is no end to the forms in which life or health is risked in these adventures; yet however great the momentary dangers may be in these mountain ascents, they are not so wearing nor so fatal as the risks of the alkali plains or the river sinks, where health is surely undermined. The danger, therefore, loses its artistic effect by repetition. Even the actor becomes careless and breaks his neck at length from mere inattention, while the reader becomes distinctly sleepy. Perhaps it is for this reason, perhaps also because words convey at best so blurred and unsatisfactory a picture of natural scenery, that we have found more pleasure in Mr. King's studies of character than in his climbings. Perhaps, too, it is because Mr. King is a humorist, and has an evident relish for the type of humor in which the extreme West excels. The little sketch of "The Newtys of Pike," for example, is quite admirably done. Or for a very characteristic bit of description, we may stop a moment on the following, an extract from "Cut-off Copples's": —

"With a look of despair the driver got off and laid the lash freely among his team; they jumped and jerked, frantically tangled themselves up, and at last all sulked and became stubbornly immovable. Meanwhile, a mile of teams behind, unable to pass on the narrow grade, came to an unwilling halt.

"About five wagons back I noticed a tall Pike, dressed in checked shirt, and pantaloons tucked into jack-boots. A soft felt hat, worn on the back of his head, displayed long locks of flaxen hair, which hung freely about a florid pink countenance, noticeable for its pair of violent little blue eyes, and facial angle rendered acute by a sharp, long nose.

"This fellow watched the stoppage with impatience, and at last, when it was more than he could bear, walked up by the other teams with a look of wrath absolutely devilish. One would have expected him to blow up with rage; yet withal his gait and manner were cool and soft in the extreme. In a bland, almost tender voice, he said to the unfortunate driver, 'My friend, perhaps I can help you'; and his gentle way of disentangling and patting the leaders as he headed them round in the right direction, would have given him a high office under Mr. Bergh. He leisurely examined the embedded wheel, and cast an eye along the road ahead. He then began in rather excited manner to swear, pouring it out louder and more profane, till he utterly eclipsed the most horrid blasphemies I ever heard, piling them up thicker and more fiendish till it seemed as if the very earth must open and engulf him.

"I noticed one mule after another give a little squat, bringing their breasts hard against the collars, and straining traces, till only one old mule with ears back and dangling chain still held out. The Pike walked up and yelled one gigantic oath; her ears sprang forward, she squatted in terror, and the iron links grated under her strain. He then stepped back and took the rein, every trembling mule looking out of the corner of its eye and listening at *qui vive*.

"With a peculiar air of deliberation and of childlike simplicity, he said in every-day tones, 'Come up there, mules!'

"One quick strain, a slight rumble, and the wagon rolled on to Copple's. . . . .

"We betook ourselves to the office, which was of course bar-room as well. As I entered, the unfortunate teamster was about paying his liquid compliment to the florid Pike. Their glasses were filled. 'My respects,' said the little driver. The whiskey became lost to view, and went eroding its way through the dust these poor fellows had swallowed. He added, 'Well, Billy, you *can* swear.'

"'Swear?' repeated the Pike in a tone of incredulous questioning. 'Me swear?' as if the compliment were greater than his modest desert. 'No, I can't blaspheme worth a cuss. You'd jest orter hear Pete Green. *He can exhort the impenitent mule.*'"

It is pleasant to the Eastern man who lives in cities, who has no respectable mountains near him, and who cordially detests climbing them even when he is at their foot, to learn that the mountain-top is after all not an attractive spot even to the professional mountaineer. Persons who have, against their better judgment, been led to make one of these ascents must rejoice to hear their sensations expressed, by an authority like Mr. King, so well as they are in the following passage:—

"I always feel a strange renewal of life when I come down from one of these climbs; they are with me points of departure more marked and powerful than I can account for upon any reasonable ground. In spite of any scientific labor or presence of fatigue, the lifeless region, with its savage elements of sky, ice, and rock, grasps one's nature, and, whether one will or no, compels it into a stern, strong accord. Then, as you come again into softer air, and enter the comforting presence of trees, and feel the grass under your feet, one fetter after another seems to unbind from your soul, leaving it free, joyous, grateful!"

Mr. King has added to his mountaineering sketches a short concluding chapter on the people of California. His opinions on this subject will perhaps not be altogether gratifying to the Californians, although it is friendly enough. On one point, however, we are glad to find Mr. King express himself in terms very different from those which have been commonly used, even by Massachusetts travellers and writers

who should have known better. Of all the mischievous precedents that have ever been set in America, that of the vigilance committees was the most dangerous. Its success has done more to shake faith in the supreme necessity of law and legal measures for the redress of society than any other single experience in American history. It is gratifying to meet with a man who is bold enough to express this opinion, and in whose mouth the opinion has unusual weight: —

"The vigilants quickly put out of existence a majority of the worst desperadoes, and by their swift, merciless action struck such terror to the rest that ever after the right has mainly controlled affairs. This was *perhaps* well. With characteristic promptness they laid down their power and gave California over to the constituted authorities. This was magnificent. They deserve the commendation due success. They have, however, such a frank, honest way of singing their praise, such eternal, undisguised, and virtuous self-laudation over the whole matter, that no one else need interrupt them with fainter notes.

"Although this generation has written its indorsement in full upon the transaction, it may be doubted if History will trace an altogether favorable verdict upon her pages. Possibly to fulfil the golden round of duty, it is needful to do right in the right way, and success may not be proven the eternal test of merit.

"That the vigilance committees grasped the moral power is undeniable; that they used it for the public salvation is equally true; but the best advocates are far from showing that with skill and moderation they might not have thrown their weight into the scale *with* law, and conquered, by means of legislature, judge, and jury, a peace wholly free from the stain of lawless blood. . . . . Whether better or best the act has not left unmixed blessing."

Mr. King writes with characteristic spirit and energy, and his book will, we hope, create a wide and popular interest in the success of the great work on which he has been so long engaged.

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10. — *Recollections of Past Life.* By Sir Henry Holland, Bart. Second Edition. London: Longmans, Green, & Co. 1872. [New York: Appletons.]

Sir Henry Holland's little book has, it appears, had a success in London. The second edition lies before us, and there is every reason to suppose that it will be, if it has not already been, followed by a third. Perhaps this success is, however, primarily as much due to the unusually large circle of acquaintance which the author enjoys as to the merits of the book itself. At least we are prepared to say that the personality of the author is the most noticeable part of his work, and

that wherever he takes us — to London, Naples, Albania, Virginia, or Iceland — we are always distinctly conscious of Sir Henry's presence, and of something strongly marked in his manner of observing and reflecting; while, on the other hand, he prides himself with reason on the extraordinary number of his acquaintances in many parts of the world, so that one might risk the assertion that few or no men living could rival him in this respect. His book, therefore, as a picture of the man, if for no other reason, was sure of a wide circulation, even if it were limited to his personal friends.

It is as a picture of the man that we call attention to it, for all the critics have, we believe, agreed that the book in itself is disappointing, owing to the cautiousness of its author in refraining, not only from gossip and scandal, but from adverse criticism. Ali Pasha and Coleridge almost appear to be the only personages in regard to whom Sir Henry allows himself to indulge in something approaching fault-finding: the first having robbed him and attempted to make him an accomplice in murder; the second having committed the worse sin of talking too much, and talking German metaphysics at that. Here, therefore, are four crimes unpardonable in the eyes of the old English Court physician, and they are precisely the offences that one might have guessed in advance as likely to rouse the most vindictive feelings in the breast of the author. We say, therefore, with confidence that the book has one great charm, which consists in its exact reproduction of the entire personality of an English Court physician in the first half of this century. Sir Henry has made himself a typical man, and will figure in some historical novel, a few centuries hence, when our age has acquired that effect of romance which time always kindly gives to what is long dead and forgotten. We do not intend to describe him as he unconsciously describes himself in this book, though we refrain from doing so only because the canons of criticism have decided that such personal comments are out of place and impertinent, not because the result would be unfavorable to Sir Henry. He has, in fact, little to fear from attack. Through life he has, it is clear, carried his theories as a physician into practice as a member of society; he has observed, but not interfered with human nature; he has avoided dangers, not tempted them; followed society good-naturedly, with a smile covering a little well-concealed scepticism, but has not contradicted it; and in this way, leading a double life, half in the world of London, half in a larger world in his own mind, he has seen eighty-four years run by, and has made certain observations, of which he has collected a few of the most trifling and amused himself by giving them to society. Here is all he chooses to say. The rest,

whatever it is, remains for the benefit of that other world of his in which he alone is actor and society at once. For ourselves we confess that we should prefer to know what he has not told, rather than what he has told. We would like to see a frank revelation of the cynical or the sceptical side of this keen and watchful courtier; to obtain a little insight into his mind when it worked, if ever it does work, in undress. Sir Henry is a man of very exceptional powers; he is a physician, and physicians of his stamp are more than other men obliged to be cautious, sceptical, and self-dependent; he has known London society long and well, and London society is a marvellous field for study: but in this volume he has not thought proper to tell much more than was already known to all mankind.

But if Sir Henry is doubly bound to secrecy, as a physician and as a courtier, there are men enough in England ready to meet the difficulty by supplying a little of the smaller kind of gossip which readers miss in this volume. The old school of table-talkers has vanished even in London before a generation which detests long stories and despises a man who is in what Mr. Disraeli calls his anecdotage. Even Macaulay was, towards the end of his life, near to being considered a bore. But there is still a class of diners-out whose business it is to be witty and scandalous, and who on this understanding are received in the character of tame cats in great country-houses. Sometimes these talkers are writers also, and it is one of these, we presume, who in the last number of the "Quarterly Review" furnishes an amusing article on Sir Henry's book, which should be read by every one who has an appetite for this kind of gossip, and has been disappointed by Sir Henry's professional cautiousness.

SPECIFIC GENESIS.

[The following communication receives insertion, contrary to the ordinary rule of the North American Review, owing to the interest attached to the subject discussed. All further comment will be reserved for a subsequent number.]

The Editor of the North American Review:—

Sir, — The rapid growth of physical science, and the constant publication of ever-new observations, make such demands on the time of naturalists that an author actively engaged upon a subject covering the whole field of biology cannot be expected to reply directly to critics, unless under very exceptional circumstances.

I have to thank Mr. Chauncey Wright for having been so obliging as to devote much space, and necessarily a considerable portion of his valuable time, to an examination of my recent work, the "Genesis of Species." Nevertheless I must confess that, with all respect for his conspicuous talents and for his deserved reputation, I should not have undertaken the following few words of explanation but for his paper's wide circulation in England and elsewhere by Mr. Darwin.

Any criticism published by Mr. Darwin himself, or by Professor Huxley, I should always deem it a duty respectfully to consider and, if possible, reply to; and the very extensive circulation by Mr. Darwin of a reprint of Mr. Chauncey Wright's remarks, appears to me to amount to such an implied adoption of them, as to demand for them a consideration somewhat similar to that which I should accord them were Mr. Darwin himself their author.

Mr. Wright's criticism touches upon so many matters of detail that it is not altogether easy to ascertain his main objects. Having, however, considered his remarks with that care which my esteem for his opinions makes incumbent on me, I venture to express my belief that, neglecting minor matters, his criticism is mainly directed to the assertion of two points.

One of these is, that I have misrepresented Mr. Darwin's views, and have been guilty of involuntary injustice with respect to the natural forces which, according to our great naturalist, have determined specific forms.

The other is, that I have attributed an irreligious tendency to Mr. Darwin's writings which they do not, in fact, possess; and that this is in part owing to my defective knowledge, in part to early prejudices.

Thus Mr. Wright speaks of my "theological education" and my "schooling against Democritus." It is a matter of wonder to me who could have so misled Mr. Wright. Though reluctant, in the extreme,

to obtrude such private and personal matters before the public, I must nevertheless, in justice, observe, that my schooling has been of the very opposite character, and perfectly in unison with that which Mr. Darwin himself would favor. Only at length, and with difficulty, have I struggled out of that philosophy of "nescience," the evils and the fallacies of which are so apparent to me because, at one time, its doctrines so completely possessed my assent.

With regard to Mr. Darwin's theory of the origin of species, I should hasten eagerly to acknowledge my error if I had been guilty of injustice with respect to it, and also to thank any critic who had been so kind as to call my attention to such unintentional unfairness. I must confess, however, that I cannot detect that misrepresentation in my "Genesis of Species" which Mr. Wright seems to there discover.

In common with so many others I was, at one time, a hearty and thoroughgoing disciple of Mr. Darwin, and I accepted from him the view that Natural Selection was "*the* origin of species." It was only by degrees, and through the evidence of a multitude of biological facts, that an opposite conclusion was gradually forced upon me. Having come to that conclusion, on scientific grounds only, after careful reconsideration of those grounds and much discussion of the subject, I ventured to publish my "Genesis of Species." Therein I endeavored to bring before the public the leading facts which had produced the conviction in my own mind that Natural Selection was *not* the origin of species, *not* the main determining agent in the fixation of specific characters; although I allowed that it played, and necessarily must play a certain subordinate part.

This conviction had forced itself on many minds before the publication of my book, and since then has approved itself to the minds of many more. Indeed, Mr. Darwin himself seems to have come round substantially, though not avowedly, to the same opinion, and has, in his "Descent of Man," implicitly admitted, though he has not yet explicitly declared, that Natural Selection is *not* the origin of species. I cannot but confess that it appears to me even Mr. Chauncey Wright himself concedes all that for which I contend, though he at the same time seems to imagine that he asserts the validity of Mr. Darwin's original position.

No one could be less disposed than I am to detract from the great merit unquestionably due to Mr. Darwin, or to ignore the vast impetus which his views have given to the wide reception of the doctrine of evolution. Nevertheless, we must not allow our just admiration for the zeal, genius, and courage of Mr. Darwin to blind our eyes to two facts. One of these is that an important part of Mr. Darwin's theory was not new,

but, on the contrary, very old. The other is, that though the *popular* acceptance of evolution has been brought about through him, yet that the minds of *scientific* men were well prepared for, and disposed towards, evolution years before the appearance of "The Origin of Species."

Biological facts, by their gradual accumulation, had long been predisposing scientific minds to the acceptance of this theory. I myself, indeed, fully accepted it, and I found that a similar acceptance existed in the minds of others, notably in that of Professor Owen. Mr. Wright, therefore, is certainly correct, in this sense, when he says that "it is not to what is now known as 'Darwinism' that the prevalence of the doctrine of evolution is to be attributed or indirectly assigned." The part of Mr. Darwin's theory which is old is that which attributes so much importance to the destructive powers of nature, a view advocated by Lucretius and treated of by Aristotle in the passage quoted in my book.

What, however, was unquestionably Mr. Darwin's own, was the remarkable conception that this exterminating power, acting upon organisms presenting slight variations, so overbore all other influences as to occasion the survival of the fittest variations, and in this way (by a process of cutting off and limiting) fixed the characters of the different organic species, thus becoming their origin. *The* origin, not, of course, of the slight variations, but of the fixing of these in definite lines and grooves.

Gradually, however, the arguments of opponents have forced upon Mr. Darwin's active and candid mind modifications of his views, till, as I have said, he has come to admit in principle that Natural Selection is not *the* origin of species. I cannot myself see that there is, in this change of view, anything at all derogatory to Mr. Darwin; and for my part, my esteem for that illustrious naturalist is strengthened rather than weakened when I read candid admissions of antecedent error. These admissions should not be brought forward, save when an unscientific appeal is made to his *authority*, or when an advocate more zealous than judicious attempts to deny that Mr. Darwin's opinions have undergone any grave modifications. Then indeed truth and justice demand the production of such admissions. They do so since the assignment of the law of Natural Selection to a *subordinate* place is *manifestly* an abandonment of the Darwinian theory as originally proposed; for how can that be said to be *the origin* of species which only co-operates, in an inferior and comparatively uninfluential manner, in determining that origin?

Mr. Chauncey Wright's remarks seem to me, then, to render necessary a reference to these earlier statements of Mr. Darwin. A num-

ber of such statements * and admissions of our great naturalist — not, indeed, his earliest, but from the *third* edition of "The Origin of Species" — were recently brought forward in the July number of the "Quarterly Review." They appear to have been published for the purpose of guarding the public from a hasty acceptance of Mr. Darwin's dogmatic expressions, merely in deference to his *authority*, and without a careful estimate of the value of the facts brought forward by him.

The passages referred to seem to me to contain statements amply sufficient to repel Mr. Wright's charge against me of injustice to Mr. Darwin, and to show, on the one hand, that the original theory of the origin of species was such as I have represented it to have been; and, on the other, that Mr. Darwin has, in fact, abandoned the position which he originally took up.

From the passages referred to we may learn that Mr. Darwin, even so lately as in his third edition of the Origin, considered that Natural Selection acts only by numerous slight modifications of special use to the organisms possessing them. In fact, that he completely stakes the whole of his theory on the non-existence or non-action of causes of any moment other than Natural Selection; it being the essence of that theory to recognize only the conservation of slight variations directly beneficial to the creature which possesses them, by affording it better means either of obtaining nourishment or of eluding or outstripping its enemies or of reproducing its kind.

From "The Descent of Man," however, we find that Mr. Darwin now recognizes and admits that he had "probably attributed too much to the action of Natural Selection," and that he "had not formerly sufficiently considered the existence of many structures which appear to be, as far as we can judge, neither beneficial nor injurious." He also acknowledges that he has been too hasty in ascribing the development of certain structures, such as *Mammæ erraticæ*, to reversion, adding that "the force of the argument is greatly weakened, or, perhaps, quite destroyed." More remarkable still we have the noteworthy confession, "I have fallen into a serious and unfortunate error, in relation to the sexual differences of animals, in attempting to explain what seemed to me a singular coincidence in the late period of life at which the necessary variations have arisen in many causes, and the late period at which sexual selection acts. The explanation given is *wholly erroneous*, as I have discovered by working out an illustration in figures."

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* These are to be found in "The Origin of Species," 3d edition, pp. 208, 214, 220, 223; 5th edition, p. 104. "The Descent of Man," Vol. I. pp. 125, 152, 154, 223; Vol. II. pp. 176, 198, 387, and the postscript at the beginning of the volume. "Animals and Plants under Domestication," Vol. II. p. 57.

Mr. Darwin is most justly entitled to all honor and esteem for his candor in making these admissions; but we must not allow such feelings to blind us to the importance of the admissions themselves.

We have, however, yet more explicit declarations as to the occurrence of characters for which not only his theory will not account, but which, in his own words, annihilate his theory. He has told us in "The Origin of Species" that this fatal consequence would ensue from the discovery of characters not produced by slight *beneficial* modifications, and yet we now read: —

"No doubt man, as well as every other animal, presents structures which, as far as we can judge with our little knowledge, are not now of any service to him, nor have been so during any former period of his existence, either in relation to his general conditions of life, or of one sex to the other. Such structures cannot be accounted for by any form of selection, or by the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts."

Besides all this, in the fifth edition of "The Origin of Species," p. 104, we find the following significant passage: —

"Until reading an able and valuable article in the 'North British Review' (1867), I did not appreciate how rarely simple variations, whether slightly or strongly marked, could be perpetuated."

Finally, Mr. Darwin recognizes that he was formerly "inclined to lay too much stress on the principle of protection, as accounting for the less bright colors of female birds," and speaks now as if what he at one time favored in this respect was quite an unlikely matter, saying: —

"Is it probable that the head of the female chaffinch, the crimson on the breast of the female bullfinch, the green of the female chaffinch, the crest of the female golden-crested wren, have all been rendered less bright by the slow process of selection for the sake of protection? *I cannot think so.*"

I *also* cannot think so, nor can I so think with regard to those numerous instances brought forward in my book as examples of characters for the origin and development of which Natural Selection will not, I believe, account.

Every respect and deference ought to be shown to a naturalist such as Mr. Darwin, but deference has its limits and must not be exercised to the sacrifice of truth, and truth compels the recognition of the important modifications above noticed. It is not only, however, critics that dissent from Mr. Darwin's views who recognize the existence of these changes. Mr. Darwin's authorized interpreter, Professor Huxley, has lately told us the highly significant fact that Mr. Darwin is even inclined to reply in the affirmative to the question whether a variety

"can be perpetuated, or even *intensified*, when selective conditions are indifferent, or perhaps *unfavorable* to its *existence*." A more complete repudiation in principle of the origin of species by Natural Selection it would be difficult if not impossible to imagine.

Mr. Darwin has not, however, so far as I know, explicitly declared what Professor Huxley tells us he is inclined to admit. He has certainly made many important and significant admissions, but there is one more which consistency seems to demand as the logical outcome of others above cited: I mean the admission that the attribution to Natural Selection of the main determining office in the fixation of specific characters has also been "a serious error," whether it be not rather a fortunate than an "unfortunate" one.

Mr. Wright challenges the production of a sudden adaptive modification of a race, wild or domesticated, "not referable by known physiological laws to the past history of the race on the theory of evolution." In this statement I must in the first place object to the introduction of the words "on the theory of evolution," as that theory, far from being opposed, is, on the contrary, adopted and contended for by me, and I do not understand how Mr. Wright can have inserted them unless by inadvertence. Instances, however, of modifications, the production of which he desiderates, can readily be supplied. Thus the Cashmere sheep, when transferred to Europe, lost their long wool in a few generations, and this could not possibly have been due to Natural Selection. Again, the marine animals now living in Swedish lakes have become remarkably transformed, and the instance noticed by Mr. Darwin as to the Mediterranean oyster, though not evidently adaptive, is probably so, and if so would be in point. There was, however, no need to bring such cases forward, for surely it was fair to take Mr. Darwin's own estimate of what facts *he* would consider fatal, and such facts I claim to have brought forward, in sufficient number, in my book. I can only express my profound regret that I should be so unfortunate as to seem to Mr. Chauncey Wright to have made an "unfathomable translation" of the theory of Natural Selection. Mr. Darwin nowhere himself says, with Mr. Wright, that the "slightness" of the variations he speaks of "is only relative to the differences between the characters of the species"; and I cannot but think Mr. Wright himself misconceives Mr. Darwin's meaning, for I believe the latter gentleman would not speak of the sudden development of a large proboscis, like that of *Semnopithecus nasalis*, as a "slight" variation.

An admission which Mr. Darwin makes, and which I considered and consider to be important, is sought to be explained away by Mr. Chauncey Wright in a mode I cannot think admissible. He tells us

that when Mr. Darwin says that the goose "seems to have a singularly *inflexible* organization," Mr. Darwin's "*obvious* meaning" is, "that the goose *has been much less changed by domestication* than other domestic birds." Certainly if Mr. Darwin had meant this, he would not have used the word "inflexible," but "unmodified," "inflexed," or some equivalent expression. To have a "singularly inflexible organization" is to have one which *cannot* without great difficulty be modified, not one which, as a fact, *has* not been modified.

Similarly where Mr. Darwin speaks of "a whole organism having become plastic and *tending* to depart from the parental type," Mr. Wright asserts that Mr. Darwin means "capable of being moulded, or fashioned to the purpose, as clay." This is to credit Mr. Darwin with the enunciation of a truism which I am sure he would never have written. The words "tends to depart"* are plainly a repetition and explanation of the epithet "plastic," and fix its meaning. Mr. Darwin here evidently predicates an existing predisposition, and not a mere state of indifference. By "*tends* to depart" he cannot mean "capable of being made to depart," for that would not indicate any influence which has affected the "whole organization," as by his hypothesis every organism is "capable" of being modified.

I will now turn to the second matter of argument, that in which Mr. Chauncey Wright treats of the alleged possibly irreligious tendencies of Mr. Darwin's theory, and of my incompetency in physics and ignorance of the experimental philosophy.

He says: —

"Mr. Mivart has made the mistake, which nullifies nearly the whole of his criticism, of supposing that 'the theory of Natural Selection may (though it need not) be taken in such a way as to lead men to regard the present organic world as formed, so to speak, *accidentally*, beautiful and wonderful as is confessedly the haphazard result.' (p. 33.) Mr. Mivart, like many another writer, seems to forget the age of the world in which he lives and for which he writes, — the age of 'experimental philosophy,' the very stand-point of which, its fundamental assumption, is the universality of physical causation. This is so familiar to minds bred in physical studies, that they rarely imagine that they may be mistaken for disciples of Democritus, or for believers in 'the fortuitous concourse of atoms,' in the sense, at least, which theology has attached to the phrase."

I feel a little difficulty in replying to this criticism, because I cannot bring myself to attribute to Mr. Wright such a misapprehension either

* The omission of the words "in a slight degree" in my book was purely accidental. As, however, the question is one of *principle*, I do not see that the omission was of any importance.

of my meaning or of that of the school of Democritus as seems necessary to explain it.

I would willingly suppose that an obscurity of expression on my part is alone to blame, but in using the word "accidentally" I qualified it by the prefix "so to speak." But even had I not done so, I could not have imagined that any one would think me unaware that the various phenomena which we observe in nature have their respective phenomenal antecedents. It is extremely difficult to me to think that Mr. Wright can suppose I held the opinion that the phenomena of variation, etc. are not determined by definite physical antecedents. Yet, if he does not so suppose, how can he assert that when I use the expression "accidentally" I mean anything antagonistic to physical causation?

On the other hand, Mr. Wright cannot suppose that the old atheistic philosophy held events to be accidental in the strict sense, for he knows very well that Democritus and Empedocles and their school no more held phenomena to be undetermined or unpreceded by other phenomena than do their successors at the present day.

My meaning, which I rashly imagined plain enough, was that Mr. Darwin's theory might be so taken as to oppose the conception of *design* in the same way as the old Ionian theory opposed that conception. That I was fully justified in expressing such an opinion is, I conceive, plain, from the language employed by Mr. Darwin himself. In his work on Animals and Plants under Domestication, Mr. Darwin considers the building of an edifice from broken fragments of rock, and makes use even of strong expressions of the kind referred to. He says: —

"In regard to the use to which the fragments may be put, their shape may STRICTLY be said to be *accidental*. . . . . If the various laws which have determined the shape of each fragment were not predetermined for the builder's sake, can it with any greater probability be maintained that He specially ordained, for the sake of the breeder, each of the innumerable variations in our domestic animals and plants. . . . . But, if we give up the principle in one case, — if we do not admit that the variations of the primeval dog were intentionally guided, in order that the greyhound, for instance, that perfect image of symmetry and vigor, might be formed — no shadow of reason can be assigned for the belief that the variations, alike in nature, and the result of the same general laws, which have been the groundwork through Natural Selection of the formation of the most perfectly adapted animals in the world, MAN INCLUDED, were intentionally and specially guided. However much we may wish it, *we can hardly follow* Professor Asa Gray in his belief that 'variation has been led along certain beneficial lines,' like a stream 'along definite and useful lines of irrigation.'"

Not only then may the organic world, on the Darwinian theory, be conceived as formed in some sense *accidentally*, but we have Mr. Darwin's own words for viewing that formation as "STRICTLY ACCIDENTAL." I say "his *words*," because I am far from desiring to find Mr. Darwin in anti-teleological fetters. I have carefully given him credit for every theistic expression I noticed, as it was at once my duty and my pleasure to do.

Here I take the opportunity of acknowledging, as I have also done in my second edition, that an American naturalist — Professor Theophilus Parsons, of Harvard University — put forth, more than ten years ago, views* very similar to those I enunciated in my "Genesis of Species," though they were of course unknown to me when I published my first edition. Mr. Wright, however, is mistaken when he states that I am "indebted to Mr. Galton" for my conception of specific genesis, although I made use, with due acknowledgment, of that gentleman's illustration of a conception analogous to mine.

Mr. Wright has been so unfortunate as to misapprehend Mr. Murphy also. Speaking of spheres and crystals, that gentleman is quoted as saying: —

"Attraction, whether gravitative or capillary, produces the spherical form; the spherical form does not produce attraction."

Upon this Mr. Wright remarks: —

"No abstraction ever produced any other abstraction, much less a concrete thing. The abstract laws of attraction never produced any body, spherical or polyhedral."

But really not only has Mr. Murphy not said *they did*, but his very expression Mr. Wright will, I am sure, regret to see, has been changed by my critic; and the result is, that Mr. Murphy is unlucky enough to be blamed for what he never said, or apparently thought of saying. This is all the more hard because Mr. Wright goes on to observe, "it was actual forces acting in definite ways that made the sphere or crystal," which is precisely what Mr. Murphy himself said.

Mr. Wright goes on to make a statement which I confess is utterly beyond me. He says: —

"Moreover, in the case of crystals, neither these forces nor the abstract law of their action in producing definite crystals reside in the finished bodies, but in the properties of the surrounding media, portions of whose constituents are changed into crystals, according to these properties and to other conditioning circumstances."

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* See the July number of the "American Journal of Science and Art" for 1860.

If this is so, then when a broken crystal completes itself, the determining forces reside exclusively in the media, and not at all in the crystal with its broken surface! The first atoms of a crystal deposited arrange themselves entirely according to the forces of the surrounding media, and their own properties are utterly without influence or effect in the result!

To my mind, I confess, it would appear manifest that those marvellously delicate and complex ice mosses, which at this season occasionally fringe our walls and palings, are not due to forces residing in the atmosphere *only*, but also in the crystalline particles already deposited and in course of deposition.

Professor Tyndal's teaching differs widely from that of Mr. Chauncey Wright. Speaking of the formation of pyramidal crystals of salt, he says: —

"The scientific idea is that the *molecules* act upon *each other*, ... that they attract each other and repel each other at certain definite points or poles, and in certain definite directions, and that the pyramidal form is the result of this play of attraction and repulsion." *

Mr. Wright seeks to refute the parallelism asserted by Mr. Murphy and by me to exist between crystals and organisms, saying: —

"In organisms, no doubt, and as we may be readily convinced without resort to analogy, there is a great deal that is really innate, or dependent on actions in the organism, which diversities of external conditions modify very little, or affect at least in a very indeterminate manner, so far as observation has yet ascertained."

Here Mr. Murphy and I are fortunately at liberty to invoke in our favor the authority, once more, of Professor Tyndal, who can hardly be deemed even by Mr. Chauncey Wright as incompetent in "experimental philosophy," or as likely to forget "the age of the world in which he lives." In the little work already quoted † he tells us: —

"This tendency on the part of matter to organize itself, to grow into shape, to assume definite forms in obedience to the definite action of force, is, as I have said, all-pervading. It is in the ground on which you tread, in the water you drink, in the air you breathe. Incipient life, as it were, manifests itself throughout the whole of what we call organic nature."

Speaking of a living grain of corn and comparing it with a crystal, he tells us we are bound "to conclude that the molecules of the corn

* Essays on the Use and Limit of the Imagination in Science, 2d edition, 1871, p. 57.

† Ibid., p. 58.

are self-posited by the forces with which they act upon each other. It would be *poor philosophy* to invoke an external agent in the one case and to *reject* it in the other."

Mr. Wright, however, as I have shown, invokes what is innate in the case of organisms and rejects it in the case of crystals, and asserts that in organisms what is innate is so predominant in its action that external conditions "*modify*" them "*very little.*"

Passing over how important an admission this is against any effective action of Natural Selection, let us see how it tells against the analogy maintained.

Is not the innate force, as existing in each organism, that which has been educed by antecedent combinations and conditions, just as much and no more external to it than are the forces of the medium to each atom of a crystal? And how does this tell in the least against the analogy which has been asserted, and which really does exist between each chemical unit and each organic unit? Not of course that it is for a moment contended that there is not, as common observation tells us there is, a distinct power and principle, "vitality," in the one which is wanting in the other, as well as more or less complexity of organization.

Again we are told, as to organisms, "external conditions are, nevertheless, essential factors in development, as well as in mere increase of growth. No animal or plant is developed, nor do its developments acquire any growth, without very special external conditions." Surely, I hardly needed to be solemnly informed of so very elementary a truth.

Regarding the rules of the "inductive philosophy," Mr. Wright remarks: —

> "A stricter observance of these by Mr. Murphy and our author might have saved them from the mistake we have noticed, and from many others, — the 'realism' of ascribing efficacy to an abstraction, making attraction and polarity produce structures and forms, independently of the products and of the concrete matters and forces in them."

In whom, or in what? and what are attraction and polarity if they be not forces? Who ever considered them as acting independently of themselves? Would Mr. Wright prefer that the earth's orbit should be spoken of not as the resultant of gravity and centrifugal force, but as produced by "coming together" and "flying away"? I have, of course, no objection to that mode of expression, but I see no special advantage in it warranting such a departure from usage. It is singular that Mr. Wright himself, on the next page, employs the very "abstractions" he blames others for making use of. He there quotes approvingly the expressions "impenetrability," "mobility," and "im-

pulsive force of bodies," and says "that gravity does really exist and act according to" its laws. It is difficult to see the greater sin in speaking of the "real existence" of polarity than of "gravity." Not only, however, does Mr. Wright quote such expressions, but he uses them himself with the greatest freedom, and without scruple, whenever they suit his purpose. Thus he tells us "that *variability* and *selection* do really exist and *act*," which appear to me quite as much abstractions as polarity or attraction.

Mr. Wright divides "intellectual genius" into three classes: No. 1, "that which pursues successfully the researches for unknown causes by the skilful use of hypothesis and experiment"; No. 2, "that which, avoiding the use of hypotheses and preconceptions altogether, and the delusive influence of names, brings together in clear connections and contrasts in classification the objects of nature in their broadest and realest relations of resemblance"; and No. 3, "that which seeks with success for reasons and authorities in support of cherished convictions."

I might remark on the purely arbitrary character of this classification. But letting this pass, it must be said that class No. 1 is but a poor monster without No. 2; and that No. 1 is frequently, consciously or unconsciously, also No. 3; nor would it be difficult to bring forward an example.

A more real distinction is that to be drawn between the "scientific" and the "philosophical" habits of mind, and under these two great genera come subordinate distinctions of different degrees of importance. Now, a naturalist may attain great scientific eminence without being anything of a philosopher, and, similarly, a philosopher need have little acquaintance with physical science; but from the nature of their respective pursuits a different character of mind tends to be developed. It is from this distinction that we find (as we might *a priori* expect to be the case) such breadth of view, freedom of handling, and flexibility of mind on the part of philosophers who are not naturalists as compared with men great in physical science, who are not at the same time philosophers; a certain rigidity and narrowness seeming to result from the exercise of the mind merely in the arena of physics.

Passing to details of criticism, Mr. Wright proceeds to consider the question of the giraffe's neck, and I am asked a rather startling question: "Can Mr. Mivart suppose that, having fairly called in question the importance of the high-feeding use of the giraffe's neck, he has thereby *destroyed the utility of the neck altogether*, not only to the theory of Natural Selection, but also *to the animal itself?*" At the first glance this looks as if I had brought myself within the grasp of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. But I may, perhaps, be per-

mitted to ask, in return, can Mr. Wright suppose that I ever dreamed that the structures of animals are not useful to them, or that my position is an altogether anti-teleological one? Apparently possessed with some such idea, Mr. Wright proceeds to exhibit the giraffe's neck in the character of a "watch-tower." But this leaves the question just where it was before. Of course I concede most readily and fully that it *is* a most admirable watch-tower, as it also *is* a most admirable high-reaching organ, but this tells us nothing of its *origin*. In both cases the long neck is most useful *when you have got it;* but the question is how it *arose*, and in this species *alone*. And similar and as convincing arguments could be brought against the watch-tower theory of origin as against the high-reaching theory, and not only this, but also against every other theory which could possibly be adduced.

In reply to my objection as to different rate of increase of strength and mass, as the animal increases in size by the supposed transformation, Mr. Wright remarks, that "the neck may have grown at the expense of the hind parts in the ancestors of the giraffe"; and adds, "if we met with a man with a longer neck than usual, we should not expect to find him heavier, or relatively weaker, or requiring more food on that account." I reply, that if we should not do so it would only be from ignorance; for if, *ceteris paribus*, a man's neck was a quarter of an inch longer, he would *necessarily* and *inevitably* be heavier, less strong, and requiring more food, minute though the differences in these respects might be.

In considering criticisms on Mr. Darwin's theory drawn from animal structures, we must not forget how very great an advantage Mr. Darwin has. He has devised a theory according to which any possible utility of any organ is enough to account for its formation. It is amazing, then, that anything whatever should be found for which his theory does not readily account. Much wonder and admiration with regard to that theory has been expressed, because of the way it accounts for so many phenomena, forgetting that this is the necessary consequence of the stand-point he has taken up. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that the theory is utterly wrong; yet, let but the world be preponderatingly governed by intelligence and beneficence, then the results of that very intelligence and beneficence exhibited in organisms can be made use of to destroy the conception of those qualities in their supreme cause, and to substantiate a theory which, by our supposition, is utterly devoid of truth. It is on this account that Natural Selection can never be completely proved or disproved by physical science in *a posteriori* investigation; for it will be always open to one side to say, the utility not yet shown in any given structure will be shown later, and to the other

side to say, whatever utility you show, though existing in an organ, was not the cause of that organ.

This was no doubt felt by the earlier opponents of Mr. Darwin, who naturally opposed him on *a priori* grounds, and the same feeling has led his supporters to desiderate criticism from the physical-science standpoint, which can never be *quite* conclusive, and can only be approximatively so by going into great detail. And this, when done, they in turn affect to sneer at as "*minute*."

Mr. Chauncey Wright's remarks on mimicry do not call for reply, as it is now conceded that imitation occurs where Natural Selection cannot have developed it. In reply to my criticism as to the origin of the mammary gland, my opponent suggests that its development may have been produced by a young mammal's clinging by suction to the body of its dam, this clinging causing sebaceous glands to be hypertrophied, and this hypertrophy causing their secretion *to become nutritious*. I confess this seems to me an extreme supposition.

With regard to sexual selection, Mr. Chauncey Wright asks, "Is it credible Mr. Mivart can suppose that the higher or spiritual emotions, like affection, taste, conscience, ever act *directly* to modify or compete with the more energetic lower impulses, and not rather by forestalling and indirectly regulating them?" I answer, unhesitatingly, "Yes"; and in return say, "Is it credible Mr. Chauncey Wright can suppose they do not?"

As to apes, it is enough to reply, that other animals are also kept in cages, but do not exhibit the phenomena to which I referred.

Passing to the hoods and rattles of poisonous snakes, Mr. Wright asserts that if "their 'warnings' are also used against intended victims, they can only be used either to paralyze them with terror or allure them from curiosity," etc. Has Mr. Wright then never observed the tail of a cat when the animal is watching a mouse?

A somewhat singular exhibition of the use of the imagination occurs where Mr. Wright tells us it may be that "the rattle will serve all the purposes that drums, trumpets, and gongs do in human warfare. The swaying body and vibrating tongue of most snakes, and the expanding neck, and the hood of the cobra, may *serve as banners*." I must submit to be blamed for my "poverty of resources" by one whose "reason" is supplemented by so active an imaginative faculty.

In reviewing my chapter on Independent Similarities of Structure, Mr. Wright replies to my remarks as to characters in placental and implacental mammals which are similar, indeed, but not similar through inheritance:—

"Our author . . . . has incautiously left a hostile force in his rear. He has

claimed in the preceding chapter for Natural Selection that it ought to have produced several independent races of long-necked Ungulates, as well as the giraffe; so that, instead of pursuing his illustrations any further, we may properly demand his surrender."

But such a demand would be futile; the cases, in fact, being quite dissimilar. With regard to the Ungulates we have the action of similar causes upon organisms which, by the hypothesis, are closely alike; in the case of the carnivorous and insectivorous beasts we have similar causes acting upon organisms which, by the hypothesis, are fundamentally different.

Certainly, then, if Mr. Darwin's theory is true, we ought to have, in the first case, many similar forms developed; and we ought *not* to have such in the second case. It is just the difference between adding equals to equals and equals to unequals.

Passing over Mr. Chauncey Wright's exposition* of our Lord's discourse to Nicodemus (in which, I fear, few Darwinians will take any interest), I proceed to notice what Mr. Wright exhibits as "a good illustration" of the origin of species by Natural Selection in the shape of "the growth of a tree." It is so, he tells us:—

"For its branches are selected growths, or few out of many thousands that have begun in buds; and this rigorous selection has been effected by the accidents that have determined superior relations in surviving growths to their supplies of nutriment in the trunk, and in exposure to light and air. This exposure (as great as is consistent with secure connection with the sources of sap) seems actually to be sought, and the form of the tree to be the result of some foresight in it. But the real seeking process is budding, and the geometrical regularity of the production of buds on twigs has little or nothing to do with the ultimate selected results, the distributions of the branches, which are different for each individual tree."

Now, I willingly accept this illustration, which I propose to turn round and make use of against its author's view, and for the purpose of showing that it exemplifies, not "the origin of species by Natural Selection," but the origin of species by *innate* law, modified by the subordinate action of Natural Selection.

For, in fact, does not every one know that, in spite of these external influences, each kind of tree has a certain general character of growth which is definite and unmistakable. The oak, the fir, the birch, etc., each has its own special *facies*. Mr. Wright does not deny this; he says:—

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* Mr. Wright speaks of "the symbols *water* and the Spirit, which Christians have ever since worshipped." It is certainly difficult to remember the multitude of sects which have appeared since the dawn of Christianity, but the existence of any body of *water-worshippers* strikes me as a novelty.

"The general resemblance of trees of a given kind depends on no formative principle other than physical and physiological properties in the woody tissue, and is related chiefly to the tenacity, flexibility, and vascularity of this tissue, the degrees of which might almost be inferred from the general form of the tree."

Precisely so. But on what do these physical and physiological properties depend? It is useless to endeavor to avoid the admission; we shall always be compelled by reason to confess the existence, in each seed, of a principle, an *intimius principium* conditioning the evolution of the plant according to its nature and laws. To deny that there is a something giving unity to the composite whole, and unity of *a definite kind*, is to contradict the plain evidence of our senses and our reason.

This internal principle it is which produces the character of each tree's growth, while the special details are determined by the action of external influences upon it. Just in the same way, I believe, that an innate predisposing cause produces the evolution of new species; the special details being determined by subordinate agencies, and amongst them that of Natural Selection. Mr. Wright's illustration suits me so well I will pursue it yet further. He observes: —

"If we could study the past and present forms of life, not only in different continents, which we may compare to different individual trees of the same kind, or better, perhaps, to different main branches from the same trunk and roots, but could also study the past and present forms of life in different planets, then diversities in the general outlines would probably be seen similar to those which distinguish different kinds of trees, as the oak, the elm, and the pine; dependent, as in these trees, on differences in the physical and physiological properties of living matters in the different planets, — supposing the planets, of course, to be capable of sustaining life, like the earth, or, at least, to have been so at some period in the history of the solar system."

Precisely so once more! In each case forms would be evolved in accordance with that innate potentiality which God has implanted in each case in the matter of which such planet was composed. Not that there, any more than here, all that was potential would become actual, but that the innate potentiality, modified by external influences would be determined in special forms in the production of which the innate power, not the external conditions, would be the main evolving agent.

Mr. Wright seems to consider that the use of such words as "polarity" and "luminosity" tends to discourage the investigation of the laws and conditions by and through which such properties are manifested. Mr. Wright tells us, somewhat dogmatically, that "*definite* vital aggregations and *definite* actions of vital forces exist, for the most part,

in a world by themselves." I should be the last to deny the distinctness of "vitality"; but that certain conditions may determine its sudden and *definite* manifestation, is maintained more strongly than ever by Dr. Bastian, who is industriously pursuing his original inquiries. There is one expression of Mr. Wright's which it will be well to notice; he says: "It is not impossible that vital phenomena themselves include *orders of forces* as distinct as the lowest vital are from chemical phenomena. May not the contrast of merely vital or vegetative phenomena with those of *sensibility* be of such order." I notice with pleasure this hopeful expression. It is most true that there are these differences of order, but there is one more yet. The *intellectual* or rational order is as distinct from the merely sensible as is the sensible from the vegetative, or this last from the chemical. Here we touch the one great and fatal error of so many of our leading naturalists. The confusion of intellect with sensation, of reason with the association of sensible images is, I am persuaded, the fundamental speculative vice of the day. Before concluding this reply there are a few more objections which Mr. Wright does me the honor to make, that must be noticed one after the other.

I am represented as passing an unfair judgment because I say that, though feeling myself incompetent to advance an opinion as to the correctness of Sir William Thompson's astronomical calculations, I yet assert "that the fact that they have not been refuted pleads strongly in their favor, when we consider how much they tell against the theory of Mr. Darwin." For my part I am unable to see how an incompetence for judging astronomical calculations necessarily carries with it an incompetence for judging of the probability of their truth, resulting from their non-refutation by those whose interest would lead them to refute, and who possess the knowledge and ability to enable them ably to handle the requisite questions and calculations.

Again, Mr. Wright does not "see how, with such uncertain, 'fortuitous, occasional, and intermitting' elements" I "could have succeeded in making any calculations at all." I venture to think, however, that an inability to determine the positive time required for the occurrence of certain phenomena in no way involves an inability to fix a minimum period for their development.

Again, in criticising the use of the words "contrivance" and "purpose," Mr. Wright tells us, "the relations of a machine to its uses may be considered in good sound English as contrivances and purposes without thinking of what the inventor *intended*." Now I deny that we can so speak without *implicit* reference of the kind, though we need not make direct or explicit reference. We are also told that

"the proper meaning of the word 'intention'" is "*concentration*, and the *not* intending of something else." I should be glad of some reference to authorities as regards this assertion. As a fact the word is used in the sense I have assigned to it. Finally Mr. Wright gives us the application of these new definitions. He affirms that Mr. Darwin is not irrational in asking whether "the Creator intentionally ordered" certain phenomena, because we cannot reasonably make use of the term "intention" in reference to the Creator *at all*.

It is evident, however, that in Mr. Darwin's opinion we *can* speak of Divine intention in some things, otherwise he would not ask whether we could do so or not even in these. It would be quite superfluous for any one who believed we could do so in *no* case to ask the question with regard to certain special cases. The criticism merely amounts to saying that both Mr. Darwin and I, instead of using the word "intention," should employ some other, possibly "advertence." This leaves the substance of my remarks and my criticism of Mr. Darwin quite unimpaired and in full force.

Thus I venture to urge, in opposition to my critic, that far from misinterpreting Mr. Darwin, I have been enabled to bring out more clearly what are his exact position and teaching now, by defining more exactly what was his original theory of the origin of species.

Also, that though by no means necessarily involving irreligious or anti-teleological conceptions, there is no slight danger of the strengthening of these errors by a certain use of the Darwinian theory.

My little book was directed to two objects, — one to show that Natural Selection is not *the* origin of species; the other, that evolution is perfectly compatible with the strictest Christian orthodoxy: and, in spite of my esteem for Mr. Chauncey Wright, and a careful and respectful consideration of all that he has urged, I cannot at present see my way to retracting or even modifying, in deference to his criticism, even a single passage of my work on "Specific Genesis."

I have the honor to be, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

7 North Bank, Regent's Park,
London, December 21, 1871.

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